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This thesis shows that for much of the inter-war period the Labour Party in the Black Country 
developed in a pattern, which was distinct within the West Midlands. Whilst Birmingham could claim 
to remain as the stronghold of Unionism during this period, the Black Country came close at times to 
becoming a ̀ Labour Heartland'. This makes it impossible to generalise about the strength of Unionism 
in the West Midlands during the inter-war years. 
Even before 1914 Joseph Chamberlain's Unionism with its call for protective tariffs, coupled with 
social reforms, had had less of an impact on the working-class vote in the Black Country than in 
Birmingham. Nevertheless, the Labour Party had been slow to grow in the Black Country in pre-war 
years, suffering from similar constraints on its development as in other working-class regions. These 
were, in particular, the limited expansion of the trade union movement and the restrictive nature of the 
pre-war franchise. 
The situation altered rapidly in the post-war years with the Labour Party returning four MPs from the 
ten Black Country constituencies in the 1918 General Election. This was a relatively greater success 
than in most similar working-class regions across the country. During the early 1920s the party built 
steadily on this initial success, winning more parliamentary seats, although relatively fewer on 
municipal councils. This was mainly because these elections were still fought on a restricted franchise. 
Expansion was even swifter in the second half of the decade, culminating in Labour's success in the 
1929 General Election, when the Black Country returned nine Labour MPs. This achievement proved 
short-lived, however, as the region's nine Labour MPs were defeated in the 1931 General Election. The 
party's share of the total vote, however, dropped less here than nationally, despite the added problem of 
the defection of three of the region's Labour MPs. Nevertheless the party recovered only modestly 
during the 1930s, which ended with the Black Country having fewer MPs than in 1918. In this respect 
at least Labour reflected the position in Birmingham at this time, where, apart from the 1929 General 
Election, the city almost continually returned Unionist candidates. 
Labour's initial success in the Black Country came with the removal of the constraints on its 
development. This came with the reform of the parliamentary franchise in 1918, but more especially 
with the growth of trade unionism in the region during the war. This further weakened the bonds 
between employers and their workforce, which had traditionally characterised the workshop economy 
of Birmingham and extended into parts of the Black Country. The fact that Labour was slow to build 
on this initial post-war success was mainly a consequence of the industrial depression, which affected 
the Black Country particularly badly in the early 1920s. Falling union membership and funds affected 
local parties, which were very dependent on the trade union levy. This situation was made much worse 
by the 1927 Trade Union Act, which further hit trade union subscriptions to the Labour Party. Where 
the evidence is available it also seems that internal feuds and disputes frequently affected local parties. 
Labour's success in 1929 was influenced by such local factors as an improving economy and better 
party organisation with many constituencies showing an increase in activities and in the number of 
individual members. The impact of personalities such as the recently elected Oswald Mosley should 
not be exaggerated. Support for Labour mirrored the parochial character of many parts of the region, 
where most of the electorate still lived in close-knit working-class communities. This may account for 
the low swing against the party in the 1931 General Election, which followed soon after the fall of the 
Labour Government. 
Labour's modest performances during the 1930s were only partly a consequence of the events of 
1931, which, nevertheless, had a significant impact on local party morale and organisation. The region 
was also experiencing an economic recovery, which characterised much of the West Midlands during 
this decade. Credit for this though went to the National Government, which also offered populist 
policies on tariffs and social reform. It meant that although support for Labour remained fairly solid 
throughout the period, the region could return only three MPs in 1935. This meant that by the end of 
this decade it would not be possible to describe the Black Country as a 'Labour heartland'. 
7 
INTRODUCTION 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERIOD AND THE REGION 
The period from 1918-1939 should have been a time of great opportunity for the Labour Party. 
These were the years when Britain first experienced mass democracy, following the threefold increase 
in the electorate with the passage of the 1918 Representation of the People Act. (1) The country was 
also recovering from the effects of the First World War, which had hastened the pace of change in 
many areas, much to the benefit of Labour. At home, for instance, the trade union movement had 
emerged with even greater strength, which caused the wartime governments to consult it with growing 
frequency. (2) The war, itself, had been waged with an element of state collectivism, which many 
thought could now be used to cure the nation's social and economic ills. (3) Furthermore, the Liberal 
Party, which had traditionally spoken for the moderate Left, was now fatally divided. In these 
circumstances it might have been expected that Labour would have played a greater role in government 
during the inter-war years. Instead the party held power for only two brief periods. 
The Black Country is an ideal region to study locally the fortunes of the inter-war Labour Party. 
Whilst it has been generally accepted that Birmingham remained a bastion of Conservatism in the inter- 
war years, albeit in the form of the Unionist Party, care needs to be taken not to assume that the Black 
Country fitted into this category. (4) Labour won four of the region's ten seats in the 1918 General 
Election. The party built on this position through the 1920s, culminating in the capture of nine of the 
seats in the 1929 General Election. These were all lost, however, in the 1931 Election, with just three 
being recaptured during the 1930s. Thus, having secured initial success in 1918, which continued 
through the 1920s, the 1930s saw something of a setback with the Labour Party ending the period with 
fewer MPs than at the start. 
This does not coincide with the situation in nearby Birmingham or nationally. In Birmingham, for 
instance, Labour won only one of the 12 seats before the 1929 Election, at which 6 were then captured. 
All were lost, however, in 1931, with none being gained during the 1930s. Nationally the Labour Party, 
having lost all but 56 of its seats in the 1931 General Election, recovered to win 154 in the 1935 
General Election, which was considerably more than the 57 it held after 1918. 
Despite its proximity to the city of Birmingham the Black Country at this time has to be considered a 
region in its own right, being more of an industrial area than an urban one. It contained a number of 
interconnected industrial towns and villages, which shared little of the civic pride associated with 
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Chamberlain's Birmingham. Traditionally the Black Country was a region of coal mining, iron 
manufacturing and the production of semi-manufactured metalware, whilst Birmingham was a centre 
for finished goods and commercial capital. (5) By the beginning of the 20th Century, however, many of 
the Black Country's industries were in depression, due in part to the exhaustion of their minerals, but 
also as a consequence of foreign competition. (6) There were, however, exceptions to this picture such 
as Wolverhampton, which at the beginning of the 20th Century had developed new finished metal 
industries, such as electrical motors, cars, cycles, motor cycles and their components. (7) 
Another feature, which distinguished much of the Black Country from Birmingham was the strength 
of Nonconformity, which had never taken off as a mass movement in the city. (8) Its strength in the 
Black Country in the first half of the century must be seen as a factor in the rise of Labour, given the 
generally accepted claim that the party owed more to Methodism than Marxism. (9) Despite these 
differences the two regions did share a number of features in common. The most obvious of these were 
the social problems with regard to health, housing and education, which were serious enough to have 
provided ample opportunities for the Labour Party to exploit. (10) 
2. REGIONAL HISTORIES OF THE LABOUR PARTY 
A number of local studies have been made of the Labour Party during this period in other working- 
class regions. Reynolds and Laybourn, for instance, have made a study of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire, concluding that during the inter-war years Labour became "the most important single 
parliamentary party" in the region, making it a "Labour Heartland". (11) This, the authors claim, was 
achieved during the 1930s, despite the strength of the National Government and various anti-Socialist 
alliances, which operated in local elections. They stress the importance of the close links between the 
trade unions and local Labour parties throughout the period. (12) In particular, they show how it was 
trade union officials, who were frequently selected by the local parties for national and local 
elections. (13) 
Savage, in a study of the Labour Party in Preston, also stresses the importance of the trade union link 
in enabling Labour to succeed here in the 1918 General Election. (14) He then claims, however, that the 
local party failed to broaden its support, causing it to lose ground in the early 1920s. This was followed 
by a recovery in the years leading up to the 1929 General Election, in which Labour won both seats in 
the town. Savage believes that this success was due to the local party broadening its support so that it 
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became "more neighbourhood than work-based". (15) Labour then suffered from the party's national 
setback in the 1931 General Election. Unlike West Yorkshire, however, Savage claims that Labour 
made little recovery in Preston during the rest of that decade. He blames this first on unemployment, 
which was to prove a divisive factor amongst the working class, and secondly on the alienation of 
women voters due to the policies of the 1929 Labour Government. (16) Savage's conclusion is that the 
Labour Party did best when it concerned itself with the condition of the people, rather than the wage 
struggle. (17) 
Thorpe has concentrated on the significance of the personality factor in local Labour parties with his 
study of Derby. Here Labour held one of the two parliamentary seats for the whole inter-war period 
except for 1931-35, whilst two of the seats were held in 1923-4 and 1929-31. Furthermore, the local 
party also controlled the borough council between 1928-31 and again from 1934. Thorpe praises the 
party here for "working ... to well defined strategies in improving housing, educational facilities and 
the condition of the town generally". Defeat in 1931 was due only to "Labour's perceived 
incompetence at national level". (18) As for the basis of Labour's success, he deals with the role of 
J. H. Thomas, one of the town's Labour MPs during the inter-war years. He also points to the 
significance of the Co-operative Movement and the Nonconformist tradition in the town. (19) Even so 
Thorpe accepts the pivotal role of trade unions in their support of the local party. (20) 
The Birmingham Labour Party has also attracted some interest. Historians have been mainly 
concerned to show the persistence of the Chamberlain factor in this working-class city. Hastings, for 
instance, attributes the Conservative success in Birmingham to a combination of the Chamberlain 
political machine, the weakness of trade unions and the policy of Tariff Reform. (21) Hopkins has 
written of the economic and social changes that took place in the city both before and after the First 
World War. (22) These were to threaten the Chamberlain tradition, which rested on the workshop 
system, where a close relationship between master and workers was reckoned to exist. Hopkins stresses 
the growth of the factory system which emerged in the early 20th Century, especially in the engineering 
industry, where power driven machine tools replaced the hand operated ones. (23) He also notes the 
significance in the inter-war years of the new outer suburbs, which expanded at the expense of the 
central wards, where the Chamberlain influence was strongest. (24) Briggs too has written of the 
changing economy of Birmingham, which, after a serious post-war recession, grew in the 1930s, due to 
the expansion of the new industries of electrical engineering and the motor trade, with its many 
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components. (25) Although both Hopkins and Briggs have stressed the growing size of the workplace, 
they have also pointed out that small firms still dominated the city's economy throughout this 
period. (26) Boughton has examined the political impact of these changes on Birmingham. He claims 
that during the inter-war years, "the Chamberlain tradition was a rapidly waning asset" and "the heyday 
of Birmingham Unionism was over". Nevertheless despite Labour's success in the 1929 General 
Election, Boughton is forced to admit that, following the defeat of 1931, the 1930s was a disastrous 
decade for the Birmingham Labour Party. (27) 
Liverpool was another working-class city, where the Labour Party secured only limited success in 
the inter-war years. In a 1993 PhD thesis Davies has argued that this was not necessarily due to 
sectarian divisions. Instead he claims that the working class in Liverpool was divided between those in 
regular employment and those who were casually employed. This division led to the dockside 
communities being open to a wider range of political altematives. (28) 
The Labour Party in the Black Country has not attracted this type of attention, although there have 
been political studies of the towns of Walsall and Wolverhampton, in which the role of the local 
Labour Party is included-(29) Barnsby too has written an account of the Socialist Movement in both the 
Black Country and Birmingham during this period. (30) Meanwhile Gardner has analysed how the 
Wolverhampton Conservatives checked the advance of Labour in the town during the inter-war years. 
He has put the emphasis for their success on organisation rather than policy. (3 1) Finally West Midland 
politics between 1918-35 was the subject of a 1974 PhD thesis by K. W. D. Rolfe. Most emphasis here, 
however, was put on the Chamberlain factor, which meant that the Labour movement in the Black 
Country received much less attention. (32) 
3. CONSTRAINTS ON THE GROWTH OF THE LABOUR PARTY BEFORE 1918 
The Labour Party secured its first breakthrough in the Black Country in the 1918 General Election 
when it won four of the region's ten parliamentary seats. This was a considerable achievement for a 
party, which had only limited roots in the region before the war. Other factors made these results even 
more remarkable. For instance over half of Labour's 57 successes nationally at this time came in coal 
mining constituencies. Although mining was still carried out in the Black Country, especially in the 
constituencies of Kingswinford and Walsall, it was no longer 
the 
predominant industry. (33) 
Furthermore Labour's four successes were all secured against couponed Conservative candidates, 
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whilst a number of standing Labour MPs, who had been loyal to Lloyd George, were either unopposed 
or fought against uncouponed candidates. (34) 
A number of constraints had held back the emergence of the Labour Party, both nationally and 
locally, in the years before 1914. These were particularly evident in a working-class region like the 
Black Country, where Labour had had little significance before 1914. Historians nationally, however, 
have disagreed over where the emphasis should be laid on these constraints. 
It is generally agreed that the Labour Party emerged in industrial regions due to its close links with 
trade unions. In the Black Country, however, unions had been slow to develop before 1914. Taylor has 
concluded that even in 1914 in many industries "there was still no effective basis of union 
organisation" and where trade unions did exist they "combined a strong element of insularity with 
extreme local particularism". (35) This situation was to prove a major constraint on the development of 
local Labour parties. 
Benson has explained the factors behind the absence of a strong union movement in the region. He 
puts the emphasis on the survival of small-scale production, the subcontract system and the decline in 
real wages between the 1870s and the 1890s. He goes on to point out, however, that these features were 
by no means unique to the Black Country. He believes that the working class nationally at this time 
were "more divided and more acquiescent, industrially weaker and politically more conservative than 
has often been supposed". Weak trade unions, coupled with the continued existence of small-scale 
industrial units were common throughout the country. (36) 
This is a view also taken by McKibbin, who has looked more generally at the constraints on the 
growth of Marxism in Britain at this time. He points out that with 75 per cent of the workforce classed 
as manual working class, conditions seemed to favour the growth of a mass working-class party. Yet 
even by 1914 three-quarters of the workforce remained non-unionised, whilst of the 4 million who 
were in a trade union 40 per cent must have voted for a party other than Labour. (37) McKibbin also 
sees the size of the workforce as important, with only 100 firms, not plants, employing over 3,000 in 
the 1900s and just four `heavy industrial' firms employing over 10,000. This was small compared to 
the continent and tended to lead to closer relations between employers and employed, as in the case of 
Chamberlain's Birmingham. (38) 
More generally McKibbin points out that working-class communities were not the unified structures 
that some outsiders believed them to be. Their culture, he claims, was "incapable of giving ideological 
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direction to a working-class consciousness". (39) McKibbin also reckons that there was a stability in 
British society, which led to a kind of deference towards the constitution, which Labour itself 
accepted. (40) Other constraints noted by McKibbin were rival interests to politics, such as sports, 
religion and hobbies, which grew as real wages rose amongst the working class. These activities along 
with organised religion tended to throw the middle and working classes together. (41) McKibbin points 
out too that whilst there was still much poverty, the poor were often those without the vote. (42) 
Another constraint on the development of the Labour Party before 1914 was the policies of the two 
major parties With an expanding electorate both the Conservatives and the Liberals were seeking to 
become more populist in order to attract working-class support. Tanner gives a number of reasons for 
Tory successes in working-class areas. In particular, he notes the appeal of the Empire and of Fair 
Trade, especially at a time of industrial depression. He also points to the fact that some Tories 
"supported a degree of social intervention", especially in areas like housing and the relief of 
poverty. (43) This was particularly the case following the party's fusion with Chamberlain's Liberal 
Unionists. 
In the 1906 General Election the Conservatives had adopted Joseph Chamberlain's policy of Tariff 
Reform, as a means for solving unemployment and industrial stagnation. It had little success in the 
Black Country in that Election, as the Liberals won all but one of the seats there. In Birmingham, 
however, the Conservatives, under the Unionist banner, maintained their full complement of seats. (44) 
In the 1910 Elections the Conservatives Tariff Reform programme prevailed in the Black Country, 
leaving the Liberals with only two seats here after the December Election. (45) It was this situation, 
which must have helped to persuade Tanner to put the region into his category of working-class 
Tory. (46) 
It was because of the strength of the Conservatives in working-class seats and the emergence of the 
Labour Party, that an electoral pact was arranged between the Liberals and Labour in 1903. This 
enabled Labour to stand 50 candidates in the 1906 Election, of which two-thirds were in working-class 
Tory seats or double member boroughs. 29 of these were elected. (47) Similar pressures helped to 
persuade the Liberal Government from 1905-14 to introduce a series of much needed social reforms, in 
order to give the party a populist appeal. (48) According to Clarke the Liberals, under the inspiration of 
Lloyd George, pushed through this reform programme, described as `New Liberalism', in order to 
ensure that the Liberals remained the party of the working class. (49) Indeed its success has been judged 
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by the fact that Labour came last in all the by-elections it fought between 1910-14, leading to the 
suggestion that the Party was in decline at this time. (50) 
Clarke's interpretation has been challenged by a number of historians, especially McKibbin, who 
claims that Labour was already the class-based party in the constituencies between 1910 and 1914. He 
points to the increased links with the trade unions, especially after the affiliation of the miners in 1908, 
and Labour electoral successes, especially in municipal elections. He sees the party's electoral strategy 
changing, so that it was unlikely that they would renew their pact with the Liberals for an election in 
1915. (51) Savage and Miles similarly question the impact of New Liberalism. Whilst attractive to the 
working class, they claim that it "simply did not address the sort of class issues, which they knew to be 
vitally important to them". (52) 
Support for Clarke's view has come from Tanner, although he has admitted that the `Progressive 
Alliance' between Liberals and Labour was coming increasingly under attack after 1910. The Labour 
position, for instance, was being challenged by the Socialist left. (53) New Liberalism was also 
vulnerable within the Liberal Party, as its supporters were in a minority in the Cabinet and Parliament. 
Moreover they had failed to radicalise the constituencies, where a strong conservative element 
remained. (54) Tanner believes that the Liberals were in danger of losing working-class support in the 
pre-war years due to their involvement in issues such as Irish Home Rule, Welsh Church 
Disestablishment and naval rearmament. The Liberals were also divided over women's suffrage and 
were uncertain in their relations with trade unions. (55) Moreover when Lloyd George sought to revive 
New Liberalism through his land reform programme and the 1914 Budget, opposition within the party 
was such that he was forced to modify his plans. (56) 
There remained, however, much support within the trade unions and the Labour Party for the Liberal 
legislative programme. Tanner writes that in 1914 Labour had "not created a `class-based' political 
allegiance which would undermine the Liberal Party on a broad front. In whole areas of the country - 
including heavy industrialised, unionised, iron and steel, engineering, and textile manufacturing areas, 
and even to some extent in several coalfields - Labour was unsuccessful". (57) This is a view 
challenged by Laybourn, who points to Labour's success in West Yorkshire, where a significant 
number of seats were won in municipal elections before 1914. (58) Tanner, however, argues that had 
there been a General Election in 1915 the pact would have continued with the position little different 
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from 1910. The main factor restricting Labour from selecting extra candidates was that the trade unions 
were either unwilling or incapable of financing a broad campaign against the Liberals. (59) 
Another major constraint on the growth of the Labour Party, which has also aroused controversy 
amongst historians, was the electoral system. At one time it was thought that the 1885 Reform Act 
provided adult male suffrage. (60) In fact, Blewett has pointed out that at the time of the 1911 census 
7.9 million voters were on the register in the UK, comprising just 63.3% of the total adult male 
population. (61) Under the terms of the 1885 Act the franchise was held by adult males, who were 
householders. Excluded were sons living with their parents, domestic servants living with their 
employers and all lodgers paying less than £10 a year in rent. Furthermore there was a 12-month 
registration qualification for those who were not owner occupiers, followed by a6 month wait for 
all. (62) Another major anomaly was the existence of an estimated 5-600,000 plural voters, who 
comprised 7 per cent of the electorate. (63) 
Matthew, McKibbin and Kay have pointed out that, with about 4.67 million men disenfranchised, the 
pre-war franchise prevented the emergence of a true working-class electorate, which was to be a major 
constraint on the Labour Party. They claim, for instance, that in 1910 whilst the county franchise was 
69.9 per cent that for the boroughs was only 59.8 per cent. (64) The consequence of this was noted by 
Pelling, who in his Social Geography of British Elections has estimated that in the pre-war years there 
were only 89 constituencies with 95 members, which were "predominantly working-class in 
character". (65) 
Other historians have questioned whether there was a voteless proletariat before 1914. Clarke has 
responded to McKibbin's argument by claiming that since Labour was the party of trade unionists, its 
supporters were likely to have been enfranchised before 1914. Indeed, he claims that since the Liberals 
had become a distinctly working-class party by 1910, their support was little different socially from 
that of Labour. (66) Hart too has estimated that Labour would have secured only 15-20 per cent of the 
vote before 1914 even with the wider franchise, leaving them in a position similar to the Liberals in 
1924 and 1929. (67) 
Tanner claims that the pre-war franchise discriminated, in the case of men, against the young, 
especially sons living with their parents, which affected all classes and parties. It would be difficult to 
assume that these male voters would have voted Labour. He estimates, for instance, that 450,000 
middle-class males were disenfranchised in this way. Overall he claims that the working class made up 
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70 per cent of the pre-war electorate, compared with 80 per cent of the total population. His conclusion 
is that "the electoral framework in which Edwardian political parties operated was not overwhelmingly 
biased against the working class"(68) 
Laybourn has countered Tanner's argument by pointing out that voteless single middle-class males 
constituted only a small proportion of the 5 million who were disenfranchised, of whom 90% were 
working class on Tanner's own figures. He reckons that "given the social position of these men and the 
rising commitment of the trade union movement to the Labour Party ... at least a majority would 
have 
voted Labour had they had the opportunity". Laybourn also believes that Labour was handicapped 
before 1918 by their lack of full-time agents, who played a vital role in securing the registration of 
voters. (69) 
Finance has always been seen as a factor constraining Labour's pre-war development. The Osborne 
Judgement of 1909 prevented trade unions from contributing to the Labour Party. This particularly 
affected Labour's ability to fight the second General Election of 1910, when only 62 candidates were 
put forward. It was, however, not lack of finance but Labour's poor by-election performances between 
1906-10 that was behind the continuation of the election pact with the Liberals. (70) Between 1911- 
1914 Labour was able to solve some of its financial worries firstly by assisting the Liberal Government 
in securing the payment of MPs and secondly through the passing of the Trade Union Act in 1913, 
which allowed for the introduction of the political fund. 
4. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN DETERMINING LABOUR'S POST-WAR GROWTH 
Following their success in 1918 in the Black Country, it was felt that the Labour Party would sweep 
forward in the succeeding years. In fact the party made only modest progress in the region during the 
early 1920s. It was only in the second half of the decade that Labour began to advance more rapidly, 
winning nine of the ten seats in the 1929 General Election, whilst the Conservatives lost all of theirs. 
Labour also made substantial gains in Birmingham, where six seats were captured. In 1931, however, 
Labour's electoral performance went into reverse when, in the October General Election, the party lost 
all its seats in both Birmingham and the Black Country. Some recovery was made during the 1930s 
with Labour winning three Black Country seats in the 1935 General Election. Nevertheless, the Party 
was now performing less well during this period than other similar regions. Indeed by the outbreak of 
war it was obvious that the Labour Party had failed to capture the bulk of the working-class Black 
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Country vote, as the Conservatives held more parliamentary seats and controlled most local councils. 
Had there been a General Election in 1940 it seems unlikely that Labour would have gained any further 
seats in the region. 
In order to assess Labour's performance in the Black Country during these inter-war years national 
factors are a major consideration. Certainly at a time when communications, in the form of the popular 
press, the radio and cinema newsreels, were making dramatic advances it would be unwise to ignore 
their impact. (71) Nevertheless other factors need to be considered when studying local Labour parties. 
Indeed a number of indicators can be used to determine the relative performance of Labour in a 
particular region. 
One of these is the strength of local party organisation, with special reference to the size of 
membership. Figures for individual members of all the local parties can be found in Labour's Annua 
Report s. Local policies and activities can be studied through Labour Party Minute Books, of which 
those for Wolverhampton and Walsall are available along with those for Birmingham. The role of 
women in local parties is also significant, especially given their increased voting power during this 
period. (72) Under the 1918 Constitution women could join the party, either through the Women's 
Sections, or through their local party. The Minute Book of the Women's Section of the Bilston Labour 
Party is available for part of this period. 
Membership is a particularly important consideration. Traditionally this had come either from 
members of affiliated trade unions or from Socialist societies such as the ILP. Under Labour's new 
1918 Constitution, however, individual membership was introduced and local parties were regularly 
urged to boost their numbers. The new category of individual membership could become particularly 
important during elections, as these were likely to be the most active volunteers. Individual members 
also provided vital extra funds to local parties from the various activities they organised. They also 
acted as envoys for the party, encouraging support from within the community amongst their 
acquaintances. On the other hand high individual membership did not necessarily guarantee electoral 
success, although it was a good indication of the strength of local parties during this period. 
At the start of the period trade unions were the prevailing force within local parties, backing most of 
the elected Labour MPs in 1918, including the four successful ones in the Black Country. This 
continued during the 1920s, but historians are divided on whether it was to Labour's advantage. 
McKibbin, for instance, has few doubts, putting the party's post-war growth down to the trade union 
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link. Local parties, he claims, were "utterly dependent upon the unions as institutions and upon their 
officers and members as individuals". He also stresses the importance of union finance to the party, as 
the ILP was in decline and individual membership remained low. (73) 
This is also a view supported by Reynolds and Layboum in their study of the Labour Party in the 
West Riding of Yorkshire. They maintain that the success of Labour was a consequence of the close 
association between the trade unions and the local Labour parties throughout the inter war years-(74) 
Laybourn claims that the persistence of unemployment, the General Strike defeat and the trade union 
legislation of 1927 strengthened union links with the Labour Party. (75) A similar view is taken by 
Riddell in his study of the Second Labour Government. He points out that despite efforts to increase 
individual membership, Labour failed to develop a mass party as envisaged in 1918. (76) As a result the 
trade unions still dominated the party, so that in 1929 the TUC provided Labour with 90 per cent of its 
finance and membership. Trade unions also sponsored a third of Labour's MPs in the 1920s, as well as 
having a significant influence on party policy through the use of the block vote. (77) 
One historian to be critical of Labour's close links with the trade unions is Howard. He claims that 
growth was disappointing in the 1920s because the party failed to expand beyond its union roots. He 
notes the party's decision to turn against ̀direct action' by breaking with the Councils of Action and 
the unemployed groups led by Wal Hannington. This followed the formation of the British Communist 
Party in August 1920. Although Labour was successful in winning the Catholic Irish vote, he points to 
failures to expand support in the Anglican Church, amongst the middle class, the countryside and most 
important, perhaps, amongst the non unionised working classes. (78) Howard also points out that unions 
were able to control many local parties not only because they provided the money but also because they 
had the officials with the time for daytime party work. This led to many constituencies being controlled 
by a small number of activists, which Howard sees as a factor impeding Labour's progress. (79) 
Another historian to follow this line, with some modification, has been Savage. In his study of the 
Labour Party in Preston he accepts that the union link was important in 1918. The local party was 
controlled by skilled trade unions such as the ASE, who looked to Labour to restore their members pre- 
war status. (80) Savage points out that too much concern with `bread and butter' issues meant that the 
local party failed to develop its organisation and began to lose support in the early 1920s. (81) He 
claims, however, that in the late 1920s the local party changed focus by building up support in the 
wards amongst non-union and women voters, by concentrating on neighbourhood issues such as 
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transport, housing, education and health. It led to the setting up of a Women's Section and increasing 
individual memberships and ward committees. (82) 
Savage distinguishes four types of local parties at the end of the decade. Firstly there were those, 
particularly in London and the Home Counties, which had strong ward organisation due to the 
weakness of the unions. Then there were those which had shifted from a trade union to a ward basis. 
This was particularly the case in the Lancashire towns, where there was a tradition of women having a 
strong economic role. Then there were those Labour parties, as in Glasgow and Liverpool, which had a 
strong religious or ethnic influence. Finally there were those that remained under trade union influence, 
such as the coal mining constituencies and industrial towns like Coventry, Wolverhampton and 
Leicester. None of these had a high individual membership in the late 1920s. (83) 
After the disastrous 1931 General Election, trade-union backed members again numerically 
dominated the Parliamentary Labour Party. The party's finances were further hit by the slump, 
however, as unemployment brought more losses of union affiliation fees. Improved organisation now 
became a critical factor for the Labour Party. Big efforts were made nationally to increase individual 
membership, with the `Million New Members and Power' campaign launched in 1932. (84) In Preston, 
however, Savage claims that during the 1930s the unions again dominated the local party. This time it 
was the semi-skilled and unskilled public-sector workers, who had expanded with the growth of 
municipal enterprises. (85) The state of organisation within the local Labour parties in the Black 
Country will be a major element in seeking to explain the fortunes of the party. 
The economic situation, particularly the impact of unemployment, was another important factor 
determining the growth of the Labour Party. The example of South Wales during this period reflects 
the link. The region had the highest rates of unemployment and became a solid Labour heartland with 
success even in the 1931 Election. (86) Yet high levels of employment during the First World War 
strengthened the trade unions and aided the Labour Party through the political fund. High 
unemployment might attract those out of work to Labour, but it could also hit the Party through the loss 
of union members and their affiliation fees. This was likely to be serious given that the trade unions 
provided the majority of the party's fund. Another consideration is the impact of the Trade Union Act 
of 1927, which followed the defeat of the General Strike. It meant that trade union members would 
have to `contract in' rather than ̀ contract out' of their membership of the Labour Party. 
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In both Birmingham and the Black Country there were two periods when unemployment was 
exceptionally high. The first occasion was the post-war economic slump, as a downturn in war orders 
coincided with the decline of many of the Black Country's staple industries, such as coal mining, the 
iron industry and the domestic chain industry. Unemployment figures for Birmingham and Smethwick 
were to be higher in 1921 than for any year in the 1930s. (87) By the mid and late 1920s, however, there 
was steady economic growth in Birmingham and parts of the Black Country, due to the expansion of 
new industries, especially the motor car and its components. Nevertheless the staple industries in the 
region continued their decline, making unemployment a continuing problem in many areas. (88) 
The Depression of the 1930s affected Birmingham and the Black Country less than similar industrial 
regions, as the motor car and electrical engineering industries were less seriously hit. Indeed by the 
middle of the decade these industries, together with the building boom, were leading Britain out of the 
Depression. (89) Whether Labour was affected by the levels of unemployment during this period will be 
one factor to be explored. It could be that unemployment divided the working class with many of those 
in work fearing that a Labour Government, following a radical economic programme, would be too 
much of a risk. The Labour Party in its turn was not anxious to seem to be too closely identified with 
the unemployed for fear of alienating those in work. 
The role of personality is another important consideration. All parties recognised the value at 
elections of a candidate with a strong personality. In the case of some constituencies like Walsall it was 
also considered important that such a candidate should be local (90) The Labour MP with one of the 
strongest personalities, however, was an outsider. Frank Roberts, who represented West Bromwich for 
all but four of the inter-war years, came to the town as a union representative from Northampton. 
Another Labour MP who was to play a significant role in the region was another outsider, Oswald 
Mosley. (91) Not only was he a charismatic personality, but his wealth provided the Smethwick Labour 
Party with much needed funds. There was a similar situation with Oliver Baldwin, the MP for Dudley, 
whilst W. J. Brown, the MP for Wolverhampton West, was generously backed by his trade union. Yet 
these three MPs all split with the Labour Party in 1931. The impact of their departure on local parties 
will be a major consideration. 
The role of another personality, the Labour leader and PM Ramsay MacDonald, who broke with the 
Party in setting up the National Government in 1931, will also be examined. The now accepted view of 
the fall of the Labour Government and its defeat in the 1931 General Election is that its demise had set 
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in well before those events. Neil Riddell, the most recent historian of these events, writes of declining 
support from trade unions, falling membership in the constituencies and a loss of morale amongst the 
PLP during the Government's term in office. Riddell does accept, however, that MacDonald was "a 
figure of hero worship" amongst many of the rank and file in the party. This support was based not on 
the achievements of his government, but on his campaigning record during General Elections. Many 
constituency parties were reluctant to condemn him and saddened to lose him. Riddell claims that, 
"such a cult of personality could not be wiped out overnight". (92) How far his role in forming the 
National Government in 1931 was a factor affecting the fortunes of local parties has to be considered. 
The organisation and policies of Labour's opponents in the Black Country is another major 
consideration. The Liberal Party, although in decline during the whole of the inter-war period, could 
still play an important role in elections. Hart has pointed out that "electoral support for the Liberals in 
the country was as great as that for Labour until (and including) 1923". (93) In the Black Country the 
Wolverhampton East division was held by them throughout the inter-war years. The general feeling 
amongst Conservatives nationally was that a strong Liberal vote would split the anti-Socialist vote, 
letting in Labour. This led to the formation of many local anti-Socialist pacts in municipal elections 
during the inter-war period. (94) The extent to which these affected the Labour Party in the Black 
Country will be considered. The 1929 General Election appeared to confirm the Conservative fears as 
the high Liberal poll seemed to have opened the way for a Labour Government. With the formation of 
the National Government in 1931, however, Labour was generally faced by only one candidate in 
parliamentary elections. The extent to which this affected Labour's performance in the General 
Elections of the 1930s will be considered. 
For most of the inter-war years the Conservative leader was Stanley Baldwin. In a recent study 
Williamson stresses that his main concern was to integrate the new mass working-class electorate into 
the system. He had three strategies for doing this. One was to divide and defeat the Liberals so that the 
anti-Labour vote would not be split. Next he sought to strengthen the organisation of his Party, 
especially by appealing to newly enfranchised women voters. Finally he sought to develop 
Conservative policies in order to attract the working-class voter. Two of his policies were to have a big 
impact on the Labour Party during this period. One was his support for social expenditure, especially 
the council house programme, and the other was Protection, which having backfired in the 1923 
Election became a key Conservative policy in the 1930s. (95) 
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Pugh has pointed to two electoral factors, which greatly helped the Conservatives in the inter-war 
years. In the 1920s in particular he claims that they benefited from three party politics, due to the 
ending of the pre-1914 Lib-Lab pact. It enabled the Conservatives to win the 1922 Election with 5 per 
cent fewer votes than they secured in the disastrous 1906 Election. It also meant that in the 1924 
Election Labour gained a slightly higher percentage of the poll than in 1923, but lost 42 seats, due to 
the decline of the Liberal vote. (96) Another advantage for the Conservatives was the redistribution of 
seats in 1918, which recognised suburban growth, where much of their strength lay. (97) With a 
predominantly working-class electorate, however, Pugh recognises the importance which the 
Conservatives put on acquiring an efficient electoral machine. This involved employing full time 
agents, who were involved in raising funds and in ensuring that the party obtained its full support on 
election days. (98) 
McKibbin has shown how during the 1920s the Conservatives "assembled a formidable and 
unprecedented coalition of social groups". Much of this was based on appealing to those who felt 
threatened by the organised working class. There was, on the one hand, a growing suburban middle- 
class, whose views were articulated in the Daily Express and the Daily Mail. (99) He points to the 
growth of a middle-class consciousness, which was based on a stereotype of the working class as 
manual workers "in well organised trades with aggressive trade unions". (100) There was also the 
female vote, which tended towards the Conservatives, as the organised world of the working class was 
seen as "masculine, sectional and collectivist". (101) Finally there were the working-class 
Conservatives, whom McKibbin puts into three categories. Firstly there were those whose vote was a 
deferential one. Then there were the non-unionised, who felt isolated when organised labour developed 
muscle. Finally there were those employed in smaller workplaces, where there was a sense of class 
collaboration. (102) 
Pugh also defines two types of working-class Conservatives. Firstly there were the deferential 
Conservatives, who accepted governance by his social superiors. This was particularly true of rural 
areas, but also in wards where there was a combination of the wealthy and the dependent poor. 
Secondly there were the pragmatic Conservatives, who recognised, often through their work, that it was 
in their best self-interest to support the Conservatives. Tariff Reform can be seen as an example of 
this. (103) 
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In a recent article Pugh further emphasises the strength of working-class Conservatism, by defining 
it as "hostility towards the state and suspicion of improving legislation, enthusiasm for the monarchy, 
the empire, the union with Ireland and militant Protestantism, and in the tendency to blame immigrants 
and foreigners for Britain's ills". It is Pugh's contention that Labour had to adapt to these Conservative 
traits in order to achieve power. They only fully succeeded in doing this during the Second World War, 
which explains their success in 1945. (104) 
Gardner, in his study of Wolverhampton Conservatives, has shown that the Black Country was not 
unreceptive to Conservative policies. Although Wolverhampton was an industrial town with a 
predominantly working-class population, there was also a strong middle class. Indeed the two 
Conservatives candidates during this period were local businessmen Sir Alfred Bird and his son Robert, 
whose work gave them some knowledge of the working class. Gardner claims that in the West 
Wolverhampton constituency a mass Conservative membership was built up after 1922. The members 
were predominantly female and middle class, which reflected the more diverse character of this 
constituency, as compared with other Black Country seats. Gardner puts the appeal of the party down 
not so much to a matter of belief, but more to its past record, its general fitness to be trusted in 
government, its immediate programme and the proposals of the opposition. (105) 
5. THE AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS 
The fortunes of the Labour Party across the Black Country during the inter-war years have lacked a 
thorough study. The first aim of this thesis will be to remedy this situation by providing a constituency 
by constituency account of the party's performance in the region with special reference to the General 
Elections. The second aim will be to examine the factors behind Labour's performance. In particular 
the intention will be to analyse the reasons for the party's breakthrough in 1918, its achievements down 
to 1929 and the factors behind Labour's relative failure to build on its support through the 1930s. A 
third aim will be to compare the position of the Labour Party in the Black Country with the situation 
firstly in nearby Birmingham and then in the country as a whole. The intention here will be to illustrate 
the distinctive nature of the party's performance in the region during this period. Finally the aim will be 
to see how far a study of the Labour Party in the Black Country during this period will challenge the 
existing historiography of the party. 
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The topic will be approached in a chronological manner, with the dividing point for each chapter 
being one of the General Elections of the period. Each chapter will contain a brief account of the 
national situation including the relevant historiography for that section. There will then be a short 
account and explanation of the situation in Birmingham, which will be followed by a longer section on 
the Black Country. This will start with the economic and political background for that period and be 
followed by a constituency by constituency account of the electoral position of the Labour Party. The 
order for this will depend on the importance of the constituency within that period of time. Each 
chapter will have its own conclusion. 
One of the main problems in researching this subject is the paucity of source material. Two major 
sources will be used, but even these have their limitations. One is the press both national and local. In 
each case it was generally unfavourable to the Labour Party. The anti-Labour bias of the local press 
ranged from the populist attitude of the Birmingham Mail and some of the region's weeklies to the 
more sophisticated tone of the Birmingham Post, which was the voice of Unionism in the West 
Midlands. There were some local exceptions to this situation. Liberal papers, for instance, such as the 
Birmingham Gazette and the Wolverhampton Express and Star, saw the Labour Party as an ally of the 
Liberals against the Conservatives at the start of the period. This situation had disappeared by 1931. 
There were also a few neutral local papers such as the Smethwick Telephone, which were prepared to 
give Labour equal treatment at elections. Finally there was one paper, which was totally supportive of 
the Labour Party, the Town Crier. This was a Birmingham weekly, which was backed financially by 
local Labour supporters. 
The other main source is local Labour Party records, but even these are limited. The only Black 
Country constituency party records available are those for Wolverhampton and Walsall. Records are 
also available for the city of Birmingham. This leaves many gaps, however, which the press only 
partially fills. Other Labour Party records will be used such as the NEC Minutes, which have some 
value when local issues impacted on the national position as, for instance, during by-elections. The 
Labour Party's Annual Report has a similar value, although this does contain one important source in 
that it lists the number of individual party members, which each constituency enrolled annually. This 
provides an indicator of the strength of local organisation, although not necessarily of electoral success. 
Finally there are a limited selection of party election manifestos, contemporary accounts and memoirs. 
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Election manifestos, for instance, are particularly useful for showing which issues local candidates 
wanted to stress in their constituencies. 
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CHAPTER 1- THE 1918 GENERAL ELECTION 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The 1918 General Election has been seen as a distinctive milestone in the emergence of the Labour 
Party as the second political force in the country. At the outbreak of the First World War Labour's 
position in parliament was still very dependent on its pact with the Liberals, which would probably 
have continued had an election been called in 1915. (1) In 1918, however, the party endorsed 361 
candidates, winning 20.8 per cent of the vote and 57 seats, which made Labour the main opposition to 
the Lloyd George Coalition. (2) 
Historians are generally agreed that the First World War caused huge social and political changes, 
but there have been disagreements over the extent to which it led to greater working-class 
consciousness and political radicalism. For the first time the government chose to consult and work 
with trade union leaders, who were put on committees and involved in labour policies. There was also 
much state intervention, especially in munitions work, whilst transport and the coalmines were taken 
over by the government itself. Under the Defence of the Realm Act strikes and restrictive practices on 
government contracts were made illegal. The unions also agreed to `the dilution of labour', which 
allowed the lower skilled, often women, to do skilled work. A Committee on Production was set up, 
which fixed wages. These tended at first to lag behind price increases. Finally leaving certificates and 
exemption badges were used, particularly after conscription was introduced, to restrict job mobility and 
secure enlistment. 
This situation caused much tension in the workplace, leading to an upsurge in rank and file 
militancy. In the engineering industry, in particular, a shop steward movement developed, which was 
frequently at odds with the union leadership. There were a number of disputes, especially during 1917- 
18. The main causes of the trouble were government moves to extend ̀ dilution' into private work, 
restrict the mobility of skilled labour and reduce exemptions from conscription. (3) 
Some historians have seen the unrest amongst the rank and file as exemplifying the growth of 
working-class consciousness. Others, however, see it as an exception at a time when most workers 
were patriotic, with fewer days lost in strikes than in 1913, which was the calmest of the pre-war years. 
Marwick has been one historian to link the "extreme working-class discontent of 1917" to such factors 
as bad housing conditions, rising prices and declining real wages, at a time when union leaders were in 
the "embrace" of the Government. (4) 
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One contemporary, who later became the Labour Party historian, G. D. H. Cole, thought that the 
industrial unrest, particularly the rank and file movement, marked an end to working-class 
fragmentation. He also stressed the importance of the impact that the Russian Revolution had in 
providing confidence and ideology. (5) He wrote that the war years "made an immense difference to 
trade union opinion... most of (the leaders) were no longer hostile to Socialism of a kind". According 
to Cole it led in 1918 to the adoption of a `Socialist' Constitution with its call for "the common 
ownership of the means of production". (6) 
Many later historians have followed a similar line. Cronin, for instance, has written the following of 
the situation in 1918. "Not only were workers demanding higher wages, greater control of the 
workplace, the nationalisation of coal and other industries and a host of social reforms connected with 
housing, health and employment; in addition they exhibited a frightening taste for "direct action" in 
implementing these goals, a distrust of the political process and a marked independence from any 
formal leadership". (7) 
Winter has written of the emergence of a more confident and less deferential working class with 
barriers breaking down as skills became diluted and pay differentials narrowed. He has put much 
emphasis on the War Emergency Workers' National Committee as a body boosting socialism. It is 
described as "the only independent voice of the united British Labour movement after August 1914. "
Meeting under the leadership of Henderson, it represented the interests of the working class throughout 
the war years on issues like prices, housing, rent control, benefits and pensions for soldiers. (8) Winter 
even claims that it prevented "the major and irreversible schism over the cause and conduct of the war, 
which plagued continental Labour". (9) According to Turner the Committee "helped to make Labour a 
class party, rather than the largely industrial party, which it had been before the war". (10) 
Not all historians have seen the impact of the war in this way. McKibbin, for instance, claims that 
the war "brought no concerted move to the left". (11) He sees industrial disputes such as those in 
engineering as having "a marginal effect on the Labour movement". Instead he stresses the view that 
union leaders moved to the right, attacking the left in both the unions and the Labour Party. (12) He sees 
the new Labour Constitution as a consequence of this, giving the Party Conference, dominated by the 
trade unions, the power to elect the NEC. Nevertheless he accepts that it was the union dominated NEC 
that drew up Clause 4 and the 1918 Manifesto, with its call for the socialisation of industry. (13) He 
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concludes that "if the war did not necessarily mean the defeat of socialism in Britain, it did mean the 
defeat of socialists". (14) 
Tanner also denies the emergence of a single working-class consciousness during the war years. He 
sees a diffuse working class, which had no uniform class experience and was patriotic in its support of 
the war effort. He points out that there were "some changes but not a complete rupture with the 
past". (15) Tanner claims that government intervention was "piecemeal and cautious", due to union 
strength. With a shortage of labour, skilled workers were often able to resist the "dilution of labour" at 
a local level. (16) Furthermore he recognises that "the material well being and living standards of those 
engaged in war work, and particularly the unskilled, were far better in 1918 than in 1914. Earnings 
were more regular, overtime more common, and supplementary work for family members was more 
freely available". (17) Strike action, he points out, "fell away" with fewer days lost to strike action 
during the war than in any year since 1909. (18) 
Nevertheless skilled workers frequently resented improvements secured by the unskilled. Tanner 
claims that strikes in engineering, ironfounding and boot and shoe work in 1917-18 were aimed in 
general at preserving differentials. (19) He accepts, however, that Labour's agitation on behalf of the 
working class for higher allowances for dependants and control of rents and food prices helped bring 
about a situation of "working-class awareness" but not class consciousness. (20) Tanner's fairly positive 
picture of industrial relations seems true for the early years of the war, but by the winter of 1917-18 
there was a different atmosphere with war weariness and more strike activity. (21) 
In 1914 the Labour Party had appeared to split when MacDonald resigned the leadership of the PLP 
over his opposition to the war. MacDonald's stand was backed by the ILP, but the majority of the 
Labour Party backed Henderson, who took over the leadership. Henderson supported the war, fearing 
isolation and charges of defeatism if Labour opposed it. He realised that the party had to stay close to 
public opinion, support the war, but be critical of the government's failures. There was, however, no 
major split in the Labour Party during the war years in spite of a number of divisive issues. (22) 
Henderson became a member of Asquith's Coalition Cabinet, where he persuaded the party to 
accept conscription, despite his own earlier misgivings. In 1916 he was elevated into Lloyd George's 
five-man War Cabinet, where he secured a favourable deal for the party, including Labour controlled 
ministries, nationalisation of the coal mines and no industrial conscription. (23) MacDonald, 
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meanwhile, became chairman of the Union of Democratic Control, which included radical Liberals 
opposed to the war. It called fora negotiated peace and an end to secret diplomacy. (24) 
It was a combination of the revolution in Russia and Henderson's removal from office in August 
1917, after Lloyd George disapproved of his decision to attend the international socialist conference in 
Stockholm, which marks the emergence of Labour as an independent force. Pugh has described Lloyd 
George's action at this time as "a major blunder", as it led to "a rapprochement between middle class 
Socialists of the ILP and UDC and moderate trade unionists". (25) Wrigley too has claimed that after 
Henderson's resignation from the government, "Lloyd George never recovered the trust of the trade 
union centre of the Labour movement". (26) 
More important for Labour, however, was the opportunity it gave Henderson to improve the 
organisation of the Labour Party ready for a post-war election. In particular he worked with Sidney 
Webb to secure a new Party Constitution. This was adopted at a party conference held in February 
1918. Many of the changes reflected the increased influence of trade unions on the movement since the 
outbreak of the war-(27) There was also pressure on the Labour Party at this time from right wingers 
such as Havelock Wilson of the seamen, who were talking of forming a separate Trade Union Labour 
Party. (28) Meanwhile in response to the expansion of the electorate by the 1918 Representation of the 
People Act, Henderson secured the establishment of constituency parties with individual membership. 
Before 1918 membership of the Labour Party had only been possible through affiliated bodies, such as 
the trade unions or the Socialist Societies. Finally as part of the new Party Constitution, Clause 4 was 
adopted, calling for the nationalisation of the means of production. Historians have put forward a 
number of conflicting reasons for this. Whilst it might be seen by some as a move to the left, it seems 
that there was no intention to translate Clause 4 into a comprehensive programme. McKibbin, for 
instance, claims that Clause 4 was adopted in order to give the party a direction as well as a means to 
differentiate it from the Liberals. (29) 
In June 1918 the party adopted Labour and the New Social Order, which gave them a distinctive 
programme, with which to fight the 1918 Election. It called for "the socialisation of industry in order to 
secure the elimination of every kind of inefficiency and waste". (30) It went on to propose the common 
ownership of land, the nationalisation of railways, canals, coal and electricity, a capital levy to pay off 
the National Debt and social reforms in housing, health and education. Thorpe describes it as in many 
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ways a "radical programme", but also "a constructive programme, aiming to preserve the extended 
wartime state and the increased saliency of working-class demands that the war had brought". (3 1) 
In June 1918 the Party Conference agreed to abandon the election truce. Henderson's work in 
improving Labour's organisation meant that the number of affiliated constituency bodies had risen 
from 199 in 1916 to 400 in 1919. (32) Meanwhile the number of professional agents had increased from 
17 in 1912 to 80 in 1918. (33) Henderson's improvements in the organisation of the Labour Party 
enabled it to field 361 candidates for the election, of whom 140 were backed by local parties, 50 by the 
ILP and the rest by trade unions. This was a reflection in part on Labour's improved financial position, 
as union affiliation grew. (34) This must be seen as a major factor behind the emergence of the party as 
the second political force in 1918. 
Lloyd George's decision to fight a `khaki' election in December 1918 owed much to his fear of the 
threat of Socialism and the need to elect a new parliament before the impact of demobilisation was 
felt. (35) The government was able to exploit the national sense of Germanophobia, which prevailed at 
the time. The result was a triumph for the Coalition, which won a total of 523 seats, of whom 379 were 
Conservatives. (36) The Labour Party contested 361 seats, winning 57 of them and claiming 20.8 per 
cent of the vote. The Asquithian Liberals were isolated as the party, which had failed in government 
and then opposed Lloyd George. They secured only 13 per cent of the vote and 36 seats. 
Some historians have stressed the disappointing nature of Labour's result, especially given the 
strength of the trade union movement at this time. Turner, for instance, writes that the 1918 Election 
was "a deliberate and largely successful effort to hold back the advances of the Labour Party". (37) He 
describes Labour's performance as "unimpressive" and "worse than predicted". (38) Thorpe too claims 
that the party's performance in England was particularly "disappointing", winning only 8 more seats 
than in December 1910. Even in mining areas Labour won only 24 of the 50 divisions, which had the 
highest proportion of miners. Also in the 12 largest provincial centres Labour won only 6 of the 87 
available seats. "Only in the Midlands did Labour win seats in distinctly new areas". (39) 
Other historians have seen Labour's performance in a more positive light. McKibbin, for instance, 
stresses that in this election the party secured its "independence", since it had successfully broken its 
pact with the Liberals. (40) Indeed Lloyd George had spent much time attacking Labour as a class party, 
run by "the extreme pacifist Bolshevik group". (41) Many Coalition candidates had compared Labour 
with the Bolsheviks in Russia. (42) In these circumstances Labour's performance can be seen in a more 
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creditable light, especially as they emerged from the election as the main opposition party to the 
Coalition. It should also be remembered that Lloyd George had a great propaganda advantage, having 
called the election just after the Armistice had been signed. 
It is obvious that Labour had successfully removed many of the constraints that had held it back in 
the pre-war years. Historians, however, have been divided over where the emphasis should be put. 
Those such as Wilson (43) and Bentley (44), who claim that the Liberals were still a major electoral 
force down to 1914, have put the emphasis for their decline in 1918 on the impact of the war and 
especially the divisions it brought to their party. The wartime split in the Liberals led amongst other 
things to the abandonment of the party's reforming zeal. The Asquithians, who remained outside the 
Government, were not capable of standing as a party of the left, as they tended to be those least 
sympathetic to New Liberalism. Lloyd George, himself, could only continue with Conservative 
support, which curtailed any reform programme. The final disaster for the Liberals was to be his 
mishandling of the `coupon' before the 1918 Election. Tanner has also pointed out that Liberal 
divisions affected the constituencies, especially in areas where organisation was weak, as in parts of the 
West Midlands. Here the party had been dominated by a small group of radical Progressives, who now 
defected to Labour, leaving no constituency organisation. (45) 
Those historians of the party, who have linked the rise of the Labour Party with the emergence of 
militant trade unionism in the pre-war years, have seen Labour's achievements in the post-war years as 
the climax of this. (46) In particular they point to the party's success in the pre-war years in capturing 
the trade union vote from the Liberals at a time when union membership was increasing. (47) Wrigley, 
for instance, has put much emphasis on the Trade Union Act of 1913, which permitted trade unions to 
set up a political fund. Those unions whose members voted in favour of Labour representation "ensured 
Labour's post-First World War electoral finances, and in themselves reflect an element of the 
explanation for the rise of the Labour Party and the decline of the Liberal Party in the twentieth 
century". (48) Reynolds and Laybourn, in their study of the Labour Party in West Yorkshire, claim that 
even before 1914 the Liberal decline "had probably become irreversible" due to Labour's support from 
the trade unions. (49) 
During the war trade union membership rose nationally from 4 million in 1914 to 6.5 million in 1918 
with 5.3 million affiliated to the TUC. (50) This trend was encouraged by the role which unions played 
during the war. Many historians see this as the key factor behind Labour's rise in the post-war years. 
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McKibbin, for instance, stresses that of Labour's 57 victories all but 8 MPs were union nominees. He 
summed up Labour's success by claiming that "in this election, as in the three succeeding it, successful 
Labour candidates rode the unions to parliament". (5 1) Savage and Miles show that, as a consequence 
of Labour's dependence on the trade unions in 1918, most of their support came from small towns, 
especially in mining districts. In fact only 19 per cent of its MPs and 22 per cent of its total vote came 
from large cities, with only Manchester, where 4 seats were won, seen as "a Labour stronghold" in 
1918. (52) 
Tanner, however, has claimed that increased union membership did not necessarily mean greater 
involvement in Labour politics. He points to the unwillingness of unions to finance further 
parliamentary candidates in 1914-5 as well as the strength of opposition by union members to political 
affiliation in ballots held at this time. (53) Indeed even in those unions, which were closest to Labour, 
such as the miners and railwaymen, the political fund was not always being widely collected. For 
instance only one eighth of NUR members were paying the levy in 1917 and less than a half in 1918. 
For ASLEF it was only a quarter. (54) Nevertheless during the war more unions, including the 
Engineers, voted to support political representation. (55) 
According to Tanner, three factors persuaded Labour to increase its number of parliamentary 
candidates in 1918. There was the split in the Liberals, which amongst other things restricted their 
standing as a party of reform. Boundary revisions and proposals for an Alternative Vote were thought 
to give Labour an advantage in the constituencies. Finally the revolution in Russia gave Labour 
confidence in what might be achieved. (56) Even so as late as April 1918 Labour had only 115 fixed 
candidates, according to NEC Minutes. (57) 
Where Labour was successful in 1918 Tanner does recognise the importance of the link with the 
trade unions. He accepts that unions like the miners and railwayman, who benefited from state control 
of their industries, were influenced by Labour's policy on nationalisation. (58) Even so these unions 
financed less than half the 160 trade-union sponsored candidates in the 1918 General Election. (59) 
Tanner also sees Labour building on its success in Tory working-class constituencies where Liberalism 
was weak. He claims that these seats, which were mainly in the North West and the West Midlands, 
were won because of the party's association with the gains made by the predominant local union. (60) 
Tanner is on less certain ground, however, when he suggests that Labour support in these seats came 
predominantly from the unskilled. (61) Unions representing the unskilled were the most patriotic in 
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their support for the war, which suggests that this element of the working class was more likely to be 
attracted by the appeal of Lloyd George. Indeed nationally the party appeared to stand for the skilled 
worker, who wanted the return of pre-war working conditions. This was the situation, which Savage 
found in Preston, where the local party was dominated by the engineering union. They were opposed to 
the continued use of female labour and stood for the restoration of pre-war working conditions. (62) It is 
true that Labour did less well in those Liberal working-class heartlands, where a Liberal organisation 
and economic message remained. (63) Tanner describes Labour here as having "put a foot in the door 
... but 
it was not always unchallenged or unchallengeable". (64) 
Another constraint on the growth of the Labour Party, which has caused a certain amount of 
controversy, was the restricted size of the working-class electorate. This was removed by the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918, which trebled the number of voters from 7 to 21 million. In 
addition to all men over 21 with a six-month residential qualification having the vote, all women over 
30, who were householders or wives of householders and enfranchised for municipal elections, were 
also given the vote. Matthew, McKibbin and Kay have pointed out that the pre-war franchise prevented 
the emergence of a truly working-class electorate, as about 4'/2 million men were disenfranchised. They 
see the 1918 Franchise Act as a major factor in Labour's replacing the Liberal Party, claiming that the 
Act not only trebled the size of the electorate it also transformed its character. (65) Turner, in a detailed 
analysis of the 1918 Election, also points to a correlation between new male voters and Labour support 
although not as strongly as McKibbin suggested. (66) 
Tanner, however, claims that the 1918 Reform Act tended to give the vote to the sons and wives of 
previously enfranchised male voters, which was unlikely to cause much "political disruption". He 
estimates a small but not significant increase in the proportion of working-class voters in 1918 from 70 
to 78 per cent of the population as a whole. (67) Tanner sees the boundary revisions of 1918 as more 
significant. They worked to Labour's advantage, because they were based on `economic interest'. They 
tended to create homogeneous industrial seats to the benefit of Labour and rural agricultural 
constituencies to the benefit of the Tories. (68) 
The impact of the female vote in 1918, which made up 40 per cent of the electorate, is generally 
reckoned to have benefited the Conservatives, as there were disproportionately more middle-class 
women enfranchised under the terms of the 1918 Act. Moreover it was suggested, even at the time, that 
women were more likely to support the Coalition, as they were stronger for vengeance against the 
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Germans out of loyalty to their menfolk. (69) Also, according to Savage and Miles, many women were 
likely to see the Labour Party as being dominated by male trade unionists, who were often hostile to 
female employment. Women in work were also much less likely to be members of a trade union. (70) 
Historians have said that the Labour Party was better suited than the Liberals for mobilising the new 
extended franchise. According to Matthew, McKibbin and Kay the Liberals failed to take electoral 
organisation seriously and were "unwilling to make the necessary demagogic appeals to the mass 
electorate created by the 1918 Act". They still believed the electorate would be attracted by "an appeal 
to issues, to good sense, to active citizenship, to intelligent political interest and to an articulate 
awareness of the content of legislation". (71) The Labour Party, however, did not base its appeal on 
"democratic rationalism". Policy was never allowed to stand in the way of exploiting "the diffuse but 
intense social conscience of its adherents". Emphasis was put on "shrewdly contrived slogans" and 
"subtle calls upon class loyalty". (72) 
Although Lloyd George's decision to call a `khaki' election in 1918 brought him a great victory, it 
also opened a new era in politics, as the Labour Party became the main opposition. This factor, which 
was seen as a threat by many on the right, coloured politics during the inter-war period. The need to 
challenge or accommodate the Labour Party was to become a pressing issue in the years that followed. 
B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
Birmingham has been described by Boughton as "a bastion of working-class Toryism" and "a Mecca 
of Unionism" during the inter war years. (73) The tradition for this dates back to the era of Joseph 
Chamberlain, who, as Liberal Lord Mayor of Birmingham, was responsible for a range of social 
reforms. These were aimed at capturing the votes of the newly enfranchised working-class 
householders in the city. Having failed to impose his views nationally on the Gladstonian Liberal Party, 
Chamberlain fused his radical group with the Conservatives to form the Unionist Party. Although much 
of their reforming zeal had waned, the move had a major impact on Birmingham politics. In particular 
it left the Liberal Party a weak force in the city, so that even in 1906 at the height of the party's success 
nationally, Birmingham returned only Unionist M. Ps. The Chamberlain tradition was continued by his 
successors in the city throughout the inter-war period with two of his sons, Austen and Neville, 
representing wards in the city and featuring prominently on the national stage. (74). 
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Unionism in Birmingham was assisted by the unique nature of the local economy. At the turn of the 
century the city of a thousand trades was the centre of small-scale industry, where trade unions were 
weak and there was little independent working-class organisation. Even amongst the poorest in the 
seven ̀inner ring' wards the attraction of the Chamberlain tradition was strong. "The semi mystical 
power of the name itself' has been considered an important factor. (75) Within the slums Boughton 
describes "a fatalistic working-class mentality predicated on survival" with little time for "unproductive 
ideas of self improvement or social change". There was also "an ostensibly apolitical but strongly 
conservative culture" often centred around the public house but with a strong sense of "civic identity 
and patriotism". In these circumstances the Labour Party could be seen as outsiders threatening 
change. (76) 
Yet there were signs that the economic structure of the city was beginning to change in the pre-war 
years, as new large-scale factories emerged with the development of the motor and electrical 
engineering industries. This process was accelerated during the First World War, when Birmingham 
became a major arsenal for the allies. The city's factories were expanded to cater for the manufacture 
of army vehicles, aircraft components, machine tools and shells. The Austin works, for instance, which 
employed 2,800 workers in 1914, increased its workforce to 20,000 by 1918, after the factory was 
converted to the manufacture of munitions. (77) 
As far as the Labour Party was concerned Unionism exercised a major constraint on its development 
in the city. Yet in the immediate pre-war years and during the First World War itself there was a rise in 
trade union membership and industrial militancy. The Birmingham Trades Council, which had been 
formed as early as 1866, began to reflect this changing situation. (78) At first they had worked with the 
Liberals to secure the return of working men to School Boards and then the Town Council. In 1901 
they affiliated to the LRC. and unsuccessfully stood two Labour candidates in the 1906 Election. (79) 
In the boom years before the First World War industrial militancy mostly affected semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers, who were seeking a minimum wage. In 1913 the Birmingham Trades Council 
supported the Workers' Union in backing a demand for a general minimum wage of 23 shillings 
throughout the engineering and metal working industries. A bitter dispute then broke out initially 
across the Black Country but then in Birmingham itself, which was largely successful. (80) 
During the war most of the industrial unrest was brought about by skilled engineers in the ASE, who 
resisted wartime changes to their status, especially over the `dilution of labour' in munitions work. An 
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official agreement was reached in 1915 to last for the duration of the war, but as this did not apply to 
private work there was unrest here during 1917. There was rancour too with the Workers' Union, 
representing the semi skilled and unskilled, over the privileges which skilled men enjoyed, especially 
with regard to recruitment. There was a further disagreement over enrolling women workers into trade 
unions. The ASE, which was male only, handed over the recruitment of women in engineering to Mary 
Macarthur's National Union of Women Workers. Julia Varley, however, claimed that women would 
secure a better deal as members of the Workers' Union. (81) Skilled men were also affected by the so 
called ̀ leaving certificate', which prevented them from leaving employment at a munitions works to 
find work elsewhere without the written permission of their employer. A shop steward movement 
emerged to defend the workers, as the official union leadership was pledged to industrial peace. Unrest 
broke out during 1917-18 over these matters and also to secure pay rises to match price increases. By 
the summer of 1916 the cost of living had risen by 50 per cent on pre-war levels, whilst wage rates 
lagged behind on 20 per cent. (82) 
Having removed the `leaving certificate', skilled workers were faced with the `embargo'. Every 
factory employing skilled men needed a license from the Ministry of Munitions. An embargo was then 
placed on employing skilled men in those factories without the license. This was seen as another blow 
to the mobility of skilled men. It led to 150,000 workers in the Birmingham area coming out on strike 
on the 25th July 1918. The dispute lasted two days until the government threatened to withdraw the 
men's protection from military service. This strike, which was bitterly attacked in the local press, 
reflected the level of dissatisfaction amongst skilled engineers at this time. (83) 
Divisions in the workplace were reflected within the Birmingham Trades Council. In 1914 the 
Trades Council and the local LRC merged. At first criticism of the Government's war policy was 
limited to members of the ILP and the newly formed Union of Democratic Control. Joseph Southall, 
the chairman of the local branch of the ILP, spoke on anti-war platforms. The issue of conscription, 
however, was to prove to be a seriously divisive one within the Birmingham Labour movement as a 
whole. In the workplace the ASE, representing the skilled workers, backed their powers to claim 
exemption for their members from military service. The Workers' Union, on the other hand, took a 
leading role in recruitment with Jack Beard, its leading midlands official, active in the British Workers' 
League. This was an organisation set up to counter the growing appeal of the Labour Party, combat 
pacifist feelings and arouse patriotism amongst the working class. Financed by Milner, it combined 
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strong nationalism with socialist views on the state control of industry. It was also opposed to Free 
Trade and especially the future importation of German goods. Lloyd George supported the League, 
making its president, John Hodge, his Minister of Labour. (84) The chairman of the Birmingham branch 
of the League was Eldred Hallas, who was Joint Secretary of the Gas, Municipal and General Workers 
and a local Labour councillor. 
Within the Birmingham Trades and Labour Council the chief opponent of conscription was 
Councillor Kneeshaw, whilst its main supporters were Councillor Kesterton, the secretary, who was 
backed by union leaders such as Beard of the Workers' Union, Hallas and W. J. Davis of the 
Brassworkers. Such was the strength of feeling on the matter that differences reached the local 
press. (85) The Trades and Labour Council, itself, having supported the voluntary system, voted 72-55 
against conscription in 1916 
A more serious rift occurred, when a number of Labour leaders took up the case for a negotiated 
peace. Jim Simmons, a discharged, wounded soldier, organised and spoke at meetings under the banner 
of Peace by Negotiations. (86) Eventually the Council passed a motion to seek a negotiated settlement 
by 43 votes to 29. As a result of this a group emerged, which sought a more energetic prosecution of 
the war, claiming that the Council misrepresented the views of trade unionists. 13 branches resigned, 
including the Electrical Trades Union, the Brassworkers and some Workers Union branches. They 
claimed that "the Council had been devoting too much time to political matters to the exclusion of trade 
unionism". (87) 
In August 1918 they formed the Birmingham and District Trades Union Industrial Council, including 
members such as Eldred Hallas, W. J. Davies and Jack Beard. The group had links with the British 
Workers' League and hoped to form a separate Trade Union Labour Party. (88) They opposed 
Henderson's reorganisation of the Labour Party, fearing it would lead to an influx of middle-class 
pacifists. They also opposed his decision to leave the Coalition and break the election truce. Plans to set 
up an alternative Labour Party, however, broke down. Instead they decided to join the recently formed 
National Democratic Party, in order to oppose pacifist Labour candidates in the forthcoming 
election. (89) 
By the end of the war, despite the apparent rise in trade unionism, the labour movement in 
Birmingham entered the 1918 General Election in a divided state. The Birmingham Trades and Labour 
Council was dominated by those who were opposed to conscription and had long favoured a negotiated 
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peace. Its secretary, Fred Rudland, had been elected as an anti-conscriptionist. When in July 1918 the 
Birmingham Central Labour Party was formed, it also reflected these views. The party selected only 
five candidates to fight the twelve wards in this Election. They included, Jack Kneeshaw of the ILP at 
Ladywood, who had led the anti-conscription group since 1915. Another left winger, who later became 
a member of the Communist Party, was Dr Dunstan, who fought Moseley On the other hand 
Councillor Shann, who had repudiated the ILP's opposition to the war, fought Yardley. In addition to 
the Labour candidates, there were two, who represented the political wing of the Co-operative 
Movement, including Frank Spires, the chairman of the Trades and Labour Council, at Sparkbrook. 
There were also two Independent Labour candidates. Another candidate, Edmunsen, was disqualified 
from standing in West Birmingham, because he was too late in handing in the money for his 
deposit. (90) 
On the other side there were labour representatives tanding for the Coalition. In accordance with the 
tradition of keeping politics out of trade unions, Alderman Jephcott, a former president of the Trades 
Council, stood for Yardley as a Unionist candidate. Eldred Hallas stood for the National Democratic 
Party as a couponed Coalition candidate for the Duddeston seat. Labour had been prepared to oppose 
him, but a letter in the Minute Book of the Birmingham Borough Labour Party explains their decision 
to withdraw following a Liberal nomination. It appears that the reason for this was finance rather than 
any deal with the Liberals. (91) 
In an electoral survey of Birmingham the Daily Mail described the mood of the city as one of 
"radicalism and desire for long delayed reform". (92) Yet it went on to explain that "such is the effect of 
a generation of use and habit, that.... the entire representation of the twelve divisions of this 
progressive community is about to be committed to Tory reactionaries or colourless, characterless, 
political compromises". Labour's association with pacifism did not bode well, since, the article pointed 
out, the "the city is intensely patriotic. The pacifists during the war.... are an inconsiderable and 
despised section". (93) 
Although the Labour Party failed to win any seats their performance was not totally disastrous. Their 
best results were in the outer suburbs of the city, such as Yardley where Councillor G. Shann won 38 
per cent of the vote and at Kings Norton, where the pacifist Co-op candidate, T. Hackett, won 30 per 
cent of the vote. Another cause for satisfaction for Labour was that they finished ahead of the Liberals 
in every seat, where the two parties clashed. Yet with so many of their candidates opposed to 
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conscription, it had been easy for the Unionists to portray Labour as the party of pacifism. The Labour 
Party also lacked the finances and organisation to match the Unionists. This was particularly important 
in this election given that so many new voters were on the electoral roll. 
2. THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO 1918 
Before 1914 the Black Country was considered to be an economically depressed region. (94) The coal 
and iron industries were in terminal decline, whilst many of the metal working trades, like chain and 
nail making, were suffering from outdated technology. Whilst Birmingham continued to expand as a 
manufacturing centre, the Black Country stagnated. Unemployment was high, whilst wages were low. 
There were exceptions to this, especially in the case of Wolverhampton, where a number of large 
factories were built in the early twentieth century, making electrical equipment, cycles and motor 
vehicles, along with their accessories. (95) 
There were other significant differences between the two regions. Whilst Birmingham had 
transformed itself in the late nineteenth century into a city with distinctive public buildings, the Black 
Country apart from Wolverhampton, remained a region of industrial villages. There had also been none 
of the urban social reforms here associated with Chamberlain, which had linked the Birmingham 
working class to Unionism. Liberalism too remained a stronger force in some parts of the Black 
Country than in Birmingham. Much of this could have been due to the strength of Nonconformity in 
many parts of the region. 
Yet before 1914 the Black Country, like Birmingham, had seemed a particularly unfruitful region for 
the Labour Party. One factor here was probably the much-stated factor of the weakness of trade unions 
in both regions. Only in Wolverhampton had Labour achieved any major success. Five councillors 
were elected here between 1898-1908, before a counterattack by the Conservatives removed all but two 
of them. (96) More spectacular, however, was the Labour success in the Wolverhampton West 
constituency in the 1906 General Election, although this owed much to the active support provided by 
the Liberal Party. (97) Elsewhere in 1906 Black Country voters rejected Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff 
Reform programme, despite the proximity of Birmingham. The Liberals won all but one seat in the 
region, due to the fear that the abandonment of Free Trade would increase the cost of living. Yet the 
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swing to the Liberals here was less than 4 per cent, as Tariff Reform had some appeal, especially in 
areas of depressed industries. (98) 
As far as the Labour Party was concerned organisation, where it did exist, it was held back by 
disagreements between trade unionists and Socialists, such as the ILP. In particular the former looked 
for practical policies, which frequently meant working with the Liberals, whilst the latter was not 
willing to make such compromises, preferring to campaign alone. One area where this division was 
particularly evident was Wolverhampton, where the ILP wanted to field more candidates in local 
elections. (99) 
Despite their successes in 1906 the Liberal organisation was struggling to survive in many Black 
Country constituencies. (100) It is this apparent Liberal weakness, which has led Tanner to include the 
region in with the rest of the West Midlands under the description of Tory working-class. (101) Yet in 
West Bromwich under the influence of its MP, Dr Hazel, the Liberals did develop a radical 
profile. (102) In Walsall, too, the Liberals worked with local trade unions, such as the miners and 
railwaymen, backing Lib/Lab candidates for municipal elections. (103) Moreover in the two 
constituencies of Wolverhampton East and North Worcestershire the party remained firmly entrenched 
with working-class support. Indeed these were to be the only two seats left to the Liberals after the 
1910 Elections. Elsewhere the appeal of the Conservative's Tariff Reform policy was a significant 
factor. This was due mainly to the persistence of unemployment and low wages in the Black Country, 
whose industries were mainly dependent on the home market and prone to foreign competition. (104) 
In the years between 1910 and the outbreak of the First World War the Labour Party began to make 
steady progress in the region. Labour Representation Committees were set up in Smethwick in 1909 
and in West Bromwich and Wednesbury in 1912, whilst in Walsall a Labour Association was 
established in 1912 to secure political representation. (105) Labour's next successes came in local 
elections, especially those in Smethwick in 1912 and 1913, where nearly half the council's seats were 
captured. (106) 
In most of the Black Country constituencies, however, the party remained poorly organised and 
financed. Tanner, in his survey of regional Labour Parties at this time, claims that, had there been an 
election in 1915, Labour would only have contested Wolverhampton West, where A. G. Walkden was 
selected in 1912. (107) There was also a prospective candidate in Wednesbury, but the local party 
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backed down from its commitment to fight the seat. Finance was a problem in West Bromwich, whilst 
in the Handsworth division, of which Smethwick was a part, no candidate had been appointed. (108) 
One major feature of the region in the immediate pre-war years and during the war itself was the 
increase in trade union membership and industrial unrest. Traditionally the Black Country, with its 
small scale mines and factories along with the survival of sub-contracting, was seen as a region with 
limited labour militancy. (109) Tanner in his brief survey of the region stresses the impact of the rent 
strikes of 1912-4 and the municipal workers' strikes of 1913 on the growth of Labour support. Perhaps 
more significant, however, was the widespread unrest across the engineering and metal working 
industries during 1913 as semi-skilled workers sought a minimum wage of 23 shillings a week. At one 
time 30,000 workers were on strike and some stayed out for 3 months. Peace was only achieved when 
the employers conceded the minimum wage. The result was to be a big increase in union membership 
by the semi skilled, who, in the absence of support from the craft unions, had turned to the Workers' 
Union. At the same time the support given to the strikers by the Labour Party helped to cement ties 
between the two. As a result Labour seemed to benefit from the industrial militancy, as was shown by 
their successes in local elections in Smethwick. (110) 
The trend towards increased trade union membership continued during the First World War, when 
parts of the Black Country, especially Smethwick and Wolverhampton, became centres of engineering 
for the munitions industry with a large increase in the workforce. Full employment coupled with the 
higher profile the government gave to organised labour caused union membership to rise rapidly. 
Barnsby puts the growth in ASE membership in the Black Country at two and a half times between 
December 1914 and December 1918. (l 11) In Wolverhampton overall trade union membership rose 
from 5,000 to 20,000. Dudley had 4,000 trade unionists with 3,000 affiliated to the trades council, 
which was reformed in 1916. (112) New trades councils were also set up in Rowley Regis, Oldbury and 
Brierley Hill to augment existing ones in the larger centres. (113) Nevertheless Barnsby's conclusion is 
that "trades council activity grew considerably during the war ... but neither trades council activity nor 
trade union membership seems to have expanded as fast as either the opportunities or the necessities of 
wartime demanded". (l 14) 
There was similar friction in the Black Country as in Birmingham between skilled workers, like the 
Engineers and the general unions such as the Workers' Union. Rising prices and war profiteering were 
two further issues, on which unions acted. Wages, which were fixed by a Committee on Production, 
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tended at first to lag behind price increases. After 1916, however, lower skilled workers benefited from 
flat rate increases. This led to complaints from skilled men that their differentials were being eroded. 
When in October 1917 skilled men were able to secure a 12' per cent bonus, following the removal of 
the `leaving certificate' there was unofficial action amongst the lower paid piece workers. Eventually 
they were offered a 7'h per cent bonus, but in February 1918 there was an outbreak of strikes by piece 
workers demanding the full increase. It began with nut and bolt workers in Wednesbury, followed by 
the tube workers. Later Black Country workers were affected in July 1918 by the full-scale dispute 
over the `embargo'. 
The Black Country labour movement was to be similarly divided as Birmingham over the issue of 
conscription On the one hand the Union of Democratic Control, which was set up to oppose it, had a 
branch in Wolverhampton. (115) On the other side the British Workers' League was active in the 
region, holding a meeting in Wolverhampton in May 1916, where John Beard took the chair and the 
local speaker was Reverend J. A. Shaw. (116) Another prominent member of the League was Victor 
Fisher, who was a former member of the British Socialist Party, but had resigned over its pacifist 
opinions. He then formed the Socialist National Defence Committee in 1915, which he soon merged 
with the League, becoming its president for a time. 
Fisher spoke at a League meeting at Wolverhampton in January 1917. Another spokesman for the 
League was Charlie Sitch, who was an influential trades union official in the chain making industry. 
Indeed Shaw and Sitch were the League's main speakers in the region during 1917, addressing large 
meetings at Willenhall, Wolverhampton, Dudley and Brierley Hill. (1 17) Later Fisher negotiated with 
Steel-Maitland, the prominent Birmingham Unionist over the distribution of seats for National 
Democratic candidates in the 1918 General Election. (118) As a result Hallas stood at Duddeston in 
Birmingham, the Reverend J. A. Shaw contested Wolverhampton East, whilst Fisher, himself, stood in 
Stourbridge. All these candidates sought to appeal to the patriotic working class and were strongly 
backed by Lloyd George, who gave them the `coupon'. Charlie Sitch, on the other hand, stood as the 
Labour candidate for Kingswinford. 
By the time of the 1918 Coupon Election the Labour Party was ready to fight nine of the ten Black 
Country seats. The constraints that had held back the party before the war had been largely removed. In 
particular the wartime growth of trade unions and especially the numbers affiliated to trades councils, 
gave local Labour parties the funds to finance candidates. Moreover the war had brought forward 
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employment issues, which trade unionists felt would need political representation to promote their 
views. 
B. THE 1918 GENERAL ELECTION 
1. SMETHWICK 
Smethwick was one Black Country seat where Labour seemed to benefit from the boundary changes 
brought about in 1917. It was now a largely working-class constituency, created out of the old 
Handsworth seat. According to Pelling, the growth of Smethwick had made this constituency less safe 
for Unionism in the 1906 and 1910 General Elections. (119) Indeed Handsworth had the lowest 
percentage Unionist vote in the January 1910 Election amongst the seats within the Birmingham 
District classification. (120) Labour had also been successful in the Smethwick municipal elections held 
immediately before the First World War. (121) 
Industry had boomed in Smethwick during the war years, so that by 1918 there was an estimated 
9,000 trade union members represented on the local Trades Council. (122) This probably reflected the 
fact that, unlike other Black Country towns, Smethwick possessed a number of large employers of 
labour such as Tangyes, Avery, GKN and Chances glass works. The Labour candidate, John Davison, 
was a local man of moderate views, who was adopted as candidate in December 1917. (123) Davison 
had been the national organiser for the Society of Ironfounders for 6'h years as well as being on a 
number of government wartime committees. He had supported the war effort and spoken at recruiting 
meetings. (124) Nevertheless, the Birmingham Post claimed that he had "pacifist leanings", which was 
said to have displeased some local trade unionists. They also described him as "an extremist of the type 
that in parliament has been a source of embarrassment rather than help to the government". The reason 
for this appears to be his unwillingness to force severe reparations on Germany. (125) 
There was to be confusion amongst the Coalition supporters, as to who was to represent them. 
Initially the candidate should have been ̀ Major' Thompson, a popular local figure, who was chairman 
of the Handsworth Divisional Association and president of the Smethwick Conservative club. The 
situation was changed, however, when Christabel Pankhurst emerged on the scene, announcing herself 
as the `Independent Patriotic' candidate. Pankhurst was a former member of the Labour Party herself, 
but had left it during the war. She had been active in the region during October, when she addressed 
three meetings in Wednesbury on the theme of the ̀ Dangers of Bolshevism'. (126) Fearing a split in the 
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anti-Labour vote, a letter was sent to Thompson from Lloyd George and Bonar Law, suggesting that he 
stand down. (127) 
The removal of Thompson probably helped Labour as he was a popular local personality, who had 
been pledged support from the Smethwick Liberals. (128) Pankhurst was backed by patriotic Labour 
leaders such as Jack Kesterton, who was a local Labour councillor and union leader. He had, however, 
resigned as secretary of the Birmingham Trades Council after it had voted to oppose conscription. In a 
letter of support for Pankhurst he wrote that "We want the best brains of all parties, both sexes and we 
must have a Coalition Government. Now that the Labour Party has given itself over to the pacifist 
faction, it has no claims on working men". (129) 
Kesterton's views were swiftly disowned by the Smethwick Trades Council, which quickly met and 
secured his resignation from the party. (130) The constituency was now "flooded" with Pankhurst's 
"lady workers and literature" with the aim of capturing women's votes and those of the patriotic 
working class. (131) She promised women workers "equal pay for equal work", along with social 
reforms. (132) Her main message, however, appeared to be that Labour was a Bolshevik and pro- 
German Party. (133) 
Away from Smethwick it was felt that Pankhurst would win the seat with a large majority to become 
one of the first women MPs. (134) Locally, however, it was thought that the treatment of Thompson 
would tell against the Coalition. Davison did not fit the image painted by Pankhurst, as he had worked 
hard to promote the war effort. (135) Furthermore he sought to secure the female vote by circulating a 
leaflet, which argued that the Labour Party was the women's party. (136) Davison also made a big 
appeal to his working-class constituency by raising the issue of the restoration of pre-war working 
customs, which he claimed Lloyd George had promised to restore, but "was not prepared to carry it out 
in entirety". He also claimed credit for negotiating a 47-hour week for the engineering and metal 
industries. (13 7) 
The result was a narrow majority for Labour. The local press blamed "outside interference" by 
Pankhurst and her supporters for Davison's victory. (138) Pugh has recently highlighted Davison's 
victory as an example of a Labour candidate, who appealed to working-class Conservatives by 
successfully combining patriotism with support for government intervention in the form of the 
nationalisation of key industries. (139) There is much to be said for this, especially as Davison had 
played an important role in supporting the government's war effort, which shielded him from 
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Pankhurst's vitriolic attacks. Yet the key factor in Labour's victory in Smethwick was the candidate's 
trade union links, which enabled him to seem aware of the potential post-war industrial problems in a 
town where trade unionism had grown rapidly. 
2. WEST BROMWICH 
In West Bromwich the local Trades Council decided to consult affiliated trade unions over a Labour 
candidate in November 1917, although not everyone supported this decision. (140) In February 1918, 
however, it was unanimously agreed to fight the seat, especially as Labour had already decided to 
contest Wednesbury, Smethwick and Stourbridge. (141) It was claimed that the town had 7-8,000 trade 
unionists, of whom 3,000 were members of the Workers' Union. (142) The ILP in West Bromwich was 
also a powerful force. Under Harry Brockhouse it had led opposition to the war, describing the decision 
of the Labour leaders to join the Government as "silly vanity". (143) 
The first candidate to be selected was Joe Bailey, a native of West Bromwich, and secretary of the 
local ILP. He was acting secretary of the Trades Council and had also represented local workers on the 
National Council of the Ironfounders. (144) In his acceptance speech Bailey announced that "he would 
stand first as a Socialist and afterwards a trade unionist". (145) In September, however, Bailey resigned, 
supposedly for health reasons. It appears, however, that the local party was divided between those who 
were Socialist, following the ILP line on the war, especially over conscription, and those, like the 
Workers' Union representatives, who were more openly patriotic. It appears that Bailey was too closely 
linked with the former faction and unable to retain the confidence of the whole party. (146) 
The man selected to replace him was Frank Roberts, an outsider from Northampton, where he was 
secretary of the Trades and Labour Council. He was a member of Labour's Advisory Committee and 
nominated by the Typographical Association. (147) Roberts was not a total stranger to the constituency, 
having been responsible in 1913 for finding food and lodgings for Black Country strikers, marching 
through Northampton on the way to London. (148) He was also a member of the ILP, but made it clear 
that he had "early dissociated himself from it on the question of the war" and from their peace keeping 
views. (149) In announcing his selection the local press commented that "Mr Roberts does not agree 
with that party (the ILP) in its attitude towards the war and he holds that Britain was justified in 
entering the conflict". (150) It is clear that Roberts was chosen as a moderate, who was best suited to 
heal local Labour divisions on this issue. 
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The Conservative candidate was Lord Lewisham, who had been MP since 1910 and was a member 
of the local Dartmouth family at Sandwell Hall. Much of the party's campaign was to be based around 
his war record and the need to punish Germany. Lewisham, however, had contracted malaria and was 
to be absent for much for much of the election. (151) 
The Liberals had a prospective candidate for the seat, Dr Hazel, who was a former MP and had been 
active in the constituency for some time. On the 29th November, however, Hazel announced his 
decision to stand down in a letter to the local press. He pleaded ill health but also stressed his desire not 
to split the progressive vote. (152) Later, however, he spoke on the same platform as Roberts. (153) Not 
all Liberals, however, backed the Labour candidate. Eighteen prominent local members wrote an open 
letter to the press in support of Lewisham. (154) Although Hazel's decision to stand down happened on 
the same day as the Birmingham Labour Party withdrew their candidate at Duddeston there is no 
evidence of any deal between the two parties. (155) It is possible that Hazel's decision to withdraw was 
influenced by the apparent success of Roberts's campaign. This seems evident from the results of local 
elections. At the end of October in two newly created wards, Labour won only one of the six possible 
seats. (156) On the 23d November, however, two seats were won in by-elections, suggesting a swing to 
Labour during the election campaign. (157) 
Roberts put much emphasis on "fair and square dealing for everybody". He stood by the Labour 
programme but put emphasis on justice for those demobilised from the forces and from munitions 
work. Generous pensions should be given to all dependants, whilst the old age pension itself should be 
doubled and the age of receipt lowered to sixty. He also called for "free education from the elementary 
school to the university". Roberts called for an adequate living wage, shorter hours, annual holidays 
and the restoration of trade union conditions. (15 8) As an experienced trade union official he showed 
himself to be in tune with the needs of his electorate. 
Roberts won the seat with a majority of 1,708. (159) This was later described as "one of the most 
extraordinary victories for Labour, which the last general election produced". He had been candidate 
for six weeks in a seat, which had never before been contested by Labour and where the local 
organisation was considered to be "not of the strongest character". (160) One obvious factor behind 
Roberts success was the strength of the union movement in the constituency, which, as was noted by 
the Birmingham Mail, was "expected to be pretty solid" in its support for the Labour candidate. (161) 
Roberts also made a big play for the women's vote, pledging to extend the Rent Act at a meeting 
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attended by 700 to 800 women. (162) The local Conservative press laid much emphasis on the illness of 
their candidate and weakness in their own organisation. (163) Perhaps the major factor behind his 
success, however, was the withdrawal of Hazel and the Liberal candidate's backing of Labour. Roberts, 
himself acknowledged this, stating that "the Radicals threw themselves on to the side of Labour and 
declined to split the democratic vote". It is also apparent that the West Bromwich Labour Party healed 
its differences and fought a united campaign, as Roberts, himself, confirmed: - "A feature of the 
election has been the understanding between the advanced wing of the Socialist movement and the 
moderate members of the Labour Party". (164) 
3. WEDNESBURY 
Labour's success in Wednesbury was possibly more predictable than in West Bromwich. The seat 
was essentially working-class in character, with the Liberals being a much less effective force. The 
constituency consisted of Wednesbury itself, which was a centre for tube manufacturing, Darlaston 
where nuts and bolts were made, and Tipton which was a decaying coal and iron centre. There had 
been moves to appoint a Labour candidate here as far back as 1903, but these had come to 
nothing. (165) . 
Later the constituency had been very much involved in the Black Country strike of 
1913. The seat was then on a list for possible contention for a 1915 election, but no candidate was 
appointed. (166) Eventually Alfred Short was adopted as Labour candidate at the end of November 
1918. (167) 
Short was an official of the Boilermakers Society, secretary of the Sheffield Trades and Labour 
Council and a member of Sheffield City Council. He was also a member of the Labour Resettlement 
Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Labour to deal with demobilisation. (168) In his election 
address Short stressed the need to restore pre-war trade union rights and workshop customs. He also 
proposed "that war must be abolished as a factor necessary to human progress". In addition Short 
stressed the Labour demands for increased pensions, better education and public ownership of railways, 
canals and coal mines. (169) 
The local press had no hesitation in supporting the Conservative Coalition candidate, Maconochie, 
claiming that Short "was not the kind of man they wanted to represent Labour in Wednesbury". (170) 
Maconochie, himself, accused Short of "trying to stir up blood between employers and workpeople", 
describing Short as "a full blown Socialist, whose wild ideas would bring the country to absolute 
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ruin". (171) Similar views were also voiced in the local press, where much prominence was given to a 
local Conservative, Marshall Freeman, who accused Short of links with the ILP. In particular his talk of 
paying for the cost of the war by raising taxation, without mentioning taxing the Germans, was held 
against him. (172) Even references to a zeppelin raid on Tipton were brought up in the context of the 
issue of reparations. (173) 
What alarmed local Conservatives was Short's radical attacks on the Coalition, warning in a speech 
at Tipton that the return of the Coalition would mean the continuation of "the economic and social 
system which had brought to the workers of the country the depressing social conditions, the foul 
putrid houses called homes, low subsistence wages and the monopoly of land for the landlords". Short 
went onto answer his critics by making it clear that he supported "full and complete reparations for the 
wrongs Germany had done". (174) In Wednesbury, itself, he warned of a Commons "packed with 
autocrats, plutocrats and the great political reactionaries .... of the last 25 years". They must 
"elect as 
their representatives men pledged to do their utmost to destroy the monopolies of land ownership". 
After this enthusiastic meeting it was reported that Short was carried shoulder high "not by pacifists, 
nor by pro-Germans but by discharged soldiers". (175) 
The local press in Wednesbury had not expected Labour to win the seat, so Short's victory came as 
a shock, typified by the comment "thank heaven Wednesbury is not England". The reasons were seen 
as the promises put forward in Labour's programme, along with "local prejudices", which "clouded the 
great issues". Labour was accused of exploiting "the emotions aroused in the aftermath of the many 
petty strikes, which have taken place in the Black Country of recent years". (176) The disorganised state 
of the local Liberal Party, whose candidate secured less than 5 per cent of the total vote, also greatly 
helped Labour. 
4. KINGSWINFORD 
Roberts and Short were both newcomers to their respective constituencies, but this was not the case 
with Charlie Sitch in Kingswinford. Before the war this constituency had been a South Staffordshire 
county seat, but with reorganisation it had become an essentially industrial one. It included the mining 
areas of Rowley Regis and Old Hill, Brierley Hill with the Round Oak steel works and the chain- 
making district of Cradley Heath. Within this region Sitch was an influential trade union official, who 
had been educated at a local council school before his union paid for his education at Ruskin College. 
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He was organiser of both the domestic outworkers in the chain making industry and Assistant Secretary 
of the factory based Chainmakers and Strikers' Association. In an industry notorious for its 
exploitation, Sitch played a major part in setting up the Chain Trade Board in 1909, establishing a 
minimum wage and raising piece rates. (177) He became Midland secretary of the National Federation 
of Women Workers. He was also a local councillor on Rowley Regis District Council, switching from 
Liberal to Labour in 1916. (178) 
During 1917 Sitch had been an active supporter of the British Workers' League, speaking at 
meetings on their behalf(179) Nevertheless he was adopted as Labour candidate ahead of the Old Hill 
Miners' Agent, Samuel Edwards, in June 1918. (180) At the time of his appointment, "no Labour 
organisation existed in the division, in fact no serious effort was made to set up any political machinery 
until somewhere about August". His campaign was a purely local effort with no outside speakers and 
"all his expenses.... defrayed by local trade unionists". (181) 
Sitch was anxious to distance himself from the policies of MacDonald, Snowden and the ILP, even 
to the extent of describing the latter as "distinct and separate from the national party". (182) This was 
because he did not wish to be identified with their war-time pacifism. His campaign was greatly 
assisted by the disagreement between the Liberal and Conservative candidates, as to who was the true 
Coalitionist. (183) Sitch's victory with a majority of 2,888 was a reflection of his popularity as a local 
trade unionist. It also shows how Labour's success in 1918 depended very little on ward organisation 
and almost everything on the trade unions. Sitch was helped by the fact that most of the workers he 
represented were women, which enabled him to benefit from their recent enfranchisement. (184) 
5. STOURBRIDGE 
The old Liberal constituency of North Worcestershire was now renamed Stourbridge. It consisted of 
Stourbridge itself, along with Oldbury with its engineering and chemical industries and Halesowen 
with its iron and steel works, but not the main chain-making region, which was in Kingswinford. Parts 
of the constituency were described grimly by Margaret Bondfield as "black, pitiless mud, black grimy 
houses - little children smeared with black if they touch walls. Mothers struggling ever against the dirt 
fiend, with no proper water supply laid on and no proper sanitation, no decent bedroom 
accommodation". (185) 
60 
Labour had another strong trade union candidate to fight for the constituency in Mary MacArthur, 
who was the wife of an ILP Labour MP from Sheffield. MacArthur was the general secretary of the 
National Federation of Women Workers, which she had founded in 1906. In 1907 she had launched 
Woman Worker, a 1d newspaper, which had at its peak a weekly circulation of 20,000 copies. (186) She 
had a proud record as a union leader, working with Charlie Sitch and Julia Varley in organising a strike 
for a minimum wage amongst the Cradley Heath chainmakers in 1910. She then played a prominent 
part in securing better pay and working conditions for women in other industries such as hollowware 
and brick making. (187) During the war she was a member of the War Emergency Workers' National 
Committee, helping women in the labour market. She refused various offers of government posts, 
which upset Lloyd George, who regarded her as "a thorn in his flesh". (188) She now claimed to be the 
first woman candidate for Parliament. Her election expenses were defrayed by a 6d contribution from 
women and girl factory workers. (189) 
The standing MP was a Liberal, Wilson, who was a chemical manufacturer from the Oldbury firm of 
Albright and Wilson. (190). Wilson claimed to have supported the Coalition's war policy, whilst 
reserving his independence on domestic matters. Nevertheless he was not awarded the Coalition 
`coupon', which was the subject of some local resentment (191) The press described him as a 
`temperance man', who stood for the State control of the drink trade. (192) 
MacArthur put her views forward in an article in the Birmingham Gazette, entitled `Why I am a 
Labour Candidate'. In it she emphasised the need for justice in foreign policy and for reforms in health 
and education at home. She also called for a free press and an end to conscription. (193) At the same 
time she issued 14 Points, in which she attacked war profiteers. She predicted a revolt when returning 
soldiers saw how these profiteers had exploited the women ad children left at home. (194) 
The Coalition candidate, Victor Fisher, a former Socialist, was now standing for the National 
Democratic Party. He described himself as having spent four years "fighting the defeatists and pacifists 
at home". (195) He sought to include MacArthur in this category, claiming that she was "bought by 
German gold and had German blood in her vein"(196) She was vulnerable to these attacks because of 
associations through her husband with the ILP. Nevertheless MacArthur sought to isolate herself from 
these views, winning the backing of the miners, hollowware workers and the chain-makers. (197) She 
was also backed by George Bernard Shaw. (198) 
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Fisher hoped to secure Conservative backing with an unashamedly patriotic campaign. In fact he was 
reported to be having "an uphill battle" and needed to produce letters and official tickets to show that 
he was the Coalition candidate. (199) Local Conservatives were not happy with the arrangements, 
having hoped for a candidate of their own. Indeed at one of his first meetings only six people turned 
up. (200) Fisher was forced to call in Conservative canvassers from as far away as Kidderminster. (201) 
He did, however, receive the backing of the Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers, following a meeting 
in Oldbury. (202) 
It was Wilson, however, who held on to the seat with a majority of 1,333 in a tight three-cornered 
contest. He was greatly helped by the absence of a Conservative candidate. It seems likely that Wilson 
held on to the chapel vote, whilst Fisher captured that of the patriotic working class. MacArthur's 
strength was amongst trade unionists, especially the women. Unfortunately for her the absence from 
this constituency of the Cradley Heath chainmakers cost her important votes. A further handicap 
emerged, when the returning officer insisted that she fought with her married name, Mary Anderson, on 
the ballot paper. It was thought that this would not be recognised by many potential voters. (203) 
MacArthur's comment after her defeat, however, was typical of her character, saying that she "would 
rather be on the right side than the winning side". (204) 
6. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
This was a Black Country seat, which Labour probably felt gave them their best prospects of success 
in 1918, as the party had held it from 1906 to 1910. It was not a typical Black Country division, 
however, as it was urban rather than industrial. Indeed Pelling, in his account of pre-1914 elections, 
describes the constituency as being in part "rather middle class" due to an extension of 
"villadom". (205) Nevertheless under the terms of the 1918 Representation of the People Act the seat, 
which included most of the borough of Wolverhampton, was now essentially working class. The 
constituency has been singled out by Tanner as an example of one where the Labour Party experienced 
"a slow, steady increase in the number of affiliated societies". (206) 
The Labour candidate, Alexander Walkden, had been adopted as far back as 1912. Walkden, who 
was the general secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association, played a major role in overhauling the 
local party organisation. An agent, James Whittacker, was appointed, offices rented and a monthly 
journal, the Wolverhampton Worker, established. Most of the money for this came from outside the 
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constituency, as his union's political fund provided £700 a year. Indeed it has been established that in 
1913 only one tenth of the money spent on his candidature was raised locally. (207) 
The local party was quick to respond to the political reforms of the war years. In April 1918, for 
instance, delegates were urged, under Henderson's reforms, "to secure individual members" and to 
ensure that all trade unionists joined this section. (208) Individual membership was reported to stand at 
518 men and 189 women in July, rising to 587 and 206 in August, which was easily the best in the 
Black Country. (209) The local party also set up a Women's Section in May 1918, which elected a 
president and secretary, as well as agreeing to hold monthly meetings. (210) Later the party resolved to 
form a Maternity and Child Welfare Committee. (211) In this respect the situation in Wolverhampton 
differed considerably from that, described by Savage, in Preston, where the trade unions resisted such 
moves. Indeed the Wolverhampton party changed the membership of its Executive Committee, 
although it was still dominated by trade unionists, who had 8 of the 13 members. (212) 
They also successfully linked up with the local Co-operative Society, which agreed to donate £10 a 
year and were permitted to elect delegates to the party. (213) Meetings were also arranged with the Free 
Church Council. (214) Finally attempts were made to shake up the wards by arranging regular meetings 
and appointing Captains of Polling Areas. (215) These proved to be far from successful as reports of 
poor attendances indicated. (216) A move to set up a local party in the East Division in time for the 
election fell through. The candidature of Shaw as well as relations with the British Workers' League 
seem to have been the major stumbling block. (217) 
The Liberals had withdrawn their candidate from the seat in 1913, preferring to concentrate on the 
East division. In return for this move Conservatives sought not to oppose Liberals in municipal 
elections. The author of this move was the sitting Conservative MP, Sir Alfred Bird, who had held the 
seat since 1910. (218) The leader of the Wolverhampton Liberals, Alderman Bantock, was the other 
partner in the agreement. Yet it appears that the Liberals were divided as Walkden received the backing 
of the West Wolverhampton Liberal Association, whilst Bantock proclaimed his support for Bird. (219) 
The Conservatives had improved their organisation in the pre-war years thanks to the money and 
efforts of Bird. (220) He was a local businessman, who exemplified a type of Conservative politician, 
who prevailed in the Black Country in the post-war years. An opponent of trade unionism and the 
labour movement, yet he stood in a constituency, which was still predominantly working class. Bird 
adopted a populist approach, claiming to represent every interest in Wolverhampton, including 
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labour. (221) He called for social reforms in health and housing, along with provision for the disabled 
and demobilised, widows and orphans. (222) The Labour Party manifesto was denounced as "making 
for bloodshed and revolution", whilst he vowed equality of opportunity for every boy and girl. He 
pledged the removal of the old party labels in place of a new one, "the patriotic party"(223) Coupled 
with this, Bird exploited the feeling for revenge on Germany, putting forward his 14 proposals, which 
included the expulsion of German aliens and heavy reparations for ships, the wounded, widows and 
orphans. (224) 
A major embarrassment for Bird was the fact that both he and Hickman, the Bilston MP, had voted 
to delay extending the franchise to women in 1917. Perhaps as a consequence of this it seems that 
Walkden was more successful in attracting the newly-enfranchised female voters to his meetings. (225) 
Meanwhile Bird's son, Robert, supported his father with attacks on MacDonald and Snowden's 
pacifism and a warning that "high wages needed to be protected from German imports when the war 
was over". The Labour Party, he claimed, would allow Germany "to commence importing their 
manufactures into this country in the same way as before the war". (226) 
Walkden, meanwhile, fought a cautious campaign, stressing the Labour programme of a million new 
houses, along with nationalisation and higher taxes on large incomes. He described the Lloyd George 
Coalition as "a compact with the most reactionary forces in Britain", but supported the Prime 
Minister's social reforms and backing of the League of Nations This was a sensible move given his 
need for Liberal support. At the same time, however, he was anxious not to appear too lenient towards 
Germany. Although warning against "a revengeful spirit", he did call for "a thorough stocktaking of 
Germany". (227) 
The result, however, was a defeat for Walkden by the comparatively large margin of over 3,000 
votes. The reason for Bird's success has been seen to rest on his following the government line and 
emphasising the need for national unity. He even sent a copy of a letter from Lloyd George and Bonar 
Law, backing his candidature, to each household in the division. (228) At the same time the populist 
nature of Bird's campaign was very significant. It is likely that Walkden was too scrupulous as a 
candidate. His cause was probably not helped by George Bernard Shaw's backing, since he spoke in 
favour of Germany's immediate acceptance into the League of Nations, as "one of the four most 
cultured nations in the world". (229) 
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Labour lost here despite the local party having more members and better organisation than in any of 
the other Black Country seats. Probably the most significant factor behind this defeat was the nature of 
the constituency itself. The Labour Party succeeded in those Black Country seats, where trade unionism 
was strong within close knit working-class communities. Wolverhampton West, however, was an urban 
as well as an industrial seat, which meant that there were attractions beyond the local community. It 
also contained more of those voters who were less likely to support Labour, such as the middle class 
and the non-unionised members of the working class. In this respect it resembled Birmingham and 
other big cities, where Labour was generally less successful in 1918. It seems that these areas were 
more prone to the Coalition Government's propaganda campaign with its appeal for national unity. 
7. BILSTON 
The neighbouring Wolverhampton seat of Bilston had been held for the Conservatives since 1910 by 
General Hickman. This was the former Wolverhampton South seat, which lay entirely outside the town 
itself, but contained the large steel works at Bilston, the metal working towns of Sedgley and Coseley, 
along with the mining community of Gornal. During the war the British Workers' League had been 
active in this constituency with some success, as Reverend Shaw received a better reception here in 
1916 than in Wolverhampton. (230) 
Hickman was very much a local candidate, as his family had built up the local steelworks. They also 
dominated the Bilston Conservative Association. Hickman freely exploited anti-German feeling, 
calling for the Kaiser to be punished and Germany to pay extensive reparations. (23 1) With regard to 
German aliens he claimed that it should be "impossible for these dirty beasts to come home". He also 
insisted that the election was between the Coupon and the ILP and that MacDonald and Snowden had 
"sought to obstruct, oppose and defeat measures in the interest of the country"(232) Hickman, 
however, was forced to defend his own pre-war position on conscription as well his ties with Edward 
Carson and the Ulster Volunteers, for whom he had supplied weapons. (233) The Liberals withdrew 
their candidate early in the campaign, hoping for reciprocal action from the Conservatives in 
Wolverhampton East in support of Thorne. (234) Hickman did secure some Liberal support, but many 
of the rank and file appeared to back Labour. (235) 
The Labour candidate in Bilston was Lieutenant Colonel Kynaston, who had seen service in West 
and South Africa. It was pointed out, however, that his election address did not mention how he 
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thought Germany should be punished. (236) Then on the eve of the poll his campaign was to be 
completely undermined by Hickman's exposure of his private life. A letter was produced from a 
Lieutenant Powell, claiming that Kynaston had seduced his wife and was now living with her, whilst 
his daughter was being systematically ill treated. Kynaston had, according to solicitors, bigamously 
married Mrs Powell in November 1914 and had one son. (237) 
The late exposure of the matter hardly gave Kynaston a chance to put his side of the case. It would 
almost certainly explain the large Conservative majority. Hickman was reckoned to be popular with 
female voters and this would have boosted that support even more. (238) Kynaston had other 
drawbacks. Not only did he have no local ties, unlike Hickman, but he also lacked roots in the trade 
union movement, unlike successful Black Country Labour candidates. 
8. DUDLEY 
The Labour Party had been slow to develop in Dudley. Before the war the borough had two 
prominent working-class councillors, but neither was a member of the Labour Party. One was John 
Taylor, the secretary of the Midland Counties Trades Federation, who stood as a Liberal. (239) The 
other was William Bradford, the secretary of the Dudley branch of the Flint Glassmakers' Association, 
who stood as a Conservative. Bradford was also active in the Trade Union Tariff Reform Association, 
which had been strong in the Dudley area and gave the town some tradition for working class 
Conservatism. (240). There was as yet no Labour councillor. 
The Trades Council, founded in 1897, was reformed in 1916. In July 1918 W. B. Steer, a former 
President of the National Union of Teachers, was selected as the Labour candidate. (241) There is some 
evidence to suggest that the choice of Steer was not unanimous. (242) It is probable that the patriotic 
trade unions were not pleased with the choice of a middle-class candidate, who had voiced his 
opposition to conscription and the threat of it continuing under the Coalition Government. However, 
Steer also spoke of Dudley's social problems, especially "the abominable housing conditions". (243) 
The Conservative candidate and standing MP Arthur Boscawen, a former army colonel, was the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Pensions. He played strongly on anti-German prejudice, 
claiming that the Labour Party was "captured by a gang of Pacifists and Socialists, most of them were 
not real Labour men". This, he said, was resented by "many loyal and patriotic trade unionists". If 
Labour won, he warned, they would grant "a pro-German peace". (244) He declared that "Germany 
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must be made to pay for the war, even if there had to be an army of occupation for fifty years. We must 
wring every penny out of the Germans". He also went on to claim that Labour wanted "the capitalists 
of this country to pay for the war" rather than the Germans. (245) 
The Labour Party attacked Boscawen's policies by claiming that "every vote for him was a vote for 
conscription". (246) They also attacked him for having supported a 25 shilling a week minimum wage 
for agricultural workers rather than the proposed 30 shilling wage. (247) Boscawen, however, was to 
announce a big increase in war pensions during the campaign. This, it was claimed by the press, 
"should secure him the bulk of the votes of soldiers and those who have suffered bereavement and 
disablement". (248) Boscawen was also a strong protectionist, which, it was thought, gave him a further 
advantage locally. (249) 
The Liberal candidate Mervyn Howell withdrew early in the campaign. (250) It was hoped that his 
Free Trade supporters would back Labour, following the well-publicised lead of Liberal councillor 
T. Roberts. (251) Boscawen, however, won with a record majority. The local press, in explaining this, 
gave credit to "wise and discerning members of the Liberal Party", who "cast off those false guides, 
who would have installed their bolshevism into democracy". (252) 
9. WALSALL 
The Labour Party was also slow to develop in Walsall, where small-scale manufacturing prevailed 
and Liberalism remained a powerful force. At the turn of the century Lib-Labism was common, 
especially amongst the miners. The Liberal Party actively sought working-class support through their 
working men's clubs, as well as setting up branches of the Young Liberals and the Women's Liberal 
Association. (253) Their parliamentary candidate, William Brown, appointed in 1913, warned of the 
dangers for the Liberals of losing working-class support. (254) Although a retired businessman he 
claimed that little separated him from Labour members and even spoke of the need to defend trade 
union rights. (255) 
The Walsall Trades Council, which tried to be non-political, was reformed in 1890 after a lapse of 
time. In 1892 there was a notorious bomb-making incident, which led to the imprisonment of Joe 
Deakin, a railway clerk, who later became a leading light in the Labour movement. (256) The Walsall 
branch of the L. R. C. was formed in 1903, combining with the Trades Council in 1906. Following this 
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the local ILP and Fabian Society affiliated, leading in 1912 to the formation of the Walsall Labour 
Association, which sought to secure Labour representation in local and national elections. (257) 
Labour's first council seat was won in August 1913, at the time of the Black Country strike, in which 
the tube workers of Wednesbury and Walsall were particularly active. James Thickett, a railway 
signalman, was returned in a by-election, followed in 1914 by another railwayman, Henry Rucker. It 
was Thickett, the president of the Trades Council, who was selected to fight the seat for Labour in 
November 1918. This was reckoned to have brought a measure of unity to a movement that was 
already notably disunited. The reason for this was the number of separate societies and organisations, 
which had affiliated to the Labour Association in the town. (258) 
The Coalition candidate was Richard Cooper, who had been elected in 1910 as a Conservative 
Unionist. Dissatisfied with his own party, however, he spoke out independently on issues concerning 
the working class, such as the Insurance Act, the minimum wage and the decline in real wages. Cooper 
had already been attracted to the idea of forming a National Party before the war, based on the Empire, 
Tariff Reform and Defence. Although he welcomed Coalition Government, he had opposed Lloyd 
George. He also opposed the Conservatives over their abandonment of Tariff Reform. In 1917 Cooper 
along with five other MPs set up the National Party. (259) He did, however, keep his own Conservative 
Association in support, so that in the 1918 Election he stood as Independent Coalition, but refused the 
Coupon. (260) Cooper was a tough candidate for Labour to oppose, as his populist policies included a 
minimum wage, an eight hour day and a housing programme. (261) He even supported equal pay for 
women for equal work, which would appeal to female voters. (262) In particular though he took a 
strong stand over the punishment of Germany, claiming, despite not having the `coupon', to be "for 
Lloyd George and the Coalition". (263) 
Brown, the Liberal candidate, claimed that Labour was splitting the Progressive vote. He pointed out 
that during the 1913 tube strike in Walsall he had stood beside Thickett. (264) Cooper, however, 
accused him of not being concerned about punishing Germany, enemy aliens or the question of 
dumping. Brown was portrayed as a "henchman" of Asquith, who had "failed utterly himself and tried 
to down Lloyd George". (265) Indeed many Liberals went over to Cooper with one even signing his 
nomination papers. (266) 
It was soon apparent that Thickett was Cooper's main opponent. (267) He stood for the full Labour 
programme, although he was careful to stress a League of Nations rather than a Peace of Reconciliation 
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when mentioning the treatment of Germany. (268) This probably reflected the divided nature of the 
local Labour movement over the war and conscription. Thickett, himself, had supported the war and 
had spoken in favour of voluntary recruitment. He was forced to deny rumours that he would let 
Germany off lightly. (269) Walsall, however, had a branch of the British Workers' League, which 
backed Cooper and accused the local Labour movement of pacifism. (270) Their leader, George Power, 
was the secretary of the Midlands Leather Trades Federation, which was the most significant trade 
union in the town. (271) Indeed the Birmingham Mail reckoned there were more trade unionists in 
Walsall backing Cooper than Thickett. (272) 
Thickett opened his campaign by describing himself as "an ordinary common working man" and 
claiming that it was time to replace "bankers, brewers, landowners and financiers by democrats, who 
are prepared to fight against all comers for the all important cause of Labour"(273) He attacked Cooper 
for supporting the 25 shillings rather than the 30 shillings minimum wage for agricultural 
workers. (274) In his Manifesto he stressed 14 Points, which he claimed were those of the National 
Labour Party, but were those that he saw as relevant to his campaign. Thus he stressed "the Complete 
Fulfilment of the Nation's Pledge to the Trade Unionists, that they should be unconditionally re- 
instated in respect of the Trade Union conditions and workshop customs, abrogated in the public 
interest". He also called for a compulsory minimum wage and a shorter working day. Unlike Labour's 
Call to the People there was no call for "equal rights for both sexes" nor for "equal pay" in industry. 
Indeed, unlike Cooper, no special appeal was made to female voters. (275) 
In the last days of the campaign conscription played a major part, as both Liberals and Labour 
accused Cooper of backing it. Indeed Thickett's supporters waved large ̀ No Conscription' banners. 
Cooper was forced to urge that "if you want your man home for Christmas vote for me". (276) Cooper 
also attacked Thicken as MacDonald's man, who would let the Germans off lightly, although this was 
not strictly true, given Thickett's support for the war. (277) 
Cooper retained his seat with a majority of over 6,000, which was the largest in the region. Thickett 
came second, which was a reasonable result for Labour. Indeed Cooper's populist appeal to the 
working class had some echoes of inter-war Fascism. The Liberals were the real losers, as much of 
their philosophy was thrown in doubt by the war. Even Free Trade was under attack as the leather trade 
had called for the prohibition of German imports. 
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10. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
The only Black Country division not to select a Labour candidate for the 1918 Election was 
Wolverhampton East, which might have seemed the most promising for Labour. In his account of 
parliamentary elections before 1914, Pelling describes it as "a more uniformly working-class 
constituency than was customary in the straggling Black Country environment. "(278) Yet 
Wolverhampton East was a Liberal stronghold, having returned a member of that party in every 
election since the constituency was formed in 1832. (279) It now continued to do this in every election 
in the inter-war years The seat contained only three of the twelve Wolverhampton wards, plus 
Wednesfield and Willenhall. Leopold Amery, who contested the seat for the Conservatives in pre-war 
elections, described it as "a stronghold of Nonconformity" consisting of "a piece of 
Wolverhampton. 
.. . 
itself and a series of industrial villages... .1 
had never before realised anything quite 
so dreary or squalid ...... 
(280) The Prime Minister, however, considered Wolverhampton sufficiently 
significant as to open his campaign there with a radical speech on the 23rd November, in which he 
stressed that the effort that had won victory must be kept going "until we put England right. There are 
many things that are wrong and which ought not to be - poverty, wretchedness and squalor". (281) 
The Liberal MP, George Thorne, was a local solicitor, who had represented the seat since 1908. 
According to Jones the force behind the local Liberals before the war had been small shopkeepers, as 
industrialists had earlier gone over to the Conservatives. (282) Another base of Liberal strength here lay 
in the Party's support for Nonconformity, which they had confirmed during the education battles at the 
beginning of the century. (283) Equally significant in 1918 was the fact that Thorne was able to secure 
the backing of influential trade unions, such as the Locksmiths and the Midland Counties Trades 
Federation. (284) Even the Workers' Union offered support. (285) It seems, according to the 
Birmingham Gazette, that for this election "practically all the local Labour bodies are now either 
officially or unofficially backing Alderman Thorne". (286) It also appears that a pact still existed in the 
town between Labour and the Liberals not to oppose each other in parliamentary elections. Thus in 
return for backing Thorne, the Liberals were expected to back Labour in the West division. (287) The 
Liberals also secured the support of the Irish in this constituency, who described Thorne as "one of 
Ireland's most faithful and longest friends". (288) 
. 
Thorne, who was considered to be something of a radical MP, when he was first elected, was not 
awarded the `coupon'. Instead it went to Shaw, standing for the National Democratic Party, who 
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received it, along with a telegram of support from the PM. (289) The Labour Party in Wolverhampton 
had negligible organisation in the East division, preferring to concentrate its efforts in the West, where 
it was thought that the Conservatives were more vulnerable. The Conservatives were also notoriously 
badly organised in the East, deciding to withdraw their own prospective candidate and back 
Thorne. (290) In return Thorne did back the Coalition Government's domestic policy, but on the 
question of an indemnity on Germany, he urged that we "must distinguish between justice and 
vindictiveness". (291) 
Shaw, who had left the Labour Party the previous August, stressed his own trade union connections 
and his role in supporting the rights of housing tenants during the pre-war rent strikes. (292) He also 
spoke out in favour of a "living wage" and "protection against dumping". (293) In his Manifesto, 
however, Shaw distanced himself from the Labour Party by stressing his connections with Lloyd 
George and the Coalition. He did state, however, that he had been "a life-long champion of the cause of 
the worker, I have never turned Labour down". He also emphasised the social programme of the 
Coalition, especially the promised reforms in health, housing and education, as well as more rights for 
women. In this respect Shaw was supporting a radical political programme. (294) In effect, however, he 
was seeking to win the vote of the patriotic working class, whilst emphasising his wartime role in 
combating pacifism and strikes. He did receive the backing of the district branch of the Gas, Municipal 
and General Workers' Society, but his claim to stand for Labour was repudiated by the Willenhall 
Labour Party. (295) 
The result showed the working-class electorate evenly divided, with Thorne winning by only 522 
votes. Shaw's defeat has been put down to his lack of organisation, coupled with Thorne's strong 
personal following and his support for Lloyd George. (296) Yet this was to be Thorne's narrowest 
majority in the inter war years, It suggests that Labour could have made greater headway in this 
constituency in later elections with a strong local candidate and good organisation. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The 1918 General Election was particularly significant in the Black Country since it set the pattern 
for the inter-war years. Overall Labour won four of the region's ten seats, whilst two were held by 
Asquithian Liberals, three by `couponed' Conservatives and one by a maverick Conservative, who 
stood as a member of the National Party. Labour's share of the vote in the nine seats they contested was 
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42.8 per cent, which was an even more impressive statistic. Moreover this was a proportion that did not 
vary greatly during the period. It also compares favourably with the 24.8 per cent, which Labour 
achieved in Birmingham, where Coalition candidates swept the board. (297) 
Labour's success in this Election was particularly creditable, given the pre-war strength of the 
Conservatives in the Black Country, when they had held all but two of the seats. Conditions still 
seemed favourable to them, since as part of the Coalition led by Lloyd George, they could appeal to the 
patriotic working class, as the party, which had won the war. Writing of the Conservative performance 
nationally, Ramsden has claimed that the party "reaped the benefit of its national identity in the 
election of 1918, capturing the mood of the moment as surely as Lloyd George did. In the strident 
campaign of December 1918 the Unionists were in their element, sure of what must be done as no other 
party was sure". (298) Yet this had not been the picture in the Black Country. 
Tanner sees Labour's victories here as conforming to his theory that it was either mining or Tory 
working-class seats, which swung their way in 1918. Kingswinford, for instance, is put into the former 
category, whilst the three other Labour successes are seen as Tory working-class seats, where 
Liberalism was weak (299) Yet this is somewhat misleading as, although mining was carried out in 
Kingswinford, it was not the major industry. In fact the Labour victor here, Charlie Sitch, was a leading 
trade union official in the chain making industry. Certainly the Liberals did badly, gaining fewer than 
1,000 votes in Wednesbury, whilst in Smethwick and West Bromwich they did not stand. Yet in West 
Bromwich the Liberals had worked hard to revive their party in the pre-war years, so that Labour's 
success here was very dependent on the withdrawal of the Liberal candidate and his endorsement of 
Labour. 
In another industrial region, West Yorkshire, Labour's performance in 1918 has been described as 
"disappointing". (300) This was reckoned to have been because there was still a strong Liberal 
presence, which split the anti-Conservative vote. Tanner reckons that in such traditional Liberal areas 
both Parties had similar social roots, whilst the Liberal economic appeal was still attractive. (301) 
In the Black Country, however, except in the seats of Wolverhampton East and Stourbridge, the 
seeming disarray of the Liberals helped the Labour Party. Indeed the former contested only four other 
seats, coming last in each of them. Yet the Liberal Party was far from dead in the Black Country. In the 
three constituencies of Wolverhampton East, Walsall and Stourbridge it remained a force amongst 
working-class electors throughout the inter-war years. A significant factor behind this was the 
72 
employment situation in these constituencies. Small-scale industry prevailed with a tradition of good 
industrial relations in close knit communities. The influence of the chapel was also important. The 
Liberal vote here was a working-class vote. In Wolverhampton East, for instance, it was the skilled 
locksmiths of Willenhall, whose union backed Thorne. In Walsall it was the miners who had a Liberal 
tradition going back to the Lib-Lab days, which had not yet been transferred to Labour. In Stourbridge 
Wilson's support was strongest in Oldbury, where he was an employer at a chemical works and where 
the chapel was still a significant influence. Class-based politics had developed less here. 
Elsewhere Tanner's explanation for Labour's success is Tory working-class voters turning to Labour. 
He points to the backing the party secured from unions like the Ironfounders, who supported the war 
and sought to protect the gains, which their members had made from it. (302) No reference is made, 
however, to the industrial unrest, which affected the region both before and during the war. Turner, on 
the other hand, sees Labour's performance in Wednesbury and West Bromwich as "a survival of the 
anti-government spirit of the engineering strikes"(303) Tanner, however, makes an important point, 
when he states that the Labour Party was better organised in West Wolverhampton, West Bromwich 
and Smethwick than in Birmingham. Furthermore he claims politically the party was more moderate in 
these towns and supported by a stronger trade union movement. (304) 
It certainly seems that the major factor to benefit Labour was the rise of trade unionism in the region 
and its close links with the Party. All four of Labour's successful candidates were trade union leaders. 
Charlie Sitch, for instance, had played a big part in organising the chainmakers in his constituency. 
John Davison of the Ironfounders and Alfred Short of the Boilermakers both represented unions, which 
were important locally. Frank Roberts in West Bromwich represented a union from outside the region, 
but he was a strong personality, who was very aware of working-class aspirations. The opposite side 
can be shown with the failure of Labour at Bilston, which was a seat with many similarities, but with a 
candidate who lacked union roots. 
The differences with Birmingham were twofold. In the first place, despite the strength of engineering 
in the city, trade unionism was not so significant as in the Black Country. (305) Consequently the 
Labour Party was more dependent financially on a few individuals than on union affiliation fees. (306) 
Furthermore in the Black Country both the trade unions and the local constituency parties had tended to 
support the war, which put them more in tune with the electorate of 1918. In Birmingham, on the other 
hand, there had been a strong anti-conscription movement, followed by the passing of the motion in the 
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Trades Council early in 1918 to seek a war settlement. This made the Labour Party more vulnerable to 
Coalition accusations of pacifism during the election. 
Another significant factor behind Labour's success in the Black Country in 1918 was the extension 
of the franchise. It has been estimated that fewer than 60 per cent of the adult male population in 
borough seats was enfranchised before 1918. By the autumn of 1921 English adult male 
enfranchisement was 94.9 per cent. (307) In Walsall, for instance the electorate increased in 1918 from 
15,949 to 42,933, of whom 16,854 were women. (308) Given the socio-economic status of the new 
male voters, it seems likely that a disproportionate number would be attracted to the Labour Party. 
Even the newly enfranchised female voters in the Black Country were likely to be more attracted to the 
Labour Party than in other regions, given the high proportion of female manual workers in industries 
such as chain making, hollow ware, brick making as well as metal working. 
An important consequence of the weakness of the Liberal Party in much of the region was that the 
local Liberal press gave Labour candidates a fair hearing. Thus in West Bromwich the Midland 
Chronicle was sympathetic to Roberts, whilst the Smethwick Telephone stayed strictly neutral in that 
constituency. (309) The Birmingham Gazette also preferred Labour candidates to their traditional 
enemies the Unionists, where there was no standing Liberal. Roberts, himself, paid tribute to "the 
splendid service the Birmingham Gazett e had rendered" and expressed his appreciation for what "the 
paper had made in the cause of Democracy and Labour". (3 10) On the other hand the Wolverhampton 
Express and Star backed Thorne in the East but Bird in the West and Hickman in Bilston. (311) 
Labour Party organisation seems to have been less important for this General Election. Thus the seat 
where Labour was best prepared was Wolverhampton West, which the party failed to win. Instead they 
won Kingswinford, where party organisation appears to have been negligible. The key factor, however, 
appears to be trade union organisation, since membership appears to have been higher in those seats 
that Labour won. 
Personality played an important part in all constituencies. Where Labour was successful they had 
trade union candidates, who were aware of working-class needs. The Coalition also had local populist 
candidates such as Cooper, Bird and Hickman, who adopted a strident anti-Labour stance, appealing to 
working class patriotism. Much of this was indeed following the lead of Lloyd George himself, who 
saw it as the best way of keeping Labour at bay. Indeed it was Cooper, the most strident of these 
candidates, who secured the region's biggest majority in Walsall. 
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The fact that the Coalition appeal was still powerful in the Black Country suggests that class politics 
had not swept through the region. On the other hand since Labour did secure a significant 
breakthrough, it does suggest that the war years had brought an increase in working-class confidence. 
The war also brought divisions within the working class, especially those between skilled and 
unskilled, which probably prevented the emergence of greater working-class awareness and Labour 
success. 
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CHAPTER 2- 1919-1922 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Although the Labour Party had secured only 57 seats nationally in the 1918 General Election, they 
were expected to make bigger advances in the years that followed. It was generally accepted that 
circumstances had been against Labour in 1918 with Lloyd George able to exploit post-war patriotic 
feeling to the advantage of his Coalition. (1) With a return to peacetime issues, however, it was 
expected that Labour would benefit, especially as they were now the main opposition. Indeed 
Conservative politicians at the time saw the Lloyd George Coalition as a bulwark against the threat of 
Labour, which the prime minister himself was ready to promote in order to preserve his government. (2) 
Lloyd George hoped to advance policies that were sufficiently populist to keep the Labour Party at bay. 
Since his government was dominated by Conservatives, however, it was to be very restricted in what it 
could achieve. 
The Labour Party in 1919 was very much dominated by the trade unions, who made up the majority 
of party membership and provided most of the finances. It enabled them to control both the NEC and 
the Party Conference. Many of Labour's strongholds tended to be in small industrial towns or mining 
communities, where there were strong class loyalties, rather than in the big cities. (3) Morgan sees the 
trade unions at this time as sectional in their interests and limited in their political responses. He points, 
for instance, to their refusal to accept ̀dilution' or more apprenticeships in the building trade, which 
handicapped Labour's criticism of Lloyd George's housing programme. (4) 
During 1919 support for Labour grew as post-war shortages and conscription continued. With the 
economy experiencing a short-lived boom, there was a certain degree of confidence amongst the 
working class. This was reflected in the political successes, which Labour achieved at this time. Thus 
John Robertson could proclaim in 1919 following his success at the Bothwell by-election that "the 
workers were the governing class". Cowling writes that it was "an assault on deference as much as the 
threat to property", which most alarmed the establishment. (5) 
It was, however, the industrial aspect of the Labour movement, which seemed most threatening to 
the government at this time. There were strikes and the threat of strikes as workers sought to maintain 
their wartime gains in status, wages and hours of work. Indeed strike action throughout the country 
averaged 40 million days a year between 1919-1922. (6) There was much talk of direct action by 
workers, especially after the threat of a general strike successfully blocked the supply of arms to Poland 
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in August 1920. The government in its turn brought in an Emergency Powers Act to safeguard 
supplies. 
The most serious confrontation for the government came with the coal miners. With the price of coal 
falling, they decided to hand the mines back to private owners, who insisted on swingeing pay cuts and 
locally fixed wages. When the miners rejected these terms, a lockout was ordered from 31 March 1921. 
On the 15th April 1921, however, the rail and transport workers leaders refused to strike in support of 
the miners in what became known as Black Friday. Nevertheless the coal dispute was to last for three 
months. It ended with the miners being forced to accept most of the owners' terms, which included a 
standard wage based on the July 1914 rate plus a minimum of 20%. This was to represent a severe drop 
in living standards for the miners, especially for those in the Black Country, whose pits were amongst 
the least economic in the country. 
By this time also the economy was beginning to turn down, so that in June 1921 unemployment had 
risen nationally to exceed 2 million. This had an adverse effect on trade union membership with the 
number of those affiliated to the Labour Party falling by a quarter between 1920-22, although this was 
partly offset within the party by increased fees. (7) Talk of direct action now receded and a more 
cautious approach was adopted. Official Labour leaders, who had kept their distance from this activity, 
were now able to re-establish their control over the movement, calling for parliamentary action and 
collective bargaining. They could point to Labour's successes in by-elections as the model to follow. 
Between 1919-1922 Labour secured 14 by-election successes, whilst losing only one seat. The 
continued division within the Liberal Party helped them. Furthermore in local elections in 1919 Labour 
gained control of 3 counties. (8) They also made big gains in the municipal elections, winning over 500 
seats in London boroughs along with control of 12 metropolitan boroughs. (9) Outside London 400 
seats were won. Labour's performance has been described as "the most dramatic result" of the period 
with the party winning "an electoral landslide". (10) This success came despite the franchise for local 
elections being less favourable for Labour, as many of the newly enfranchised parliamentary voters, 
living in furnished rooms, were not eligible for the vote. It was still necessary to be a householder to 
qualify. (11) 
The municipal results of 1920 have been described as rather "flat". (12) Labour experienced heavy 
losses in London which Herbert Morrison attributed to the rate increases in Labour controlled 
boroughs. (13) It was also evident that Labour successes, along with the activities of the trade unions, 
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was bringing something of a reaction, especially in the form of anti-Socialist pacts between 
Conservatives and Liberals. Egerton Wake, the national agent, in his report on the 1920 results, wrote 
of "the forces of reaction (reorganising) themselves.... under various new guises as Independents, 
Moderates, Municipal Reformers, Citizens' Leagues and Ratepayers' Associations". He also claimed 
that the press had "endeavoured to create the impression that because Labour's advance was not as 
marked this year, our party had received a serious setback. The balance of gains and losses over the 
country.... show a substantial advance". (14) 
In 1921 unemployment rose to over 2 million. This was also the year that the Anti-Waste movement 
was set up, backed by Lord Rothermere, the newspaper proprietor. (15) It was intended to appeal to the 
lower middle class by attacking Labour authorities over their spending programmes. Nevertheless in 
the municipal elections of that year Labour made further advances with 36 net gains. (16) 
The 1922 municipal elections were held just two weeks before the General Election and proved a 
setback for Labour Nationally there were 168 losses and only 5 gains. 215 Labour candidates were 
successful but 359 were defeated. (17) Labour did particularly badly in London, where they had 
achieved a breakthrough three years earlier. The Birmingham Mail commented that "these 
communities have had a spell of Labour government and in practically every case have seen the rates 
soar up as a result of extravagant and inefficient administration". (18) Yet Arthur Henderson's comment 
reflected the situation outside the capital: - "The success of the anti-Labour counter offensive, which 
has enabled Labour's opponents to recover a little of the ground they lost in 1919, but which still leaves 
Labour in possession of the greater part of the political territory wrested from its opponents is not much 
of a victory to write home about". (19) 
In 1922 the Coalition Government fell, as the bulk of the Conservatives no longer felt the need to 
keep Lloyd George as Prime Minister, such had his popularity fallen. The new Conservative 
Government under Bonar Law called a General Election, having dropped from its party manifesto 
anything "contentious", which "might threaten party unity". (20) This meant renewing the 1913 pledge 
not to introduce tariffs without another election. The Conservatives fought the 1922 Election with few 
policy pledges of their own. Instead emphasis was put on Labour's extremism and the Liberal's 
divisions, whilst adopting a "safety first" appeal for themselves. (21) The Labour Party was now taken 
more seriously, with a propaganda campaign equating it with the Bolsheviks in Russia. Labour's tax 
and spending policies also came under greater scrutiny than in 1918. The Conservative's response to 
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the economic position was to warn of further job losses if Labour were elected. Although ruling out 
Protection, the Party emphasised the apparent success of the Safeguarding of Industries Act, under 
which certain developing industries such as the manufacturing of motor cars were protected by tariffs. 
Labour went into the General Election with the benefit of being the main critic of the Coalition, 
having attacked its foreign policy, its apparent abandonment of social reform and its support for 
Safeguarding rather than Free Trade. The party called for full employment, public housing and 
nationalisation of the mines and railways. Labour also proposed a capital levy as a means of reducing 
the National Debt, although it was to be downplayed during the campaign after it was attacked as a 
threat to employment-(22) 
In the Election Labour had 414 candidates, losing 19 seats but gaining 86. This gave them a total of 
142 MPs, making them effectively the second Party. Labour's total vote rose from 2.2 million in 1918 
to 4.2 million, which was 29.4 per cent of the total. 39 of their gains were in mining seats, whilst the 
remainder were mostly in Glasgow, Greater London, Tyneside and Sheffield. (23) The Conservatives 
secured 386 seats with 38.5 per cent of the vote, although 42 of their seats were uncontested. The real 
losers were the still divided Liberal Party, with the Coalition Liberals under Lloyd George winning 9.4 
per cent of the vote and 57 seats, whilst Asquith's Liberals obtained 18.9 per cent of the vote but only 
68 seats. (24) 
Labour's performance, however, was not consistent across the country. Cook has pointed out that the 
party lost ground in 85 seats, performing badly in agricultural areas, as well as in the textile districts of 
East Lancashire and West Yorkshire. He has calculated that there were 284 seats, where Labour had 
only minimal support or failed even to stand. He concludes that "the party, although on the road to 
becoming a truly national party, still had far to go". (25) 
Efforts were made to improve party organisation during this period. The NEC appointed four 
standing sub committees to develop policies and win support. (26) Egerton Wake became the national 
agent. He was responsible for organising a number of regional conferences, which were addressed by 
important speakers. (27) A Women's Section was formed under Dr. Marion Phillips. It had a number of 
regional organisers, appointed to attract women voters. By 1923 the national agent reported that the 
party had 1,031 Women's Sections with 120,000 members. (28) The number of full time agents also 
increased to 133 by 1922. (29) At the same time the number of constituency parties rose, so that by 
1923 only 6 of the 603 constituencies were without one. (30) 
99 
McKibbin sees Labour's growth in this period as a consequence of the energy and effectiveness of 
local parties. "The enemy was taken aback by the intensity and vigour of Labour's attack. What Labour 
lost in cars and money was more than made up by volunteer support and energetic canvassing". (31) 
McKibbin stresses the importance of the increased centralisation of the party structure, whilst stating 
that "at least until 1924" the development of local parties was almost totally dependent on the 
membership and finances of the trade unions. (32) Labour's success in draining the Liberals of their 
support by the early 1920s was due partly to the extension of the franchise but also to mobilising the 
class consciousness of the industrial working class. With the party putting more emphasis on 
organisation than policy, there was to be less stress on socialist policies. (33) Although generally 
optimistic about Labour's growth at this time, McKibbin still recognises the party's limitations. He 
goes on to state that "much of the social and political history of the Labour Party in these years is a 
history of failure". In particular he compares Labour's achievements unfavourably with the situation in 
Germany where the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party had combined closely to embrace the 
working class much more comprehensively. (34) 
A more extensive criticism of Labour's performance at this time has been made by Howard, who has 
questioned the advantage of Labour's close links with the unions. Howard believes that the Party failed 
to broaden its appeal, which prevented it from developing a mass membership(35). Savage is even 
more critical of the trade unions in his study of the Labour Party in Preston, where he claims that such 
was the control of the AEU over the local party, that they actively used it for their own sectional 
interests, which seriously restricted the party's development. (36) They delayed organising a Women's 
Section and appeared hostile to state maternity and child welfare schemes, although not to council 
housing schemes. (37) During the engineers lockout of 1922, the AEU were even able to expel the 
Workers' Union and the NUGMW. (38) 
Reynolds and Layboura portray a different situation in their study of the West Yorkshire Labour 
movement. They see an improvement in local organisation during the 1920's. This enabled Labour to 
win two by-elections in the region in 1919-20, although the party was helped by the split in the Liberal 
vote in three-cornered contests. (39) The authors look at the appointment of party agents, appeals to 
women voters and the establishment of a local press as examples of improved organisation. (40) Local 
parties were dominated by trade unions, as were candidates for elections, but the alternative was to 
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bring in a wealthy personality with his own finances. This was not always considered a wise move and 
certainly not recommended by Herbert Morrison. (41) 
Thorpe in his study of the Labour Party in Derby at this time stresses the advantages to the local 
party of the three powerful trade unions that dominated it. They provided strong financial support and 
responsible leadership, enabling the party to advance during the period. (42) The situation was helped 
by the tolerant attitude of the employers towards the trade unions and local Labour politics. The Liberal 
decline here was also important for Labour, as the local party retreated from its radical stance into pacts 
with the Conservatives. (43) 
B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
In the early 1920s the Black Country was hit by a serious economic recession. Yet in the first two 
post-war years the economy was buoyant. With full employment, trade unions were able to secure 
some significant successes for their members. Nationally membership of the Workers' Union, for 
instance, peaked at 379,000 members in 1919 with 200,000 in engineering. (44) The economy turned 
down, however, in the autumn of 1920, so that unemployment rose dramatically in 1921. 
Figures show the numbers of unemployed in the region on 18 March 1921 to be: - Birmingham 
69,587, Cradley Heath 4,444, Dudley 3,694, Smethwick 6,323, Walsall 6,220, West Bromwich 3,253 
and Wolverhampton 9,829. (45) By 3 June 1921 the numbers had risen to: - Birmingham 93,019, 
Cradley Heath 9,909, Dudley 6,301, Smethwick 8,673, Walsall 8,786, West Bromwich 5,818 and 
Wolverhampton 12,756. (46) The figures for 1921, which were distorted by the miners' strike, were 
worse in the region than at any time during the 1930's Depression. The numbers began to fall in the 
second half of the year and during 1922. Nevertheless Barnsby gives the rate of unemployment at the 
end of 1922 as 22 per cent for Dudley, 13 per cent for West Bromwich and 19 per cent for Smethwick. 
In January 1923 he gives the rate as 17 per cent for Wolverhampton and 14 per cent for Walsall. (47) 
One major reason why the Black Country was badly affected at this time was the decline of its staple 
industries. Coal mining, for instance, was already hit by the exhaustion of its best seams and by 
flooding, with the attendant cost of pumping operations. This was an issue which Short, the local 
Labour MP, raised in Parliament. In the Tipton area pumping arrangements had broken down, leading 
to a loss of 20 million tons of coal and ironstone along with the closure of 12 pits. (48) The coal dispute 
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of 1921 only intensified these problems. Production dropped from 2 million tons in 1920 to below I 
million in 1921, whilst the number of miners fell from 9,910 in 1920 to 7,362 in 1921. (49) The dispute 
also affected many local industries, as they were dependent on coal as a fuel. In the glass industry, for 
instance, 90% of workers were unemployed in June 1921 due to the dispute. (50) 
The iron and steel industries, which had boomed during the war years, were affected by a downturn 
in orders and competition from more competitive regions and countries. (5 1) The iron industry was also 
hit by a long industrial dispute between September 1919 and January 1920, in which 6.8 million days 
were lost. At the time this proved to be the third biggest strike ever in the country. (52) The output of 
puddled bars used for making wrought iron fell from 1.2 million tons in 1913 to 0.3 million in 
1924. (53) The price of iron also dropped dramatically after 1921, which in turn led to a similar drop in 
wages, as the two were linked. (54) Other industries in decline in the post-war years included the 
hollow-ware industry, hand chainmaking in Cradley Heath, and the leather trade in Walsall, which was 
hit by the declining use of horses. (55) 
The ironfounders' dispute over a 15 shillings a week rise, had a big impact on the Black Country, 
especially as John Davison, the MP for Smethwick, was a prominent official in the union. There was 
also much support from local Trades Councils, which set up funds to relieve distress. (56) The strike, 
however, was doomed by disunity as other unions kept their members at work. Following the 
Ironfounders defeat in January 1920, the verdict of the Town Crier was that it was "an object lesson to 
the workers on the value of unity and the suicidal policy of sectional strikes and internecine warfare 
between unions". (57) In a speech in Smethwick J. H. Thomas made a similar comment, whilst observing 
that the employers had "closed ranks" and fought the strike through "one body". (58) 
This was the first of several setbacks for trade unions during this period. InýFebruary 1921, for 
instance, women and girls in the nut and bolt trade in Darlaston went on strike over a wage reduction. 
They were eventually forced to accept the new terms. (59) The main confrontation during 1921, 
however, was to be in the coalmines, as the government sought to return the industry to private 
ownership, which invariably meant worse conditions for the miners. The dispute was to be particularly 
bitter in the Black Country. John Richards, President of the South Staffordshire and East 
Worcestershire Miners' Association, said :- "The public.... could not but be on the side of the Black 
Country collier.... On the basis of the new terms he would not be able to get more than 50 shillings a 
week, which was considerably below the poverty line". (60) 
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Moreover, with the men locked out, pumpmen and enginemen were withdrawn. The local press 
reported that this threatened the complete flooding of many Black Country mines, as those in the 
Rowley region were "only normally workable by continuous pumping". (61) In the previous year a 
Committee of Inquiry had recommended the abandonment of mines in the Tipton area as "waterlogged 
beyond redemption", in order to concentrate on those in the Old Hill and Oldbury region. (62) The local 
press now reported a "serious position" with one of the largest mines in the Old Hill region, Ramrod 
Hall, described as "completely flooded" and much of the region "drowned out like Tipton". (63) When 
pumping was eventually resumed 40 mines had been flooded. Most were abandoned. (64) 
The miners themselves experienced much hardship since, although they claimed to have been locked 
out, they were refused unemployment benefit and forced to turn to the Poor Law authorities. There 
was, however, support from local Trades Councils and Labour Parties, which sought to use the dispute 
to Labour's advantage. (65) Workers in other industries were also hit. Wages in the iron industry were 
cut by 22'/x% in April and May, whilst brickmakers' wages declined by 10 shillings owing to the 
dispute. (66) 
Defeat meant that the day wage for the Black Country miner was cut from 16/1 in March to 13/1 in 
September. (67) It also brought a drop in union membership. In the Old Hill district, for instance, there 
were 2,400 miners in April 1920 with 1,600 in the union, but by June 1921, when there were 2,200 
miners, only 1,200 were members. By 1926, however, the numbers were 2,000 miners with only 587 
union members. (68) 
Engineering was particularly badly hit by the 1921 recession with 27% unemployed compared with 
18% nationally. In March 1921, the Engineering Employers' Federation secured a 20% wage 
reduction. Then at the end of the year the EEF attacked the AEU over overtime agreements and 
demanded employers' rights to "managerial functions". This led to a lockout of workers in April-May 
1922, followed by a further 16s. 6d. reduction. The lowest paid suffered the most with some labourers 
losing 40 per cent of their wages and their real incomes falling to pre 1914 levels. Union membership 
dropped with the Workers Union reportedly losing as much as 90 per cent of its members in the 
Birmingham and Coventry areas in 1921-22. (69) 
With unemployment such a major factor in the region, the Labour Party in Smethwick proposed 
raising unemployment pay to £2 a week for every householder and 25 shillings for women and single 
men with allowances for all dependants. (70) In Smethwick, where unemployment had risen from 6,323 
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on 18 March to 9,109 on 24 June, an Unemployed Committee was set up and an attempt was made by 
W. Salmon to amalgamate it with the Trades Council. (71) This was successfully resisted by Councillor 
Clem Jones and Alderman Willetts, who were worried by the Committee's attacks on the Labour 
Party. (72) 
During the summer of 1921, the Committee orchestrated a series of marches and demonstrations by 
the unemployed, in order to secure an increase in the scale of relief from the local Board of Guardians. 
In this they sought the backing of the Mayor and Town Council. (73) A delegation was also sent to 
London to the Ministers of Labour and Health to speed up progress. (74) Eventually at the end of 
September new scales of relief did emerge with a man and wife now receiving 9 shillings of groceries 
plus 29 shillings in cash. (75) 
2. POSITION OF THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
Despite their lack of success in 1918 the Birmingham Labour Party emerged from the war'in a 
confident mood. During 1919, for instance, delegates were appointed to a `Hands off Russia 
Committee'. (76) The local party was also involved in a Council of Action, which included local 
Communists. (77) In October the Town Crier was launched under the editorship of W. J. Chamberlain 
and supported by the Birmingham Central Labour Party through its secretary, Fred Rudland. (78) At the 
municipal elections of November 1919 the local Labour Party stressed social problems, especially 
housing, claiming that they were not being dealt with either locally or by the Coalition Government. As 
a result Labour had successes similar to those in London. The Conservatives lost 13 seats, whilst 
Labour gained 10 overall, giving them 21 on the Council, which was about a sixth of the total. (79) 
The Town 'er emphasised the gloom in the local Conservative press about their Party's prospects. 
According to the Birmingham Post, for instance, "the Unionist Party, at the moment, is a party with a 
machine that works cumbrously and without either inspiration or enthusiasm". The Birmingham Mail 
agreed that housing was the main issue and asked, "what was the policy of the Unionist candidate on 
this? " It gave its answer that it was "an apology for the Housing Committee, of justification for its 
delays, of putting the blame on to other shoulders". (80) 
Elsewhere the press emphasised Labour's positive side with the Birmingham Dispatch writing that 
"Labour has a policy and a programme that appeals to the imagination. It knows what it wants and is 
out to get it. "(81) The Birmingham Gazette described the results as "a triumph of enthusiasm", giving 
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two reasons for Labour's success. One was housing, where there were delays "in providing those 
homes for heroes". The other was the women's vote, which this time had gone "with their 
husbands". (82) 
Labour had an unexpected bonus in 1920, when Eldred Hallas announced that he was severing 
relations with the organisation, which had secured his election in 1918 and he was recommending the 
re-affiliation of the Gas, Municipal and General Workers to Labour. (83) In March Hallas rejoined the 
Party, which appeared to give Labour its first Birmingham MP. A letter from Head Office expressed 
the hope that "the party was beginning to see the end of the difficulties and differences in 
Birmingham". (84) It is difficult to assess Hallas's relations with the party, especially as in October he 
announced that he would not be standing for re-election. (85) By the time of the 1922 Election the press 
was reporting that "up to a point (Haifas) supported the last Government". (86) 
During 1920 Labour set up a branch for the first time in the constituency of West Birmingham, 
which meant that only Edgbaston of the 12 divisions was now without one. (87) A year later, however, 
Labour refused to challenge Austen Chamberlain in a by-election in West Birmingham, following his 
move within the Cabinet to Lord Privy Seal. (88) A more positive achievement for Labour was the 
decision in June 1920 of George Cadbury to join the party. As a major employer in the city, Cadbury 
provided Labour with not just influence but also financial support. (89) 
A serious problem for Labour at this time, however, was divisions within the Labour Group on the 
Council. These were first exposed when two of their members, including the chairman, Percival 
Bower, allowed themselves to be elected to the Aldermanic Bench with the backing of the Unionist 
Party and in opposition to the official nominees of the Labour Group. (90) Their action was deplored, 
but no sanctions appear to have been taken against them. (91) Instead during 1921 Group members 
were asked to sign the Pledge to ensure their loyalty. There was some opposition to this from within the 
Group, but the Birmingham Party overrode this. (92) 
The municipal elections of 1920 coincided with the coal strike in the Black Country. The 
Birmingham Gazette blamed the effects of this for Labour's poor performance in Birmingham, where 6 
seats were lost and only 2 won. (93) The Town Crier, however, pointed to a pact between Unionists and 
Liberals to keep out Labour. (94) In his annual report to the Birmingham Borough Labour Party Fred 
Rudland blamed defeat on "the industrial crisis and its exploitation by the government and the big 
employing combinations, backed by the press". (95) 
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1921 saw a big increase in unemployment in Birmingham as the effects of the coal strike and the 
recession took its toll. The total peaked at 93,019 in June, whilst by September Unemployed 
Committees were being set up. (96) In the 1921 municipal elections the Labour Party did much better in 
the city, winning 10 of the 15 contested seats and making 6 gains. According to the Birmingham 
Gazett e the Party "had recovered all of the ground lost in the coal strike elections of last year". (97) 
Although unemployment was dropping during 1922, there remained much agitation amongst those 
out of work. This was directed against the Birmingham Poor Law Guardians, who refused to provide 
any relief to those on benefit. In August the first post-war hunger march occurred when 30 marched 
from Birmingham to London. (98) The trade union movement in Birmingham, however, suffered a 
serious setback during 1922 following the engineers' lockout. Membership declined along with support 
for the Labour Party. Thus the 1922 municipal election results were considered by the local press to be 
a "rebuff' and "a severe blow" for Labour, with the party having a net loss of 3 seats. The local press 
put this down to the publication by Labour of its national manifesto, which included the capital 
levy. (99) Yet as the Town Cri er pointed out 48,458 voters supported Labour for 6 successes, compared 
with 49,409 for the Conservatives with 11 successes. (100) 
In the. 1922 General Election, which followed two weeks later on the 16 November, Labour 
contested 8 seats, as in 1918. This time the party increased its total vote in Birmingham from 36,000 in 
1918 to 70,251, which was 36 per cent of the total in the seats contested. Labour won none of these 
seats, however, which the Conservatives retained with 106,892 votes. Nevertheless in Kings Norton, 
Deritend and Sparkbrook the Conservatives won only on a minority of the vote. The Birmingham 
Gazette thought Labour was "gaining ground" and would find "much to encourage it". (101) The Town 
Crier went further, describing the results as "magnificent", sounding "the death-knell of Unionist 
domination in Birmingham". (102) 
The Conservatives certainly seemed to have taken the Labour Party seriously this time. Their press 
put much emphasis on the impact that Labour's capital levy would have on savings and employment. 
On Labour's side the Town Cri er pointed to the threats and intimidation at the workplace by 
employers, which Labour candidates had to contend with. There was, for instance, a report of the 
managing director of Guest, Keen and Nettleford addressing his workers and telling "horrible stories of 
Bolshevik misrule in Russia". (103) After the Election the paper printed a letter sent by Messrs. 
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I. A. Goldberg & Sons to their workers, warning them of closure and job losses if Labour came to 
power. This was described as "intimidation of the greatest kind". (104) 
Despite some success in municipal elections it seems evident that the Labour Party had made only 
modest progress in Birmingham during these years. This is best illustrated by looking at individual 
membership, although it must be assumed that in working-class constituencies there were many 
members, who were affiliated through their trade union. Nevertheless between 1919 and 1922 only one 
Birmingham constituency paid above the minimum of £1/10 in affiliation fees, which at 2d a member 
represented 180 individual members. This was Yardley, whose members contributed £2/10 in 1919, 
13/16/3 in 1920,0/3/9 in 1921 and £3/5 in 1922. (105) 
3. THE POSITION OF THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. EARLY POLITICAL SUCCESSES 
By 1921 Labour seemed well established in the Black Country. In 1919, H. Drinkwater, the Party's 
part-time Midland regional organiser, was made one of five full-time organisers. This was described as 
"a marked forward movement in the political consciousness of Labour". He inaugurated a series of 
training classes for agents and other members of the party hoping to qualify as agents. There were 
already at this time six party agents in the Black Country. (106) Two years later the party appointed Mrs 
Fawcett as the Women's Organiser for the Midlands. (107) 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party had held a number of regional conferences during 1919 to boost 
support. At one held on 17 May at Kidderminster Charlie Sitch moved a resolution condemning "the 
vacillatory policy of the government on demobilisation, conscription, pensions and housing". There 
was some disagreement over the blockade of Russia with Clem Jones, secretary of the Smethwick 
Trades Council, calling for the withdrawal of troops from Russia and the raising of the blockade. There 
was some opposition to this from Workers' Union representatives, who had been prominent in 
supporting the government's policy during the First World War. (108) 
There was to be no dramatic growth in party membership during this period. The Wolverhampton 
Labour Party, for instance, rushed to boost individual membership during 1918, which resulted in them 
collecting £7/10 in affiliation fees for that year, which represented 900 members. (109) This was a total, 
which the local party never again attained during the inter-war period. Most local parties were raising 
only £1/10 in affiliation fees, which represented the minimum membership of 180. (110) The only 
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consistent exception to this were the Walsall and West Wolverhampton parties, which both had over 
360 members in 1920. (111) This, however, represented a significant decline on the 1918 figure. By 
1921 even the West Wolverhampton party was recording the minimum total in affiliation fees. (112) 
Furthermore with the recession of 1921 the number of affiliated union members also dropped. The 
Workers' Union, for instance, saw a drop nationally from 180,000 affiliated members in 1920 to 
40,000 in 1922. (113) 
The consequence of low membership and falling union affiliation was that local parties were in 
constant financial difficulty. The Wolverhampton Labour Party made regular appeals to trade unions 
for financial support. At this stage the bulk of this seems to have come from the ASE and the rail 
unions, although appeals were also made to the Workers' Union. (114) The local party was unwilling to 
step beyond its remit. Thus when a call came from the Newcastle Labour Party for a special conference 
on conscription, the withdrawal of British troops from Russia and the raising of the blockade, the local 
party, whilst showing sympathy, agreed to leave the matter to the next Party Conference. (l 15) As the 
1919 municipal elections approached the local party suggested to their Executive Committee, that they 
fight more seats, appoint women candidates and draw up a programme. (116) 
Labour's first post-war successes in local elections came in the urban district elections of April 1919. 
This is not surprising as these Councils tended to be in areas of close knit working-class communities, 
where single industries often dominated. These were the types of areas that had voted Labour in the 
1918 General Election. In Tipton, for instance, the local party captured 8 of the 24 seats, whilst in 
Sedgley, which included the mining district of Lower Gornal, Labour won 7 of the 8 seats that were 
fought. Meanwhile in Coseley, according to Barnsby, Labour won 11 out of 20 seats, but this is 
difficult to confirm as the press lists only 17 seats and no party labels. One of Labour's best results 
came in Rowley Regis, which was part of the Kingswinford parliamentary constituency, where Labour 
won 5 of the 12 available seats. The party also won 2 out of 4 in Bilston and 2 out of 7 in 
Oldbury. (1 17) 
By the time of the municipal elections of November 1919 Labour was confident of some success, but 
in the Black Country the results were to be less dramatic than in Birmingham. In Wolverhampton, 
where there was a local pact between Conservatives and Liberals to keep Labour out, the Liberal 
organiser of the pact, Alderman Bantock, agreed with the Conservatives "not to oppose one another's 
candidates but to work as a Coalition to assist each other's candidates". (l18) There was also some 
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concern for Labour, in that the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and 
Sailors was contesting three seats. (119) Labour candidates, who included one woman, Mrs E. Sproson 
in Park Ward, stood in six of the wards. Altogether Labour made three gains from the Conservatives, 
who also lost two seats to the National Federation. (120) In the 6 wards that they contested Labour was 
able to claim 54% of the vote, but the local party commented on "the dearth of workers". (121) 
Labour also gained their first ever seats in Dudley with two victories over combined opposition 
fighting as Progressives. At the same time Labour won two seats for the first time on Wednesbury 
council. The local press credited the local party for "the thoroughness of their organisation" and 
described Labour's success as "a very severe defeat" for the Conservatives. (122) Labour also made one 
gain in Walsall. 
The Party did less well in West Bromwich, however, where it decided to contest all seven seats. The 
opposition combined to fight behind the banner of Independents. Labour made only one gain at Greets 
Green, whilst losing the seat of Town Hall. Councillor Bailey described the election as "dirty, 
miserable and unclean", calling on the local Labour Party to secure "a press of their own"(123) There 
was a similar situation in Smethwick, where in the fight with Independents, Labour gained one seat but 
lost another. The Town Crier described it as "the forces of reaction (joining) hands to beat the 
workers". (124) The anti-Socialist pacts, which were a feature of these elections in the Black Country, 
help explain why there was no electoral landslide for Labour here at this time. The elections were the 
first setback for some local parties, which now had to accept that electoral advance would not 
necessarily be "inexorable". 
The 1920 local elections began with 7 Labour candidates failing to win seats on Sedgley Urban 
District Council, where they had succeeded the previous year. A seat was also lost in Coseley. (125) In 
the municipal elections, however, the situation was different with Labour doing much better, despite 
the coal strike. In West Bromwich, which had the Sandwell Park and Hamstead collieries closed, 
Labour made two gains in the two seats that they contested. (126) In Smethwick they won two of the 
four contested seats, making one gain, whilst holding the other two wards uncontested. The Town Crier 
claimed that "the industrial side of the movement is exceedingly strong in Smethwick", where there 
was "a bigger number of trade unionists in the town than in any town of similar size in the 
country". (127) 
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Elsewhere Labour gained two seats from the Liberals in Dudley and one from the Conservatives in 
Walsall. In Wolverhampton the party gained two seats but lost one. Only in Wednesbury did Labour 
experience a reversal, gaining one seat but losing two. On the whole, however, Labour increased its 
support in the Black Country, where electors were less likely to be swayed against the Party by the 
issue of rising rates due to increased social expenditure. There was also likely to be more sympathy for 
the miners here than in Birmingham, especially as the local Labour parties were much more closely 
tied to the union movement. 
B. THE DUDLEY BY-ELECTION 1921 
By the time of the Dudley by-election on the 3 March 1921 the Black Country economy was 
entering a serious recession. The election was needed because of the promotion to Cabinet rank of the 
local MP, Sir Arthur Griffith Boscawen, the Minister of Agriculture. In 1918 Boscawen, standing as a 
Coalition Conservative, had secured a majority of over 3,000. This time Labour brought in an outsider, 
James Wilson, a railway union official from Newcastle on Tyne, to contest the seat. He was to secure 
what was to be considered a surprise victory by a majority of 276, making him one of Labour's 14 by- 
election victors of this Parliament. (128) 
Writing of these by-election successes Cook reckons that Dudley was "the only really `safe' 
Conservative seat won by Labour" and the victory was "a protest at the Coalition rather than a positive 
swing to Labour". (129) This is similar to the view expressed in the local press that Boscawen's defeat 
was due to "a clever but mendacious election stunt". As Minister of Agriculture he was blamed for a 
dear food policy on account of his "maintaining an embargo on the importation of Canadian 
cattle". (I30) 
Lord Beaverbrook's campaign through his Express newspapers to end this embargo is seen as a 
decisive factor in Boscawen's defeat. The Birmingham Post, for instance, claimed that Boscawen had 
been "the victim of gross, persistent and malignant misrepresentation". Its editorial claimed that "Mr. 
Wilson has been elected not because Dudley admires his political views.... but because a great number 
of exceedingly ignorant people have been successfully induced to believe that his return will lead to the 
cheapening of bread and meat". (131) 
An alternative view was put forward in The Time editorial on polling day, which pointed out that 
Dudley was "purely industrial and urban and has presented a fertile field for Labour propaganda. It is 
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surrounded by Labour constituencies and is not susceptible to the Unionist influences of Birmingham". 
It went on to point out that "unemployment is a much more potent factor in the Dudley election than 
the beef question. The town has three or four thousand unemployed, who throng the streets all day long 
and obviously do not intend to vote for the Coalition. If the Labour Party win Dudley they will do so on 
the backs of the unemployed". (132) Wilson, himself, when interviewed by the Birmingham Gazette, 
claimed that his victory was due to resentment at the Government's "failure to deal with the vital 
problems confronting the country - unemployment, high prices etc. ". (133) Morgan wrote in his 
account of the period: - "The campaign by the Express (Beaverbrook) to end the embargo on Canadian 
cattle was blamed for the defeat of Griffith Boscawen.... even though Dudley was largely industrial 
and cared little for Canadian or imperial interests". (134) It seems likely, however, that the cattle issue 
helped Wilson secure the Liberal vote. Certainly the Netherton Liberal Association came round to 
supporting him on Free Trade grounds. (135) 
Another factor is that Boscawen misjudged the mood of the electorate in 1921, having won in 1918 
by making good use of the `Hang the Kaiser' slogan. He now talked of making "Germany pay to the 
last farthing", whilst "Labour would let Germany off'. As J. H. Thomas said, the electors "having been 
fooled with the `Hang the Kaiser' cry are not likely to be taken in by its present equivalent". (136) 
Indeed Labour claimed that the policy of vengeance on Germany was leading to the dislocation of trade 
and unemployment. Clynes, the Labour leader, claimed that the Party "would make Germany pay for 
the wrong she did within the measure of the means". (137) 
With unemployment in Dudley at 3,694 on the 18 March it seems obvious that this was a major 
factor in determining the election result. (138) Boscawen did recognise this, but put the blame on 
Labour and the trade unions. He pointed out that 27 million working days had been lost in strikes 
during 1920. The unions were also blamed for refusing to train ex-servicemen for the building 
trade. (139) Furthermore to assist his election chances the Government raised unemployment benefit to 
£1 a week a few days before the vote. Labour dismissed this as worth only 7 shillings in pre war 
purchasing power and called for a rate of £2 a week-(140) Labour also appealed to the unemployed 
calling for "work or maintenance" and condemning "the expenditure of millions on military adventures 
abroad". (141) 
Wilson, himself, claimed that his victory was due to resentment over the Government's failure "to 
deal with the vital problems confronting the country - unemployment and high prices". (142) The Town 
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'er declared that, "hopelessly beaten in the industrial field the workers are now turning to politics for 
salvation". (143) The Conservative press, however, saw things differently with the Birmingham Post 
headlining the result as "Dudley's Ingratitude". Their editorial claimed that "Mr Wilson has been 
elected not because Dudley admires his political views (which seem to be extremely nebulous) but 
because a great number of exceedingly ignorant people have been successfully induced to believe that 
his return will lead to the cheapening of bread and meat". (144) 
C. THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 1921 
1921 proved to be the high water mark for Labour's performance during this parliament. High 
unemployment along with agitation over benefits seemed to anger the electorate. In April, for instance, 
the Wolverhampton Express and Star pointed out that Labour had secured a majority in Sedgley on the 
Urban District Council-(145) As the election was held during the miners' strike, the result was perhaps 
not unexpected. 
In the November municipal elections Labour contested all six seats on Smethwick Council, winning 
four, including Uplands for the first time. Yet the opposition, again fighting under a Coalition banner, 
captured Spon Lane with a working-class candidate, backed by the Conservatives. He claimed to be a 
trade union official, who blamed unemployment on the Labour Party for encouraging strikes. (146) 
Nevertheless successes in Smethwick led to the first appointment here of a Labour Lord Mayor in 
Alderman Willetts. (147) 
Labour's best performance came in Wolverhampton, where three gains were made. One of those 
elected was Emma Sproson, who was a member of the ILP and was to be the town's first female 
councillor. She has been described as Wolverhampton's "leading Suffragette and War Resister". (148) 
After the election she unfolded a red flag on the Town Hall balcony. (149) Nicknamed ̀ Red Emma', 
she and her husband Frank were to be leading figures on the left in Wolverhampton during the 1920's. 
Elsewhere in the Black Country Labour's performance was rather disappointing. In West Bromwich, 
where the party was defending four seats, two were lost to an Independent and a Liberal. This setback 
came despite the support given by local MP, Frank Roberts. The result may have been affected by a 
strike of local unemployed workers on relief schemes run by the Council. They had had their wages cut 
by 2d an hour in order to comply with the terms of a government grant. (150) 
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In Wednesbury, Labour made no new advances, retaining the Town Hall seat, but failing to win in 
either Kings Hall or Wood Green, where they had succeeded before. These elections were keenly 
contested with a 75-80% turn out. (151) The Conservative argument, which seemed to prevail, was put 
in the local press: - "Social reforms are very desirable.... but not in times like the present, when there is 
unemployment everywhere and large numbers of workers are on short time! '. (152) 
Labour made two gains in Dudley, but, since these were the only seats that they won, it could be 
argued that they did not build on their by-election success. In Stourbridge the Party lost one seat and 
failed to win any. Labour fought only a limited campaign in Walsall, retaining their two seats. Results 
here were affected by the intervention of Anti-Waste candidates. Nevertheless an Unemployed 
Association's candidate won a surprise victory in Birchills Ward. (153) 
On the whole Labour's performance in the region in 1921 seemed quite promising. Yet the impact of 
unemployment certainly hit the party's finances, whilst not always benefiting its electoral prospects, as 
the threat of job losses could make some voters more cautious. This was especially the case, when 
opposition election manifestos were linking the Labour Party with Communism and Bolshevism. (154) 
D. THE WOLVERHAMPTON WEST BY-ELECTION. 1922 
In these circumstances a by-election was held in Wolverhampton West on the 7 March 1922, 
following the death of Alfred Bird, the Coalition Conservative candidate. Labour was expected to do 
well, as the Government had been defeated in four consecutive by-elections. In fact during February 
they had made two gains from Coalition Conservatives with swings of around 20 per cent. (155) Then 
on the eve of the by-election Labour gained two seats on Staffordshire County Council. (1 56) Instead of 
victory, however, there was to be a swing of only 1.9 per cent against the Coalition candidate and 
Labour lost. (157) 
The result, which came at the same time as Labour suffered a setback in the London County Council 
elections, marked a turning point for the party in its opposition to the Coalition. After Wolverhampton 
Labour made two further gains in the life of this Parliament, but these were from Coalition Liberals 
rather than Conservatives. Since the latter were then to win a large majority in the General Election of 
1922, it appears that the Wolverhampton result was something of a turning point. 
Bird was replaced by his son, Sir Robert, who had taken over the family business. The Labour 
candidate was again Alexander Walkden, whose links with the town went back ten years and had stood 
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in 1918. According to the Birmingham Post he was a moderate, who was able to "keep in the 
background the more extreme policies with which Labour.... has now become associated". (158) Also 
in a constituency, where there were 3,0000 railwaymen, Walkden's own position as General Secretary 
of the Railway Clerks' Association was thought to be a big advantage. (159) 
In his Address to the Electors Walkden stressed his close ties to the national leadership, who were 
supplying him with speakers at meetings. He condemned the Coalition Government for failing to 
provide work and decent housing. A special appeal was made for the Irish vote by condemning the 
`Black and Tan' campaign for wasting lives and money. He also actively sought votes from women 
electors, by organising special meetings with them to discuss the issues. The Address contained nine 
proposals, which particularly stressed the provision of work, building new houses and reducing the cost 
of living. (160) 
The position of the Liberals was important as they had no candidate standing and were working with 
the Conservatives in municipal elections. However, the respected Liberal MP for Wolverhampton East, 
George Thorne, backed Walkden. In a letter to the Labour candidate, Thorne justified his support on 
the grounds that they both wanted "the speedy dismissal from power of the present Coalition 
Government". He also admitted that although from different parties, "there is very little between us as 
regards our views in relation to possible and practicable policies in the immediate future". (161) 
This assistance, however, was seen as double-edged. It was suggested that Thome's support for 
Walkden came because he did not want to stand against a Labour candidate in a future election in his 
own constituency. (162) Furthermore not all Liberals were prepared to back Walkden. Bird was 
supported by amongst others, Alderman Bantock, who had arranged the local deal with the 
Conservatives. (163) Alderman Dickinson, Chairman of the East Wolverhampton Liberal Association, 
claimed he had voted for Walkden at the last General Election, "but having regard to the present 
attitude of Labour in East Wolverhampton to Mr Thorne, he feels he cannot continue his support for 
the Labour candidate in West Wolverhampton". (164) 
The main issue in the by-election was the economic recession, which Wolverhampton had not 
avoided. (165) Walkden sought to use this to show how Lloyd George had failed to keep to the 
programme he had laid down in Wolverhampton in 1918. Unemployment in the town at the time stood 
at around 13,000, which was about 28 per cent of the workforce. (166) Walkden should have been 
further helped by the government's recent cut in unemployment benefit and increased insurance 
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contributions, which were resented by employed and unemployed alike. (167) He called for "useful 
work or adequate maintenance for the unemployed as a national responsibility not out of the 
rates". (168) The opposition, however, accused Labour of being "barren of helpful suggestions" and not 
knowing "how to set the industrial machine to work". (169) Significantly there was a drop in 
unemployment in the weeks before the election, with a fall of over ISO in Wolverhampton in one week. 
Indeed unemployment fell by over 10,000 between January and February in the West Midlands as a 
whole. (170) 
At first it appeared that Labour was winning the campaign. The Times, for instance, reported that 
"another Coalition defeat seems to be indicated". Bird was considered to have had "little experience of 
public life", whilst meetings arranged in his support had to be cancelled. Walkden, meanwhile, had 
arranged five with speakers including Thomas, Henderson and Frank Hodges, the secretary of the 
Miners' Federation. (17 1) It was admitted, however that Bird was likely to secure most of the women's 
vote as well as that of the licensed trade, which he claimed was threatened with prohibition by 
Labour. (172) 
Indeed a significant factor behind Walkden's defeat was the nature of the opposition. Bird was a 
populist Conservative, who was considered a "model employer" especially as he had "kept his works 
going almost at full time during the slump". (173) His father had been a popular constituency MP, 
which was to prove a big asset. The Birmingham Gazette commented that "as the son of a well liked 
and trusted father, he started with an advantage, which was heightened by the sympathy felt towards 
him in the sudden and tragic manner of his bereavement". (174) Moreover with its significant middle 
and lower-middle-class residential areas, Bird had a strong base to work from in the constituency. 
Although Bird stood as a Coalition Unionist, "pledging himself as a supporter of the Government", 
he announced his freedom "to vote as may seem to him wisest in regard to the urgent and pressing need 
to reduce national expenditure and on questions of national well being". (175) More specifically he 
pledged that he would not vote against the repeal of the Parliament Act or any proposal to allow the 
Lords to veto money bills. He was not in favour of the Geddes Axe regarding education and he 
favoured equality of divorce for men and women-(176) Bird was also notoriously scurrilous in his 
attacks on his opponents. In this election, for instance, Walkden had to face probes into his salary and 
expenses as a union official. A leaflet was distributed listing the increase in members' contributions 
between 1918-1920, along with the increase in management costs and the reduction in benefits. (177) 
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Bird also received the wholehearted support of the Wolverhampton Express and Star. In an editorial 
the paper claimed that "Socialists and extremists have got into the saddle" and have captured the trade 
unions. Labour "has failed to offer anything that can be called either practical or constructive, 
politically or industrially. All its ideas and hopes are based on schemes for which the taxpayer would 
have to foot further heavy bills". (178) 
On his defeat Walkden put much emphasis on the "working class being scared with preposterous 
tales about Bolsheviks and the likelihood of their savings in saving certificates being jeopardised in the 
event of my election". (179) The Birmingham Post editorial commented that "Walkden was old hand 
enough to play the moderation card", but that although he was "an able man and a reasonable man, he 
was still unable to convince West Wolverhampton that he was a safe man". Typically Bird put his 
victory down to the electors preferring "constitutional government to unconstitutional methods and 
revolution". (180) The Birmingham Mail eulogised on Bird's victory: - "He stood for peaceful orderly 
progress in opposition to strife and class war, for security against spoliation, for the good of all sections 
instead of privilege for one at the expense of the rest, in a word for Unionism". (181) 
The Labour Party described the result as "disappointing", but agreed that Walkden had put up "a 
splendid fight", increasing his vote by 3,641. They also accepted that the opposition had "mobilised 
their resources and fought desperately". (182) The Birmingham Gazette put Labour's defeat down to 
their failure to win the Liberal vote, due to their manoeuvres against Thorne in the East Division. (183) 
There was no doubt, however, that Bird was the kind of populist Conservative, who could win support 
amongst the Wolverhampton working class by stressing the economic risks in voting Labour. His 
campaign set a pattern for future contests in the region during this period. 
E. THE 1922 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
These elections, which were held two weeks before the General Election, proved something of a 
setback for Labour in the Black Country as elsewhere. (184) Labour had its biggest defeat in 
Wednesbury, where the Conservatives captured the three contested seats. The local paper called the 
result "a great day in the history of Wednesbury", seeing it as a favourable sign for the forthcoming 
General Election. The paper warned that if Labour were able to implement its Manifesto "it would not 
be long before there would be not merely universal distress but starvation and famine". (185) 
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In West Bromwich Labour contested just the Lyng seat, which they held. There had been some hope 
that Labour might gain control of Smethwick. All six seats were contested but there were to be no 
changes with Labour retaining three of them. (186) The Birmingham Post was able to write of 
Smethwick, that "the seeds of Socialism so lavishly sown in the last few years are not bearing all the 
fruit that was expected". (187) The main issue here for Labour was the size of the new council rents 
with the Party demanding economic rents only when workers got economic wages, with any losses 
made up by ratepayers. (188) Elsewhere the situation was even worse for Labour with the Party losing 
two seats in each of Dudley, Stourbridge and Walsall. Indeed they won no seats in the latter and only 
one in each of the other boroughs. 
As for the reasons for these setbacks, which came on the eve of a General Election, the Birmingham 
Gazett e blamed Labour's national plans for a capital levy. This was seen "not as a substitute for 
existing taxation but as an addition". (189) The Wolverhampton Express and Star agreed, warning of 
"dangerous and extreme elements" and pointing out that "the publication of the programme of the 
Labour Party has finally opened the eyes of the public". (190) The Birmingham Mail believed it was the 
example of the "chaos, misery, starvation" of Bolshevik Russia. "A good many of the socialistic 
doctrines, which inspire our own Labour Party are identical with those of the Bolsheviks and they 
would lead to social and economic disaster here". More significantly the Birmingham Mail pointed to 
the absence of three-cornered contests with "men and women of all parties" supporting "the anti 
Socialist regardless of his political colour". (191) Indeed anti-Socialist pacts, such as the Ratepayers' 
Coalition in Walsall, were in operation with some effectiveness. (192) 
Labour was facing a much stronger attack in these municipal elections. Scare tactics were being used 
by a generally unfriendly press to distort Labour's policies and frighten voters. (193) The results were a 
setback for Labour, although it could have been worse. Yet the Party was not making the progress in 
municipal elections that their success in the 1918 General Election might suggest. This reflects the fact 
that few of the local Labour parties had expanded their membership much above the minimum, whilst 
the recession had severely hit finances as union affiliation dropped. (194) The Party was also faced with 
tough opposition, which understood the electorate and was not afraid of adapting its social policies on 
matters like housing to meet their needs. The more restricted nature of the franchise in municipal 
elections is another important consideration. 
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F. THE 1922 GENERAL ELECTION 
In the 1922 General Election, which took place on the 16 November, two weeks after the municipal 
ones, Labour retained its four original seats but lost Dudley. In three of the four seats the Labour 
majorities were reduced. Thus as far as the Black Country was concerned it seems that the Labour 
Party had held its own without making any significant electoral progress since 1918. 
The main issue in the election throughout the region was unemployment, although there had been 
some recovery in the local economy during 1922. Labour's proposal for a capital levy on business was 
controversial since the Conservatives claimed it would make the recession worse. In turn many Labour 
candidates sought to downplay the levy, realising it would make them vulnerable to Conservative 
attacks. 
1. SMETHWICK 
The Conservatives had high hopes of regaining Smethwick, where their defeat in 1918 was blamed 
on the dropping of the popular candidate Major Thompson for Christabel Pankhurst. The borough was 
suffering, however, from high unemployment with 25% or 9,000 of the working population out of 
work. (195) Moreover I in 9 of these, having exhausted their benefits, were dependent on the Poor Law 
Guardians. The local Unemployment Committee was very active in pressing the Town Council for 
more relief work schemes. (196) 
The Labour candidate and MP, John Davison, had worked hard in Parliament on behalf of his 
constituents. In an impressive maiden speech, for instance, he launched an attack on "the folly of 
successive Governments in this country in restricting their output of housing accommodation". He 
enlarged on this by describing conditions in which "one living room less than 11 feet square (was) 
occupied by a mother, father and six children" and "twenty back-to-back houses of from one to three 
rooms each, sheltering 136 people with one common yard and lavatory accommodation composed of 
four foul privies". (197) 
Nevertheless Davison was described by the Birmingham Post as standing by "with more frankness 
than some of his compatriots under the red flag", standing by the "full Labour programme of 
reconstruction", calling for the "State ownership of land, mines, railways, canals and shipping.... 
Pensions for mothers and the abolition of the Poor Law". (198) Davison also called for "the equitable 
distribution of the proceeds of industry.... not Bolshevism or Communism but common sense and 
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justice". He also advocated a reduction in working hours, the raising of the school leaving age and a 
large programme of public works, including housing, transport and schools. To pay for it there would 
be a supertax on large incomes and increased death duties. He was prepared to support the capital levy 
but, when pressed, replied cautiously that "he did not think the Labour Party would attempt to do it if 
returned to power tomorrow. They would have to examine the whole question". (199) 
As Major Thompson decided not to stand, the Conservatives chose Major Simcox, the Lord of the 
Manor of Harborne, to replace him. Simcox had spent nearly 30 years in the Indian Civil Service and 
Defence Force, but was also able to claim local roots. (200) He quickly sought to equate the Labour 
Party as closely as possible with the Communists, claiming that "they have toned things down and 
smoothed things out.... but they meant the same as Lenin and Trotsky". (201) The Conservatives hoped 
to win support from Liberals by emphasising Labour extremism. Indeed it was reported that many 
Liberals, led by Alderman Pinkney, had agreed to back Simcox. (202) In truth, however, the Liberal 
Party in Smethwick was in serious decay, being described by Cook as "totally unorganised until 
1925". (203) 
Davison won but his majority was reduced. The reason for the reduction, according to the Town 
r was "the money poured out by the Unionists in Smethwick, the scurrilous posters, the 
misrepresentation of Labour's case and the fleet of motor cars on polling day". (204) One example of 
these tactics was the intervention of the managing director of Guest, Keen and Nettleford, who 
addressed his workers on "the horrible stories of Bolshevik misrule in Russia". (205) 
2. WEST BROMWICH 
Unemployment was also the big issue in West Bromwich for this election. (206) During 1921 there 
were marches and demonstrations by the unemployed in support of outdoor relief. (207) The local 
Labour Party was active in supporting them as well as the striking miners. Labour officials, such as the 
party agent, Guest, addressed public meetings. (208) 
The local MP, Frank Roberts, was a strong candidate. The Birmingham Gazette called him "a good 
speaker and moderate in his views"(209) An election poster stressed "his honesty of purpose" and his 
work for "countless good causes" such as hospitals, lifeboats, education and workers' recreation. He 
had served on several important committees over the previous four years. Roberts also made a special 
appeal to women voters, warning of rent rises when the Rent Restriction Act expired in 1923 and 
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listing price increases since 1914. No mention was made of the capital levy, although he stressed the 
need for "taxation according to the ability to pay". The poster emphasised that he had "a sympathetic 
understanding of the true needs of the industrial classes. He is of the workers; he lives with the 
workers. In all his public life he has voiced the workers needs and ideals". (210) 
The Conservatives, however, thought they had good prospects of success, believing that their failure 
in 1918 was due to the ill health of their candidate, Lord Lewisham. Their initial candidate, Charles 
Petrie, who, according to the local press, "had worked hard for the cause.... and had made himself very 
popular", was forced to retire at the last minute due to ill health". (211) His replacement, Herbert 
Parkes, was a director of the local Atlas Iron Works, a member of the Midland Iron and Steel Wages 
Board and chairman of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce. It was claimed that he was "on the 
best of terms with his workers" and approved of trade unionism, "when kept within its proper sphere 
free from the dictation of extremists". (212) 
Parkes appealed for `Peace, Retrenchment and Reform', calling for "a cessation of those industrial 
disputes, which had hampered trade so long; they must get down to work and work as hard as they 
could". He wanted to extend industrial conciliation, which he claimed worked well in the iron trade 
with the Midland Wages Board. (213) There were, however, claims which he was forced to deny that a 
worker at the Atlas Ironworks was dismissed for displaying a photograph of the Labour candidate. 
There were also stories that he would close the Atlas Ironworks, if he were not elected. (214) 
This time West Bromwich had a Liberal candidate, A. E. Glyn Edwards, who was a barrister from 
London. He was supported by Dr. Hazel, the town's most prominent Liberal, who had backed Labour 
in 1918. (215) Their success in capturing a seat from Labour in the 1921 local elections probably 
encouraged the Liberals to stand. Their plan of campaign was to attack the Conservatives over Tariff 
Reform and Labour over the capital levy. (216) 
In his election programme Roberts called for the doubling of old age pensions and a lowering of the 
qualifying age. For the unemployed he promised "the provision of useful work" and "adequate 
maintenance, where work cannot be found". He also called for a return of the Penny Post, the abolition 
of indirect taxation, the clearing away of slums and the provision of healthy homes at reasonable rents. 
The Birmingham Post accused him of promising "all sorts of good things to the workers without regard 
to how the money for them is to be found". (217) The West Bromwich Free Press described the Labour 
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programme as one of "plunder and confiscation", likely to bring about a situation similar to that in 
Russia. (218) 
The result, however, was a victory for Roberts with an increased majority. He certainly benefited, as 
the Free Press accepted, from having had four years in possession, whilst Parkes had only been 
candidate for a short time. (219) Roberts had also been determined to secure the women's vote, inviting 
Margaret Bondfield to the town, where she addressed a large meeting. (220) The intervention of the 
Liberals was also significant. Roberts was the only one of the Black Country Labour MPs to increase 
his majority, which suggests that locally the Liberal vote had been more inclined to the Conservatives 
than to Labour. 
3. WEDNESBURY 
Wednesbury was a third Labour seat, which the Conservatives were optimistic about capturing. In 
1918 the contest had been a three-cornered fight, but now it would be a straight fight with Labour. 
Moreover Labour had performed wretchedly here in the November municipal elections with the 
Conservatives capturing the three contested seats, including that held by the local party agent. The 
parliamentary constituency, however, was much larger than the municipal one, covering Darlaston and 
Tipton as well as Wednesbury. Labour was particularly strong in Tipton, where, according to Barnsby, 
it had developed with close links to the Methodist Church. (221) Both Wednesbury and Tipton had high 
unemployment rates, as they were badly affected by the depression in the coal and iron industries. (222) 
The Conservatives in Wednesbury believed that the unemployment situation would not hinder their 
chances. The Birmingham Post, in its survey of the seat, claimed that "the workers confidently 
subscribe to the view that trade is never as good as when a Conservative Government is in office". 
Their candidate was Hubert Williams, who was the assistant secretary of an employer's federation and 
was seen as an authority on currency and finance, having worked as a government statistician during 
the war. He blamed the recession on "high taxation, the condition of Europe and Socialist agitation". 
His solution was to support "the safeguarding of our heavy industries and the development of mutual 
preferences within the Empire". (223) 
Williams attacked Labour's plan for a capital levy, claiming that it was "not going to touch the 
problems of the National Debt. It simply means a redistribution of the country's wealth. The scheme 
would cause such a panic that countless millions would be thrown out of employment". (224) Williams 
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was also prepared to link the Labour Party with Russia saying that "they would like to tax the capitalist 
out of existence in order that a few Mr Lenins and Mr Trotskys might enjoy that which they could give 
them". (225) The local Wednesbury press took this up, pointing out that in Russia "war on private 
enterprise has resulted in a devastated land and a starving people". (226) 
Short, the Labour MP, realised that he had a persuasive opponent. He sought to counter Williams's 
call for more Protection, by claiming that the Labour programme offered a better future with full 
employment and social justice. He also stressed the moderation of the Labour movement, saying in a 
speech at Darlaston that "if it had not been for the sound common sense of the trade union leaders of 
this country, there might easily have been a revolution, because of the poverty, destitution and misery 
those people had forced upon the masses of this country". Short emphasised the need to settle the peace 
treaties along with reparations and war debts, in order to restore trade. He stood for "the abolition of 
unemployment, a fair standard of living, decent houses with the abolition of slumdom and sound 
sanitary conditions". He claimed that "the horses of the police were better housed than some of the 
people in Wednesbury". (227) 
The Tipton Herald claimed that Short's meetings had more "shouting exuberance" and bigger 
crowds than those of Williams. "There is no room at Burnt Tree to accommodate all who wish to hear 
Short, " wrote its reporter. (228) He was helped further by some costly mistakes, which Williams made. 
In the first place he was accused of talking contemptuously of `common soldiers', although he later 
claimed that he meant ̀ competent soldiers'. (229) Then at a public meeting at Dudley Port he appeared 
to endorse the recent 10 shillings reduction in engineers' wages, when he said that "masters and men 
should make absolutely necessary sacrifices". (230) 
These could have been vital lapses as Short won by only 105 votes. The result was not what the 
municipal elections had indicated, but it should be remembered that the franchise was larger for 
parliamentary elections. Williams's support for Safeguarding and Imperial Preference seems to have 
attracted some working-class support in a constituency hit by recession. Certainly Liberal supporters, in 
the absence of a candidate, appear to have voted for the Conservatives. Nevertheless Short had built up 
his popularity locally over four years. "Labour support for what Labour has gained" was how the 
Tipton Herald put it. (23 1) 
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4. KINGSWINFORD 
The fourth Labour MP defending his seat in 1922, was Charlie Sitch in Kingswinford. This time he 
was opposed in a straight fight by Gilbert Beyfus, who had secured the backing of the Kingswinford 
Conservatives to stand as a Coalition Liberal after giving "certain assurances". (232) Before the war he 
had nursed the Dudley Parliamentary seat, part of which was now in Kingswinford. He announced that 
it was a time when "moderate men should join together to support any moderate Government". (233) 
Sitch had the advantage of being an important local figure, who as a union official was aware of the 
problems in the constituency. It was described as "an electorate of ironworkers, chainmakers, 
glassworkers, brickmakers and a fair sprinkling of miners". (234) With many of these industries in deep 
recession, unemployment was prevalent throughout the constituency. Mining had been particularly 
badly affected by the 1921 dispute, which was followed by the closure of many pits due to flooding 
problems. Meanwhile the domestic chain making industry in Cradley Heath was beginning a terminal 
decline, bringing the high unemployment figures, which peaked at 10,170 on 17 June 1921. (235) 
Beyfus could make a strong claim for the ex-servicemen's vote as, in addition to being wounded 
and captured during the war, he was "mentioned in dispatches for gallantry and persistence in 
attempting to escape". (236) He attacked nationalisation and the capital levy, warning that "half the 
wealth of the country would be taken and industry would be crippled, for capital was the most essential 
part". He also directed attacks on Sitch's position as a trade union official, blaming strikes not on the 
rank and file but on some trade union leaders, who had taken political action. (237) 
Sitch was prepared to support a capital levy, explaining that it was a means whereby those who made 
money out of the war "will pay off most of the war debt". (238) He was, however, forced to deny 
claims in a poster that Labour wanted to reduce interest on war savings' certificates and loans. (239) He 
also championed the cause of ex-servicemen and the disabled. Sitch denied being an extremist or that 
he had ever preached class war, urging that he had always worked for fairness from both sides. (240) He 
did make an issue out of his opposition to sweated labour, pointing out how Lloyd George had turned 
down the chance of reform, owing to his position in the Coalition. (241) 
Sitch's majority in 1922 was down by 2,000 on his 1918 victory. Much of this can be attributed to 
the fact that whereas in 1918 he had been involved in a three-cornered contest, this time he was in a 
straight fight. In fact Sitch's performance was quite creditable, since in 1918 he had won with only a 
minority of the vote. The key factor for Sitch was the popularity he had secured locally through his 
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work in the trade union movement. (242) The number of individual members in his constituency party 
remained at the minimum throughout this period. (243) 
5. DUDLEY 
Labour was also defending a fifth seat at Dudley, following their by-election success. This time, 
however, the Party would not be able to concentrate its organisation on the seat, leaving much to local 
resources. The Birmingham Post, however, pointed out that the Labour organisation had been 
"considerably strengthened" and that Wilson was "confident of victory". (244) 
The Conservatives chose a strong candidate in C. E. Lloyd, director of N. Hingley ironworks in 
Netherton and vice president of the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers. Lloyd 
accepted that Dudley was "among the biggest sufferers in the economic troubles of the time" with its 
major industries, glass, iron and coal, deep in depression. He attacked the sectional interest of Wilson, 
the union official, claiming that the reestablishment and extension of trade needed "the united will for 
peace of all people in the State". (245) It was noted in his favour that "he kept the iron industry moving 
in the district where others closed". (246) The Conservatives were confident of success, blaming their 
defeat in 1921 on "a flood of misrepresentations", especially "the dear food bogey". (247) 
Lloyd followed standard Conservative policy by attacking the capital levy as likely to bring further 
unemployment. (248) As with other local Conservative candidates he attacked his opponent's union 
costs. In the case of Wilson's union he claimed that its management expenses represented 47shillings 
out of every 100 shillings spent. He also reminded the electorate of Wilson's pledges at the time of the 
by-election, which he had not been able to fulfil, although the fact that Labour was not in government 
was not pointed out. (249) In fact Lloyd proved to be such a popular candidate that he won the support 
of many moderate Liberals and trade unionists, "some of whom signed a nomination paper on his 
behalf'. (250) 
Wilson avoided any mention of the capital levy in his election address. When pressed on the subject, 
he said: - "We are not wedded to this policy. We fully appreciate that our country is in a difficulty. We 
believe this will be a way out". He then challenged his opponents to propose other ways of reducing the 
National Debt. (251) He did announce that he favoured "the readjustment of taxation that will fit the 
burden to the capacity of the individual to bear it". He also supported "the adequate provision of houses 
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in co-operation with local authorities; the removal of the income limit disqualification from the Old 
Age Pensions Act and the granting of pensions to widows". (252) 
Wilson's apparent moderation could not save Labour from defeat, as the Conservatives gained a 
majority of over 4,000, which was their largest in the Black Country in this election. The Conservatives 
certainly benefited from having a strong local candidate, who could be described as an ideal Unionist, 
able to appeal to all classes in the constituency, helped the Conservatives. They also had the absolute 
support of the local press, which claimed that "the demands of Labour and socialistic influences are not 
agreeable to the sturdy and independent folk of Great Britain". (253) 
In fact Labour was to lose 11 of their 14 by-election gains of the previous Parliament in this General 
Election. The Annual Report put this down to the party not being able to concentrate its organisation in 
the General Election. "Local parties were left to their own resources and in some cases the organisation 
had not been effectively maintained". (254) This was probably the case in Dudley, where the local party 
seemed to be in a fragile state at this time, having failed to build up an effective local organisation. The 
Annual Repor , 
for instance, gave Dudley's individual affiliation fees for 1922 at the minimum of 
£1/10. (255). 
6. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
Labour still had high hopes of success in Wolverhampton West, despite their earlier by-election 
defeat. Unemployment, which had been as high as 28 per cent in May 1921, was still at 17% in January 
1923. (256) This was despite the fact that the town had a broad industrial base, which included new 
industries such as motor cars, motor cycles, bicycles and electrical appliances. (257) 
Walkden was again the Labour candidate. This time he quickly made his position clear on a number 
of points, in order to check the expected attacks and innuendoes from Bird. He assured the electorate 
that he was connected only with the Railway Clerks Association, "which will provide every farthing 
which will be spent by Labour in the contest..., freely contributed by railway clerks and 
stationmasters". If returned, he assured the electors, "he would be liberated from his ordinary trade 
union work and would be free to devote all his time to their interests in parliament". (258) 
In his Election Address Walkden stressed his moderation, stating that he stood for constitutional 
progress through the House of Commons and denouncing "the abominable suggestion made during the 
last by-election that he was connected with an unconstitutional party governed by extremists". He 
125 
wrote of getting the National Debt paid off quickly "by more graduated taxation of large incomes and 
big fortunes" and added that Labour "absolutely refuses to approve any policy of repudiation". 
Walkden also put much emphasis on the need for slum clearance and a house building programme. 
Wolverhampton, he claimed, had nearly 3,000 houses in need of demolition, while nearly a thousand 
families had applied to the Town Hall for a home. On unemployment he stated that his party would 
provide "work or maintenance", promising "a large programme of necessary and useful public 
works"(259) 
Walkden supported the capital levy, claiming that it was "a matter that does not concern the manual 
working class but the people that have money". (260) The Birmingham Post pointed out that Walkden, 
having failed to convince the electors that he was a safe man in the by-election, was now less likely to 
do so with an attack on private capital. (26I) Later in the campaign, however, Walkden was able to 
quote Arthur Chamberlain, brother of Austen, who said: - "In my opinion a levy on capital now would 
be sound economically". (262) 
Bird fought a similar campaign to that of the by-election, putting much emphasis on smears and 
innuendoes. In particular he was anxious to link his opponent with Russia, talking of "Communist" 
Sunday Schools. He again attacked the management expenses of Walkden's Railway Clerks Union, 
whose membership, he claimed, was falling. (263) Walkden was provoked into issuing a writ against 
Bird, claiming that the reason for the fall in his union's membership was the number of girls leaving 
after the end of the war. (264) 
Both parties were hoping to secure the Liberal vote, but the latter appears to have given no lead in 
this ward. (265) Walkden promoted his own Free Trade views, whilst Bird denied any leanings towards 
Protection. (266) Walkden, however, received a glowing testimonial from George Thorne, the Liberal 
MP for the East division, who called him "a most honest and honourable man". This was over his stand 
on the licensed trade (267) Walkden probably had more success in attacking Bird's voting record over 
work schemes and unemployment pay. (268) Bird admitted that unemployment was the most important 
problem, saying that the only cure was "a revival of trade". He did, however, promise to defend the 
level of ex-service pensions and the old age pension. (269) 
Bird was re-elected, although his majority was nearly 500 down on his by-election success. This was 
a constituency situated on the edge of the industrial belt with a significant middle class element. It 
seems that Bird was well suited to exploit their economic fears over trade unions, taxation and 
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government spending. This probably helped him to secure much of the Liberal vote, which tended 
towards the Conservatives anyway, as the local election pact shows. Meanwhile individual membership 
of the local Labour Party slumped to the minimum return of £1/10 for 1921 and £111314 for 1922, 
despite the earlier efforts to secure an increase. (270) 
7. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
Wolverhampton East was a more typical Black Country seat in that it was predominantly industrial 
and working class. Moreover it had its deep-rooted Liberal tradition, which dated back to the 1832 
Reform Act. Rather surprisingly, this tradition was to be maintained throughout the inter-war years, 
despite the collapse of the Liberal vote elsewhere. For this election, however, the parliamentary 
arrangement, which the Liberals had had with Labour in 1918, had broken down. Labour decided early 
in 1922 to contest the East division, appointing as their candidate W. T. A. Foot, a London railwayman 
and member of the NUR. However, since the party had only recently been established in this division, 
their organisation and finances were weak(271) 
The Liberals, on the other hand, remained strong here for a number of reasons. One factor was the 
personality of the local MP, George Thorne, who had been the member for 14 years. At the heart of the 
constituency was the lock industry of Willenhall. Before the war Thorne had been responsible for 
helping to reorganise the Lockmakers Union. A Wages Board was set up and a post war 47-hour week 
secured. During the 1921 recession the union was to work with the employers in an example of co- 
operation rather than conflict. With wages linked to prices employers agreed to hold their prices, whilst 
the union would boycott those employers selling below the price list. This was possible because there 
was a regular demand for the product and it was confined to the town of Willenhall. (272) This example 
of class collaboration helps explain the strength of Liberalism in the constituency. 
The basis for much of Thorne's support came from the Nonconformist vote in a constituency, where 
the chapel was still a significant factor. Roman Catholics also backed him, owing to his consistent 
support for Irish Home Rule. He stated that he wanted "Irishmen to have the chance to work out their 
own salvation". (273) His connections with Nonconformity in turn led to links with the temperance 
movement. Thorne, himself, made his own position clear in a letter, in which he opposed prohibition 
but backed "a local option" on the matter. He praised Walkden for following the line of the Labour 
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Manifesto, unlike Foot, who had secured the backing of the licensed trade. This situation persuaded 
some Labour supporters, uch as Councillor George Evans to back Thorne. (274) 
The Liberals had another advantage in this division. Owing to their local pact with the 
Conservatives, there were no three cornered contests in local elections. It meant that the Liberals could 
concentrate their efforts in the Eastern wards, whilst the Conservatives had the Western ones. However, 
without any local elections to contest, the Conservatives remained poorly organised in the East. The 
Conservatives appointed as their candidate, Pinson, who was a local lock manufacturer and Chairman 
of Willenhall Council. He was considered "a just and generous employer", but lacked Bird's aggressive 
attacks on Labour. (275) The election became a four way contest, when the Reverend Shaw stood again 
as a National Liberal with the backing of Lloyd George. 
Labour's decision to stand against Thorne was not popular even amongst some of their own 
supporters. There was much talk of apathy as the party's greatest enemy. (276) Foot was anxious to 
emphasise the distance between Liberals and Labour. He stressed policies such as the nationalisation of 
the mines and railways as well as the need for a capital levy to cut the National Debt. (277) He also 
condemned both Liberals and Conservatives for not doing enough to improve housing conditions in 
Wolverhampton, which he described as "an absolute disgrace". (278) 
Even before the vote it became obvious that Foot was not going to threaten the Liberal's 
position. (279) Shaw also found that this time he was getting less support, with reports of "sparse 
attendance" at some of his meetings. (280) Indeed, he even offered to stand down, if Thorne agreed to 
back Lloyd George, but this was something the MP was not prepared to do. (281) Thorne sought to 
appeal to the moderate working class, claiming that "there was a great deal of loose talk about 
revolution done to frighten people, but he had faith in the sobriety and sense of the workers of this 
country". (282) He put emphasis on social reform, the League of Nations and Free Trade. (283) 
In fact Thorne's biggest challenge came from the Conservative, Pinson, who had the advantage of 
being a local candidate. His campaign, however, was less well organised and certainly overshadowed 
by that of Bird's. In this constituency, with its respected Liberal MP, it was not possible to centre the 
campaign around "the threat of Socialism" as Bird succeeded in doing in the West division. (284) 
Thorne won with a majority of over 2,000 with Foot coming a poor third. 
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8. BILT N 
The Bilston seat had a Conservative majority of over 3,000 in 1918, although the result had been 
affected by the scandal concerning the Labour candidate. The victorious Brigadier General Hickman 
now stood down to be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Howard Bury, who was the leader of a recent 
expedition to Mount Everest. The Labour candidate was John Baker, a Tynesider and the assistant 
secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation. Baker was judged "a moderate man", who was 
expected to appeal to the ironworkers of Bilston and the miners of Gornal. (285) 
Labour was quite optimistic, due to their success in the local elections at Coseley and Sedgley within 
the constituency. Unemployment, which had peaked at over 9,000 in May 1921, remained a serious 
problem. (286) Baker gave full support to the capital levy, seeing it as a way of reducing the National 
Debt and removing the taxes on food. (287) He attacked the class-based policies of the former Coalition 
Government, claiming that they had benefited the profiteer at the expense of the working class. He 
pointed out that real wages, which had peaked in 1918, had now fallen below the 1913 level. (288) 
Howard Bury talked of the Government wanting "a spirit of friendship and good will between all 
classes", whilst "the Socialists were preaching a class war". (289) He attacked Labour's nationalisation 
plans as a threat to employment as well as the capital levy, which he called "a disaster". (290) With no 
Liberal standing the Conservatives needed to stress Labour extremism in order to secure their vote. 
This seemed successful, with one prominent Liberal, Major J. S. Thompson, brother of the Mayor of 
Wolverhampton, giving his support. (291) This seems to be another example of the post-war local 
Liberal establishment turning to the Conservatives out of fear of Labour. The result was that Howard 
Bury won a fairly comfortable victory with a majority of nearly 2,000. The Labour vote, however, 
increased by 50 per cent. 
9. WALSAU. 
Walsall was another Black Country town to have been badly hit by the recession. Its traditional 
industries of saddlery, harnesses and leather goods, linked with the horse trade, were in long term 
decline, whilst iron, steel and tube manufacturing were affected by the general recession. 
Unemployment, which had reached 9,109 or around 20% of the workforce in June 1921 at the time of 
the coal dispute, still stood at 6,161 in October 1922. (292) The widespread unemployment in the town 
had brought some co-operation during 1921-22 between the local Trades Council and the Labour Party, 
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which had enabled pressure to be put on the Town Council to secure more assistance for the 
unemployed. (293) In 1918 the local Labour Party had shelved its tradition of disunity to unite behind 
the candidacy of Joseph Thickett. In 1922 no local Labour candidate was forthcoming, so R. Dennison 
was appointed by Party HQ. Dennison, the assistant secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades 
Confederation, was a moderate, who condemned Direct Action. (294) 
Meanwhile Sir Richard Cooper, who had won the 1918 General Election with a majority of over 
6,000, had fused his National Party with the Lloyd George Coalition. He decided to stand down for this 
Election, but his wife, Lady Cooper, was adopted by the local Conservatives in January 1922. (295) 
Walsall had retained a strong Liberal tradition, partly due to the survival of the town's small-scale 
manufactures. In the 1918 General Election many Liberals had supported Cooper, leaving their 
candidate in a poor third place. For this election the local party chose a popular personality, Pat Collins, 
who was a Walsall showman and President of the Showman's Guild. Collins political programme was 
described by the Birmingham Post as "broadly indistinguishable from that of the Unionist Party", in 
that he wanted "peace, retrenchment and reform". (296) He took no stand on the issue of the Liberal 
leadership. His popularity was said to rest on his appeal to the man in the street and the fact that he was 
a Walsall Liberal. (297) 
The intervention of Collins was a blow to Labour. According to the Birmingham Mail "their hopes 
of success have sunk to zero". (298) They were particularly annoyed as back in June Collins had written 
a personal letter to the Labour candidate "expressing the hope that nothing would be done to split the 
progressive vote". (299) It appears that the deal fell through because it required Labour to withdraw 
from other constituencies, including Wolverhampton East, which they were not prepared to do. (300) 
Collins won a surprise victory with Labour coming third. Lady Cooper may have suffered as a 
woman candidate, but more likely because she was seen as too much part of the establishment. (301) 
Dennison was disappointed, especially as he had stressed his moderation. (302) He denied that Collins 
victory marked a revival of Liberalism, claiming that "Walsall was essentially and fundamentally a 
Labour constituency". (303) Dennison put his defeat down not just to the personality of Collins, but also 
to "the jealousies, petty disputes and frictions of the local party leaders, which made for disunity". (304) 
The result was such that Dennison's association thought it not worth his while fighting the seat 
again. The candidate also addressed some plain words to the local Labour leaders, saying that they 
should "show a great deal more charity to one another. There should be less jealousy and, if 
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personalities were sunk, it would be all to the good - the pettiness of some of the disputes had caused 
him pain and amazement". (305) It is probable that the fact that Dennison was an outsider proved the 
biggest drawback for Labour in this election. 
10. STOURBRIDGE 
The final Black Country constituency of Stourbridge was not contested by Labour in 1922. This 
appears surprising as the Party had come within 1,333 votes of capturing the seat in 1918. However, 
Mary MacArthur, the popular candidate of 1918, had died not long after that election. It was suggested 
that the Party could not afford the expense of the fight. (306). Labour's Annual Report gave the division 
the minimum individual membership for 1921, contributing 11/10 a year, which was standard for the 
region. (307) For 1922, however, the constituency gave no return, suggesting that membership had 
slumped below even the minimum requirement. (308) Since Labour contested 414 out of the 657 seats 
nationally in this election, this was probably the case. The constituency was also badly affected by the 
recession, with unemployment reaching 5,000 in Oldbury and 8,000 in Stourbridge, which included 
Brierley Hill, in June 1921. (309) 
The Liberal MP, J. W. Wilson, had held the seat for 27 years. The Birmingham Mail claimed that 
since 1918 there had been a revolt from "the colourless latitudinarian Liberalism of Mr Wilson". (310) 
The immediate beneficiary was not Labour but the Conservative, D. P. Pielou, who won a surprise 
victory. His main policy was support for colonial preference and the safeguarding of home 
industries. (3 11) Moreover due to his war record and the work he had been doing for ex-servicemen, he 
was probably not an unattractive candidate amongst potential Labour voters. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Given their success in 1918 Labour's performance in the Black Country in the 1922 General 
Election must be seen as slightly disappointing. The party retained its four MPs, but suffered a drop in 
their percentage of the vote in the three seats of Smethwick, Walsall and West Bromwich, although in 
the latter this was largely due to the intervention of the Liberals. Only in Bilston was there a significant 
increase in the Labour vote. Overall Labour increased its vote by 20 per cent to 104,796, but the party's 
share of the total vote in contested seats fell from 42.8 per cent to 41.0 per cent. Nevertheless this was 
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still well above the national figure of 29.4 per cent and the Birmingham figure of 36 per cent in 
contested seats. (312) 
The results reflected the steady rather than rapid expansion, which the local Labour parties had 
experienced between the General Elections. There was an increase in the number of local councillors 
across the region, although the total did not give a true reflection of the party's strength, which was 
partly due to the restricted nature of the local government franchise. Meanwhile individual party 
membership, as seen through the affiliation fees, remained low. Nevertheless organisation was not 
lacking with Drinkwater continuing to appear effective in his role within the Midlands. The number of 
full time agents in the region stood at six in 1920. (313) 
A significant factor behind Labour's modest growth during this period was the 1921 recession, 
which affected the Black Country more seriously than other regions. In 1918 the General Election had 
been fought at a time of full employment and rising trade union membership. The appearance of high 
unemployment along with the fall in trade union membership must have affected the confidence of the 
working class and their organisations. Workers feared losing their jobs, whilst the decline in union 
membership meant exposure to aggressive policies from employers. It meant that workers were more 
likely to follow the established line. It also led to a decline in membership and finances for the Labour 
Party, which could explain why there was no Labour candidate in Stourbridge for the 1922 Election. 
Another problem for Labour was that their proposals for dealing with the recession probably did not 
seem precise enough at the time. Even their schemes for public works appeared rather vague. On the 
other hand local Conservatives developed populist policies and candidates. This was very much a 
legacy of the Chamberlain years, when Tariff Reform had emerged as a policy to unite the classes. 
Local Conservatives realised that they could rival Labour for the working-class vote by make good use 
of issues such as Tariff Reform along with some modest social reforms. They argued that it was cheap 
imports and the loss of export markets that were hitting Black Country industries and jobs. 
Another Conservative message, which was proving effective at the time, was to warn of the threat to 
the economy of Labour's proposals. In local elections their candidates pointed to rising household 
rates, whilst in the General Election it was the capital levy. In addition to this many Conservative 
candidates were prepared to fight scurrilous campaigns against Labour, hoping to arouse the fears of 
the electorate, particularly the potential Liberal voter. Successful Conservative candidates like Bird and 
Lloyd had strong local ties and populist policies. As industrialists within their constituencies they had a 
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sound understanding of the needs of their electorate. Local employers could identify with these 
candidates, which encouraged them to exert pressure on their workforces to conform. Labour seemed 
to be at a particular disadvantage when it appointed outsiders such as Dennison and Foot. 
The decline of the Liberals should have helped Labour at this time. In those Black Country towns, 
where there was still a strong working-class Liberal vote, such as in Wolverhampton East, Walsall and 
Stourbridge, the Labour Party made least progress. On the other hand parts of the Black Country have 
been described as "the worst scene of Liberal decay". In Smethwick and Wednesbury the Liberals had 
no organisation until 1925, whilst in West Bromwich they secured less than 10% of the vote in 
1922. (314) Both Labour and the Conservatives sought to squeeze the Liberal vote with the former 
pressing their reform policies and speaking of working-class solidarity, whilst the latter stressed the 
threat of Socialism. In 1922 both sides could claim some success in this matter. 
The local Labour parties were certainly helped by the work in Parliament of their four MPs. 
Historians have been dismissive of Labour's intake in 1918, largely it seems on the grounds that they 
were mainly sponsored by the trade unions. Thorpe, - for instance, describes the PLP of 1918 as 
"somewhat lacklustre". (315) In fact the for Black Country Labour MPs all developed their reputations 
through their activities in Parliament, working hard on behalf of their constituents on issues such as 
working conditions, housing and unemployment. 
By 1922 the Labour Party in the Black Country had secured its organisational structure and 
maintained its electoral position in the General Election. With their dependence on trade unions and 
small individual membership, local constituency parties resembled the picture portrayed by McKibbin. 
Yet with an economic slump and falling trade union membership the party's organisation and finances 
were being stretched. This was a major factor behind both the decision not to contest Stourbridge and 
the failure to hold Dudley in the 1922 General Election. It also helps to explain the slight swing against 
the party across the region in this election, which contrasts unfavourably with the position nationally, 
where Labour nearly trebled the number of its MPs from 57 to 146. The figures for the Black Country 
show that despite the party's expansion nationally, there were still limitations on Labour's 
achievements at this time, as has been pointed out by McKibbin, Howard and Savage. 
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CHAPTER 3- THE 1923 AND 1924 ELECTIONS 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
By 1923 the Labour Party had emerged as the major opposition to the Conservatives in most of the 
country. The National Agent, Egerton Wake, announced that of the 603 constituencies only 6 were 
without a Labour Party organisation. There were also 1,031 Women's Sections with 120,000 
members. (1) Although individual membership remained low, there were over 4 million affiliated trade 
union members in 1921 and 1922, although this figure did drop to 3.3 million in 1923. The Labour 
Party's income was also increasing from £25,537 in 1919 to a temporary peak of £61,178 in 1922. (2) 
Within a year another General Election was called mainly around the issue of tariff reform. Bonar 
Law had pledged not to introduce Protection before referring the matter to the electorate. Baldwin, who 
had replaced Law as Prime Minister, decided that Protection would help solve the unemployment 
problem, so a fresh election was called for December 1923. (3) The move had the effect of uniting the 
significant group of former Coalition Conservatives, led by Austen Chamberlain behind Baldwin. It 
also reunited the Liberal Party under the banner of Free Trade, with Asquith as its leader. 
Baldwin's decision to call an election was not entirely supported either by his Cabinet colleagues or 
by backbenchers. Lancashire Conservatives, who were traditional Free Traders, opposed the decision, 
although Baldwin rejected any food taxes. According to Cook the Conservatives entered the election 
"confused, divided and unenthusiastic with the policy of Protection only half thought out". Public 
opinion, he claims, believed that "he was a puppet in the hands of the Party hierarchy". (4) As for the 
details of his proposals, Baldwin was "deafeningly silent". (5) The Economist, in a celebrated editorial, 
claimed that "the Prime Minister has invited the country to sell its birthright for a mess of pottage". (6) 
The national press too was "unenthusiastic" with the Rothermere and Beaverbrook papers attacking 
Baldwin. (7) Later in the campaign the Conservatives, sensing a negative response, switched tactics to 
stressing the dangers of Socialism in the Labour Party, with lurid details of what was happening in 
Russia. (8) 
The Liberals fought for Free Trade, arguing that Protection would bring higher food prices. At the 
same time they attacked Labour's nationalisation proposals and the capital levy as damaging to the 
economy. Yet the Liberals had few radical proposals of their own to offer. Cook claims that their 
campaign "revealed a party that could offer only an anaemic conservatism". (9) This enabled the 
Labour Party to stand as the radical alternative. 
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MacDonald, who had been re-elected leader on his return to`parliament in the 1922 General Election, 
sought to' sideline the Liberals and present Läboür' as the alternative government. (10) This meant 
. moderating some of 
his own supporters more extreme views. He was aware, for instance, that, despite 
initially supporting his leadership, the Clydesiders in parliament wanted Labour to preach a class war 
and avoid contacts with the opposition. MacDonald's election strategy was to fight the Conservatives 
with a Free Trade policy, whilst proposing more progressive policies than the Liberals. Yet MacDonald 
was cautious over the capital levy, since he was aware that it laid the party open to accusations of 
confiscation and Bolshevism. Indeed he later confided to Dalton that he thought the levy had cost 
Labour 50 seats. (11) 
The result of the General Election was indecisive with the Conservatives winning 258 seats with 
38% of the vote, the Liberals 159 with 29.7 per cent and Labour 191 with 30.7 per cent. The 
Conservatives gained 20 seats mainly in rural areas at the expense of the Liberals, but lost 108, of 
which 41 were to Labour in industrial areas and 67 to the Liberals, 23 in boroughs and 44 in 
counties. (12) It seems that whilst rural areas favoured tariff reform, elsewhere the fear of `dear food' 
told against the Conservatives. 
The Labour Party gained 63 seats, losing 16, whilst the Liberals gained 80, losing 38. The Liberals 
lost seats to Labour in the industrial East Midlands, London, Bristol and Norwich. Their survival in 
many industrial seats was only due to local pacts with the Conservatives. (13) Labour's total vote rose 
from 4,439,780 in 1922 to 5,489,087 in 1923. Of Labour's 191 MPs, 101 were backed by trade unions, 
39 by the ILP and 39 by Divisional Parties. (14) Labour's biggest advance was in Greater London, 
where 21 new seats were gained, giving a total of 37. However, the party still failed to capture any 
seats in Liverpool or Birmingham. (15) Egerton Wake, in his Report, admitted that the election was "a 
great strain on the resources of the party, which was taxed to the utmost by this effort". (16) 
A comparison with 1922 is not easy to make, because of the presence then of former Coalition 
Liberals working with the Conservatives. Cook has, however, analysed seats, where there was a 
comparable contest. Thus in the 53 seats, where Conservatives fought Labour in both elections, there 
was a swing of 5.2 per cent to Labour. Labour performed better in borough seats, but the Conservatives 
did well in chemical and engineering towns in the North West and in Birmingham and the Black 
Country. (17) In three-cornered contests the Conservatives were down 4.9 per cent, whilst the Liberals 
were up 4.1 per cent and Labour 0.8 per cent. Liberals were outperforming Labour in rural 
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constituencies. In the 25 seats where Labour fought the Liberals only, there was a swing of 2.7 per cent 
to Labour but not in the rural ones. (18) 
Cook sees Asquith's decision to put Labour into power in January 1924 as ̀ decisive' for the fortunes 
of the Liberal Party. Had the Conservatives won or the Liberals come second, Cook believes the 
situation might have been different for them. (19) He believes that the aim of MacDonald's Government 
was to reduce the Liberals to `parliamentary impotence'. Thus there was to be no political deal with 
them, despite being dependent on their support. Instead the key to his administration was to follow 
moderate policies in order to win over middle-class Liberal voters for a forthcoming election. (20) 
Marquand believes there were personal factors behind MacDonald's policy, as he found Asquith's tone 
"patronising" and thought Lloyd George "cynical and unprincipled". (21) 
It has also been claimed that MacDonald believed socialism would only emerge, if capitalism were 
restored. (22) Snowden's Budget, for instance, was essentially a Liberal one. The capital levy was 
dropped, the McKenna duties were ended and taxes cut. (23) In industrial relations, far from 
dismantling the Emergency Powers Act, MacDonald proposed using it, when a national dock strike was 
called in February and again over a London transport strike in March. This hardly made him popular 
with the trade unions or with the ILP. Meanwhile unemployment remained at well over one million 
with the government seeming to have no solution for it. Their one lasting achievement is generally 
accepted to be Wheatley's Housing Act, which opened the way for a large council house building 
programme. Even so this was a long-term measure, which only became apparent later. Given the 
Government's minority position it could be argued that there was little choice for MacDonald. 
Nevertheless his opponents on the Left called for a more radical programme, which, if defeated in 
Parliament, could then be put to the electorate. 
It seemed at first that MacDonald's plan was working, as in by-elections held during 1924 Labour 
increased its vote in their areas at the expense of the Liberals. The Conservatives too had their way of 
frightening Liberal voters into the Conservative camp, by arousing the electorate with talk of the 
`Socialist' threat and the so-called Bolshevik nature of the Labour Party. (24) This policy seemed to 
peak with a big attack on Labour over the Russian Treaty of August 1924, which involved a loan to 
Russia to help her to start repaying pre revolutionary debts. 
According to Pugh, MacDonald only intended running in office for a short time, in order to show 
that Labour was fit to govern, after which he would find a way out "before basic economic and social 
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questions had to be faced". (25) His chance came in September 1924 over Labour's decision to abandon 
the prosecution of the Communist, J. R. Campbell, who had urged soldiers not to fire on fellow workers. 
The Conservatives backed a compromise move by Asquith to set up a select committee to investigate 
the matter. The government was defeated and MacDonald insisted on a dissolution. 
The key feature of the 1924 General Election was the collapse of the Liberal vote. The Conservatives 
sought to use the Russian Treaty and the Campbell case as the basis for `a Red Scare campaign', 
although Baldwin, himself, acted with some moderation. Having reorganised the Conservatives and 
renounced Protection, he called for "sane common sense government". (26) In the constituencies, 
however, "a rabid and emotional anti-Communist campaign developed". In particular there were 
references to MacDonald's wartime pacifism and to Labour's apparent threat to religion and family 
life. Much of this seemed to be aimed at women and wavering Liberal voters. (27) The campaign 
culminated on the eve of poll with the publication in the Daily Mail of the Zinoviev Letter. (28) 
The Liberals, on the other hand, were in a state of disarray. The number of their candidates was 
down from 457 to 340. They were short of funds and their organisation was in decline. Many Liberals 
were involved in anti-Socialist pacts and where there was no local candidate, they were usually urged 
to vote Conservative. (29) The Liberals in their election addresses put most emphasis on Free Trade, 
land reform and the Russian Treaty, but made less mention of Lloyd George's plans to develop national 
resources. It meant that they were left without a distinctive policy of their own. (30) 
The Labour organisation was expanding into rural areas with the party contesting 101 new seats, of 
which 50 were for the first time. (3 1) Essentially the party was fighting a defensive campaign, pointing 
out that their lack of achievement in Government was due to being in a minority, which needed Liberal 
support. The Labour manifesto remained moderate, promising to reorganise mining, tax land values 
and set up a national electricity generating system. The capital levy and nationalisation were virtually 
ignored this time, as was any clear policy to deal with unemployment. There is evidence in the last 
week of the campaign of growing tenseness in the constituencies, perhaps in response to Conservative 
campaigning. There were, for instance, complaints of Labour inspired rowdyism at meetings. (32) 
The result was to be an overwhelming victory for the Conservatives, who secured 412 seats with 
46.8 per cent of the vote compared with 38 per cent in 1923. Labour came second with 151 seats, 
which was a net loss of 42. However, they secured one million extra voters and their proportion of the 
vote rose from 30.7 per cent to 33.3 per cent. (33) The Liberals, on the other hand, lost 114 seats, 
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leaving them with just 40, whilst their proportion of the vote dropped from 29.7 per cent to only 17.8 
per cent. It is, however, not strictly accurate to compare nationally the proportion of votes in 1924 with 
1923 as more seats were contested, especially in Ulster, which increased the total Conservative vote. 
Labour made 16 gains from the Liberals, mainly in Yorkshire, Scotland and the North East. They 
also made 6 gains from the Conservatives with the party doing well in the North East, Yorkshire, the 
West Midlands and Merseyside. Labour's biggest losses came in London, especially the suburbs, and 
in Scotland. (34) Of Labour's 64 losses 40 were in straight fights with the Conservatives, whilst 15 of 
their 22 gains came in three-cornered fights. (35) The main reason why Labour did badly was the 
collapse of the Liberal vote. There were fewer three-cornered contests than in 1923, as the Liberals put 
up 100 less candidates. This was partly due to finance and partly to anti-Socialist pacts. Hence 27 seats, 
which Labour had won in three-cornered contests in 1923, were lost to single opponents in 1924, 
although Labour's share of the poll increased in each of them. (36) 
McKibbin sees the 1924 Election as a turning point for the Liberals, whose vote was now to become 
"a quasi-Conservative vote, a protest vote by social groups, who would in future normally vote 
Conservative". (37) Only 7 Liberals were elected in three cornered fights. According to Cook of the 40 
Liberal survivors "only 15 could be said to be unaided by Conservatives" and of these 7 were in Wales 
and 4 in Scotland. (38) It is for this reason that Cook claims that "the real victors of the 1924 Election 
were the Labour Party". (39) 
According to the Report of Labour's National Agent the constituencies attributed their losses to "the 
operation of pacts between the Liberals and Tories in many areas, to the heavy Tory poll due to the 
`Red Letter scare' and to Liberal voters deserting their own candidates". (40) Most historians are agreed 
that the Zinoviev Letter made little difference to the result, although it may have increased the 
Conservative majority. (41) The main factor was the decline of the Liberals, which had been the key 
strategy of both Labour and Conservative during the campaign. In particular Baldwin's abandonment 
of Protection and his use of Red Scare tactics during the campaign undermined the Liberals. Another 
handicap for the party at this time was the appeal of Baldwin amongst middle-class and moderate 
working-class voters. His most recent biographer has shown how under his leadership the 
Conservatives were able to capture and shape the middle ground, winning the support of many Liberal 
voters. (42) 
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Cook has analysed the results in 265 seats, which were fought by the same parties in 1923 and 1924. 
In 39 constituencies, where the Conservatives fought the Liberals, there was a swing of 9.1 per cent to 
the Conservatives, compared with one of 4.5 per cent in the 80 seats, where Labour fought the 
Conservatives. In both cases the swing was greatest in middle-class constituencies. Indeed in 7 seats 
there was actually a swing to Labour, whilst in mining seats the swing to the Conservatives was only 
3.7 per cent. In the 123 three cornered contests the Conservative vote was up 8.6 per cent, Labour's 
was up 2.7 per cent and the Liberal's down 11.3 per cent. Only in Greater London was there a high 
swing of 9.3 per cent from Labour to the Conservatives, compared with 2.6 per cent nationally. (43) 
B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
By October 1923 unemployment in Birmingham had fallen to 41,934, which was well down on the 
peak of June 1921, but similar to the level of October 1922. (44) The industrial recession, coupled with 
the defeat of the Engineers following their lockout, had seriously depleted the resources of the local 
Labour Party. Affiliation fees from individual members, given in Labour's Annual Report, show 
returns for just 7 of the 12 divisions, with only Yardley contributing more than the minimum £1/10. (45) 
In the November municipal elections Labour made 28 gains nationally with 8 of these being in the 
West Midlands. (46) The verdict on this in the Birmingham Gazette was that "Labour seems to have 
done rather better than hold its own". (47) In Birmingham, however, where Labour was defending only 
three seats, the party lost two of them, whilst gaining one other. The Town Crier blamed Labour's lack 
of success in Birmingham on "the apathy of the very people whom the Labour Party desires to 
help". (48) It also lamented the party's financial resources, which had led to the absence of "an effective 
distribution of readable literature.... to counteract the influence of the anti-Labour press". In many 
wards the local Labour Party "could not afford to do more than issue an address and the usual poll 
card". In Sheffield, by comparison, where the party made five gains, the distribution of the Sheffield 
`election special' was three times that of the Town Crie r. (49) 
With Protection the main issue in the 1923 General Election, the Unionist Party in Birmingham was 
fully behind Stanley Baldwin. The Birmingham Post, for instance, claimed that only the Unionists had 
anything "that is both tangible and valuable to offer for the relief of unemployment". The Labour 
programme was dismissed as destructive of industrial enterprise, whilst the Liberals were considered to 
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have "practically nothing to offer". (50) Indeed the Liberals in Birmingham had candidates in only 5 of 
the 12 seats, despite their apparent national revival under the banner of Free Trade. It meant that the 
Birmingham Gazette warned Liberal voters, who were in a constituency where there was a straight 
fight between Labour and Conservatives, to put `Free Trade first'. The paper was reluctant, however, to 
endorse Labour, pointing to MacDonald's stated aim of destroying the Liberals as a political force. (51) 
The Labour Party itself was fighting only 9 of the 12 Birmingham Divisions, which was a reflection 
on their lack of resources. The Town Crier complained that Unionist and Liberal employers were using 
"intimidation of the grossest kind" by warning that, if Labour were returned and brought in a capital 
levy, they would have to close down their works. (52) The Labour Party found it hard to counter the 
Unionist case, as they were fighting the issue which gave Unionism its distinctive feature. At one time 
it was thought that Percival Bower might capture Aston for Labour, but this was not to be as the 
Unionists retained all 12 seats. (53) 
Labour's share of the vote in the 9 seats that they contested was 37 per cent which was an increase 
on the 36 per cent achieved in 1922. (54) The party's position in Birmingham was seriously hampered 
by the weakness of the Liberals, who captured 27,074 votes in the 5 seats they fought, which was just 
10.6 per cent of the total. The Liberals best performance was in Kings Norton, where they secured 25.9 
per cent of the vote, making this the only genuine three-cornered contest in the city. Not surprisingly 
this was the only minority vote that the Unionists secured, compared with 3 minority votes in the 1922 
Election. (55) 
The Birmingham Gazette described the city as "a black spot on the map of political progress". (56) 
The Birmingham Post, on the other hand, proudly proclaimed that the city "has not wavered" and 
"remains true to its political faith". (57) One newspaper contrasted the results with those in London, 
where Labour made substantial gains, commenting on "the really remarkable persistence and 
vehemence of what may most closely be described as Chamberlain party feeling in Birmingham". (58) 
Nevertheless Labour took some consolation from their defeats. The Town Crier, for instance, was 
able to claim that Labour "has given the Chamberlainites the biggest shock they have ever had in their 
lives", pointing to the reduction in Neville Chamberlain's majority in Ladywood and Austen 
Chamberlain's in West Birmingham. (59) Indeed Neville Chamberlain secured the smallest majority in 
the Birmingham Divisions. The Daily Herald went so far as to claim that "the writing is on the wall" 
for Tory Birmingham. (60) 
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For the 1924 General Election Labour had candidates in all seats apart from West Birmingham, 
where Dr Robert Dunstan stood as a Communist. (61) Yet Labour resources in the city remained weak. 
Indeed the Party was so short of funds, that in Duddeston, Edgbaston, Erdington, Sparkbrook and 
Moseley they found difficulty in raising the £150 deposit in time for the nominations. Nevertheless 
there was comment in the Town Crier, that before the exposure of the Zinoviev Letter Labour had 
hoped to win the 4 seats of Ladywood, Yardley, Kings Norton and Deritend. (62) 
Indeed Birmingham went against the national trend in the 1924 Election, with a swing to Labour in 
most seats. The Unionists' proportion of the vote remained virtually unchanged at 59 per cent, but the 
Liberals collapsed to less than 2 per cent of the total. Labour increased its overall vote by over 50 per 
cent from 77,386 in 1923 to 118,103 in 1924. In the 11 seats that the party contested, excluding the 
Communist poll in West Birmingham, Labour secured 39.6 per cent of the vote. Moreover they 
provided a shock for the Unionists, when Robert Dennison captured Kings Norton to become 
Birmingham's first elected Labour MP. (63) Meanwhile in Ladywood Neville Chamberlain found his 
majority cut to 77, whilst the Unionist majorities in Duddeston and Deritend were reduced to under 
1,000. 
Kings Norton was an outer suburb of Birmingham, containing the Austin car works at Longbridge. 
The seat was therefore less under the influence of the Unionist voting machine. Many of the voters 
would have moved into the area with the expansion of the Austin works during the First World War. 
Dennison gave three reasons for his victory. In the first place he had "the untiring efforts" of never less 
than 700 helpers. Secondly his predecessor, Herbert Austin, the founder of the Longbridge works, had 
a poor voting record in parliament. It was claimed that he took part in only one in three divisions. 
Finally Labour's repeal of the safeguarding duties, instead of weakening the motor industry, appeared 
to herald a period of expansion. (64) 
Indeed there was a swing to Labour in all the working-class wards, whilst in middle-class Edgbaston 
and Moseley there was a swing to the Unionists. This split reflected the divisive nature of the national 
campaign, which Baldwin fought, seeking to frighten middle-class voters away from the Liberals with 
talk of Labour extremism. In fact there were few Liberal votes in the working-class wards for the 
Conservatives to squeeze. Overall in 1924 the Liberals could only secure around 5,000 votes from just 
three candidates, with two losing their deposits. 
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Baldwin's campaign of arousing the middle class against Labour may well have had the effect of 
sharpening working-class consciousness to the benefit of Labour. Furthermore the moderation of the 
Labour Government, when contrasted with the hysterical anti-Labour claims of the Unionist press may 
have helped the Party. Indeed the one candidate to perform badly against Unionist opposition was Dr 
Dunstan, standing as a Communist in West Birmingham, where there was a9 per cent swing to Austen 
Chamberlain. 
Another factor, which seemed to help Labour in the city, was the emergence of Oswald Mosley as a 
personality with wealth and charisma to stimulate the local party. Mosley came from an aristocratic 
background and his wife, Lady Cynthia, was the daughter of Lord Curzon. He had entered Parliament 
in 1918 as a Conservative but, having clashed with the leadership, he had fought the 1922 and 1923 
Elections as an Independent. In March 1924 Mosley joined the Labour Party and the ILP. He was 
welcomed by MacDonald, who wanted to broaden the party's support, making it less dependent on the 
trade unions. His move to Birmingham was a deliberate challenge to Neville Chamberlain, whom he 
had fought in Parliament the previous year over the Rent Act, which had removed wartime controls. 
Even the presence of his wife, Lady Cynthia, in the city was said by the Birmingham Gazette to have 
"possibly attracted some thousands of votes to her husband". (65) Mosley's contest with Chamberlain 
ended in narrow defeat, although it was one factor in persuading the minister to seek a safer 
Birmingham seat for the future. 
Mosley, who had developed good relations with the Clydeside leaders Maxton and Wheatley, had 
fought the campaign on the full ILP programme of nationalising railways, mines and banks.. He was 
particularly annoyed by the intervention of the Liberal, Bowkett, who had fought Edgbaston at the 
previous General Election. Mosley lost by 77 votes, after recounts, but Bowkett captured 539 votes. 
There was much talk of unfair play in the result as "the final figures given did not agree with the total 
votes counted". (66) Mosley later congratulated the Liberal Party on having retained the seat for Neville 
Chamberlain, saying "that this was the last function left to Liberalism in the world". (67) 
The Labour advance was diagnosed by the Birmingham Post, which stressed the changing character 
of the city as a result of enlargement. "The old sense of community of interest has been weakened", it 
reported, whilst Unionists were too inclined "to rest on their oars between elections". The paper 
claimed that Labour's efforts and propaganda were untiring, but the Unionists "give relatively little 
time to the educational work, which counts for so much in the long run". (68) In fact the problem for 
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Labour in Birmingham was that they were too dependent on a fairly weak trade union movement. 
Individual membership remained low, which left the local party short of funds and relying for 
candidates either on trade union officials or rich men, such as Mosley. There was to be a similar 
situation in many of the Black Country constituencies. 
2. THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
By 1923 the Labour Party seemed well established in the Black Country, but as in Birmingham it 
was very dependent on the trade unions. The Annual Report gave all the constituency Labour parties in 
the region only the basic membership for 1923, paying affiliation fees of £1/10, which represented the 
minimum 180 members. The Black Country, however, did have four full time Party Agents, covering 
the constituencies of Smethwick, Wednesbury, West Bromwich and Wolverhampton West, but this 
was down from the six recorded in 1920. (69) The recession of 1921, coupled with various industrial 
defeats, meant that the party had had to fight hard to retain its 4 MPs in the 1922 General Election. 
The minutes of the Wolverhampton Labour Party illustrate the precarious state of the movement's 
finances at this time. A Ward Council Meeting at the end of 1922 reported "poor attendance at 
meetings" and the need for "greater effort to raise funds locally". (70) The situation had not improved 
by February 1923, when the Executive decided to give the Agent "a written undertaking to cease 
holding the office... on May 18th, subject to the position being revised if the financial position 
warranted it". (71) In June 1923 the Executive Committee agreed to place finance first on the agenda at 
all their meetings. They resolved that due to "changed circumstances", they would be unable to assist 
the Labour Women's Council as before, although they would "give all the help we can". (72) In July 
the Committee agreed to appeal to the trade unions for funds. (73) 
Meanwhile the local party was being embarrassed by internal splits. One particular incident occurred 
at a Town Council meeting, when Emma Sproson accused another Labour councillor, Allan Davies, of 
concealing the mismanagement of the Borough Fever Hospital. (74) The issue reflected the split in the 
local party between the ILP faction and the unions. (75) Sproson's case was that Davies was seeking to 
restrict access to the Fever Hospital by members of its sub committee. (76) When a motion was put, 
censuring Sproson for bringing the matter up in the Town Council without first reporting to the 
executive of the party, there was a 5: 5 split in the vote. (77) The dispute eventually led to a revision in 
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the constitution of the Consultative Committee, which decided party policy on the Council. It was 
agreed that there should be majority decisions, which would be binding on all councillors. (78) 
Unfortunately the new constitution did not stop another bitter dispute during 1924. On this occasion 
two local councillors, Allan Davies and J. E. Dederidge, defied the committee's wishes by voting for an 
increase in the Town Clerk's salary. The matter was made more serious because Davies was the party 
chairman, although he had recently stood down. A motion was drawn up censuring the two and 
requesting that they give an undertaking to observe the committee's decisions in future. As the two 
declined to give the undertaking, the motion was passed by 25 votes to 2.. (79) 
Davies and Dideridge later argued that they would carry out the committee's decisions as long as 
"they were in conformity with the principles and policy of the party as laid down or as had been 
previously agreed upon". (80) The local Executive Committee then voted that "the two cannot be 
considered as representing the party". (81) Eventually, however, with the prospect of municipal and 
parliamentary elections approaching, a reconciliation took place. As there had been no further acts of 
defiance by the two, the vote of censure was removed on 2"d October. At the same time a move to 
censure Emma Sproson, who had voted against the wishes of the committee over the filling of an 
aldermanic vacancy, was also dropped. (82) 
In the November 1923 municipal elections Labour was no more successful in the Black Country than 
in Birmingham. The party gained one seat in Wolverhampton, but lost seats elsewhere. One each was 
lost in West Bromwich, Smethwick and Walsall, whilst the Conservatives gained the two Netherton 
seats in Dudley from Labour. (83) In West Bromwich there were only three contests with the local press 
complaining that the parties had apparently agreed "not to have any more elections than they can 
avoid". (84) Despite this Labour lost the fairly safe Greets Green seat to a Liberal, standing as an 
Independent. In Smethwick too the seat that Labour lost was that of party chairman, W. E. Lawrence, at 
Spon Lane. 
The Conservative press was rather dismissive of Labour's chances in the 1923 General Election. 
With the Black Country still seriously affected by unemployment, it seemed likely that the 
Conservative policy of Protection would be a popular cause. Indeed The Time wrote of the probability 
of Unionist gains in Kingswinford, West Bromwich and Smethwick. (85) Conservatives thought that 
Protection would benefit the Black Country, since most of the industries in the region were geared to 
the domestic market. This made them vulnerable to imports, whilst not likely to suffer from reciprocal 
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action as with those that exported. On the other hand cheap imported raw materials were an advantage 
to some industries, especially those in metal working trades. 
In fact the General Election brought no major changes in the 10 Black Country seats, although there 
was a swing away from the Conservatives to the advantage of both Labour and the Liberals. The 
Protectionist argument, which had swung votes to the Unionists in Birmingham, had never been quite 
so popular in the Black Country. Moreover there was less of the Chamberlain tradition of urban reform 
amongst Black Country Conservatives, with which to attract working-class voters from Labour. 
In the 1924 General Election the Black Country followed the line of the working-class wards in 
Birmingham, providing an overall swing to Labour. The Party gained an extra seat at Bilston, whilst 
cutting Conservative majorities to under a thousand in Dudley and Wolverhampton West. The 
Conservatives were left with comfortable majorities only in Walsall and Stourbridge. They did capture 
Walsall from the Liberals but George Thorne held on to Wolverhampton East. It seems that the 
Conservatives' ̀Red Scare' tactics of frightening Liberal voters had less effect in a working-class 
constituency like Wolverhampton East. In general, however, the Liberals performed as badly in the 
Black Country as in Birmingham and elsewhere in the country. 
The Labour Party did not have everything its own way, however, as all the four Labour MPs 
experienced cuts in their majorities. Unemployment was still a major factor in the Black Country, 
whilst the Labour Party's record in office had been limited, although it widely used the excuse that it 
was a minority government. Moreover, distinctive issues such as the capital levy and nationalisation 
were no longer prominent in candidates' manifestos. 
B. THE 1923 AND 1924 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
1. WEST BROMWICH 
In West Bromwich the election results of 1923 and 1924 showed no dramatic changes, although 
Frank Roberts, the Labour MP, experienced reduced majorities in both General Elections. In 1923 the 
Labour majority fell from 2,947 to 1,764, whilst Roberts's share of the vote fell from 50.6 per cent to 
44.8 per cent. The swing, however, was not to the Conservatives but to Glyn Edwards, the Liberal 
candidate, who increased his vote by over 2,000. In 1924 Roberts's majority was down to 971, but this 
time he was in a straight contest with the Conservatives. The total Labour vote rose by over 2,000, 
giving Roberts 51.6 per cent of the total. 
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Unemployment was one of the dominant issues in both General Elections. The jobless total in West 
Bromwich was 3,597 in October 1923, which was down from a peak of 5,835 at the end of June 
1921. (86) In 1924 the figure was still 3,408, which, according to the Birmingham Post, was an increase 
on the total for December 1923, when Labour came to power. (87) The industrial situation was 
described as "very serious" with 50 per cent of blast furnaces and 80 per cent of iron ore mines closed 
down. The iron industry in particular was said to be in "a disastrous condition" with many works 
having shut down in the previous 3 or 4 months. The Germans, it was claimed, were selling at 50 per 
cent below local prices. (88) Yet the town had a diverse range of metal industries, which, it could be 
argued, had shielded it from the worst effects of the recession. Some, such as spring manufacturing, 
were expanding with the motor car industry. (89) 
In 1923 the Conservatives sought to make Protection and its likely impact on jobs in the constituency 
the big election issue. Speaking at Hill Top early in the contest, H. E. Parkes, the Conservative 
candidate, warned of the consequences of importing many thousands of tons of tubes: - "About 4,000 
men had been kept out of employment in this country and a great many might have been employed in 
that immediate vicinity". Belgium, he said, was sending 11,000 iron bars every month, which 
represented 2,400 to 2,600 jobs. (90) Two days later he reported that within the previous ten months 
4,000 tons of foreign nuts and bolts had been dumped in this country, robbing "1,000 English nut and 
bolt makers of their work". (91) Later in the campaign examples of dumped foreign goods were to be 
exhibited in a vacant shop in the High Street. (92) 
West Bromwich had a strong pre-war Liberal tradition, which meant that Tariff Reform had never 
been as popular here as in Birmingham. Tariff Reform implied dear food, which was as powerful an 
argument in 1923 as in 1906. Roberts, himself, sought to exploit this. On the 29th November, for 
instance, the Birmingham Gazette reported a "remarkable meeting" held by Labour for women voters. 
"Extraordinary enthusiasm" was shown for Roberts, who stressed the impact of tariffs on the 
housewife's bill. (93) When questioned by the Birmingham Post on his alternative to Protection for 
finding employment, Roberts replied with work schemes to provide "a national system of electrical 
power supply, transport developments, afforestation and waste land reclamation". (94) 
The Labour Party was more firmly established in West Bromwich than in Birmingham, although 
individual membership remained low. (95) The party was dependant on the local trade unions, who 
seem to have provided large support. When, for instance, in 1923 Austen Chamberlain attempted to 
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address a meeting of 5-6,000 in the old market place on the 4th December, he was shouted down and 
refused a hearing by Labour enthusiasts. (96) The Birmingham Post admitted that Roberts had secured a 
strong local following. (97) He also courted popularity by going out of his way in appealing to certain 
groups. In 1923, for instance, he made ̀pensions for ex-servicemen' a big issue and addressed women 
only meetings. (98) By 1924 the opposition realised that Roberts was no extremist, describing him as 
having "a kindly ingratiating way with him, no pomposity, and an approachableness, which has 
brought him into the closest touch with the men and women of the meanest by-streets". (99) The local 
press reported that when he arrived at his High Street headquarters on the 28th October, he was 
"followed by thousands of people and youths" and "carried shoulder high to his office". (100) Roberts 
and the Labour Party, however, were not popular with everyone in West Bromwich, as the scenes at the 
Town Hall on the election night in 1924 indicate. Roberts claimed that for the first time he had been 
"publicly pelted in the streets of West Bromwich... and had had disgusting epithets used towards 
him". (101) 
The Liberal vote was still a significant factor in West Bromwich. Indeed in the 1923 municipal 
elections, fighting as Independents, they retained two seats and captured Greets Green from 
Labour. (102) For these elections they appeared to be fighting in a pact with the Conservatives, who did 
not oppose them. In the General Election, however, their candidate, Glyn Edwards, was fighting on a 
Free Trade ticket, which would probably have helped Labour by taking votes from the Conservatives. 
In 1924 the Liberals had no candidate, but the position of the local party was important. Tariff 
Reform was not meant to be an issue in this election, but many Liberals were said to be upset by a 
blatantly Protectionist speech given by Leo Amery on a visit to the town. (103) Nevertheless one 
Liberal councillor, J. J. Grant, came out in support of the Conservative, Captain Graham. (104) This was 
more than balanced, however, by the support for Labour given by Dr Hazel, the town's most prominent 
Liberal and the former MP, who claimed that "he would prefer the Red Flag to the Black Flag of 
Conservatism". (105) 
Roberts was an MP, who closely followed the Labour Party line, concentrating mainly on social 
issues. Thus in 1923 the Birmingham Post reported Roberts promising "increased Old Age Pensions at 
an earlier age, adequate provision for widowed mothers, improved State aid for the blind, fuller 
compensation for injured workers, equality of opportunity in education and. ... relief 
for the taxpayer 
by a capital levy". The paper questioned how the war debt could be wiped out and "millions found to 
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finance these grandiose projects". They complained that Roberts was not eager to stress "the 
advantages of the levy" but preferred to steal the Liberals "Free Trade thunder". (106) 
In 1924 Roberts was defending the record of the Labour Government, of which he was the Pensions 
Minister. He pointed out that they had raised unemployment pay, reduced food taxes and increased the 
number of old people on pensions. A further extension of pensions, he said, had not been possible due 
to the minority status of the Labour Government. (107) He defended the government's unemployment 
record by pointing out that it had fallen until August, whilst the rise thereafter had been due to the 
numbers coming on to benefit, who had not been entitled to it earlier in the year. Asked whether he 
stood for the Red Flag, Roberts replied that "he did not know the meaning behind that question, but .... 
he loved his country and would fight for it to the best of his ability". (108) 
In both General Elections Roberts was opposed by strong Conservative candidates, who had links 
with the business community. In 1924, for instance, Captain Graham, put most emphasis in his 
campaign on unemployment and price inflation. (109) He seemed a popular candidate, who was 
reported as receiving "a rousing reception" in the Labour stronghold of Greets Green. (1 10) He was 
well backed by local business leaders with Roberts complaining of "near intimidation" at a Hill Top 
firm, which had put a Conservative leaflet in their employee's pay packet. (111) 
After his victory in 1923 Roberts told the local press that opposition to Protection was the major 
factor behind his success. He also claimed that there was support for the capital levy, once it had been 
explained. He thought that the Conservatives had suffered from "doubtful tactics". (112) In 1924 the 
local press credited the Labour victory to their organisation and workers, who were said to be "imbued 
with a zeal that carries them wholeheartedly into their electioneering duties". Roberts himself admitted 
that the Russian question was a major issue, "capable of much distortion by my opponents", although 
he thought that it had not greatly influenced the local electorate. (113) In fact Roberts's support rested 
with the strong trade union element within the constituency, which was less likely to be shaken by `Red 
Scare' tactics. 
2 SMETHWICK 
The Labour Party appeared to be on the defensive in Smethwick in both General Elections. The 
Conservatives had achieved some success here in the 1923 municipal elections, capturing a seat from 
Labour. Moreover as the constituency was close to Birmingham the Conservatives expected the 
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Protectionist cause to be strong here. Both contests were straight fights, as the local Liberal 
organisation was virtually non-existent. In 1923 the Labour MP, John Davison, increased his majority 
from 382 to 2,333. The local press, expecting the result to be "a near thing", considered the size of the 
Labour majority "a great surprise". (114) In 1924 Davison won again, but on this occasion the size of 
his majority was halved. 
Unemployment was a major issue in both General Elections. In November 1923 the total was 5,326, 
whilst in October 1924 it was still high at 4,888, although these figures were well down on the peak of 
9,058 for June 1921. (115) Indeed the high unemployment levels in the town were regarded by the 
Birmingham Post as "the worst in the country". (116) In 1924 the newspaper again claimed that the 
town had been "hit as severely by the languishing of industry as any constituency in the country". (117) 
In 1923 the Conservative candidate, E. Brocklebank, a businessman, was said to be "an ardent 
adherent" of Tariff Reform, arguing that Free Trade had been found wanting after a fair trial. (118) In 
his election address Brocklebank pledged a tax on foreign manufactured goods, whilst ensuring "a full 
and free supply of raw materials". He also pledged that he would vote against any food taxes. (119) 
Brocklebank was supported in a Unionist rally in the constituency by Neville Chamberlain, who argued 
that in the USA and Europe under a Protectionist system, "the workmen were fully employed and their 
wages were constantly rising, whereas ... men in this country were walking the streets, had nothing to 
do in some cases for two or three years and wages were falling even faster than the cost of living". (120) 
In 1924, however, the Conservatives had dropped Tariff Reform. Their candidate, Marshall Pike, 
who was described as "a shrewd, hard hitting speaker", was something of a populist. Having left school 
at 13, he had worked in a locomotive depot before becoming a journalist and then being elected to the 
London County Council. (121) Pike was anxious to put the blame for unemployment in local industries 
on cheap imports from the continent. He blamed sweated labour in Belgium, where workers were said 
to work longer hours for lower wages, for undercutting both the local glass industry and the 
Birmingham Carriage and Wagon Co. (122) However, Pike avoided the Tariff Reform argument, 
talking instead of developing "closer bonds with the Empire" and of supporting "Government credit for 
British industry, where it was needed", improved pensions and an earlier retirement age. The Labour 
Government, he said, had not introduced "a single new idea for dealing with unemployment". (123) 
Since tariffs were not an election issue, Pike sought support from local Liberals, who were working 
with the Conservatives in local politics to keep out Labour. The Conservatives hoped to attract their 
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support by emphasising the "menace of Socialism". Thus a poster appeared, backed by four local 
Liberal councillors, appealing to their supporters to back Pike. (124) 
Like West Bromwich the Smethwick Labour Party had few individual members and the trade unions 
dominated. The Birmingham Post described the town as "a great centre of trade unionism" with "more 
trade union organising secretaries here than in any other town in England" relative to its size. (125). 
John Davison was a popular local candidate, who in 1923 was prepared to fully support the Labour 
Manifesto, including the capital levy. (126) He answered the Protectionist case by arguing that iron and 
steel imports were at their highest in years of least unemployment like 1913 and 1920 and lowest in 
years of high unemployment like 1909 and 1922. (127) 
In 1924 Davison's popularity was such that his election meetings were said to have broken all 
attendance records with the candidate addressing "the biggest crowd in the history of the borough and 
three overflow meetings". (128) Davison stressed the Labour Manifesto commitment to build more low 
cost houses and provide improved pensions. His main solution to unemployment, however, was to 
revive trade with Russia, which he saw as a source of cheap food and a market for exports. (129) His 
opponent was attacked as an outsider from London, who was a member of organisations favouring 
imperial unity. (130) 
. Labour's victories 
here owed much to Davison's popularity, based on what the local paper called 
"the faithfulness with which he has represented the borough". (131) In 1923 Labour's case against 
Tariff Reform was helped by reports of a "flow of orders to local factories for the New Year", which 
was bringing down unemployment in the constituency. (132) Indeed Smethwick with its engineering 
works and foundries saw its fortunes revive with the development of the motor industry. In 1924 the 
contest became more heated, especially as Pike appeared to be making some progress. (133). The "Red 
Scare", however, appears to have played little part locally in the campaign, as it was fairly obvious that 
Davison was not an extremist. 
3. WEDNESBURY 
The Conservatives had high hopes of success in Wednesbury in both of these elections, due to the 
fact that Labour was defending majorities as low as 105 from the 1922 Election and 1,019 from 1923. 
In 1923 tariffs were to be the main issue, especially as much of the constituency was still affected by 
recession. Unemployment in the town of Wednesbury had dropped from a peak of 5,919 in July 1921 
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to 2,530 in November 1923, but the local iron industry remained depressed. (134) Meanwhile 
unemployment in Darlaston, which was part of the constituency, had fallen from 2,861 to 1,558 over a 
similar period. (135) A description of Wednesbury at this time came following a fleeting visit by 
Ramsay MacDonald in 1924, which was reported by the Manchester Guardian: - "Wolverhampton was 
cordial, but West Bromwich and Wednesbury, particularly Wednesbury, were delirious. Mr 
MacDonald in Wednesbury was the object of such a demonstration of affection as can rarely have 
fallen to his lot. Labour is in possession here all right. Of all the Black Country towns it is the 
unlovliest. It is set in a landscape of blackened works and slag heaps and presented today perspectives 
of squalid streets that Ancoats could hardly rival. Up from these streets had poured a multitude of 
people all too plainly bearing the marks of a crippled poverty. They swarmed in thousands around the 
centre of the town, waiting for the PM's arrival. "(136) 
In 1923 the contest was to be a repetition of that of 1922 with Short again being opposed by Herbert 
Williams. The Conservatives fought an openly Protectionist campaign with strong nationalist 
overtones. In Burnt Tree, for instance, Williams linked the German zeppelin bombing of Tipton with 
imports of their manufactured goods. At Dudley Port he linked the closure of local furnaces with 
imports of pig iron from Belgium, Germany and France. (137) Comparisons were also made with the 
motor industry, which was protected under the Safeguarding of Industries Act. At Tipton, for instance, 
he compared the Harper Beans motor works, which were "working day and night.... because the 
industry had protection" with the Roberts and Coopers furnaces, which were "out and black and in the 
place where iron was first puddled, not a single pig of iron was being produced, because there was not 
a single blast furnace in blast in the Wednesbury constituency". (138) Williams warned voters not to 
believe "the lies that they were told by the Labour Party that food would be taxed". On the contrary he 
claimed that Protection "would release the taxes on tea, sugar, meat and other food". (139) 
Williams was strongly backed by the local press, which published a letter from a Mr H. A. Davies, 
general manager of the Patent Shaft and Axletree Co. Ltd. He claimed that his company was running at 
a loss, whilst only the Conservative Party had the policy to assist the iron and steel industry. He urged 
that "in recording your vote in this Election... (voters should) consider carefully the facts as I have told 
them and the responsibilities you are incurring to yourselves, your wives and families". (140) 
Short responded with a letter of his own, claiming that Davies's letter was "a deliberate act of 
intimidation, involving as it does the veiled threat that the various works of his Company will be closed 
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down". He questioned the Company's figures, pointing out that Mr Davies "knows that a tariff or any 
form of Protection will ruin the iron and steel trade for one half of the iron and steel production of the 
country is directly exported, half of the remainder is in the manufacturing of machinery, ships and 
various other articles which are exported". (141) 
With no Liberal candidate Short sought to pick up their vote by stressing his own support for Free 
Trade, declaring that Protection was "a device to enforce the cost of the war upon the backs of those 
who had made too many sacrifices". (142) He also countered the claim that Protection was a remedy for 
unemployment by stating that "nearly 20,000 tons of nuts and bolts were exported", most of which 
would be lost if imports were stopped. (143) The Birmingham Post wrote of the misrepresentation of 
the Protectionist case in the constituency with "working women ... being frightened by stories of a 
dear 
loaf and of other increases in the cost of living". (144) The Birmingham Gazett e, however, touched 
upon what was probably the decisive issue, when it wrote of "the instinctive dread of Protection 
among housewives, because of its effect on the cost of living". (145) 
Short had won something of a reputation as a campaigning MP as his parliamentary record for 1923 
shows. Among the issues that he took up in Parliament were the number of women not receiving 
unemployment benefit, the number of council houses erected since 1918 and grants from central 
Government for relief work. (146) Nevertheless the local press continued its attack on Short by 
producing a handbill, showing the amount of money which the MP received from the Boilermakers 
Society. They also printed a photograph of his London residence near Hyde Park-(147) The 
Birmingham Post complained that there was no mention of the capital levy in Short's election address, 
but at meetings he spoke of it as a tax on war wealth, which would reduce the National Debt. (148) 
Short, however, widened his campaign by stressing the need for better housing, sanitation and 
education. (149) He also successfully cultivated the not inconsiderable Irish vote in Wednesbury. (150) 
The result was to be a 1.3 per cent swing to Short, who increased his majority to 1,019. 
In 1924 the Labour Party was again on the defensive, with Short not expected to be returned. (151) 
He was to base his campaign around the record of the Labour Government, emphasising the 
improvement in unemployment benefits and pensions. Any recent rise in unemployment was explained 
on the grounds that more people were entitled to benefits, whilst with an overall Labour majority the 
party would be able to deal more effectively with the problem. (152) 
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The Conservative candidate, Lampard Vachell, was appointed only two weeks before the start of the 
campaign. As a Cambridge graduate and lawyer, who had flown test aircraft during the war, he was 
seen as "practically a stranger to the constituency and its people". (153) Although a supporter of 
Imperial Preference, he chose to base his campaign around the issue of the `Red Scare', which he 
termed `Constitutionalism versus Socialism'. (154) This approach seemed to win over many local 
Liberals, who attended a meeting he addressed at Tipton, which was to end in uproar. (155) Vachell 
also denounced the Russian loan, claiming that the money "should be spent in England, alleviating our 
own people instead of Russian Bolsheviks". (156) He warned that "Socialism had been put into 
practical form in Russia and after seven years of it, that country was in the throes of anarchy". (157) 
Short had much local support with the press complaining that "every evening a battalion of young 
folk have marched in procession singing the Red Flag". (158) He complained of "foul bills" distributed 
by the Tories, who were trying to defeat him "by appeals to the prejudices of the people". (159) Short 
defended the Russian loan, saying that it had been granted because the Soviet Government was 
prepared "to spend 75 per cent of it in this country to find work for some of our unemployed". (160) 
Short, whose majority was cut to 338 in a1 per cent swing to the Conservatives, gave credit for his 
victory to his supporters in the town: - "Never did the Tory Party engage in a fight under more 
favourable conditions to themselves. The press has been against us, the employers have been against 
us, everybody has been against us. But you my friends have remained loyal". (161) Vachell put his 
defeat down to the lack of time he had to fight the constituency. (162) The local press, however, blamed 
poor organisation compared with the Labour Party, whose workers "are imbued with a zeal that carries 
them wholeheartedly into their electioneering duties". (163) With individual membership remaining at 
the basic level much of this support and organisation came through the trade unions. (164) Nevertheless 
such organisation was not evident in all the Black Country constituencies. 
4. KINGSWINFORD 
The fourth Labour constituency of Kingswinford was another to be still badly affected by the 
recession. The Birmingham Post, for instance, interviewing a local, reported that "where once a score 
of furnaces were in full blast, now he doubted if there were three... He showed me two great empty 
ironworks with doors closed against the workers by the depression of trade". (165) Chainmaking was 
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another major local industry, which was in serious distress, with exports down from 32-36,000 tons a 
year before the war to only 10,000. This was leaving 25-40 per cent of chainmakers unemployed. (166) 
The Conservative candidate, Major H. Webb of Bewdley, made Tariff Reform the main issue in the 
1923 Election, claiming that Free Trade had "left England high and dry on the shore". (167) His father 
had been a previous holder of the seat, whilst he was the head of a seed manufacturing firm in 
Wordsley. (168) There was also a Liberal candidate, C. P. Blackwell, who attacked the capital levy and 
defended Free Trade. He claimed at Old Hill, for instance, that local manufacturers could buy iron from 
Belgium to make nuts, bolts and screws, which could then be sold more cheaply in Belgium. (169) The 
local press, however, accurately described the Liberal organisation in Kingswinford at this time as 
virtually non-existent. (170) 
Sitch, the Labour MP, was furious at the intervention of a Liberal, declaring that he was the Free 
Trade candidate, why bring in another and that "the Liberals are here to fight Labour". (171) In 
rejecting Protection, he asserted that "Free Trade is never more necessary than it is today". (172) He 
argued that tariffs would not help the chainmakers, as there were few imports of chains. (173) 
Furthermore in the hollowware trade, which was recently safeguarded, employers were trying to reduce 
women's wages by 6 shillings a week. (174) 
Sitch claimed that "the real causes of unemployment were economic instability, the great inequalities 
in the distribution of wealth and the payment of low wages". Sitch went on to explain that through its 
housing programme, Labour would find work for nearly half of the unemployed as well as providing 
justice for ex-servicemen. There would be proper educational facilities for the worker's children and a 
minimum wage would be established for all trades. Sitch was not afraid to explain how the money 
would be raised to pay for the programme, declaring that there would be taxation of land values and a 
readjustment of the income tax. He also gave his support to the capital levy on wartime profits in order 
to reduce the National Debt. (175) 
The case for Free Trade was backed by the Birmingham Gazette, which published a circular from Mr 
Ernest Stevens, the head of the largest holloware manufacturing business in the constituency. In it he 
denied seeking to bring his business under the Safeguarding Act, adding that "Free Trade is the best 
policy for this country". (176) Sitch was able to increase his majority to 4,312, which was the largest in 
the Black Country for this Election. Even the Birmingham Post accepted that he was "a popular 
personality apart from his politics". (177) 
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In 1924 there was to be no Liberal candidate, leaving a straight contest between Short and Webb. 
The Conservatives hoped that their abandonment of Protectionism would persuade many Liberals to 
support them. Indeed leading Liberals were said to have signed the nomination papers of the 
Conservative candidate, Major Webb, a local businessman. (178) He was also backed by both the 
previous Liberal candidates, on the grounds that he stood for "Constitutionalism against 
Socialism". (179) 
However, Charlie Sitch, nicknamed ̀Our Charlie', remained a popular local MP. The Birmingham 
Gazette reported him addressing meetings of 2,000 at Blackheath and over 1,000 at Cradley Heath and 
Quarry Bank, with hundreds unable to gain admission. (180) Webb, on the other hand, was forced to 
cancel meetings due to disorderliness and heckling. (181) Sitch fought his campaign around the 
improvements in pensions and unemployment pay, which the Labour Government had achieved, along 
with their promise to build new houses. (182) He claimed that the Conservatives were fighting a dirty 
campaign, quoting a pamphlet headed ̀Socialism', which spoke of "murder, blasphemy, revolution, 
starvation, destruction and famine". (l83) 
Sitch had his majority cut from over 4,000 to only just over 1,000. As in the other Labour held seats 
there was a swing to the Conservatives, although this could be accounted for here by the absence of a 
Liberal. Sitch claimed that the campaign was "one of the dirtiest elections that have ever been fought 
from the standpoint of the literature issued against the Labour Party throughout the country". He put his 
success down to keeping his platform "free from personalities" and not resorting to "literature of a 
shady character". (184) Sitch's local popularity came through his work as a trade union official in the 
region. It was from here that all the enthusiastic electoral support came, as the local party, like those in 
the other Labour constituencies in the region, had no large individual membership. (185). 
5. ILS TOLA 
Labour was to gain its fifth seat in the region against the national trend, when in 1924 John Baker 
captured Bilston. The party's victory here was based on its post-war successes in Urban District 
Council elections in Coseley, Sedgley and Bilston itself, although they did not maintain all their early 
gains during the recession years. (186) The constituency, which contained major iron and steel works, 
had seen its unemployment total drop from over 7,000 in 1921 to below 4,000 in 1923. (187) 
Nevertheless unemployment remained the main issue in both elections. 
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. In 1923 there was to 
be a three-way contest with Baker again challenging the Conservative MP, 
Howard Bury, along with a Liberal, Prentice. Bury, who was an active supporter of Protection and 
Empire Free Trade, promoted it as a way of solving unemployment and reducing taxation. (188) He 
pointed to "the vast quantities of Ruhr steel, waiting to be dumped into the country, if the Free Traders, 
Liberal or Labour, have their way". (189) The programme was fully backed by the Hickman family, 
which had a powerful influence in the local Conservative Party, as well as in Alfred Hickman Ltd. the 
major steel company in the constituency. (190) Edward Hickman argued that the Liberals had no 
solution to unemployment, "while the two planks in the Labour platform were trade with Russia and 
the capital levy". (191) 
In the Express and Star, however, the Liberal candidate, Prentice, accused the company of sending 
out a scare circular. This reported unfair competition from French and Belgian steel imports and 
warned that conditions would worsen when the dispute in the Ruhr ended. The circular predicted that 
under Free Trade the company "would be obliged to close down everything except the skelp mill with 
the effect that instead of employing over 2,000 men, they would only be able to employ about 
200". (192) 
Baker, himself, was a firm supporter of Free Trade, warning that tariffs created enmity between 
countries. (193) The presence of a Liberal, however, meant that the Free Trade vote was split, leaving 
the advantage with Howard Bury, who retained his seat with a majority of 1,101. The Conservative 
total vote was down by over 2,000, whilst their percentage fell from 54.2 per cent to a minority poll of 
42.6 per cent. Labour also lost ground, but not by this much. 
In 1924 Labour was to be helped here by the absence of a Liberal candidate, making the contest a 
straight fight with the Conservatives The Conservative MP, Howard Bury, decided to fight the election 
on the issue of the Red Peril, distributing notices and leaflets to warn voters. One spoke of a choice 
between "the Union Jack or the Red Flag of Socialism", whilst others warned of civil war and the 
Communist threat to women. (194) He also condemned the Russian loan and the removal of the 
McKenna duties, claiming that Labour had "great friends of everyone except their own countrymen and 
were out to benefit Russia and Germany and every other country at our expense". (195) 
The Labour candidate was again John Baker, who was reported to have "nursed the district 
continuously" and "established a strong Labour element". (196) Baker defended the Russian loan as a 
means of stimulating British trade. (197) He also dealt with his opponent's literature in a mature 
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manner, pointing out that there was a higher standard of morality amongst the workers than amongst 
the aristocracy. (198) With regard the economy Baker claimed that the removal of the Safeguarding 
duties had led to a significant drop in car prices, which had stimulated exports. (199) 
On the eve of the poll the Birmingham Post admitted that Labour had made "considerable headway". 
Much would depend on the 5,000 votes, which had gone to the Liberals at the previous election. (200) 
Later Baker was to acknowledge the number of Liberals, who had worked to secure his return. He 
claimed that literature sent out by the Conservatives to advise Liberals to vote Tory had been "resented 
by the rank and file" in the party. Baker also gave credit for his success to the Labour manifesto pledge 
to reduce the old age pension limit to 65 and to grant widows' pensions. (201) Equally significant, 
however, was the improvement in the organisation of the local Labour Party. Baker, himself, praised 
the work of Sam Hague, the Labour leader and Manchester JP, who had moved into the division in the 
previous twelve months-(202) Under his leadership individual party membership was to increase over 
the next few years-(203) 
6. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
In Wolverhampton the Labour Party remained optimistic of success in the West division, despite the 
internal problems of the local party. In both General Elections there was to be a straight fight between 
the sitting Conservative MP, Sir Robert Bird, and Labour. In 1923 Labour had replaced Alexander 
Walkden, who had stood down in April, with W. J. Brown, General Secretary of the Civil Service 
Clerical Association. Brown was recommended by the Labour agent Dan Davies. With the local party 
strapped for cash he was impressed by the union's agreement to pay £250 a year plus election 
expenses. (204) 
Brown was born into a large working-class family in Battersea, from where he progressed as a 
scholarship boy to the Civil Service. (205) Here he set up the Boy Clerks' Association, which he later 
formed into the Civil Service Clerical Association and affiliated it to the TUC. He became the union's 
full time general secretary in 1919 and was also a member of the ILP. (206) At a Selection Conference, 
Brown faced two rivals, Emma Sproson and O. G. Willey, with Brown easily winning the vote. (207) 
Sproson later challenged the methods of the Selection Conference, claiming that delegates were not 
allowed to speak on the merits of the candidates. (208) 
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The election campaign quickly centred on the issue of tariffs. Wolverhampton was recovering from 
the recession more quickly than other Black Country towns, partly due to the growth of new industries 
such as motor cars, motor cycles, bicycles and electric light gear. Bird was quick to point out that the 
expansion was due to protection under the Safeguarding of Industries Act, which put a 33 per cent duty 
on imported motor cars. He went on to challenge Brown and the "Labour Socialist Party" whether they 
were in favour "of that duty, which has done so much to build up the prosperity of the motor industry 
and to secure employment for those engaged in the trade... during the last three years". Bird was 
publicly backed by the chairman of the Wolverhampton Engineering Employers' Union, who warned 
that if Safeguarding went "50 per cent of the firms would be compelled to discharge at least half of the 
workmen employed"(209) 
For Bird Tariff Reform meant extending Safeguarding to other industries such as the tube trade, 
which he claimed was being flooded with low price imports, forcing wages down. He assured voters 
that food would come in free, whilst taxes on tea and sugar would be reduced. For those involved in 
industries like the edge tool trade, he claimed that with Protection, they would be in a strong position to 
bargain for concessions over tariffs. (210) 
Yet Bird seems to have had some doubts about the policy. He claimed that he had "never been a 
convinced Free Trader or Protectionist" and was not "bound by the theoretical doctrines of 
either". (211) Aware of growing Labour strength in the constituency, Bird was anxious to retain Liberal 
support. (212) This accounts for the Party's decision not to oppose Thorne in East Wolverhampton. It 
also explains his announcement that Protection need not be permanent and that the present system 
could be restored in time, if circumstances warranted it. (213) 
Brown responded to this campaign by stressing his support for Free Trade, asserting that "every vote 
for his opponent is a vote for higher prices and less work". (214) He showed little support for 
Safeguarding, even as it affected the car industry, and warned of the effects of a threatened tariff on 
imported steel. (215) The Birmingham Post accused Brown of "playing the Free Trade card for all it is 
worth in an endeavour to obtain Liberal support". (216) Indeed his stand assured him the support of a 
number of local Liberals, including Mr Price Lewis, a former candidate, but not that of George Thorne, 
the MP for the East division. (217) 
Brown, however, declared that tariffs were a "distraction", leading to higher prices, whilst the real 
issues were "better housing" and "free education from infant school to the university". (218) The capital 
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levy was also defended by Brown, who claimed that only 330,000 people would be affected. (219) 
Moreover personal wealth had risen by £5 billion during the war. (220) The offer to debate the matter 
along with the question of tariffs was turned down by the Conservatives. (221) Brown also attacked 
Bird's voting record in parliament, which showed a high rate of absence. (222) 
As the campaign heated up there was much rowdyism at Conservative meetings. Bird aggravated 
matters himself by his constant references to the ̀ Labour-Socialist Party' and calling the capital levy "a 
hideous menace", equating it with confiscations in Russia. (223) There were also deliberate 
Conservative distortions, such as their poster "depicting the hand of the Labour Party grabbing the 
goods of the poor". (224) The result was a narrow defeat for Brown with Bird winning by 241 votes, 
which was the smallest majority in the Black Country. Brown put his defeat down to "superior 
resources in the shape of cars and the influence of the out-voter". (225) The closeness of the result 
reflected the impact that Brown's campaign had had. Even the Birmingham Post described him as "an 
accomplished and persuasive speaker". (226) 
Brown again stood for Labour in 1924, when he seemed to be helped by a reported drop of 2,270 in 
the numbers of unemployed in Wolverhampton over the previous year. (227) The Birmingham Post 
described the local party as "an efficient machine", which traditionally "played the moderate fiddle", 
with Brown, himself, "a persuasive candidate". (228) The candidate's policies already had a rather 
distinctive edge. They included pensions for widows, Free Trade, an 8-hour working day, equality of 
voting for women, a tax on land values and nationalisation of the coal industry. (229) 
During the campaign Brown received a sympathetic letter from the former candidate, Walkden, 
warning him of what to expect from Bird: - "I doubt not that you are having to face a great deal of 
misrepresentation on the part of your political opponents, who are apparently so bankrupt of legitimate 
arguments with which to meet our case, that they seem to stop at nothing in their wild endeavours to 
discredit the excellent work which Labour has already accomplished". (230) 
Bird started his campaign by attacking Labour's record in office, especially the level of 
unemployment and the Russian loan. (23 1) As in previous elections Bird was quick to equate the 
Labour Party with Socialist extremism. In this respect the publication of the Zinoviev letter during the 
campaign proved ideal for him to exploit. The Birmingham Post wrote: - "Sir Robert Bird's warnings of 
the dangers of the Socialist gospel, backed up by the hard facts of experience like unemployment, food 
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prices and the like, have entirely discredited the Labour Party in the eyes of reasonable people and now 
the dramatic exposure of the Red Moscow plot will most certainly convince all the waverers". (232) 
Bird had earlier made clear his position on Tariff Reform, claiming that it was not an issue and, if it 
came before the Commons, he would not support it. (233) This statement enabled him to retain the 
support of Alderman Bantock, the prominent local Liberal, who was behind the municipal pact with the 
Conservatives. Bantock had already written to Bird giving him his support and agreeing to advise his 
Party members to do the same. (234) He now wrote an open letter to the Wolverhampton Liberals, 
urging them to vote for Bird: - "I am a Free Trader but the issue is not Free Trade versus Protection. It is 
rather sound constitutional advancement versus Socialism". (235) Brown also appealed for the Liberal 
vote, stating that "there was hardly anything in Thorne's election address with which he did not 
agree". (236) Labour, however, had upset local Liberals by standing a candidate against Thorne in the 
East division. 
The campaign rapidly descended into personal attacks, with Brown complaining of comments made 
about him by Bird and his wife. (237) Meanwhile Brown attacked Bird's parliamentary lobby record, 
which showed 55 absences from 77 divisions. (238) The Conservatives, however, exploited an article 
written by Brown in a trade union periodical, in which he stated that that the Labour Government's 
"biggest failure is in unemployment" and its "treatment of pledges has been deplorable". (239) 
Meanwhile, Bird found his meetings subject to "a good deal of disorder and personal abuse by Labour 
opponents". (240) 
As the campaign drew to a close Brown told the press that he did not know of another election 
"where we have had to contend with such low down tactics". (24 1) Indeed Brown put his narrow defeat 
down to "a campaign of lies, bad weather and motor cars". Bird's explanation for his success, on the 
other hand, was "the ineptitude and incompetence of a Socialist Government". (242) Bird was 
undoubtedly helped, however, by the absence of a Liberal opponent, especially as he made clear his 
own opposition to Tariff Reform. 
7. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
With the growing demise of the Liberals after 1918 both of the other Parties must have hoped for 
success in Wolverhampton East. Yet Liberalism was to prove deeply rooted in this seat. In 1923 neither 
of the main parties decided to contest George Thorne's seat. For Labour financial factors were probably 
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the major reason, given the state of the Party in this division. Both Labour and Conservatives, however, 
preferred to concentrate on the West, hoping to win Liberal votes there by allowing Thorne a free run 
in the East.. 
In 1924, however, George Thorne was faced by two opponents, with Labour deciding on a last 
minute intervention. This caused some alarm amongst local Liberals, especially as it was recognised 
that whilst Labour lacked the machinery to win the seat, having forfeited their deposit in the 1922 
Election, they could let in the Conservatives. (243) This was not something that would worry Labour 
too much, since it was the Party's intention nationally at this stage to squeeze out the Liberals. (244) 
The Birmingham Post put Thome's success over 16 years down to the fact that he had "always 
trimmed his sails to deal with the Labour winds from which he has gathered much carrying support in 
the past". Labour, it was claimed, "cannot hope to do other than make a moderate impression". With 
the Conservatives having dropped Tariff Reform the Birmingham Post thought it possible that they 
might "slip in Sir Thomas Strangman". (245) 
The Labour candidate, R. H. Williams, was a railwayman and local councillor from Bala in North 
Wales. As a Calvinist lay preacher and a worker in the Brotherhood Movement, he was an immediate 
challenge to Thorne, who was a Nonconformist himself and gained much support from this 
section. (246) Williams also hoped to pick up votes from union members, such as the locksmiths and 
railwaymen, who had previously backed the Liberals. (247) 
Thorne responded to this by claiming that he was "a Labour man himself as distinct from a 
Socialist". (248) His programme put emphasis on education, health and improved pensions, as well as 
stressing free trade and free enterprise. (249) Nevertheless he was prepared to exploit the Zinoviev 
Letter to isolate Labour, claiming that, although it might possibly be a forgery, "(it) has not increased 
the confidence of the electorate in Mr MacDonald on the Russian treaty". (250) Many local Liberals 
also called for "open retaliation" against the Labour candidates in the West Wolverhampton and 
Bilston divisions. (251) Brown must have felt the impact of this as he came out openly in agreement 
with Thorne's election address. (252) 
Thorne's main threat, however, came from Captain Strangman, the Conservative candidate, who 
attacked the removal of the Safeguarding Duties for causing an increase in unemployment. (253) He 
called for trade links with the colonies rather than the Russian proposals. His party, however, was not 
181 
fighting a Protectionist campaign, so his warning of cheap steel imports from Belgium was less 
effective. (254) 
The Birmingham Post claimed that Thorne was relying on "sentiment" to pull him through, as the 
electors were looking for an "industrial resurrection" under a Conservative Government. (255) Certainly 
Thorne put his victory by a majority of just over 1,000 down to "the loyalty and steadfastness" of 
friends and neighbours. (256) Labour again came third, which reflected their continued poor 
organisation in this division. 
8. DUDLEY 
Dudley was another Black Country town to have been badly affected by the recession. The 
unemployment total in 1923 stood at 5,000, which was considered "out of all proportion to the 
population" and "greatly in excess of most other industrial areas of a similar size". (257) Moreover, 
unlike Smethwick and Wednesbury, the total was dropping only slowly from a figure of 6,483 posted 
on the 8 July 1921 during the peak of the recession. (258) This reflected the traditional nature of many 
of the town's industries, which included coal, iron, brick making and limestone quarrying. (259) 
The state of the iron industry in 1923 was said to be as bad as or worse than during the slump of the 
previous year. According to the Birmingham Post "many works (were) being dismantled or in 
liquidation ... 
due to unfair foreign competition", leaving only three or four in the constituency. (260) 
The Conservative MP, Lloyd, was the head of the most important of these and was an enthusiastic 
Protectionist. He blamed the slump on unfair continental competition with bar iron being imported 
from Belgium, equivalent to £120,000 in wages in the Black Country. He pointed to the success of 
Harper, Son and Bean Ltd., which employed 3,000 in the region, 1,000 of them in Dudley, which was 
being helped by a 33 per cent tariff . 
(261) 
At first it seemed that Labour would not stand in the 1923 Election. The Birmingham Post reported 
that their funds "were greatly depleted by the last contest, in which their candidate sustained a heavy 
defeat". (262) Furthermore Labour had also lost two seats in the municipal elections in their Netherton 
stronghold. This was followed by a by-election defeat in another stronghold, St. Thomas's Ward-(263) 
The fact that Labour seemed unlikely to stand encouraged the Liberals. They selected Councillor 
F. J. Ballard, a strong local personality, who had always taken an active interest in the town's affairs. He 
argued that tariffs meant higher prices, increasing the wealth of the wealthy, whilst providing "a poorer 
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breakfast table for the toiler". (264) To illustrate their point the Liberals used the traditional "big and 
little loaf' posters. (265) Ballard proved to be a popular candidate with reports of him being "carried 
shoulder high" after one meeting. (266) Following the surprise victory of Pat Collins in Walsall in 1922, 
the Liberals in Dudley had high hopes of emulating him 
Initially Ballard appealed for Labour support, inviting the Party "to come forward and help me as far 
as they can... we know that about 80 per cent of the Labour Party are good old Liberals". (267) 
Unfortunately for Ballard Labour did provide a late candidate in R. F. Smith, who was also an "but and 
out Free Trader", whilst stressing his working-class origins. (268) Ballard was upset by the Labour 
intervention, asserting that "there never ought to have been a three-cornered fight in Dudley" and 
pointing out that he would not have stood had Labour been in the field earlier. (269) He also made an 
appeal for the working-class vote by opposing the decontrol of housing rents and supporting the 
extension of Old Age Pensions by removing the thrift disqualification. (270) 
Smith's election address avoided mention of the capital levy, which was under attack from both his 
rivals. Instead he stressed the importance of the international situation with the need for peace, revision 
of the Peace Treaties, an effective League of Nations and a resumption of economic and diplomatic 
relations with Russia. (271) Smith was also to be a victim of a campaign of rumours, explaining, for 
instance, that he had not been a conscientious objector during the war, but had served in the Ministry of 
Munitions, where he was exempted from military service. (272) 
The result was a narrow victory for Lloyd over Ballard, with the Labour candidate coming a poor 
third. Ballard partly blamed his defeat on the Labour intervention and partly on the poor organisation of 
the Liberal Party, which a three-week campaign could not repair. (273) The result, however, was a 
bigger disaster for Labour, despite having won a by-election here two years before. Smith lost over 
6,500 votes on the 1922 result, securing less than 10 per cent of the poll and losing his deposit. The 
main achievement of the Labour intervention seems to have been to prevent the Liberals from winning, 
which suited national party policy at this time. 
Smith put his defeat down to the weakness of the trade union movement in the town. (274) At the 
same time the Dudley Labour Party had only the minimum individual membership. (275) Smith was 
also critical of the Labour organisation, saying that after being in Dudley a few days "he found a 
condition of affairs different from what he had been accustomed to finding in other parts of the 
country". He thought that the election would give the local party "the opportunity to purge itself of the 
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undesirables". He warned that "there had not been sufficient spadework and they would have to start 
and build up their movement". (276) 
The Labour Party was to perform much better in Dudley in the 1924 Election. A major reason for 
this was the appointment of Oliver Baldwin, the son of the Conservative leader as their candidate. His 
selection reflected the desperate state of the party following their drubbing in the 1923 Election. 
Baldwin, who was only 25, had already experienced an adventurous wartime career in the army in both 
Russia and Turkey. After his return he had written a play and a novel. (277) As regards his political 
views Baldwin was described as a Social Democrat "belonging to the school founded by William 
Morris and Mr H. M. Hyndman". (278) 
Baldwin quickly became a popular candidate, who since his adoption in July, was said to have 
"sedulously nursed" the constituency, visiting and making himself known in all parts, especially the 
slum areas. (279) He was particularly appalled by the "horrible housing conditions" that existed in 
many parts of the town, declaring "how iniquitous the present system was that committed a great mass 
of the people ... to 
live in wretched surroundings". (280) Baldwin was outspoken on other social 
matters, pointing to Dudley's lack of educational opportunities. The Tory Party, he said, was "afraid of 
education", having increased class sizes and school fees, whilst reducing State scholarships when they 
were in power. This was a policy, which, he claimed, had been reversed by the Labour 
Government. (281) His visits to the town's slum areas further raised his popularity and alarmed the 
Conservatives. The Birmingham Post reported that "most of his meetings have been so crowded that 
large numbers have been unable to gain admission". This was put down to the glamour of being the 
son of an ex-Premier and to his courageous war record. (282) Along with Baldwin's popularity Labour 
had another advantage as some effort appears to have been made to increase individual party 
membership, which, according to the Annual Report, rose to 400 in 1924. (283) 
Lloyd was frustrated in his campaign for Tariff Reform by the Conservative's change of policy on 
this, but he maintained his support for the restoration of Safeguarding as a solution to unemployment. 
Oliver Baldwin described this as "Tariff Reform in sheep's clothing". (284) On the other hand, sensing 
a close contest, Lloyd was prepared to exploit the Zinoviev letter, claiming that the Labour 
Government had failed to stop Russian propaganda and that some trade unions had received money 
from Moscow. (285) 
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The Liberals, who had run the Conservatives a close race in 1923, were not standing this time. In the 
1921 by election they were believed to have supported Labour, whilst in the 1922 Election it was the 
Conservatives. This time Labour sought to win them over by showing that their aims were similar to 
theirs on issues such as the nationalisation of mineral rights, taxation of land values and governmental 
electric schemes. (286) Nevertheless the press reported a number of prominent Liberals coming out in 
support of Lloyd, claiming that it was in response to the much publicised Socialist threat. (287) 
The result was a cut in the Conservative majority to under a thousand. Lloyd gave the reason for his 
victory "the threat of a Socialist majority to prosperity", whilst Baldwin put his defeat down to "the 
weight of motor cars and the fact that the Liberal vote to a large extent was against". This, he claimed, 
was frightened "by `bogeys' of a kind that should not have disturbed a party claiming to be 
progressive". (288) Nevertheless Baldwin could claim a moral victory, having increased the Labour 
vote from under 2,000 to over 10,000. He pointed out that at the start of the campaign "they had only 
£10 and yet they had got 10,000 votes". He recommended improvements in the local party's 
organisation, such as setting up a Labour club, "similar to what they had got in Wednesbury". (289) 
9. WALSALL 
Walsall was another town whose unemployment remained stubbornly high. The figure for October 
1923 was 6,060, which was about 30 per cent less than the peak figure in 1921. (290) One major reason 
for this was the town's dependence on the leather trade and the horse. Its main industries were listed as 
"saddlers and coach ironmongery, buckles, chairs, curbs, bits and stirrups, bridles, saddles, harnesses, 
collars and all the necessary trappings for horses and carriages". The town also had iron and brass 
foundries, but even these trades were in recession. (291) 
Collins, the Liberal MP, was well prepared for this contest, sending out an appeal to each household, 
pointing out the consequences of Tariff Reform. He reckoned that 24 shillings would be needed to pay 
for articles now worth £1. (292) He was actively supported by Dan Cartwright, the Bloxwich miner's 
agent and Labour councillor for that ward. (293) Cartwright had broken away from F. J. Dean of the 
Pelsall and District Miners' Association and formed his own separate union. (294) It was such action 
that typified the divisions within the Walsall Labour Party. 
The Conservatives eventually chose a working-class candidate, S. K. Lewis, to contest the seat. He 
had started work at the age of 12, running errands in a Walsall office, although he was now the chief 
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clerk and cashier of the South Staffs. Tramway Co. Collins accused him of misleadingly calling 
himself "a Conservative Labour man". (295) Indeed Lewis was lauded as having "graduated in the hard 
school of toil", which was seen as an advantage in this constituency. He was another forthright 
supporter of Tariff Reform, as a solution to unemployment, which secured him the endorsement of the 
former MP, Sir Richard Cooper, who claimed in a letter that Protection was "the one hope of salvation 
for our people". (296) When asked why he was not standing on a working man's platform, he replied 
that "it is not a Labour Party today, but a Socialist Party and I refuse to ally myself with those who are 
friends of Russia". (297) 
The Labour candidate, Dr. Arthur Osburn, who had a distinguished medico military career, was 
appointed from HQ as the Walsall Labour Party lacked the finances for a local candidate. (298) Indeed 
during the campaign itself representatives were sent to London to secure financial assistance and 
Osburn, himself, had to dip into his own pocket. (299) He was described in The Times as a 
"gentleman... having few qualifications to fight for Labour". (300) In his election manifesto Osbum 
gave his full backing to the capital levy and the resumption of trade with Russia. He also stood 
"wholeheartedly" behind Free Trade, a government spending programme on schemes of housing, 
afforestation and transport but no mention of nationalisation. He did, however, stress the need for better 
pensions, improved housing, the nationalisation of the drinks trade and full adult suffrage. (301) Yet 
Osbum's position was hopeless, especially given the state of the local party. Hecklers argued that he 
was splitting the Free Trade vote. (302) 
The Times predicted a Conservative gain, but the press again underestimated Collins. (303) He 
increased his majority to over 2,000 with Osburn coming a poor third. Collins owed his success partly 
to his local popularity and partly to his Free Trade stand. The Labour vote fell by nearly 2,000, with 
their proportion of the poll falling from 23.6 per cent to 18.7 per cent. In the 1918 General Election 
Labour had secured 30 per cent of the vote. These figures show that there was nothing inevitable about 
Labour's rise during these years. 
Pat Collins's successes in Walsall had been due partly to personality and partly to the `dear food' 
campaign, which he directed against the Conservatives. For the 1924 Election this argument was now 
less effective, as Tariff Reform had been abandoned by the Conservatives, whilst it was claimed that 
food prices had risen under Labour. (304) It meant that it was possible for the Liberal vote to be 
successfully squeezed by the other two parties to the advantage of the Conservatives. 
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The Conservatives had chosen as their candidate a popular local personality, 'Billy' Preston, a 
businessman and secretary of the Walsall Party. The fact that he was a local man was a key part of his 
campaign, although he had little active experience even of local government. (305) His motto, 'The 
Empire as against Socialism', indicated the nature of his policies, arguing that the electors had to 
decide between "a government of Socialists backed by foreigners or (one) consisting of true British 
men". At the same time he vigorously denied any support for Protection, claiming that if elected to 
Parliament he would never vote for food taxes. (306) 
The Labour candidate was Captain Lothian Small, the son of a miners' agent from Lanarkshire, who 
had served with the South Staffordshire Regiment during the war and with the League of Nations 
afterwards. The Birmingham Post described him as "one of the best type of Labour candidates". (307) 
He defended the government's unemployment record, claiming that it was "a colossal lie to declare that 
unemployment today was greater than when Labour took office". The Labour Government, he said, 
had increased benefits, whilst including people on short time in the statistics for the first time. (308) 
Small received little support, however, from the Walsall Observer, which proclaimed that the issue was 
one of "Constitutionalism versus Socialism", with "the Socialists determined to get the mastery". It is 
"the business, nay the duty of Liberals and Conservatives alike to prevent them" was their advice. (309) 
All three parties considered Walsall a key electoral seat with visits from MacDonald, Lloyd George 
and Neville Chamberlain. Collins made a big appeal for the working-class vote, especially the miners, 
warning them that to vote Labour would let in the Tories. (310) Nevertheless this appeared to be what 
happened, as Preston captured the seat with a majority of over two and a half thousand. Small, 
meanwhile, increased the Labour poll by over 3,000 from 7,000 to over 10,000, although remaining in 
third place. 
Collins blamed the size of the Labour vote for his defeat, claiming that his Party was "betrayed", 
being "caught between reaction on the one hand and extremism on the other". (311) Small, however, 
r blamed lack of money and his late start to the campaign for his defeat. (312) The Walsall-Observe 
remained critical of Small, claiming that he was "not quite the type to win popularity" and adding that 
"he has something to learn... both in the character of his addresses and in the handling of his own 
supporters and those opposed to his political creed". (313) 
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GE 10. STOURBRID 
The Stourbridge constituency was another to have retained a strong Liberal base, although the 
Conservatives had captured the seat in 1922. Unemployment was also a major problem in some 
industries in the constituency, with 60 per cent of workers in the glass trade said to be 
unemployed. (314) Overall, however, the unemployment figures for Stourbridge and Brierley Hill 
showed a decline from 8,279 in May 1921 to 4,040 in October 1923. (315) 
Douglas Pielou, the MP, was another Protectionist, although he made clear his opposition to food 
taxes. (316) In the 1923 General Election the Conservatives hoped to use this issue to convince the 
electorate that it would reduce unemployment. The case had powerful backing from local businessmen. 
A letter was publicised from the chairman of Somers and Co. of Haywood Forge in Halesowen, 
claiming that his workforce of 200 could be doubled, if the Unionists were returned to power. (317) 
Further support came from hollowware manufacturers, who reckoned that an extra 500 workers could 
be employed at Everson Brothers in Lye and another 350 at James Grove and Son Ltd. in Halesowen, 
"if Baldwin's Protection becomes operative". (318) Pielou could even claim the support of the local 
glass manufacturer, K. M. Chance, who although a Free Trader, was convinced that the dangers of 
Protection were "grossly exaggerated". (319) 
The contest was to prove a genuine three-cornered one with the Liberals still seen as the main 
opposition. Yet with the defeat of their longstanding MP at the previous election, they were less certain 
of success. This was particularly evident given that Labour had a strong candidate in Wilfred Wellock.. 
A member of the ILP from Nelson in Lancashire, he called himself a Christian Communist. As a 
minister in the Independent Methodist Church he had been a leading pacifist during the war, being a 
prominent member of the No Conscription Fellowship. Since then he had founded the `No More War 
Movement'. (320) 
Wellock's solution to unemployment was to call for the eventual nationalisation of raw materials and 
industry. (321) According to the Birmingham Gazett e his views were well received at an open-air 
meeting of the unemployed in Stourbridge, whilst it was also claimed that he was "getting good 
backing from the railwaymen". (322) Wellock also spoke out in favour of the capital levy, claiming that 
the only alternative was "increased taxation on the people". (323) However, after sending out 300 
invitations to business leaders to discuss the matter only 6 turned up at a meeting addressed by the 
candidate. (324) 
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The result was a victory for Pielou by 1,500 votes from the Liberals. Despite his efforts Wellock 
came third with nearly 25 per cent of the vote, but this was still below the percentage secured by Mary 
MacArthur in 1918. The Conservative vote was also down on the 1922 result, but with the opposition 
split they were able hold the seat. 
There was another three-cornered contest in 1924 with Labour once again selecting the popular 
Wilfred Wellock. Since the previous General Election his presence in the constituency had led to a 
steady increase in party membership. (325) However, Wellock's membership of the ILP and his record 
as a conscientious objector during the war made him vulnerable to Conservative attacks. He was, for 
instance, described as a "fervent" supporter of the Russian Treaty, who "spoke lightly" of the Campbell 
case. (326) Wellock, himself, defended the Russian Treaty, claiming that there were "misconceptions 
and misunderstandings about it". (327) He was also able to make much publicity out of a £50 cheque 
donated by W. A. Albright, the Oldbury chemical manufacturer, who had broken with the Liberals over 
their attack on the Russian Treaty. (328) 
The Liberals chose Geoffrey Mander, a Wolverhampton solicitor, as their candidate, but the other 
two parties were squeezing their vote. Douglas Pielou, the successful Conservative candidate of the 
previous two elections was a big champion of the cause of ex-servicemen, having been crippled himself 
by his war injuries. (329) Pielou put his main emphasis on "the Safeguarding of industries", claiming 
that with the removal of the McKenna duties "imports of musical instruments, clocks, watches, motor 
cars and motor cycles had increased". (330) He was backed by the Birmingham Post, which reported of 
"truck loads of Belgian goods... unloaded, while local works stood idle" and of Belgian horseshoes 
being imported at £7 a ton, "less than the cost of raw materials in Lye". Pielou also attacked the 
Russian loan, saying that the money would have been "much better utilised in relieving hardship and 
misery in this country". (3 3 1) 
Wellock increased the Labour vote by over 50 per cent, but this still left him 1,900 behind the victor, 
Pielou. He blamed the "scandalous stunt of the Red Plot" for his defeat. (332)The real losers, however, 
were again the Liberals, who finished in third place with their vote down by 3,000. 
C CONCLUSION 
In the 1923 General Election the total Labour vote in the Black Country of 102,293 represented a fall 
of 2,500 on the 1922 figure. In both elections nine seats were fought, so that Labour's proportion of the 
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poll in contested seats dropped from 41 per cent to 37.8 per cent. (333) This compares with a national 
swing to Labour of 1.3 per cent from 29.4 per cent to 30.7 per cent. The Conservative share of the vote 
fell too in the Black Country, dropping from 47.8 per cent in the 1922 Election to 42.7 per cent. The 
party to benefit most from this was the Liberals, who despite the absence of an election in 
Wolverhampton East increased their overall share of the vote from 15.8 per cent to 19.5 per cent. In the 
six seats they contested, however, the proportion was 29.4 per cent. In Birmingham, on the other hand, 
Liberalism remained weak, enabling Labour to increase its share of the poll in contested seats from 
36% to 37%, in spite of the Conservative's Protectionist campaign. 
Another way of checking Labour's performance is by comparing results in similar seats. There were, 
for instance, three seats where there was a Labour v Conservative clash in both elections. (334) In 1922 
in these seats Labour won 48.8 per cent of the vote and the Conservatives 51.2 per cent, whilst in 1923 
the ratio was Labour with 51.7 per cent and the Conservatives with 48.3 per cent. This swing to Labour 
of 2.9 per cent compares with a national swing in such seats of 5.2 per cent with 6 per cent in borough 
seats. (335) In the two seats where all three Parties fought both elections, Labour won 35.2 per cent, the 
Conservatives 38.8 per cent and the Liberals 26 per cent in 1922. (336) In 1923, however, Labour won 
only 30.1 per cent whilst the Conservatives won 38.2 per cent and the Liberals 31.7 per cent. Thus 
there was a 5.1 per cent swing away from Labour and a 5.7 per cent swing to the Liberals, compared 
nationally with a swing of 0.8 per cent to Labour, 4.1 per cent to the Liberals and 5.5 per cent away 
from the Conservatives. (337) 
It is apparent from these figures that, although Labour maintained much of its support in the Black 
Country, there was to be no increase as happened nationally in 1923. One factor was the revival of 
Liberalism, which accounted for Labour's third place in Dudley, Walsall and Stourbridge, as well as 
their failure to contest the seat of Wolverhampton East. The Liberal revival owed much to the issues of 
Free Trade and cheap food. At the same time the attraction of Protection as a solution to unemployment 
seems less evident here than in Birmingham. Thus although the Conservative vote remained strong, 
there was in fact a swing against them. 
In 1924 it appears that, as in the working class wards in Birmingham, the Labour Party did better in 
the Black Country than in Britain as a whole. They now held 5 of the 10 seats, with their total vote 
rising from 102,293 in 9 contests in 1923 to 137,998 in 10. Moreover their share of the vote rose from 
37.8 per cent to 43.3 per cent, which was above the national swing of 2.6 per cent. The Conservatives, 
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who now held only 4 of the seats, secured 45.6 per cent compared with 42.7 per cent in 1923, which 
was considerably less than the 8.8 per cent national swing. On the other hand the Liberals' overall 
share of the vote fell from 15.8 per cent to 10.8 per cent, but they contested only three seats and did 
retain Wolverhampton East.. 
In directly comparable seats there were the same three contests in which Labour fought the 
Conservatives in both elections as well as in 1922. Here there was no Liberal candidate to squeeze. In 
1924 Labour won 50.4 per cent of the vote, compared with 51.7 per cent in 1923 and 48.8 per cent in 
1922. Nationally in such seats there was a swing of 4.5 per cent to the Conservatives between 1923 and 
1924. (338) 
From these figures it is apparent that the Labour vote in the Black Country was not significantly 
affected by the Conservative's Red Scare campaign. The reason for this must rest with the fact that 
there were few middle-class Liberal or Labour voters to be frightened by the Conservative's campaign. 
In fact the Labour vote here was very much a working-class vote, closely linked to the trade unions. 
The party had also become well known and represented locally, making it less easy for the electorate to 
be scared. Furthermore in office the Labour Government had proved its competence over the economy 
and given modest help to the unemployed and pensioners. 
Nevertheless it is apparent from these two General Elections that the Labour Party had not greatly 
expanded its support amongst the working class electorate of the Black Country. The party was not 
helped by poor organisation in many constituencies. In Dudley, for instance, Labour seemed 
demoralised after their 1922 defeat, which had so quickly followed their by-election success of 1921. 
In Wolverhampton East the party had only recently been organised and was to remain weak throughout 
the inter-war period. Meanwhile in Walsall Labour continued with its reputation for division and 
disunity with some members actually backing the Liberals. 
With its low individual membership the Labour Party in the Black Country still remained very 
dependent on the trade unions. In 1918 the party had emerged at a time of full employment on the back 
of an expanding trade union movement. By 1923-4 the unions were badly hit by the recession and a 
series of unsuccessful strikes. As trade union membership dropped, so their affiliation fees to Labour 
were hit, leaving local parties with declining resources. This was not offset by any rise in individual 
membership, which remained at low levels in all constituencies. This was because non-unionised 
members of the working class were less likely to join or even vote for Labour than their unionised 
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colleagues. Labour benefited from this in 1924, as the General Election was seen as a Conservative 
attack on the working class and their institutions. On the other hand its close association with the trade 
unions made it difficult for Labour to expand further in the Black Country at this time. It meant, for 
instance, that local parties without a mass membership were being run by small cliques, who often 
spent much time squabbling, as can be seen in the case of the Wolverhampton and Walsall parties. By 
1924 Labour had become well established in the region, but was finding it more difficult to expand 
beyond its basic support, especially amongst the non-unionised members of the working class. 
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CHAPTER 4- 1924-1929 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The period from Labour's defeat in the 1924 General Election to its success in 1929 was one of 
steady electoral advance by the party. In his analysis of local election results during this period, Cook 
has pointed to consistent gains each year, with the biggest advance coming in 1926, the year of the 
General Strike, when it was thought that the working-class electorate were radicalised by events. (1) 
Cook has also analysed by-election results for this period, during which Labour captured 13 seats (11 
from the Conservatives and 2 from the Liberals). He has found that the yearly swing to Labour 
accelerated from 4.9 per cent in 1925 and 5.9 per cent in 1926 to 7.6 per cent in 1928 and 12 per cent in 
1929. (2) 
Despite these successes these were not easy years for the Labour Party itself. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 1924 General Election, for instance, there was much internal criticism of the record of 
the 1924 Labour Government and of MacDonald's leadership. At the 1925 Party Conference the lead 
was taken by Ernest Bevin, the trade union leader, who never forgave MacDonald for his threat to use 
emergency powers in dealing with the dock and tramway strikes. The Left, in the form of George 
Lansbury and the Clydesiders, were also critical. MacDonald, however, retained the support of the bulk 
of the right wing trade union MPs. (3) 
The years 1925 and 1926 saw a return to `direct action' by the unions, as a result of the coal crisis, 
which culminated in the General Strike. MacDonald privately opposed these events. He realised that it 
was unlikely that the Government would be defeated in the General Strike. Moreover he knew that a 
consequence of these events would be a continued drift of Liberal voters to the Conservatives as in 
1924. (4) Nevertheless it can be argued that despite his victory in the General Strike Baldwin's triumph 
was short lived. According to Pugh, the Conservative triumph "represented a major setback" since "it 
undermined their claims to treat the working class fairly and to represent he national interest". He sees 
this as helping "to lay the foundations" for Labour's victory in the 1929 General Election. (5) 
A further consequence of the Government's success in the General Strike was Baldwin's decision to 
attack the union levy to the Labour Party, by legislating for members to `contract in' rather than 
`contract out'. This was to have a considerable financial impact on the party throughout the remainder 
of this period, especially in regions like the Black Country, where local parties were dependent on 
union backing. One consequence was the influence it had on the choice of candidates in these 
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constituencies, making local parties more willing to accept rich donors. This was something that many 
Labour leaders were wary of (6) 
An alternative strategy for Labour was to build up individual membership. Efforts were made, for 
instance, to make it easier for members to pay their subscriptions. (7) Another way to increase 
membership was for local parties to appeal to a broader urban working class by concentrating on 
neighbourhood politics with policies for municipal housing, transport, electricity and education. One of 
the guiding lights behind this approach was Herbert Morrison, who was himself suspicious of the trade 
unions. Savage, in his study of the Labour Party in Preston, illustrates how the local party here changed 
focus in this way. He suggests that the reason for Labour's popularity in the late 1920s was more due to 
this change of strategy than out of sympathy for the miners following the General Strike. (8) It is 
reflected in the figures for the 1929 General Election, in which constituency parties sponsored 364 of 
the 569 Labour candidates, of whom 128 were successful. (9) 
Nevertheless despite these changes it is generally agreed that at a local level the Labour Party in the 
late 1920s was still dominated by the trade unions, as their financial contribution was indispensable. 
Reynolds and Laybourn, for instance, have stressed the importance in West Yorkshire of the close 
association between the trade unions and the local Labour parties. (10) Not only did trade unionists 
dominate the constituency parties, their officials were also candidates for council and national 
elections. Indeed Laybourn points out that for the 1929 General Election there were to be more trade 
union sponsored candidates than before. (11) 
Riddell too agrees that trade unions dominated the party despite efforts to increase individual 
membership. He gives figures showing that in 1929 there were 227,897 individual members in 578 
local parties, making an average of 400 per party. At the same time there were 2 million affiliated 
union members, although this was down from a peak of 4.3 million in 1920, due to the overall decline 
in union membership and the introduction of contracting in. (12) 
By the late 1920s the leadership in the form of MacDonald, Henderson and Snowden had a big 
influence over the Party. This was a consequence of the defeat of the unions in the General Strike, 
coupled with the low individual party membership. MacDonald wanted Labour to move gradually 
towards socialism with the backing of a broad range of the population. It meant that the Party had to 
break with the extreme Left. (13) At the London Party Conference in 1924 members of the Communist 
Party were debarred for the first time from membership of the Labour Party. Attempts the next year to 
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refer this decision back to the Executive Committee were defeated with comfortable majorities. (14) 
This led to the disbanding of 26 constituency parties between 1926-28, including Edgbaston and 
Moseley in Birmingham. (15) 
Thorpe also points out that at this time the women's movement, which had played a significant part 
in Labour politics before 1918, was becoming marginalised. (16) Calls for a higher status for the 
women's conference and for the women members of the NEC to be elected by women were 
rejected. (17) The Party also avoided so called women's issues such as birth control, partly out of fear 
of alienating Catholic voters. (18) Nevertheless in many local parties women played an active part, with 
many standing in council elections and as Poor Law Guardians, although in some local parties their 
role was only that of routine activities. (19) 
Thorpe concludes that in the late 1920s there was " an ideological stagnation" with the Party drifting 
into a policy of "minimal short term change at home". (20) This view can be seen in a new programme 
Labour and the Nation, produced by Tawney in 1928. It proved to be a typically vague document with 
few definite proposals, which was later blamed for the failure of the second Labour Government. (21). 
What was needed was a more specific programme for a five year Labour Government, but this was 
something that the Party, with so many obvious divisions, might have found difficult to produce. 
Meanwhile an alternative programme had been drawn up by the ILP under the guidance of James 
Maxton. In 1926 they produced a radical document The Living Wage, which envisaged a solution to 
unemployment through a high wage economy. This was rejected at the 1927 Labour Party Conference. 
The ILP followed this with the unofficial Cook - Maxton campaign of 1928, which called for a new 
class struggle and an end to compromise. This was easily defeated by the party leadership, who 
emerged in an even stronger position. 
As the 1929 General Election approached the Labour Party was threatened by Lloyd George, who 
launched a programme entitled We can Conquer Unemployment, which advocated the raising of £250 
million by means of a loan, to be spent on public works schemes, such as road building, housing and 
electricity. Labour's response to this was to produce a new pamphlet, How to Conquer Unemployment, 
which described the Liberal proposals as either stolen from the Labour Party or financially unsound. 
Unemployment, it claimed, could not be cured by "palliatives" but by "a lasting restoration of 
industry". Labour proposed schemes for housing, electricity, roads and land improvements, which were 
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to be financed by taxation. Critics, however, described the programme as too abstract, general and not 
costed. (22) 
The 1929 General Election was the first at which women had equal voting rights with men at a 
common age of 21. This added about 5 million new voters to the register, giving women a majority in 
85 per cent of the seats. (23) Since there was an increase of 3 million in the Labour vote there have been 
some suggestions that the `flapper vote' benefited Labour. Certainly, as Savage has shown in the case 
of Preston, many constituency parties had worked during the late 1920s to broaden their appeal in order 
to secure membership and support from women. (24) Nevertheless in this General Election none of the 
Parties made a special appeal to women or the young. Indeed historians have shown that it was the 
Conservatives, who were better able to mobilise support amongst women at this time. (25) 
Baldwin went into the General Election with a `Safety First' programme, stressing the responsible 
and sound nature of his Government. He wanted to contrast this with what he considered the radical 
and irresponsible policies of his opponents, especially Lloyd George. (26) Protection was rejected, but 
the slogan ̀Sow Safeguarding and Reap Prosperity' was to be widely posted in the West Midlands. (27) 
Safeguarding had been renewed by the Conservative Government, but they now wanted to extend it, 
claiming that Labour would threaten jobs by removing it. For a while the matter became a national 
controversy, when Sir Herbert Austin, in a letter to the Conservative candidate in the Birmingham 
Kings Norton constituency, warned that a Labour Government which repealed safeguarding, would 
lead him to close the Longbridge car works. (28) 
With unemployment at 1.1 million most historians would agree that this was the major issue in the 
Election. C. L. Mowat claimed that the Conservatives lost due to "their pugnacity in 1927, their 
flabbiness since, especially concerning unemployment and disarmament. They offered safety first but 
so did Labour which, since the General Strike, had cold shouldered its extremists and grown eminently 
respectable". (29) Rather controversially A. J. P. Taylor disagreed with this verdict, claiming that "there 
was no burning question to excite the passion of the electorate". Unemployment, he claimed, was seen 
as "an evil but inevitable" and the General Election turned "solely on the question of `who should be 
the next Prime Minister? "(30) 
One historian of the Conservative Party, J. Ramsden, has claimed that Baldwin lost the General 
Election because the Party was out of touch with the national mood, being too "defensive" and 
"unadventurous". Baldwin has been accused of being too complacent, attacking the Labour and Liberal 
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programmes but offering nothing in return. His slogan 'Safety First' was later criticised as "safety first 
and nothing second". It may have worked in 1924 and 1931 but in 1929 the electorate was "ready to try 
something more adventurous". (31) 
The result of the 1929 Election was that 287 of Labour's candidates were elected compared to 260 
Conservatives and 59 Liberals. The swing to Labour was 6.4 per cent, bringing them 126 net gains. Yet 
the Conservatives polled 300,000 more votes, giving them 38.1 per cent of the total to Labour's 37.1 
per cent. Historians have made much of the fact that as many as 118 of Labour's seats were held on a 
minority vote in three-cornered contests. It meant that a swing of just 2.5 per cent to the Conservatives 
would secure them 20 seats from the Liberals and 46 from Labour. This has led Cook to describe the 
result as "a marked step forward" but "hardly... the secure victory that on the surface it appeared". (32) 
At the same time, however, it should be noted that the Conservatives won only 60 seats with a clear 
majority, leaving 150 held on a minority vote. The figures are a reflection of the large Liberal vote, 
although this secured them only 59 seats from 5.3 million votes. 
Cook has pointed out that the constituency parties sponsored 43.9 per cent of Labour's victorious 
candidates. This was easily their highest proportion and compares with the 40.1 per cent backed by the 
trade unions (33) The total Labour vote of 8.37 million also suggests that the Party was drawing 
support away from the trade union movement. In fact, as Riddell points out, only a quarter of the 
workforce was unionised in 1929, which meant that the total Labour vote was over twice the union 
membership of 3.67 million. (34) Savage has used the election results to support his view that Labour 
was winning support in the big cities by pursuing social policies which appealed to a broader section of 
the working class. He points out that whereas in 1918 Labour's strength lay outside the cities, in 1929 
Labour won nearly two-thirds of the seats in large urban areas. These accounted for 40 per cent of their 
MPs, compared with 19 per cent in 1918. (35) 
Labour's gains in the 1929 General Election were general across the country. The biggest advances, 
however, came in those working-class areas where Labour had underperformed in the 1924 General 
Election. Hence in Lancashire and Cheshire the advance was from 18 to 44, in the West Midlands from 
11 to 25 and in London and Greater London from 28 to 54. (36) Although the result owed much to 
national factors the Labour advance was still very dependent on local developments, either in the 
constituencies or amongst the trade unions. 
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B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
The Labour Party was to make one of its biggest advances during this period in Birmingham. Having 
gained its first parliamentary seat in 1924, the party went on to win 6 of the 12 seats in the 1929 
General Election. There was little evidence of this, however, in the 1924 and 1925 municipal elections. 
In those held in 1924, which came only three days after the General Election, Labour did reasonably 
well nationally, making 20 net gains. This compared to the 8 gains made by the Conservatives, whilst 
the Liberals lost 14 seats. Yet in Birmingham the Conservatives made 7 gains and Labour lost 5 
seats. (37) 
1925 was the year of `Red Friday', when the TUC decided to back the miners in their fight to 
preserve their wage rates and hours of work. Despite this apparent victory for the working class, the 
municipal elections of that year saw only modest gains for Labour. In Birmingham Labour lost 2 more 
seats overall, leaving them with only 17 members on a council of 120. The Conservative's motto of 
`Down with the Reds and Down with the Rates' proved to be persuasive. (38) 
Labour's disappointing performances in Birmingham at this time have been analysed by Boughton. 
One factor commonly accepted by historians was the civic tradition, associated with the Chamberlain 
family and the Unionist Party. After a stutter in the immediate post-war years, the Party found its feet 
again in the mid 1920s. A range of local services were provided, including municipal baths, hospitals 
and health centres, along with a bigger council house programme per head of population than in any 
other city in the country. Even opponents described it as "an inspiring record of the successes and 
practicality of social ownership". Equally significant was the strength of the Birmingham Unionist 
Association, which Boughton describes as "the most efficient political machine in the country". It had 
an annual income of £10,000 compared with only £750 for Labour. There were also 20,000 paid up 
members with 15,000 in a separate women's organisation. (39) 
Meanwhile between 1926 and 1928 the Birmingham Labour Party was hit by an internal row over 
the candidacy of Dr Robert Dunstan for the parliamentary seat of Birmingham West. Dunstan had 
fought Ladywood for Labour in 1922 and 1923, but left the party over his views on land confiscations. 
In 1924 he had fought Birmingham West for the Communist Party with much Labour backing. Then in 
1926 Labour selected O. G. Willey of the ILP as their candidate for this seat, although Dunstan wanted 
to stand again. The party was to become seriously divided over the controversy with Joseph Southall 
215 
the vice president of the party and former anti-war protester, along with the Edgbaston and Mosley 
Labour Parties supporting Dunstan. (40) In November 1927 a number of left wingers, including 
Southall, were expelled from the Borough Labour Party at a meeting of the Executive Committee. (4 1) 
Southall appealed to the members, claiming that "certain rich men influenced the policy of both the 
Party and the Town Crier". This was an attack on the paper's editor, W. J. Chamberlain, and perhaps 
also on Oswald Mosley. The Executive Committee's decision, however, was backed by 99 votes to 
33. (42) Following this in 1928, having continued to back Southall and the expelled members, the 
decision was taken to disaffiliate the Edgbaston and Moseley Divisional Parties. (43) The decision was 
confirmed by the NEC, who appointed George Lansbury, Frank Roberts, Arthur Henderson and 
G. R. Shepherd to hold an inquiry and consider the views. (44) 
Despite this controversy Labour made steady progress in Birmingham from 1926 down to the 1929 
General Election. One factor behind this is thought to have been the active part played by Birmingham 
trade unions in the General Strike. (45) The response to the strike call by the first wave was almost total. 
20-30,000 were estimated to have gone on strike, with many more out of work due to the lack of 
transport or coal. (46) Others, like the Engineers, were discontented because they were not called out. 
Indeed Birmingham along with Wolverhampton was to be placed in the first of the four categories with 
regard to its response. (47) John Strachey later wrote in the Town Crie r that the turn-out was remarkable 
considering that, with regard to trade unions, Birmingham was considered to be "at least ten years 
behind the best organised areas", whilst 50 per cent of the working class habitually voted Conservative. 
He claimed that "for the first time the Birmingham workers acted as a class". (48) 
Considerable bitterness followed the defeat of the General Strike, as employers sought to exploit 
their position. (49) Much sympathy was shown within the city for the miners, with the Birmingham 
Labour movement raising £5,200 for them. At a municipal by-election held at Ladywood three months 
after the strike, there was considerable hostility shown towards the Unionists. C. Augur, a railwayman 
and strike leader, captured the seat with a majority of over 1,100 votes. Soon after this Neville 
Chamberlain was to abandon his parliamentary seat at Ladywood for the more secure one of 
Edgbaston. In September there was another by-election at Rotton Park, which was part of the 
Ladywood constituency. This time Labour converted a Unionist majority of 1,294 into a Labour 
majority of 1,002. (50) 
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether Labour's advance in the succeeding years was due to 
any radicalising of the working class. It might, on the other hand, have been the defeat of the trade 
unions and the loss of some of their powers, which might have persuaded many of the non-unionised 
members of the working class to turn to Labour. If this were the case then the move would have been 
made easier by the fact that the Birmingham Labour Party became less militant during the late 1920's, 
partly as a result of members becoming drawn into positions of civic importance. 
One immediate consequence of the aftermath of the General Strike was to be an increase in 
individual party membership. Until 1926 only Yardley with £3/5/-, equivalent to 390 members, had 
more than the minimum membership of 180. According to the 1927 Annual Report six other 
constituency parties had increased their membership by over 50 per cent. The biggest rise was in 
Sparkbrook, where membership increased to 469. (51) The figures in the 1930 Annual Report, which 
reflected the situation in the General Election year, gave Kings Norton 630 members, Yardley 600, 
West Birmingham 420, Aston 396, Ladywood 350 and Handsworth 322. (52) Three of these seats were 
to be captured by Labour in the General Election. 
In the 1926 municipal elections Labour made sweeping gains across the country in what has been 
seen as a reaction to the defeat of the General Strike. Overall the Party secured 146 gains, including 8 
in Birmingham. The advance might have been greater, but as the Birmingham Gazette admitted, "the 
city was on the whole well governed". (53) Labour continued to make progress in the local elections of 
1927 and 1928. In 1927 Labour made a net gain nationally of 90 seats in municipal boroughs, with 3 of 
these in Birmingham. (54) A further 3 seats were gained in Birmingham in 1928, when 101 municipal 
seats were gained nationally. Yet even at this stage Labour held less than a third of the seats on the 
Council. (55) 
In the 1929 General Election Labour made its significant breakthrough in Birmingham, securing 
41.8 per cent of the vote, which was well above the national average of 37 per cent, and capturing 6 of 
the 12 seats. (56) Boughton suggests a number of reasons for this success. One significant factor was 
the growth in importance of national over local politics during the 1920's as the press and radio 
expanded its influence. Certainly national issues such as the disappointingly inadequate social reforms 
of Baldwin's Government caused much disgruntlement amongst the Birmingham working class. (57) 
There was also a generational factor with younger voters less likely to be swayed by the Chamberlain 
factor. Many of this new generation of workers were growing up on the council estates, which were 
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being built outside the city's inner ring. It was here that the Unionist movement was least powerful and 
Labour strongest. (58) 
Boughton also considers the role of local `notables' such as George Cadbury, the chocolate 
manufacturer, who played a major role in building up Kings Norton as a Labour stronghold during the 
decade. (59) Another significant personality was Oswald Mosley, who remained a factor in the 
Birmingham Labour Party, despite his move to Smethwick in 1926. Mosley provided the Party with a 
subsidy, whilst its organisation was improved by his associates John Strachey and AllanYoung. Pugh 
claims that the working class electorate was flattered to be represented by upper class candidates such 
as Mosley and Strachey, who captured the Aston seat. (60) Boughton also points to the work of Labour 
activists such as Percy Shurmer, who worked tirelessly on various local bodies, winning respect within 
the working-class community. (61) 
There was also an economic factor behind Labour's performance, with the continual emergence of 
factory based manufacturing at the expense of the workshop economy. This helped Labour as it 
widened class divisions. For a while it seemed that one economic argument would become the major 
issue in the city, following the intervention of Sir Herbert Austin. He wrote a letter to the press 
threatening to close the Longbridge car works down, if the Safeguarding duties were repealed by a 
Labour Government. (62) Indeed Labour lost their seat at Kings Norton, which contained the 
Longbridge works due in the main to this intervention. 
The Unionist case was strongly argued by the Birmingham Post, which claimed in an editorial that 
"security in the home market" could increase the volume and value of exports. The volume had risen 
by 33 per cent between 1924-28 in safeguarded industries, whilst declining by 8.5 per cent in 
others. (63) The Times, in an election report on the city, emphasised "prospering Birmingham", where 
there were over 28,000 more in work than when the Conservative Government took over. The numbers 
employed in motor components, for instance, had increased from 6,000 to 9,000. (64) The other side of 
the argument was made most strongly by the Town Crier, which pointed out that the biggest expansion 
in the motor industry came from August 1924 to June 1925, when duties were removed. (65) 
For the 1929 General Election it seemed, as the Birmingham Gazette announced, that "Protection has 
been beaten again". The paper went on to declare that "the British public has applied ̀ Safety First to 
the Safeguarders". (66) The Town Crier described the result as "sensational", stressing the city's 
housing conditions as a major factor. The defeat of Dennison in Kings Norton was blamed on Herbert 
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Austin's "outrageous threat". (67) For the Birmingham Post the Unionist defeat was attributed to the 
"lavish promises" of Liberals and Labour. It saw, however, in the Kings Norton result "a substantial 
crumb of comfort" and "a good omen for the recovery at the next election", so long as organisation was 
improved. (68) Moreover, despite Labour's parliamentary success, the Unionists outvoted Labour with 
a total of 225,874 votes to 195,500. 
2. THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. THE STATE OF LOCAL PARTIES 
Labour's advances in Birmingham were more than matched by those in the Black Country. Between 
1924-29 the Party made steady if not continuous progress in local elections, whilst retaining the 
Smethwick parliamentary seat in a by-election in 1926 and capturing Stourbridge in 1927. Their 
greatest triumph, however, came in the 1929 General Election, when Labour won 9 of the 10 seats with 
the Conservatives losing all theirs, whilst the Liberals held on to Wolverhampton East. 
In the 1924 municipal elections there were fewer changes in the Black Country than in Birmingham, 
although many seats were uncontested. This was another reflection of the financial position of the 
Labour Party. One seat was lost in Smethwick, whilst in Walsall Labour lost a seat to the United 
Ratepayers' Coalition, which had been set up to check Labour's spending plans. Elsewhere Labour had 
one net gain in Wolverhampton, whilst in West Bromwich the Labour agent, Guest, regained a seat on 
the council by capturing Hill Top. (69) Labour again did well in the 1925 municipal elections, winning 
four of the five contested seats in Smethwick, making one gain from the Conservatives. They also 
gained seats in Wolverhampton, Walsall and Wednesbury. (70) 
The General Strike probably had a bigger impact in the Black Country than in Birmingham, due to 
the continued presence there of coal mining. The terms offered by the employers meant a pay cut of 
around 18 per cent for Black Country miners. (71) The main mines at this time were those north of 
Walsall, along with the large mines such as Baggeridge, Hamstead and Hilton Main. In addition a 
number of medium to small scale mines remained in parts of Dudley, Rowley Regis and West 
Bromwich. Trade union membership was low, but when the strike was called there was full support 
throughout. (72) 
The response to the General Strike in the Black Country has been described by one historian as 
"remarkably solid". (73) Towns such as Smethwick, Stourbridge, Walsall and Wednesbury were 
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categorised as Class 2, which meant that they were wholly effective but with some weaknesses. There 
were none in the region that came below this category. (74) The TUC was not only successful in calling 
out those on strike, it also had to persuade those not included to stay at work. The shortage of fuel, 
however, soon caused factories to close down and others to be put on a 3-day week. Attempts were 
made to run volunteer bus services, but in general there was little support for this. 
In Wolverhampton, where the response was categorised as Class 1,35,000 were estimated to have 
taken part. Amongst the works, reported closed, were the Star Engineering Works, Sunbeam and most 
of Guy Motors. Elsewhere the three major steel works in the region, the Round Oak in Brierley Hill, 
the Springvale works in Bilston and the Coombs Wood works in Halesowen were closed. Many more 
works were closed down due to the shortage of fuel. Two local MPs Charlie Sitch and Alfred Short 
were closely involved, addressing a crowd of 3,000 in Cradley Heath on Saturday 8 May. 
The ending of the General Strike brought much bitterness and disillusionment to many of those 
involved. (75) The legacy continued, however, with Councillor Salmon unsuccessfully moving a motion 
that all permanent workers for Smethwick Council should be members of a trade union. (76) Meanwhile 
local Trades Councils continued to be involved, raising money to support the miners. (77) Eventually 
the Black Country miners drifted back to work, accepting a deal, which meant a real wage, which was 
cut to 83 per cent of the 1914 level. (78) 
In the 1926 municipal elections Labour had its best performance yet, when the local party secured a 
majority of two on Smethwick Council after capturing two seats. This gave them control for the first 
time of a Black Country Municipal Council. (79) Labour also made four gains in Dudley and one in 
Wednesbury. (80) There were no contests in Wolverhampton in November 1926, because a new 
Council was to be elected in March 1927, following the extension of the borough boundaries. 
Labour was expecting success in Wolverhampton in this election, but the Party was to be 
disappointed, winning just 12 of the 39 seats. (81) A major reason for this can be found in the anti- 
Socialist pact, which the Liberals and Conservatives had made for fighting local elections back in 1919. 
In practice this meant that the Conservatives concentrated on the western wards where their strength 
lay, whilst the Liberals were content to contest the eastern wards, where the Conservatives had only a 
limited organisation. The local party agent, W. H. Jacobs, took the defeats seriously, telling the press 
that Labour "is ready to take what appears to be a defeat with their courage in both hands and a smile 
across their faces". (82) 
220 
At a Ward Council meeting of the local Labour Party on the 28th April reports were received from 
the various wards, which drew a picture of apathy and poor organisation. In the Blakenhall and St. 
John's Wards, for instance, where three Labour councillors were defeated, there were reports of "not 
sufficient workers" and "not enough collectors" in Blakenhall and "no collections being made" in St. 
John's. It was also admitted that boundary revisions had made a difference. In Graisely, where Labour 
also finished bottom of the poll, the report admitted that there were "few canvassers" and "general 
apathy shown all round". Also "voluntary collections still being taken but a general fading off in the 
amount being collected". (83) 
Labour gained total success in only the three wards of St. George's, St. Mary's and Bushbury. The 
latter was dominated by the railway unions and included a large council housing estate. In St. George's 
the report claimed that success was due to "two years of developing the organisation in the ward", 
which was "staffed with polling area stewards", who held "a personal canvass" and "open air 
meetings". In Dunstall, where Emma Sproson stood as an Independent, Labour won only one seat. The 
report stated that "organisation upset through recent events in the ward and the withdrawal from the 
party of one of the late councillors. No street captains. Voluntary collections being taken but only a few 
collectors and not so many subscriptions". (84) 
Elsewhere the reports were equally grim. In St. Marks there were "few workers. No checkers... no 
one to undertake the collections". In Park Ward there was "no organisation.... No street captains.... No 
voluntary collections being made". There was a similar position in the St. Matthews Ward, where the 
only Labour candidate to be returned was Miss M. Perry. (85) 
In the November municipal elections of 1927 Labour gained four seats in Dudley, one in Smethwick 
and Walsall, but lost one to a Liberal in West Bromwich. (86) Overall Party representation in the three 
biggest Black Country boroughs in 1927 was 15 Labour to 9 Conservatives in Smethwick, 7 Labour to 
14 Conservatives, 10 Liberals and I Independent in Walsall, whilst in Wolverhampton it was 13 
Labour, 21 Conservatives, 11 Liberals and 7 Independents. (87) In 1928 Labour gained one seat in both 
Dudley and Wednesbury, but one was lost in Wolverhampton. (88) 
It was only in Smethwick that the Labour Party made any major advance in municipal elections in 
the immediate post-war years. In both Walsall and Wolverhampton it was probably the strong presence 
of the Liberals, which held back Labour. Some care is needed, however, in making comparisons, as the 
borough franchise was more restricted, being still based on householders. Nevertheless there is no 
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evidence here to suggest hat Labour was about to make a big advance in the 1929 General Election. A 
number of factors still seemed to be holding the party back in the late 1920's. 
The opposition, in the form of the Black Country Conservative Associations, remained a force, 
although less of a threat than the `well oiled' Birmingham Unionist's machine. The nature of many of 
the Black Country industries, such as coal mining, iron and steel and the metal working trades, gave 
less opportunity for the paternalistic approach, which had been common in Birmingham workshops. 
Apathy and the deference vote could still be relied upon. This applied to the many non-unionised 
members of the working class, for whom the Labour Party was seen as an offshoot of the trade unions. 
The closest that Black Country Conservatives came to emulating the Birmingham Unionists was 
probably in Wolverhampton, which has been analysed by K. D. Gardner. The party here, however, was 
essentially based on the middle-class wards of the West constituency, having little organisation in the 
East. Nevertheless the party was quite skilled in appealing to working-class voters. Gardner shows how 
they adapted the methods of business to politics, especially in the development of the techniques of 
advertising and in the use of film. Furthermore the Conservatives continued Labour's housing 
programme, which enabled them to attract some working-class support. They were also adept at 
appealing to the newly enfranchised female voter, by calling special meetings and producing appealing 
leaflets. (89) 
Labour's growth locally was made harder by the continued existence of anti-Socialist pacts between 
the Conservatives and Liberals. These were present in "all the Black Country boroughs, but were 
particularly harmful to Labour in municipal elections in Wolverhampton, Walsall, Dudley and West 
Bromwich. The Conservatives and Liberals seemed to coalesce around a policy of resisting increased 
local expenditure, which threatened rate increases. For the 1927 municipal elections in Wolverhampton 
the Conservative and Liberal candidates actually stood as ̀ anti-Socialists'. Presumably it was better for 
propaganda purposes to use the word Socialist than Labour. 
Meanwhile low individual membership remained a feature in most of the Black Country 
constituencies during this period. One reason for this, as noted by Riddell, was that in working-class 
regions most males sympathetic to Labour would be affiliated through their own union. (90) Low 
membership, however, tended to encourage the development of cliques and personal feuds, which 
characterised many of the local parties at this time. Yet in 1926, the year of the General Strike, 
membership rose in many constituencies. Bilston, for instance, recorded a return of £12, which 
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represented 1,440 members. Stourbridge had 500, Wednesbury 432, Walsall 360, Smethwick 335, 
Wolverhampton West 300 and West Bromwich 258. (91) With some exceptions these numbers were not 
maintained in the succeeding years. 
The one notable exception was Bilston, which under the influence of its agent Sam Hague retained a 
large membership. The figures for the following years were: - 1927 - 780,1928 - 700 and 1929 - 660. 
The only constituency party to equal this was Stourbridge, which appointed an agent during this period 
and had a popular parliamentary candidate in Wilfred Wellock. Individual membership here grew from 
500 in 1927 to 600 in 1928 and 930 in 1929. The figures given for the other constituencies in the 1930 
Annual Report were 378 for Kingswinford, 300 for Wolverhampton West and 240 for Smethwick. The 
remainder had the minimum figure of 180, except for Dudley, which recorded no return. Yet according 
to the 1930 Annual Report 47 constituencies across the country had over 1,000 individual 
members. (92) In this respect the Black Country Labour Parties resembled the trade union dominated 
ones in West Yorkshire, described by Reynolds and Laybourn. (93) 
The Bilston Labour Party also included a particularly successful Women's Section. It was these 
women members that boosted the local party's overall membership figures, as they were less likely to 
be affiliated through a union. The Minute Book of the Bilston Section shows that the Women's Section 
held fortnightly meetings between 1926 and 1929. Subjects, which were discussed included nursery 
schools, unemployment, citizenship and birth control. (94) The section was sufficiently active during 
this period to be able to provide candidates and funds to fight local elections. (95) This in turn helped 
the local party to make progress in the Bilston Urban District Council Elections, as in 1928 when two 
seats were gained. (96) 
In general, however, the figures suggest that individual membership of most local Labour Parties 
remained small, despite national attempts to increase it. However, an ILP element remained in many 
constituencies, often finding itself in conflict with the more right wing trade unionists within the local 
parties and even on Town Councils. This was certainly the case in Wolverhampton, where there was to 
be a continuation of splits and in-fighting between ILP members like Councillor Emma Sproson and 
the trade unionists in the local party. Trouble arose over a meeting in Wolverhampton in September 
1926 addressed by Dr. Robert Dunstan, the former Labour Party member, who had stood as a 
Communist for Birmingham West in the 1924 Election. He was looking for support to set up a branch 
of the National Left Wing Movement. A number of Labour Party activists attended the meeting, 
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including Sydney Robinson and Emma Sproson, who both spoke in support. Both were criticised by 
the Executive Committee of the Wolverhampton West branch of the party. (97) In return Sproson 
resolved "that she would not again stand as a candidate for the Town Council for the party, but that she 
would run as an independent candidate". (98) This she did in the 1927 local election, only to lose her 
seat at Dunstall. Robinson, on the other hand, seems to have soon made his peace with the party, as he 
was elected vice chairman in March 1927. (99) 
Internal disputes continued in 1928 over the voting records of local councillors despite the setting up 
of a Consultative Committee to decide policy. Three councillors and one alderman voted against the 
wishes of the Committee for a grant of £400 to the Roman Catholic College of St. Chads. A move was 
made in the Executive Committee to disband the Consultative Committee, allowing councillors to 
determine policy themselves. This was defeated and instead it was agreed that the non-councillors 
would decide the matter on the Committee. (100) This led to the resignation from the Labour group of 
two councillors, J. Davies and Miss M. Perry. (101) 
The Smethwick Labour Party also had a strong ILP element within it, which included its trade- 
unionist MP, John Davison. In December 1925 a meeting of the local branch protested over the 
imprisonment of 12 Communists, demanding their immediate release. Alderman Willetts was one to 
protest, stating that he did not wish to defend the Communists, but their right to free speech. There 
were attacks on the local Trades Council over its attitude towards the Communist Party. (102) 
A more serious difference occurred following the resignation in 1927 of the parliamentary agent for 
Smethwick, Councillor R. A. Baker. At first he kept his links with the Party, but then in October 1928 in 
an interview with the local press, he announced his resignation not just from the Party but also as a 
prospective Labour candidate for the Soho Ward, for which he was councillor. Instead he declared that 
he would contest the Spon Lane Ward as an Independent. He went on to tell the press that he was "sick 
of the intrigues and corruption one sees within the Labour movement". (103) It appears that Baker had 
been disciplined at a joint meeting of the local Executive Committee and the Labour group for speaking 
out on the policy of the Housing Committee and its Direct Labour Scheme without consulting 
colleagues. Asked to attend a further joint meeting, he failed to turn up and applied to join the 
Conservatives. (104) 
Finance was the final serious constraint on the growth of the Labour Party during this period. In 
Wolverhampton, for instance, concern was expressed at an Executive Committee meeting on the 1" 
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January 1929 over "the falling off of affiliation fees from trade unions and the decrease in voluntary 
contributions collected in wards". On the 3'' April, just before the General Election, ward treasurers 
emphasised the seriousness of the financial position and agreed "that a special appeal be issued for 
funds and that a request be made for loans to meet the position. "(105) The problem was that with low 
individual membership in the constituencies local parties were very dependent on the trade unions for 
financial support. Union membership, however, was at best static, whilst the Trade Union Act of 1927, 
which changed union affiliation from contracting out to contracting in, was estimated in the short term 
to have lost Labour a third of its income raised from the levy. (106) Savage and Miles have claimed that 
only around 51 per cent of trade union members ̀contracted in' after 1927, with the figure as low as 
24% for the AEU. (107) The financial situation was such that some local parties turned to wealthy 
parliamentary candidates, which partly explains the appointment of Oswald Mosley in Smethwick and 
Oliver Baldwin in Dudley. In 1928, for instance, the newly elected Mosley paid the £337 salary of an 
agent in Smethwick. (108) 
B. THE WALSALL BY-ELECTION 1925 
The first serious test for Labour during this period came with the parliamentary by-election in 
Walsall on 27th February 1925. The election was called because of the disqualification of Billy Preston 
under a law, which prevented people who traded with the government from sitting in parliament. The 
matter was described as a `technicality' by the Conservatives, but on the eve of the poll Labour was to 
issue a special leaflet, stating that the `technicality' had been enacted to prevent MPs from `voting 
contracts and money to themselves". Labour promised to extend the law to include directors of limited 
companies. (109) 
At first the Walsall Labour Party Executive Committee refused to endorse Gladstone Small, who had 
contested the seat in 1924, on the grounds that "their financial resources were exhausted". (l 10) Instead 
they wanted to consult Labour Headquarters over a new candidate. Before this could happen, however, 
the rank and file readopted Small, following a specially convened delegate meeting of the local Labour 
Party. (1 11) This action suggests a split in the notoriously factious Walsall Party. This appears to be 
confirmed when, at an early election meeting addressed by James Maxton, the leader of the ILP faction 
in parliament, many prominent local leaders did not attend. The local press, however, claimed that 
those "who had gone expecting to hear fiery utterances were disappointed, the Clyde member making a 
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speech which contained little beyond the usual Socialistic platitudes". (112) The episode reflects a 
division between the moderate trade union establishment and the more radical rank and file in the local 
party. 
Preston unashamedly boasted of his position as the local candidate, but his limitations were 
recognised by The Times, which wrote that "he has not gone in great detail into political 
questions". (113) He was backed by the former Walsall MP, Sir Richard Cooper, whilst Baldwin, 
himself, sent a letter warning of "the menace of Socialism" and the need for the electorate to show 
"continued firmness". (114) Preston, who modelled his style on Baldwin, also used his wife to warn 
women voters of the threat of "strikes and revolution". (115) 
The Liberals saw themselves as the main challengers as Pat Collins had held the seat in 1922 and 
1923. They selected a strong candidate in T. J. MacNamara, who had been Minister of Labour in the 
Lloyd George Coalition Government, where he had been responsible for introducing safeguarding. His 
first task as candidate was to convince the electorate that Pat Collins had not been pushed out but had 
retired on health grounds. (l 16) Collins had been a popular local candidate and a Catholic, which had 
helped him in a seat with an estimated 5-8,000 Catholic voters. (117) MacNamara, on the other hand, 
was a Nonconformist, who campaigned as a Free Trader and anti-Socialist. He claimed that the 
electorate wanted "neither stagnant Toryism nor revolutionary Socialism". (118) Yet the Liberals were 
not as well organised as the Conservatives, whilst a visit from Lloyd George offered no new 
policies. (119) MacNamara did make a special appeal to the miners, on the grounds of the 1919 Sankey 
Report, which he felt offered a middle way between employers and employed. (120) 
The main issues in the campaign were to be unemployment and housing. Walsall still had a workless 
total of 7,000, due to the decline of its traditional industries of leather and mining. (121) Labour was to 
make an issue of the Government's policy on unemployment benefit, claiming that "60,000 men have 
been deprived of the dole and during the year increasing numbers of the workless will be cut off from 
insurance benefit". (122) A strong rumour went round, suggesting that workers would need more 
stamps on their insurance cards to claim unemployment benefit. Preston strongly denied this along with 
other rumours that the Government intended abolishing the miner's seven hours day and reducing the 
wages of railwaymen by 6 shillings a week. (123) 
The growing friction between the Government and the trade unions was seen in housing policy. 
Neville Chamberlain was proposing to build steel houses for the homeless, using "unskilled men now 
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walking the streets". This was likely to bring the Government into conflict with the building trade 
unions, which had resisted a similar proposal from MacNamara, when he was in the Lloyd George 
Coalition. A letter was sent to Small from Ramsay MacDonald, defending the trade union position, by 
claiming that the Government was making `unjustifiable attacks upon trade unions, which are 
unwilling to allow the need for houses to lower their standards of living". (124) 
It was felt in some quarters that Small was too highly educated to appeal to the miners, railwaymen 
and other workers in the constituency. The Birmingham Post claimed that "he seems to suffer from the 
defects of his good qualities and attainments". (125) A more serious embarrassment came when 
rumours were spread about his divorce, claiming that he had deserted his wife and three children. Small 
was forced to issue a statement, pointing out that his divorce was on the grounds of "technical desertion 
required by Scottish law", due to "incompatibility of temperament". (126) The significance of the 
matter was pointed out by the Birmingham Gazette, which claimed that many Catholics had 
"withdrawn Mr Small's cards from their windows", following this statement. (127) 
Meanwhile the local Conservatives further stirred up matters, when the Walsall Unionist Association 
issued a leaflet entitled `Socialism destroys Marriage'. (128) Amongst its many claims were that 
religion would be stamped out, Bolshevism established and marriage made a civil contract of 
convenience. The leaflet was much derided by MacDonald on a visit to the constituency. The Labour 
leader summed up the situation by claiming that the electors had a choice between "active reaction, 
active progress and a dead corpse". (' 129) 
The Labour campaign was certainly hit by this campaign, with the Town Crier calling the election 
"the dirtiest fight in twenty years". (130) The paper claimed that Labour canvassers originally thought 
that their candidate would win by a few hundred votes. The result, however, was a victory for Preston 
by over 2,000 votes with Labour coming third, which was a similar result to 1924. Small had some 
consolation in that the Labour vote was the only one to increase, although MacNamara considered his 
vote "reasonable" considering the short time he had had in the constituency. (13 1) 
C. THE SMETHWICK BY-ELECTION 1926 
The region's most dramatic political event of the period came at the end of the year with the 
appointment of Oswald Mosley to fight the Smethwick by-election for Labour, On 21" November John 
Davison informed the executive of the local Trades and Labour Council that he intended to resign on 
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health grounds and that he had asked Mosley to consider an invitation to contest the seat. (132) Mosley 
agreed to the proposal and the executive interviewed him. He was recommended for adoption ahead of 
a full meeting of the Trades and Labour Council. The National Agent was informed, but the executive 
went ahead without consulting the NEC, since they regarded the case as an emergency. 
The Council discussed the situation on 23'd November. Two local men, Aldermen Willetts and Betts, 
felt they had some claim to be approached as possible candidates, but a motion inviting them to address 
the Council along with Mosley was defeated. Instead Mosley alone was invited to address the Council, 
after which he was unanimously adopted as candidate. Both Willetts and Betts agreed to abide by the 
decision and shook hands with Mosley after the vote was taken. (133) 
It has been claimed that Mosley had become alienated from his background on account of his 
experiences in the First World War and by a humanitarian desire to see full employment and decent 
living conditions for the British people. (134) It was this, which was to lead him to adopt Keynesian 
economic policies. He questioned the remedies of economic liberalism, calling for an expansion in 
production by making use of the nation's unused capacity whilst increasing demand by raising wage 
levels and expanding credit. In particular he saw the banking system as the enemy, calling for its 
nationalisation and the rise of national credit. These ideas were put forward at an ILP conference at 
Gloucester in April 1925 and became known as the ̀ Birmingham Proposals'. 
Mosley was to play an active part in the General Strike, although he did not personally approve of 
this type of action. (135) He was even more active in support of the miners' strike, speaking regularly at 
rallies and donating lavishly to their cause. It gave him a power base amongst trade unions, which was 
to secure him election to the NEC in 1927,1928 and 1930. Mosley also had good relations with 
MacDonald, who was ever keen to broaden the party's support. He had, however, also made a number 
of enemies, especially amongst the party leadership. (136) 
The manner of Mosley's selection forced the National Executive to intervene, arguing that the 
situation was not an emergency and normal procedures had not been followed. The chairman of the 
National Labour Party, Frank Roberts, and the National Agent, Egerton Wake, visited Smethwick with 
the intention of persuading Davison to continue. With this objective not possible pressure was put on 
the local party to back down. Instead the move drew the Council closer together in resistance to the 
NEC. (137) Mosley, in an article in the Town Crier, justified his candidacy, by pointing out that 
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Smethwick was a neighbouring constituency to Ladywood and would enable him to continue his work 
in the Midlands. (138) 
The local Conservative press was anxious to prove that Mosley was chosen because of his ability to 
finance his own campaign. It was stated that the local Trades Council and unions had "no money to 
spare". (139) The Birmingham Post interviewed a member of the Trades Council, who said: - "Many of 
the older Labour leaders in the town... are frankly disgusted with the method in which Mr Mosley was 
adopted". He went on to say that in addition to Mosley the names of four other local men were 
mentioned. In each case it was a question of: - "Has he got the money to fight the seat? What it boils 
down to is that Mr Mosley had the money and others hadn't and so it was Mr Mosley who was 
chosen". (140) 
This conclusion was not strictly accurate since the Birmingham Gazette pointed out that if Willetts 
had been selected he would have been backed by the Birmingham Co-operative Society, "who would 
be prepared to finance him to a large extent". (141) It may be that the powerful ILP faction in the local 
party were still disgruntled with the NEC over its attitude to members of the Communist Party. The 
Town Crier, for instance, defended the Council by pointing to the example of the selection of 
O. G. Willey as candidate for West Birmingham, following the expulsion of Dr Dunstan, the 
Communist, who was the 1924 candidate. The National Agent was quoted as having said at the Party 
Conference of that choice, that they "dared not interfere with the right of the local parties to choose 
their own candidate". (142) 
Skidelsky claims that Mosley was chosen, "because he was a brilliant, exciting and dangerous 
campaigner, a candidate with rare charisma and an exceptional electoral record". (143) However, 
opposition to the selection appears to have come from some union branches. A letter was sent to the 
NEC by John Beard, secretary of the Workers' Union, expressing dissatisfaction with the procedure 
adopted by the Smethwick Trades and Labour Council and urging that "facilities should be given to all 
k locally affiliated bodies to nominate candidates for the impending vacancy". (144) The Smethwic 
Telephone also reported that Alderman Willetts had spoken out against the local executive on 
constitutional grounds, urging the need to recognise the authority of headquarters. The Town Crier, 
however, reckoned that "if there were any waverers over the selection of Mr Mosley, the action of the 
National Executive has brought them round as one man in support of the local executive 
position". (145) 
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Opposition to Mosley also came from within the national leadership. Philip Snowden, for instance, 
warned the party "not to degenerate into an instrument for the ambitions of wealthy men" and referred 
to candidatures being "put up to auction by the local Labour Party and sold to the highest bidder". 
Herbert Morrison also warned against Mosley in the New Leader. (146) The NEC, however, resolved 
"that the party emphatically repudiate the statements made in the capitalist press and elsewhere that the 
National Executive has been in, any way actuated in its attitude to the impending by-election by any 
personal feelings, respecting the claims of Mr Oswald Mosley". (147) 
Given Mosley's undoubted popularity the NEC quickly agreed to a compromise. First, however, it 
was resolved to secure assurances from Mosley that he was "prepared to accept and abide by the 
Constitution of the Party". (148) Then on 5th December a special selection conference, which included 
four representatives of the NEC, was held in Smethwick with the express purpose of readopting 
Mosley. (149) It was reported that "not a single voice (was) raised in opposition to Mosley" and that 
"all the speakers paid fine tributes to Mosley's sincerity and ability as a fighter for the workers' cause". 
As there were no other nominations, a motion to adopt Mosley was carried unanimously "amid great 
enthusiasm". Mosley, himself, gave a short speech, concluding that "the day the Mail ceases to abuse 
me is the day to get rid of me. While I am being abused by the capitalist press, I know that I am doing 
effective work for the Labour cause". (150) 
The election which followed proved to be one of the rowdiest of the inter-war period. This was 
largely due to the fact that the campaign attracted the national press, which was to become obsessed 
with Mosley and his wife. The Conservatives saw him as a class traitor, since he was an aristocrat, who 
championed the cause of the working class. Furthermore, whereas the Labour leadership of MacDonald 
and Henderson were seen as offering "a reasonable approach", Mosley was accused of stirring up class 
hatred and seeking "in civil troubles the readiest way to power". (151) 
The Manchester Guardian summed up the press's fascination with Mosley in this way: - "One would 
have thought that there were here sufficiently realistic issues but little enough attention to these issues 
seems to be given by the writers about the campaign. Mr Mosley and his wife are, unfortunately, 
perfect material for those who want nothing but `stunts'. What do they eat, what do they drink, 
wherewithal are they clothed are the most important issues. When Mr Mosley lived in a Birmingham 
hotel, they attested to his aristocratic aversion to ugliness; now that he has moved to a small room in 
Smethwick, his hypocrisy becomes clear". (152) 
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The Town Crier described the campaign against Mosley as "vile and contemptible" and based on 
"lies and vulgar abuse". (153) The Birmingham Gazette, however, believed that Mosley had provoked 
the treatment by compensating "for his handicap of unearned wealth and his lack of personal 
experience of the worker's daily life... (with) violent denunciation of the possessing classes". (154) 
Ironically Mosley was opposed by two candidates, who could claim working-class roots. J. Marshall 
Pike, the Conservative, was a former railwayman but now employed in Conservative Central Office, 
whilst the Liberal, Edwin Bayliss, was the son of a miner. (155) Pike, who had been the candidate in 
1924, campaigned on the success of the government's record in reducing unemployment in Smethwick, 
which in April was the lowest since 1920. (156) One firm, he claimed, which had employed 400 in 
1924, now regularly employed more than 2,000. He also pointed to the provision of widows' and 
orphans' pensions and the cut in the qualifying age for old age pensions from 70 to 65. (157) 
Bayliss was portrayed as "the real working-class candidate" by the Birmingham Gazette, although he 
was now on the distribution staff of the Nottingham Journal. (158) The Liberals, however, had never 
fought the Smethwick seat before and not all their members agreed with the decision to fight it now. 
Alderman Pinkney decided to stay neutral, claiming that "the only effect of running a candidate will be 
to swell the Socialist majority". (159) According to The Times some Liberals were supporting 
Pike. (160) This would be in accordance with their stand in local elections, where they were in an anti- 
Socialist pact with the Conservatives. 
The election took place at a time when striking miners were returning to work on reduced 
wages. (161) In these circumstances Mosley put special emphasis in his campaign on a statement 
refuted to have been made by Baldwin on the 30a` June 1925, in which he said that "all the workers 
have got to face a reduction in wages". (162) Although denied by Baldwin himself, Mosley went on to 
reiterate the claim, quoting him as saying that "in order to compete with the world either the conditions 
of labour, hours or wages, will have to be altered in this country". (163) Large posters were put up by 
Mosley's supporters attributing the statement to Baldwin and adding that "higher wages lead to 
prosperity; lower wages lead to ruin". (164) 
Pike attacked the so called `wages lie', claiming to The Times reporter that "there was never 
anything meaner than the lie the Socialists are trying to foist upon the electors of Smethwick". (165) 
The Birmingham Post accused Mosley of abandoning "the ordinary decencies of political life. Starting 
to win Smethwick by gross misrepresentation he has now committed himself to winning it ... by an 
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audacious falsehood... To speak quite plainly a man with such standards is out of his elements in 
British politics". (166) 
Mosley also claimed that the Government was planning attacks on trade unions by passing 
legislation to restrict their freedom. Pike strongly denied these charges, but there appears to be some 
discrepancy over what he stood for. The Times declared that he would vote against any alteration in the 
constitution of trade unions, except for opting in on the political levy. (167) The Birmingham Post, 
however, claimed that he also supported secret ballots on strikes and restrictions on mass 
picketing. (168) Pike was fully backed by Baldwin in a letter, which warned of "Socialists, who pose as 
leaders of Labour without a shred of qualification for that position". (169) 
The problem for Pike, however, was the difficulty he faced in getting his message across, due to the 
uproar at his meetings. The Birmingham Gazette, which claimed that his meetings sounded from the 
outside like "a dog show", thought that he was making the mistake "of confusing the Smethwick 
Labour movement with Communism". (170) The Times, however, blamed "a large number of 
Socialists, wearing rosettes... (who) sought to assume control of the proceedings... howled down the 
speakers and threw handfuls of Socialist handbills among the audience". (171) 
The presence of the London press corps also appeared to arouse high feelings, encouraged by 
Mosley's own attacks on the press lords. (172) An amazing scene took place at a Labour women's 
meeting at the Theatre Royal, when a crowd of 20 or 30 women stormed the press box, "hammering on 
the door with clenched fists, breaking one of the glass panels before being eventually repelled". Then 
on leaving the building, the pressmen had to walk through "a lane of women shouting abuse", whilst 
one received "a sharp blow to the head which knocked him against the wall". (173) 
Trouble also broke out in the streets with Pike accusing Mosley of stealing his lunchtime pitches 
outside factories. When Pike tried to make a similar move uproar broke out. One woman Conservative 
speaker was reported "lying seriously ill with a broken rib after being struck when leaving a 
meeting". (174) At a final Conservative demonstration, attended by four MPs, disorder broke out with 
none of the speakers able to speak. When the crowd "retired to the Blue Gates Hotel... Mosley 
conducted them through three verses of the Red Flag". (175) 
Mosley continued to secure the backing of MacDonald, who confirmed this in a letter: - "The 
spluttering, vitriolic personal attacks that the Tories have made upon you should make you so secure 
that assistance and commendations are quite unnecessary. You stand as a living proof of the fact that 
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the Labour Party is not a class party and adherence to it is not determined by what a ma has but what he 
thinks". (176) MacDonald backed this up by attending a rally at Smethwick on the 16th December, when 
he addressed a crowd of 15,000 at Victoria Park, stressing that what he looked for in colleagues was 
not their background but what they believed in. (177) 
A final attempt to tarnish Mosley was made when the Conservative press widely reported support for 
him from the Communist Party. Prominent members of the party were reported to be active in 
Smethwick, whilst a party meeting was held at the Smethwick Baths on the 19'h December. (178) The 
Labour agent, R. A. Baker, hastened to issue a statement denying that the meeting had any connection 
with the Labour Party. (179) 
In the end Mosley won with a majority of 6,582 on an 80 per cent poll. (180) Addressing a crowd of 
8,000, he praised his supporters for having "beaten the press of reaction". (18 1) Pike put his defeat 
down to having "to contend with systematic rowdyism and the now notorious wages lie". (182) Most of 
the press agreed that the Labour organisation was much superior to that of the other parties. The Times 
wrote that "the Socialist campaign has been carried out with extreme efficiency... the organisation is 
one that would gratify any candidate, and there has been no lack of voluntary helpers... Almost every 
house displays a portrait of the Labour candidate". (183) 
The Birmingham Gazett e claimed that Mosley not only had "a vastly stronger organisation and more 
resources", but also "voiced the current dissatisfaction more vigorously". (184) Presumably this was a 
reference to the coal dispute, where miners were returning to work on reduced wages. The Birmin8ham 
Post stressed the strength of the Labour organisation, comparing it favourably with the Conservative's, 
which was "relatively ineffective" and failed to keep order at Pike's meetings. The paper also admitted 
that the press campaign against Mosley backfired: - "They flung against Mr Mosley a torrent of abuse... 
They produced a reaction in his favour. From an aggressor they converted him into a victim". (185) 
This view was backed by a local party worker, who claimed that the press campaign was worth at least 
2,000 votes for Mosley. (186) 
The Town Crier took a similar view, reckoning that "the Smethwick Trades and Labour Council 
ought to pass a vote of thanks to Lords Rothermere and Beaverbrook for the valuable assistance they 
have rendered to Labour's cause". They also thought that Mosley articulated well the Labour case on 
wages: - "His vast audiences listened eagerly to his brilliant speeches and cheered him as they 
have 
never before cheered a Labour candidate". (187) 
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Following the by-election the NEC discussed a report that Mosley had stated that he "had no 
confidence in Head Office and had no intention of working or communicating with them". They 
resolved to appoint a sub committee to review with him "in a frank and friendly manner, the whole 
situation in the Midlands, more particularly as it had arisen in connection with the Smethwick by- 
election". (188) 
It is easy with hindsight to see in Mosley's campaign the signs of latent fascism. The demagogic 
style, coupled with the repetition of points like `the wages lie', are typical of this. Even at this time not 
everybody within the local party was swayed by Mosley. The chairman, W. E. Lawrence, warned of the 
dangers of personalising the campaign: - "Labour means to deal with principles not personalities. My 
advice is never to indulge in mudslinging. Work wholeheartedly for Labour not Oswald Mosley". (189) 
The retiring MP John Davison also warned: - "The cause is greater than the man. I appeal to you not to 
be led away by personalities". (190) 
D. THE STOURBRIDGE BY-ELECTION 1927 
During 1926 the Conservatives lost three by-elections and in 1927 a further three. One of these was 
to be at Stourbridge, where Wilfred Wellock captured the seat for Labour with a majority of over 
3,000. Yet this was a constituency with no tradition of Labour success. The Liberals had held the seat 
until 1922 and it was only in 1924 that Labour had managed second place. The constituency, which 
stretched from Stourbridge to Oldbury, was described by The Times as having "an extraordinary 
variety of industries carried on in a scattered collection of villages and small towns, which have little 
cohesion. Iron and steel works, fire clay works, forges and collieries provide employment, which is in 
the main skilled or semi-skilled. Most of the works are small or moderate in size, with the result that 
there is personal contact between employers and their men". (191) 
Pielou, the deceased Conservative MP, had been a popular local candidate partly on account of his 
war record, which had given him a strong hold on the ex-servicemen's vote. It was generally felt that 
personality would be a factor in the election. The Conservative candidate, H. C. Hogbin, had only 
recently joined the party, having stood in the 1922 Parliament as a National Liberal. It was in March 
1926 that he had severed his links with the Liberals, writing to Asquith that the Party no longer 
provided "strenuous opposition to the pernicious doctrines of Socialism". Nevertheless he was the 
unanimous choice of the local Conservatives, who were said to be "in good spirits with a vigorous and 
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active organisation". It was felt, however, that the government's record put the local Conservatives on 
the defensive, whilst having a candidate, who was new to the constituency, was considered a 
handicap. (192) 
The Labour Party was likely to benefit from having their candidate, Wilfred Wellock, working in the 
constituency for four years, as well as from the effects of Mosley's campaign in nearby Smethwick. 
The thrust of Wellock's programme seemed to be orthodox Labour policy. He advocated the 
nationalisation of the mines, transport, electricity and banking, whilst condemning the government for 
legislating in the interests of "the powerful and privileged few". (193) 
As a wartime conscientious objector and editor of the pacifist paper The Crusader, Wellock was in a 
strong position to attack the government's recent decision to send troops to Shanghai to protect British 
lives there. The Labour Party condemned the move as likely to lead to war. George Lansbury, speaking 
in the constituency, thought that the Chinese question was "the supreme issue in the by-election" and 
described British policy as one of "piracy and plunder". (194) Wellock, himself, produced a leaflet 
warning against war in China. "War is Hell! Why walk into it? Vote against war. Vote for Wellock", it 
explained. Hogbin, on the other hand, claimed that the troops were sent to protect our kith and kin as 
well as our property in Shanghai". (195) Baldwin sent him a letter justifying the government's action on 
the grounds that it was the duty of the government "to protect lives and interests of British subjects in 
any part of the world". (196) 
Wellock also claimed that the government was following "a low wages policy" and had done little 
but "back up the coal owners and other capitalists" since coming to power. (197) He pointed to 
Baldwin's intention to amend the trade union law, following the General Strike. In a speech in the 
constituency MacDonald made much of this along with the government's failure to help the million 
plus, who were unemployed. (198) Hogbin responded by claiming that "Mr Baldwin has given his word 
that he will not interfere with the rights of trade unionists and his intention is to strengthen and improve 
the trade unions in their legislative function". (199) He even had a poster declaring "Vote for Hogbin 
and stronger Trade Unions". (200) 
A key factor in the constituency was the Liberal vote, which was thought to be in decline. However, 
the Liberal candidate, Glyn Edwards, was said to be having "some very good meetings". A letter was 
received from Lloyd George, claiming that "the country is Liberal to the core" and "already the tide is 
turning". (201) Hogbin made an appeal to Liberal voters, claiming that the contest was between 
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Socialism and the Constitution. Baldwin's letter too called for electors to "strike an effective blow at 
those whose avowed object is the overthrow of our existing Constitution and the substitution for it of 
the so called ̀ Dictatorship of the Proletariat'. (202) Labour, meanwhile, in a final poster claimed that a 
vote for Edwards "is a vote thrown away on a dead party and a dying cause", whilst a vote for Hogbin 
would "help the Government blunder into war and will be a vote for lower pay and longer hours". (203) 
The result was a Labour victory with a swing of over 7 per cent. (204) Wellock stressed that the main 
issues had been "the low wage policy so disastrously pursued by the Government and the situation in 
China". (205) He pointed to the advantage, which four years of work in the constituency had brought. In 
particular membership of the local party had increased nearly fourfold during this period to reach 500 
at the time of the election. (206) Also unlike Smethwick the London press had left Stourbridge alone so 
that "Labour speakers and Labour organisations had been able to put the constructive case for 
Socialism". (207) 
A different interpretation has been made by G. H. Bennett in a study of by-elections in the Midlands 
during this period. (208) He points to a letter sent by Hogbin to Baldwin in which he ascribes Labour's 
success to "the fact that both workers and employers have been thoroughly disappointed over the 
working of the Safeguarding of Industries Act". (209) He also quotes from a letter in The Times, which 
claimed that there was a lack of MPs in the constituency, speaking in support of the Conservative 
candidate. (210) Yet the author points out that in fact as many as 25 Conservative MPs had spoken 
there, but "the writer's perception is revealing nevertheless". (211) 
E. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
As the 1929 General Election approached the Labour Party in the Black Country seemed to have 
good prospects of success. The issue, which seemed likely to dominate the campaign, was 
unemployment. Yet its impact on voting habits at this time is difficult to assess. This is because there 
was much variation in the unemployment level in the Black Country. Wolverhampton, for instance, 
was experiencing an economic revival similar to that in Birmingham and Coventry, due to the growth 
of the car industry and its components. At Bushbury the newly established Goodyear Tyre factory was 
employing nearly 1,500 workers. Courtaulds had also set up in the town, manufacturing artificial 
fibres. (212) 
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There was a similar situation in towns like Smethwick, Oldbury and Darlaston, which all had 
unemployment rates of below 9 per cent in December 1927. (213) There were said, for instance, to be 
3,000 people making aluminium castings for the motor trade at Smethwick. Darlaston's low 
unemployment rate was due to the manufacture of motor pressings and car wheels, whilst Oldbury was 
doing well on account of its chemical and tube works. (214) 
Yet there were still many signs of economic depression in the Black Country during the late 1920's, 
due to the continued decline of the region's traditional industries of coal mining, iron and steel and 
chainmaking. In 1913 there had been 10,000 coal miners in the region, producing 3 million tons of 
coal. By 1926 there were 6,500 miners producing 1.3 million tons. Flooding and exhaustion were the 
major factors behind this decline, exacerbated by the industrial disputes of the early 1920's, which 
affected pumping operations. The decline was greatest in the thick coal seams of Tipton, Rowley Regis 
and Old Hill, leaving half of production from three deep mines on the fringes of the region. (215) 
The iron and steel industry in the region was also suffering from depression. Much of the coal and 
iron ore was now being transported into the region, making the cost of assembling the materials around 
£2 a ton. Output dropped to about '/4 million tons a year between 1922-27, which was only half the 
1914 level. (216) Wrought iron production experienced an absolute decline in the early 1920's with the 
output of puddled bars falling from 1.2 million in 1913 to 0.3 million in 1924. (217) Meanwhile steel 
production became confined to three large works, whilst there was much evidence that semi- 
manufactured steel was being imported by local metal trades, probably making up 80% of the 
total. (218) 
A number of the specialist Black Country trades were also experiencing a decline at this time. The 
hand chain industry and nail production were both hit by a combination of imports and new production 
techniques. The enamelled hollowware trade was suffering from a loss of pre-war markets and an 
increase in imports. It was also adjusting to new products such as motor and electrical castings or bath 
and sanitary wares. Similarly the leather trade in Walsall was forced to switch from saddles, harnesses 
and whips to fancy leather goods, motor accessories and sports equipment. (219) 
Unemployment was highest in those towns, which were slowest in adapting to new developments. 
Thus in December 1927 the rate was over 12 per cent in towns such as Dudley, Tipton, Cradley Heath, 
Bilston and Brierley Hill, whilst in Wednesbury the rate was the highest at 18.3 per cent. (220) 
Certainly the evidence suggests that support for Labour was stronger in these towns, although it was 
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even stronger in Smethwick, which had low unemployment at this time. It seems more likely that the 
Labour Party's success in the region would depend more on its links with the trade union movement 
than with the level of unemployment. 
Nevertheless the Conservatives saw Safeguarding as their best policy for wooing working class 
voters in the region and the key to electoral success. Safeguarding was held to be under threat from a 
future Labour Government with its consequent risk to employment. The Times claimed in a survey of 
the region that "the whole area, employers and workers, is looking anxiously into the question". Posters 
carrying the slogan ̀ Sow safeguarding and reap prosperity' were widely displayed. (221) Although 
most local industries were geared to the domestic market, they were vulnerable to cheap imports. With 
tariffs, however, they would be safe from any reciprocal action, unlike those that relied on exports like 
the Lancashire cotton industry. On the other hand many of the metal working industries were now 
using cheap imported iron and steel at the expense of local manufacturers. 
The Unionist Birmingham Post backed the Conservatives by pointing to the new jobs created by 
Safeguarding. In Wolverhampton, for instance, they claimed that there were 5,000 more jobs in the 
town than in 1924, due to the safeguarding of the motor industry. (222) They pointed to the Goodyear 
Tyre factory, Courtaulds and Orme Evans Ltd., which made enamelled hollowware, an industry "which 
a few years ago was very seriously threatened by the unfair competition from abroad". (223) In Walsall 
the local Conservative MP was reported as saying with regard to the benefits of Safeguarding, that "it is 
difficult to get men for the particular job to be done". (224) Similarly in West Bromwich the 
Conservative candidate reported that where Safeguarding had been tried "employment has increased, 
work has become more regular, wages higher and selling prices lower". (225) 
In Dudley the Conservative MP, Cyril Lloyd, was reported as "an out and out supporter of the policy 
of the protection of British industry and wages". (226) He was in favour of extending the list of 
safeguarded industries to include the iron and steel works at Brierley Hill, which was reported "at a low 
ebb for want of protection against sweated continental labour". (227) Meanwhile the recently 
safeguarded hollowware industry in Lye was "working full shifts, all stocks cleared and most of the 
manufacturers... considering putting down new machinery and adding to wages". (228) 
Officially the Labour Party denounced Safeguarding on the same grounds as the Liberals, claiming 
that it would lead to an increase in prices, especially for food and raw materials. This would threaten 
those metal trades that were dependent on imported steel. The-Time s, however, accused Liberal and 
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Labour candidates of having little to say on the subject. (229) W. J. Brown, the Labour candidate for 
Wolverhampton West, accepted the benefits of Safeguarding and admitted that he would not support 
their removal. (230) Charlie Sitch, MP for Kingswinford, where the chainmakers of Cradley Heath were 
particularly badly hit by unemployment, was equivocal, admitting that "a strong case can be put for 
safeguarding a particular industry but... a tax in the last resort means higher prices to the 
consumer". (23 1) 
It appears that the Conservatives failed to persuade the electorate of their case, as in the 1929 
General Election Labour won 9 of the 10 Black Country seats, whilst the Liberals retained 
Wolverhampton East. It left the Conservatives with no MPs in the region, leaving Labour with its best 
result here in the inter-war years. 
F. THE 1929 GENERAL ELECTION 
1. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
In a survey of the Wolverhampton constituencies, The Times reckoned that Sir Robert Bird would 
find it difficult to hold his seat in the West division, despite the constituency being "full of the very 
interests, which have gained under Safeguarding". One of their explanations was the increase in the 
trade union vote, due to the new factories that had been set up. Also the presence of a Liberal candidate 
after years of abstention was thought to have made the situation less predictable. (232) The decision to 
put up a Liberal candidate at this election appears to have been due to pressure from the local branch of 
the Young Liberals. (233) 
The Labour candidate was again W. J. Brown, who was already showing an independent line on 
policy. He reckoned that the Labour programme for unemployment, "however good and necessary" 
was not "a final solution to the unemployment problem". He wanted to see three other proposals: - 
"decent old age pensions, raising the school leaving age by one year and the introduction of a seven 
hour (working) day". (234) Brown's criticism of the 1924 Labour Government in his union journal, Rd 
Tape, provided ammunition for Bird. Brown had said then that "the government's treatment of pledges 
had been deplorable" and that "its biggest failure is in unemployment; of the seriousness of that failure 
there can be no doubt". (235) Bird also questioned Brown's recent visit to Russia. (236) 
Brown concentrated on what he considered to be the main campaign issues: - "Peace and the 
condition of the people ... at the end of four and a half years of Conservative rule". 
(237) One topic he 
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was determined to make an issue of was housing, describing the slums of Monmore Green as "a place 
where a rich man would not keep his dog or horse in". (238) Labour supporters were active in shouting 
down Bird, so that at a meeting of women voters, he was unable to answer questions due to the singing 
of the Red Flag. (239) 
Brown won with a majority of nearly 4,000. The Wolverhampton Express and Star special 
correspondent reckoned that the intervention of a Liberal was decisive, as their candidate secured over 
4,500 votes. Brown, himself, put his victory down to a desire to remove "class government" and set up 
"a social system more closely representative of their own conceptions of social righteousness". (240) 
Samuel Bowers, the West Wolverhampton Conservative agent, later gave a list of reasons for his 
Party's defeat. Amongst these were the government's failure to reduce unemployment, the lack of an 
inspiring policy, epitomised by the ̀ Safety First' slogan and the Liberal intervention. He laid no blame 
on Bird. (241) 
2. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
The Wolverhampton East constituency was a different matter. The secret of Liberal success here, 
which dated back to 1832, was touched upon by The Times in its survey of the Wolverhampton 
constituencies. On the one hand there was the tradition of Free Trade amongst the locksmiths of 
Willenhall. Here "hundreds of small manufacturers" working in "little backyard shops" were concerned 
for "their supply of cheap iron and steel". The report also pointed to the fact that Wolverhampton was a 
stronghold of Non Conformity. "The vote from the chapels is perhaps not so big a proportion of the 
electorate as it used to be, bot it is a steady foundation". This time the Liberals had a new candidate, 
due to the retirement of the MP, George Thorne. Geoffrey Mander, like his predecessor, was a strong 
local personality, being described as a chairman of a board of directors with a reputation as "generous 
employers of labour. (242) 
The Labour Party had a poor record in this constituency, partly owing to the lapsed tradition 
whereby in parliamentary elections they kept out of this contest, whilst being given a free hand to fight 
the Conservatives in the West division. Many workers in the constituency, however, were employed at 
the Goodyear Tyre factory just over the border. It was also felt that Mander had not "the close touch 
with local trade unions, which Mr Thorne had". (243) The Labour candidate, D. R. Williams, also made 
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much of the irony that in 1918 Lloyd George had opened his election campaign in Wolverhampton by 
appealing to the local people to turn out George Thorne. (244) 
The Conservative candidate, Buchan-Hepburn, fought a strongly Protectionist campaign. Leo 
Amery, who was invited to speak in the constituency to stress the importance of Empire Trade, 
described Mander and the Liberal Free Traders as "crazy theorists". (245) It was claimed that 
Safeguarding would lead to an increase of only 1/2d on a gross of keys. (246) A meeting was arranged, at 
which ex-Liberals confessed to joining the Conservatives, because they considered that by the policy of 
Safeguarding, "the British worker would be protected against unfair foreign competition". (247) 
Yet both the Conservatives and Labour had weak organisations in this division, with the former 
having temporarily closed theirs down in 1928. (248) Thus it was the Liberals, who once again emerged 
supreme, with a majority of over 5,000. Mander put his success down to the "inexhaustible stronghold 
of Liberalism in East Wolverhampton" and the support of his predecessor and other Liberal workers 
throughout the constituency. Williams put Labour's defeat down to the fact that "we had no money to 
spend in the division". (249) Indeed the Birmingham Post described the Labour effort as "comparatively 
feeble". (250) Nevertheless Williams did increase the Labour vote by around 75%, although the 
Liberals increased their total support by even more. 
3. BILSTON 
In Bilston both the Conservatives and the Liberals selected popular local candidates. Major 
Thompson, the Conservative, was appointed on the advice of Central Office. (251) He was considered a 
moderate, who put much emphasis on the need for "the harmonising of industry" and "a spirit of co- 
operation between employers and employed". (252) It was thought by The Times that the intervention 
of a Liberal, Gilbert Salter, would "undoubtedly harm the Labour Party's chances" and might even be 
"sufficient to defeat Mr Baker". (253) 
It has, however, already been pointed out that Bilston was one constituency, in which both 
membership and organisation had improved considerably. (254) This certainly proved to be an 
advantage to Baker, especially as it included an active Women's Section. This encouraged him to 
appeal to the important female vote, by stressing social reforms such as improved maternity and child 
welfare. (255) Baker's majority rose to over 5,000, which was the largest for either Party during the 
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period. He put the reasons for his success down partly to dissatisfaction with the Government and 
partly to "growing enthusiasm amongst the workers " for better representation in Parliament. (256) 
4. DUDLEY 
The Dudley constituency attracted national attention, since the Labour candidate was the Prime 
Minister's son, Oliver Baldwin, who had been nursing the seat since his defeat in 1924. Unlike Bilston 
the local Labour Party here was short of members and funds, which probably made them thankful to 
have a candidate of independent means. (257) As a contrast the Birmingham Mail reported the 
Conservative organisation as being "near perfect as possible", with the local branch of the Primrose 
League having a membership of about 1,600. (258) The Times too considered the Conservative MP 
Cyril Lloyd the likely winner, on account of his strong local business interests in the iron and steel 
industry. (259) 
Baldwin, however, proved to be a popular candidate, arousing "tremendous enthusiasm" in the 
mining ward of Lower Gornal, according to the local press. (260) In his election address he put much 
emphasis on support for the League of Nations and disarmament, whilst in his campaign he stressed the 
need for adequate pensions, raising the school leaving age and better housing. He put unemployment as 
his first priority, claiming that only Labour had a cure for it. (261) During the campaign he was forced 
to confess to being a capitalist, declaring that "he would be willing to work, when he would be sure that 
the money he earned would not go into the pocket of some private individual". (262) 
Lloyd put much emphasis on Safeguarding, which The Times believed was making headway across 
the region. (263) He also attacked nationalisation, warning of the "heavier taxation", which he predicted 
it would bring. He dismissed Labour's policies as "unsound and impracticable". (264) There was 
uproar, however, over his claim that wages had not been reduced under the Conservatives. (265) 
The Liberal candidate fought as an out and out Free Trader, promising to remove all tariffs. (266) The 
Times, however, reported that nowhere was there a sign of "the Liberal unemployment policy ... 
making headway". (267) Baldwin was to secure a victory with a majority of over 3,000. It was reported 
that the local party was so short of funds that the campaign had cost it less than £100. (268) Lloyd put 
his defeat down to "misguided poverty", claiming that his opponent had raised expectations, "which he 
will find hard to fulfil". (269) It was also thought that the intervention of the Liberals, who secured only 
15.5 per cent of the vote, was a significant factor in securing the Labour victory-(270) 
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5. WALSALL 
Labour's third gain in the region came at Walsall, where a Conservative majority over the Liberals 
was turned into a Labour victory of nearly 5,000. The contest proved to be a genuine three-cornered 
struggle, owing to the Liberal's recent electoral successes here. Indeed the party had a strong candidate 
in Thomas MacNamara, the former Cabinet Minister, who had contested the 1925 by-election. The 
local organisation remained strong, whilst MacNamara had been nursing the seat carefully over the 
previous four years. The Labour candidate, selected in 1928, was J. J. MacShane, a Catholic Scot, who 
had moved to Walsall in 1916. He was a local headmaster, a member of the ILP and Chairman of 
Walsall's Board of Guardians. (271) 
The Conservative MP was ̀ Billy' Preston, a local businessman, who had made little impression at 
Whitehall. Preston defended his parliamentary record by claiming that he was "not a professional 
politician", but knew "what my native town wants and how I can help it". He had the support of at least 
one prominent local Liberal, S. M. Slate, a former Mayor, who called for an anti-Socialist alliance. (272) 
Preston based much of his campaign around the issue of Safeguarding, claiming that local trade was 
improving and in some factories "it is difficult to get men for the particular job to be done". (273) 
Since his selection MacShane had worked hard to improve the local party's organisation, especially 
in the wards. Finances were improved and canvassing tripled. (274) By the start of 1929, for instance, 
the Walsall Party had an election fund of nearly £15. (275) Unlike Bilston and Stourbridge, however, 
there was no significant increase in party membership at this time. (276) MacShane also recognised the 
importance of the new women voters, of whom there were over 10,000 in the constituency. (277) An 
Election Committee had been set up as early as February 1929, with at least four of its members to be 
women. Various committees were also appointed to deal with different aspects of the forthcoming 
election. (278) In March an agent was appointed and a newsletter, Eve Witness, printed. (279) 
MacShane proved to be a forceful speaker, who put much emphasis on the constituency's 
unemployment problems. He concentrated his campaign on winning over the Liberal vote, warning the 
electorate that "they could not get a government with the Liberals". In particular he looked to the 
miners for support, as they were badly affected by unemployment and had traditionally supported the 
Liberals. A. J. Cook, the miners' leader, spoke at a May Day rally, warning that there would be no 
mining industry if Baldwin were returned. (280) A number of prominent politicians, including 
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MacDonald and Mosley, spoke in support of MacShane, with the Labour leader scorning Lloyd 
George's unemployment proposals. (28 1) 
The result was to be a victory for MacShane, who secured over 20,000 votes, with Preston and 
MacNamara both polling over 15,000. The Walsall Observer declared that the anti-Socialist vote was 
higher than the Labour vote, concluding that "the two old parties should get together and not fight one 
another". (282) MacShane put his victory down to disgust with the existing Government, which "has 
helped its friends at the expense of the poor". (283) Another factor was the personality of the Labour 
candidate, who was held in some awe by the local party. (284) The improvements, which he had made 
to its organisation and finances, were also significant. Dean summarised him as "party agent, organiser 
and leader as well as candidate". (285) 
6. SMETHWICK 
Elsewhere in the Black Country, Labour was defending seats already held. In Smethwick Mosley 
predicted a majority of over 10,000, but had to settle for just over 7,000. After the excitement and 
rowdiness of the by-election, the local press described this contest as a "model campaign", fought in a 
"splendid spirit". (286) 
The Conservative candidate, A. RWise, proved to be a tough opponent, who based much of his 
campaign on safeguarding and Empire development. (287) "The only way to increase prosperity all 
round was in the home market", he said, "which the Conservatives proposed to defend against goods 
produced under unfair competition abroad". (288) He was not afraid to stress the `successes' of the 
Baldwin government on house building, pensions and Safeguarding, which he claimed had brought 
600,000 jobs. (289) 
Mosley attacked further Safeguarding as future tax increases, whilst he dismissed Lloyd George's 
plans as "an improvisation at the last moment", which would bring no long-term jobs. The Labour 
Party, he claimed, had "a comprehensive plan, a scientific plan, which did not just look ahead, but a 
long way ahead and would rebuild industry from the foundations upwards". (290) In an article in the 
Town Crier Mosley highlighted three issues. The first was unemployment and wages. Labour would 
reduce the former to a norm of 1/2 million by means of earlier pensions, raising the school leaving age 
and a constructive programme of slum clearance, electric power, roads and land reclamation. Less 
unemployment would bring higher wages and greater purchasing power, which were "the basis upon 
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which permanent industrial prosperity must rest". His second issue was housing as there were 200,000 
unemployed in the building trades. Houses would be built at rents, which could be afforded by all. 
Finally Mosley focused on world peace, by arbitration and disarmament through the League of 
Nations. (29 1) 
This time the Smethwick constituency had a Liberal candidate, Miss Marshall, who had an 
exemplary record of public service for East End charitable societies. She proved to be a well-qualified 
platform speaker, although noticeably staying silent on the question of Free Trade. It was wryly 
suggested that this was due to the state of local iron and steel works, which were reported as 
"languishing for want of safeguarding". (292) The Liberal organisation, however, had been allowed to 
lapse in the constituency and had only been revived three years earlier. (293) 
According to the local press the result was "a foregone conclusion", but Labour did not poll as well 
as some of its supporters expected. (294) There was a 2.5 per cent swing to Labour on the 1924 result, 
but in the 1926 by-election Labour had secured 57.1 per cent of the vote, compared to 54.8 per cent this 
time. Indeed Mosley's share of the vote was almost exactly the same as Davison's had been at the 1923 
General Election. This was largely due to the fact that the Consevative vote held up well, indicating 
that their Safeguarding policy had some support, although the Liberals also increased their share. The 
result shows,, however, that there was no overwhelming support for Mosley in the constituency. 
7. WEST BROMWICH 
In the Labour seat of West Bromwich the Conservatives also made Safeguarding their main issue. 
The Times pointed to the spring and tin plate trades in the constituency, which were part of the motor 
component industry, being safeguarded, but not iron and steel. (295) The Conservative candidate, 
Captain Cheshire, who was a local employer and the son of an alderman, warned that the motor spring 
industry would be "swept away by Labour" if Safeguarding went. This time the Liberals had a 
candidate, W. Ramage, an ex-cotton manufacturer, who was described as "a Free Trade stalwart of the 
old type". (296) 
The Labour Party had a huge advantage in the personality of their MP, Frank Roberts. When he 
spoke at a meeting in the Town Hall, the Birmingham Gazette admitted that there was scarcely an 
interruption. (297) There was an audience of 3,000 at one West Bromwich meeting addressed by 
Roberts and Mosley. (298) The MP was popular with all generations, so that on polling day it was 
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reported that "crowds of youngsters followed him around the borough". (299) Cheshire, on the other 
hand, experienced considerable abuse during the campaign and was even spat upon when leaving a 
meeting at Spon Lane. (300) 
Roberts stressed the full Labour programme of nationalisation, public ownership of land and the 
extension of pensions for widows and ex-servicemen. The Birmingham Post complained that there was 
no mention of the cost of this. (301) Roberts gave credit for his victory to "the straight stand", which he 
took on Labour's policies and "the personal regard and good will" of the public. (302) However, 
Roberts share of the vote was little changed from 1924, but the Conservative vote dropped from 48.4% 
to 29 per cent. This was largely due to the 19 per cent share of the vote, which the Liberals secured. 
8. WEDNESBURY 
Much of the Wednesbury constituency was still affected by the recession of the early 1920s. The 
Lime claimed that the local steel tube manufacturers were being driven by competition to import 
cheap raw materials from abroad. (303) In this constituency, too, the Conservative campaign was to 
stress the advantages of Safeguarding and its possible extension to other industries. The benefits of the 
Government's De-rating Act were also praised, since it was claimed to have saved Wednesbury 
£90,000 a year. (304) Yet neither of these policies seemed to benefit the constituency's Conservatives. 
As in West Bromwich there was a certain degree of bitterness in the campaign, with the 
Conservatives in particular being affected by rowdiness at their meetings. The Conservative candidate, 
Rubin, suffered a particularly serious indignity. Unable to get a hearing at one meeting, he marched 
with his followers to the Market Place, where a Labour meeting was being held. He called for free 
speech for both sides. In the pandemonium, which followed, Rubin was hit on the head with a brick, 
rushed to hospital and took no further active part in the campaign. Later in a statement to the press 
Rubin complained of "the outrageous tactics" of his opponents, who organised raids by "howling 
irresponsibles" at Conservative meetings. (305) 
The Wednesbury Labour Party remained a union dominated organisation with only the minimum 
number of individual members. (306) Nevertheless Short, the MP, aroused much enthusiasm and 
support as even the local press admitted. (307) He also experienced disruption at his meetings, although 
he seemed able to control it. (308) On one occasion after a bout of rowdyism he led a counter 
demonstration to the Conservative headquarters. (309) 
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Wednesbury also had a Liberal candidate, John Stockdale, who actively voiced his Free Trade 
credentials and emphasised Lloyd George's programme of public works, although this was dismissed 
by Conservatives as "skilled men doing road building". (3 10) However, the Liberal organisation in this 
constituency was notoriously weak and the party failed even to save its deposit. Short won comfortably 
with a majority of 5,331 and just over 50 per cent of the vote. 
9. KINGSWINFORD 
Labour's best result in 1929, however, came in Kingswinford, where Charlie Sitch's 10,338 majority 
was the largest in the region during the inter-war period. In securing 53.2 per cent of the vote, he was 
second only to Mosley's 54.8 per cent in Smethwick. Yet this had seemed unlikely twelve months 
earlier, when Sitch was defeated by a Liberal for the Quarry Bank and Amblecote seat on Staffordshire 
County Council. (311) 
The Liberal parliamentary candidate, A. W. Bowkett, accused Sitch of a lack of involvement in the 
Commons. He flourished a folder, in which he claimed was a record of all the speeches made by Sitch 
during the previous parliament. When he opened the folder, it was empty. (312) The Conservatives in 
their turn stressed the success that Safeguarding had brought the local hollowware industry comparing 
it favourably with the iron and steel industry. (313) 
Sitch obviously felt it necessary to trim some of Labour's policies. He admitted that there might be a 
case for Safeguarding certain industries, although in the last resort this meant "higher prices to the 
consumer". He went on to state that unemployment could only be reduced, if the International Labour 
office secured "uniformity of hours of labour and conditions of work". The Birmingham Post 
described this statement as "a courageous admission". (314) Sitch was also forced to deny opposition 
claims that Labour wanted to raise the school leaving age to 15. He claimed that if Labour had to raise 
the age due to employment difficulties, "parents should be compensated for the loss of wages". (315) 
Sitch's comfortable victory owed much to the Liberal intervention as Sitch only increased his 
percentage of the vote from 51.5 per cent to 53.2 per cent. The Liberals secured 18.1 per cent, which 
was their best result for the inter-war period. Sitch claimed that his success was because the electors 
preferred "a local man who understands their needs". (316) Certainly there is some evidence of growing 
local support for Labour as the number of individual members rose to 378 in 1929, which was the first 
time it recorded a figure above the minimum. (317) 
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10 STOURBRIDGE 
The final Labour success was at Stourbridge, which was to be another three-cornered contest. Indeed 
the Birmingham Gazett e referred to the constituency as "a Liberal stronghold" and considered the 
Liberal candidate, D. Finnemore, as the favourite. He was a well known Midland barrister, who was 
described as "one of the ablest political speakers any political platform in the country can boast". (318) 
The Birmingham Post, however, reckoned that a Liberal revival would be at the expense of Labour. 
They were confident that the Conservative Safeguarding policy, which was benefiting the hollowware 
and glass industries, would reap benefits in the constituency. (3 19) 
The Labour Party in Stourbridge was expanding its membership during these years under the 
inspiration of its popular MP, Wilfred Wellock. The Birmingham Post described him as an "out and out 
revolutionary Socialist". (320) Nevertheless Wellock increased his by-election majority to nearly 4,000, 
although his share of the vote declined from 41.9 per cent to 38.4 per cent. It was the Liberals, who 
experienced the biggest increase in their vote amongst the enlarged franchise. They also raised their 
share of the vote from 24.1 per cent to 29.8 per cent, suggesting that they were attracting the new 
`flapper' vote. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The 1929 General Election was the peak performance for the Labour Party in the Black Country 
during the inter-war years. They secured 45.8 per cent of the vote compared with 33.5 per cent to the 
Conservatives and 20.5 per cent to the Liberals. This compares with Labour's national share of 37.1 per 
cent and the Birmingham figure of 41.8 per cent. (321) Labour support in the Black Country showed 
much similarity to that in the West Yorkshire region surveyed by Reynolds and Laybourn The main 
difference was that in West Yorkshire the Conservative support was lower at 27.6 per cent and the 
Liberals higher at 26.4 per cent. (322) A number of factors have to be considered in assessing Labour's 
success. 
Overall it seems that the General Strike proved to be the decisive turning point in the fortunes of 
Labour. Yet defeat for the trade unions meant that local parties could rely even less on them for 
membership and funds. On the other hand the Government's policy was seen as an attack on the 
working class itself. It might seem that trade unionists were encouraged to turn to politics to reverse the 
impact of their defeat and the attack on the political levy. At the same time non-trade unionists, who in 
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the past might have been suspicious of Labour's close links with the unions, might now have been 
encouraged to support the party since some union powers had been clipped. The fact that the Labour 
Party nationally had been widening its appeal to attract support beyond the trade unions would have 
helped. 
. This situation 
is reflected locally in constituencies where the Labour Party made efforts to improve 
its organisation and finances. This was most evident in Stourbridge and Bilston, where with an increase 
in party membership Labour appeared dynamic and performed well. This reflects the position described 
by Savage in his account of the Labour Party in Preston. In Walsall, too, improved organisation was a 
significant factor, although here there was no large increase in party membership. Indeed low 
individual party membership continued to remain a feature of the West Bromwich and Wednesbury 
parties, which suggests that they were still relying widely on trade unions for funds and organisation. 
Preserving this arrangement might suit some local parties, as it left control in the hands of a small 
clique of union members. The evidence from Wolverhampton, in particular, highlights the potential for 
clashes between the trade unionists and radical individual members. 
The Conservative's decision to campaign around the issue of Safeguarding as a means of protecting 
and securing jobs seems to have failed in this Election. It may, however, have prevented bigger defeats 
in seats such as Smethwick. Overall there appears to be no correlation between levels of unemployment 
and Labour support. Thus the swing to Labour in Wednesbury with its high unemployment rate was 
much less than in neighbouring West Bromwich where employment was growing. 
Personality was another major factor, especially in the case of Dudley, where party membership and 
funds remained minimal. Oliver Baldwin proved the ideal personality with an outstanding war record, 
coupled with his zeal to improve conditions for the working class. Indeed where the swings to Labour 
were biggest, as in Smethwick, West Bromwich, Kingswinford and Walsall, the personality of the 
candidate was a major factor. 
Nevertheless despite Labour's strong polling in this Election only five of their nine victories were 
secured with a majority of the votes cast. This tended to reflect the national situation, making Labour's 
success seem rather fragile. Nevertheless this was more a reflection of the three party politics of the 
period. Labour's MPs were not that vulnerable, since the closest the Conservatives came was in 
Stourbridge, where they were still 6.6 per cent behind. Indeed in six of the region's seats the 
Conservatives needed swings of over 10 per cent to catch Labour, whilst in three the swing needed was 
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over 29 per cent. It seemed that in 1929 after a decade of growth Labour was firmly established across 
the Black Country. 
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CHAPTER 5- 1929-1931 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Historians have noted that Labour's success in 1929 had not been as great as it seemed, since many 
of their victories were won by the slenderest of margins. With 41 per cent of their seats won on a 
minority vote, Labour was very dependent on a strong Liberal poll. Indeed a Liberal collapse would 
greatly benefit the Conservatives, who were the main challengers in Liberal seats. (1) Overall the 
Conservatives had won the largest share of the vote, although securing fewer seats than Labour. 56 of 
Labour's 287 seats were vulnerable to a3 per cent swing to the Conservatives, whilst a3 per cent 
swing to Labour would yield them only 21 extra seats. 
Nevertheless there was a great deal of optimism amongst Labour supporters following their victory. 
Most anticipated that their party would continue its advance, gaining an absolute majority at the next 
Election. (2) The NEC sought to capitalise on this goodwill by doubling the individual affiliation fee to 
head office to 4d a member at the Party Conference. This was strongly resisted, however, by many 
local parties, who claimed that it would undermine their membership. Eventually a compromise figure 
of 3d per member was agreed upon. (3) 
Historians have also pointed out that the government started well, especially in foreign affairs, where 
the Soviet Union was recognised and moves on disarmament begun. At home the Widows and Old Age 
Pensions Acts were extended, but there was soon trouble over the government's plans for the coal 
industry, education and repeal of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act. (4) Even worse the unemployment 
numbers remained static and then began to rise. 
The state of the Conservative Party during 1929 seemed to confirm Labour's early hopes. A survey 
of constituencies was made by the Conservatives, in order to analyse the reasons for their defeat. Most 
felt that the party lacked a "definite and constructive policy" as a "positive alternative to Socialism". 
Since it was also thought that the policy of Safeguarding should have been promoted with "greater 
vigour", this can been seen as support for introducing a wider policy of Protection. At the same time 
there was little support for the party's social reforms when in government. The `flapper' vote was 
blamed for their defeat, whilst reforms in local government and the de-rating policy did not arouse 
enthusiasm. Indeed it was felt that the failure to cut public spending lost them support at a time when 
there was a growing demand amongst the middle class for retrenchment. Finally lack of support in the 
national press was considered a serious handicap. (5) During 1929 Baldwin found leadership of his 
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Party difficult as the demands for Protection grew and Beaverbrook launched his Empire Free Trade 
campaign. 
The first test of Labour's popularity came in the 1929 municipal elections, when the party made 100 
net gains. (6) Yet unemployment remained high. Having dipped in June, the total rose steadily during 
the autumn to reach 1.5 million in January, which was 12.9 per cent of the insured workforce. During 
1930, as the impact of the American Depression was felt, the position deteriorated dramatically, rising 
each month to reach 2 million in August and 2.5 million in December. (7) 
Oswald Mosley had been appointed to the Cabinet in 1929 in order to help Jimmy Thomas, the Lord 
Privy Seal, deal with unemployment. He soon became impatient and then contemptuous of Thomas's 
proposals, which seemed ineffective. Snowden and the Treasury, however, blocked more radical 
solutions as they were determined to maintain a balanced budget. In December 1929 Mosley produced 
a Memorandum, which called for greater executive power, import controls to enable domestic 
development and for a short term reconstruction programme to be financed by a £200 million loan over 
three years. The proposals were eventually rejected by the Cabinet in May 1930. Mosley then resigned 
his post but failed by 210 to 29 to secure the support of the Parliamentary Labour Party. (8) 
Mosley was not the only critic of the government from within the party. The ILP also blamed 
unemployment on underconsumption, but saw Mosley's policy as an alternative to Socialism. They put 
more emphasis on redistribution and nationalisation. At the ILP Party Conference in Birmingham in 
April 1930 18 of the 140 ILP Members of Parliament agreed to follow Maxton in a policy independent 
of the Labour Party. Amongst these was the Wolverhampton MP, W. J. Brown, who claimed that "the 
characteristic feature of Labour Party policies during the past ten years has been a steady drift to the 
right and increasing attacks on the left. There was now an effective Liberal-Labour alliance". (9) 
At the Llandudno Labour Party Conference in October 1930 Mosley secured much support, but a 
motion to examine his proposals was lost by 200,000 votes. Nevertheless Mosley was elected on to the 
N. E. C. In general, however, the challenge to Snowden's insistence on Free Trade, the Gold Standard 
and a balanced budget was not strong enough. These policies, backed by MacDonald and Thomas, 
were influenced by the orthodox Treasury view on Government spending. There has been much 
criticism of this by writers such as Skidelsky in Politicians and the Slump and in his biography of 
Mosley. Skidelsky believed that the Labour - Government should have followed a Keynesian 
programme of deficit financing and extensive public works. (l0) 
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The difficulties of a Labour Government adopting Keynesian policies at this time have been 
examined by Ross McKibbin. He claims that it was unlikely that Mosley's views could have been 
imposed, given the economic strength of the financial establishment. Orthodox opinion prevailed 
amongst the three main parties, which only the Second World War broke down. Moreover when 
Keynesian policies were tried by the Australian Labour Government, they did not succeed. 
Furthermore with Britain dependent on food imports there was a danger that by expanding the domestic 
economy, the pound would lose its value and inflation prevail. The memories of Germany in the early 
1920s remained strong. Finally McKibbin has argued that by following a policy of drift, coupled with 
Britain's fairly generous unemployment benefits, the Labour Government was actually avoiding the 
worst effects of the Depression. (11) 
Historians of the demise of the Labour Government have been divided over whether defeat was due 
to the events immediately preceding the 1931 General Election or whether a malaise had set in well 
before due to the unemployment crisis. Mowat, for instance, although giving a devastating criticism of 
the failures of the Labour Government, endorses the view that defeat was due to the betrayal of 
MacDonald and his handful of National Labour MPs, coupled with a dishonourable election campaign 
by the supporters of the National Government. "The stridency of the campaign" he writes "was another 
unpleasant reminder of 1918 and of 1924". The National Government had no programme "except a 
belief in their own indispensability". The one thing that their candidates could unite around was "the 
abuse of Labour and appeals to voters fears of Labour if victorious". (12) 
Reynolds and Laybourn, in their study of the West Yorkshire Labour Party, seem to agree with 
Mowat, in claiming that support for the Party appeared to hold up well until the General Election. A 
by-election was lost at Shipley in November 1930, but there were the special circumstances here of a 
ten week lockout in the textile industry, which was followed by a5 per cent wage cut. The authors 
accept too that in the 1930 municipal elections in West Yorkshire, although the Party lost some seats, 
"Labour did not do badly". (13) 
On the other hand Cook has noted that by-election results were beginning to go against Labour, with 
four seats lost to the Conservatives between May 1930 and June 1931, whilst others were held on 
reduced majorities. (14) Cook has also noted the check to Labour in the 1930 municipal elections, 
which certainly provided a sharp rebuff for the Party. Nationally they suffered a net loss of 65 seats, 
whilst the Conservatives had 69 net gains. Labour lost 6 seats in Salford, 7 in Liverpool, 5 in 
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Birmingham Labour also lost control of Leeds, Hull, Swansea, Barnsley and Blackburn. Cook has 
explained Labour's defeat as partly due to "a national swing back from 1927, partly a protest at the 
Government but perhaps as much as anything due to a renewal and extension of Conservative-Liberal 
municipal pacts". (15) 
In his recent study of the 1929-31 Labour Government Neil Riddell has followed a similar theme, 
describing a deepening rift between MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas on the one hand and elements 
of the Labour Movement on the other. The trade unions, for instance, had become estranged by the 
Government's failure to solve the unemployment situation and by the inadequacies of the 
Government's legislative programme. (16) They were also resentful at not being represented on the 
Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, which proposed reduced benefits and increased 
contributions in an interim report in June 1931. (17) The PLP was equally frustrated due to the failure of 
the consultative machinery to work effectively. There was deep frustration over unemployment and a 
growing lack of confidence in the leadership. 
Thorpe too has pointed out that by 1931 many local parties were experiencing considerable 
organisational and financial difficulties. Some were reported to be in a "state of unpreparedness" and 
with falling rolls. This forced the NEC to launch a special membership campaign in June 1931. 
Financial problems developed too as unemployment brought a fall in the numbers of union members 
`contracting in'. The party had a deficit of £466 in 1930, which rose to £8,500 in 1931. The situation 
was such that in June 1931 Henderson, the treasurer, warned the NEC of the problem and in July he 
decided to ask the October conference to raise the subscription to 4d a year. (1 8) 
Riddell has also pointed to the dissatisfaction with Labour in the constituencies, which was reflected 
in declining finances and membership, as well as tensions from the activities of the ILP and Mosleyites. 
Local parties cited "indifference" and "apathy", but there was general dissatisfaction with the 
government's failure to deal with unemployment. As membership fell local party affiliation fees to head 
office dropped from £4,363 in 1930 to £3,160 in 1931. (19) Riddell even claims that the membership 
figures for 1930 were deliberately falsified in 1931 in order to maintain the impression of constantly 
increasing numbers. (20) 
Thorpe has claimed that by 1931 "two of the three main parties had run out of practical ideas as to 
how to deal with the problems of Britain and its ailing economy". He goes on to stress that once the 
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Conservatives had resolved their leadership crisis and developed their policies on tariff reform and 
financial retrenchment, "they seemed to be heading for a decisive electoral victory". (21) 
On the 1" December 1930 Mosley issued his Manifesto, which called for short-term public work 
schemes, a national loan and a Cabinet of five overlords, along with Protection and Empire trade. It 
was signed by 17 MPs, of whom three (Brown, Baldwin and McShane) came from the Black Country 
and 8 from the West Midland region as a whole. (22) This partly reflected the pressure being put on 
them by Neville Chamberlain in Birmingham with his programme of Protection and a self supporting 
Empire. There was already talk in the local press of a National Government with capital and labour 
working together to face the economic crisis. (23) Although Chamberlain's campaign failed to secure 
him the Conservative leadership, it did eventually persuade Baldwin to take up Protection again, giving 
the Party a viable alternative economic policy, with which to challenge the Government. (24) 
In January 1931 Mosley addressed the Smethwick Trades and Labour Council, claiming that his 
Manifesto had met with "an extraordinary response from the rank and file". (25) According to his 
biographer, Mosley intended meeting the Council again on the 25th February, but two days earlier the 
press leaked news of his intention to quit the Labour Party and form a new political party. (26) The first 
MPs to resign from the party were John Strachey of Birmingham Aston and Dr Robert Forgan of West 
Renfrew. (27) Two days later Oliver Baldwin joined them in what was intended to be a rolling 
programme of resignations. (28) Then on the 28th February Mosley revealed his plan to field 400 
candidates for the New Party at the next General Election. (29) 
An editorial in the Birmingham Gazett e was highly critical of Mosley's tactics, pointing to "vaunting 
claims, muddle in regard to publicity and allowing subordinates to take the plunge of resignation before 
he has taken it himself' and of having "invested the birth of his new party with an atmosphere of 
farce". (30) Within a week the NEC had expelled Mosley from the party for "gross disloyalty" and 
resolved that "adhesion to the proposed New Party is incompatible with membership of the Labour 
Party". (31) Very little support, however, came from within the Labour Party with no District Parties 
joining him. Michael Foot, writing in his biography of Aneurin Bevan, claimed that Mosley had no 
love for the Labour Party, "no roots in it, no compunction at the breach with old comrades. He could 
leave as easily as he had joined, without a twinge of conscience or regret". (32) Skidelsky agreed to a 
certain extent, pointing out that Mosley's loyalty was not to the Labour Party. "Mosley himself would 
have said it was to his conceptions, which in turn were fixed by the sacred memories of the trenches". 
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Since the Labour Party had failed to realise these conceptions there was nothing to hold Mosley in the 
Party. (33) 
By mid-1931 Thorpe describes "a tired and ageing premier", presiding over "an ill, not infrequently 
incompetent and often acrimonious Cabinet". (34) In February 1931 the May Committee had been set 
up on a Liberal amendment to investigate reductions in government expenditure. When it reported in 
July 1931 it called for £96 million of cuts. This in turn led in August to a financial crisis with a run on 
sterling. Snowden, having personally ruled out adopting a tariff, proposed a cut of 10 per cent in the 
unemployment benefit, which would enable him to balance his Budget and secure a loan from 
American bankers. The Cabinet was split, with the opposition led by Henderson and backed by the 
TUC. The Government resigned, but MacDonald was persuaded to stay on as Prime Minister by the 
King and the Opposition leaders. A National Government was formed, which included Snowden and 
Thomas, but was backed by only a dozen Labour backbenchers and no constituency parties or trade 
unions. The Labour Party now elected Henderson as their leader and came out against all cuts. 
Although support for MacDonald's move appeared to be minimal within the Labour movement, it 
did have a profound effect on morale. Riddell has made the point that "the latent support, which existed 
initially for MacDonald was more substantial than admitted subsequently and has been 
underestimated". MacDonald had been "a figure of hero worship" amongst many of the rank and file, 
with many local parties reluctant to condemn him. (35) Furthermore MacDonald had been an 
inspirational election campaigner. His oratorical flair as a platform speaker at public meetings had won 
Labour considerable support. (36) The consequence of MacDonald's departure was to leave much of the 
party in a demoralising state. 
The National Government, having proceeded with the cuts and being forced to leave the Gold 
Standard, called a General Election for October 1931. MacDonald's Government was far from united, 
with Conservatives wanting Protection, whilst the Liberals as well as Snowden standing by Free Trade. 
Baldwin, however, accepted that MacDonald's leadership was necessary for the defeat of Labour. Each 
of the three parties issued its own manifesto, whilst MacDonald called for a `doctor's mandate' to use 
any methods fit to restore the economy. The government, however, was united in its vitriolic attack on 
the Labour Party, accusing it of running away from the crisis and threatening policies that would bring 
a total economic disaster. 
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One factor, which certainly affected Labour in the 1931 General Election, was that a united 
opposition faced them. Cook has written that "the once great Liberal Party had become, in reality if not 
in name, an adjunct of the Conservative Party". (37) Labour fielded 516 candidates, but in over 400 
constituencies the Party was faced by only one opponent. There were only 99 seats, where there were 
three-cornered contests, compared with 447 in 1929. The result was that Labour lost 215 seats, leaving 
them with only 52. The total vote, however, fell less dramatically from 8.37 million to 6.6 million, 
which in fact was Labour's second highest vote ever at that time. 
A key factor in the reversal in fortunes of the two main parties, which has been emphasised by 
Thorpe, was the Conservative's adoption of Protection. This gave them a credible economic policy, 
with which to defend jobs at a time when unemployment was rising rapidly. (38) The Labour Party, on 
the other hand, stuck to Free Trade, on the grounds that it provided cheap food for the working class, 
arguing that Protection had failed in the United States and Germany. (39) 
A report on the General Election was made to the Labour Party's NEC, which put forward a number 
of explanations for the defeat. Most stress was put on the National Party's election strategy. Backed by 
slogans such as ̀The Nation First' and ̀ Stand by the Nation', MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas were 
portrayed as "having stood by the ship of state whereas their colleagues put party first". Moreover they 
were reported as being able to create "the maximum of distrust and suspicion of their old colleagues by 
false statements, half truths and indirect suggestions regarding what had taken place in the 
Cabinet". (40) 
The NEC report made much of the denial of equality of political broadcasts for Labour. The 1931 
General Election was probably the first to be influenced by radio broadcasts and sound cinema 
newsreels. In both instances the National Government benefited. The report complained that whilst 
Labour had only three broadcasts, the National Government had five before the election was called and 
seven during the campaign. (41) Indeed historians have drawn attention to the nature of the National 
Party's broadcasts. In particular Snowden's bitter party political broadcast, in which he referred to the 
Labour Party as ̀Bolshevism run mad', was reckoned to have had a big influence. According to Mowat 
it "undoubtedly convinced many independent voters and many Labour men and women to vote against 
Labour as untrustworthy". (42) 
The press too, led by the Rothermere and Beaverbrook groups, was also overwhelmingly anti Labour 
in this Election. Only the Daily Herald, Manchester Guardian and Reynolds News backed Labour. (43) 
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Even Liberal papers like the News Chronicle warned of the dangers of the return of Labour. Thorpe, in 
his history of the Election, has described the press campaign as "unrivalled in its scurrility for 52 
years". Even so he believes it did not affect the result, except to cause Labour to lose more seats than 
they might otherwise have done. "To blame the press for Labour's defeat is to blame the messenger for 
the message and to seek to evade unpleasant political realities". (44) Yet the press at this time was the 
main source of political information and the Daily Herald with a circulation of just over 1.1 million by 
no means counteracted the other morning papers. 
The aim of the National Government's campaign was to frighten the electorate by warning that the 
return of a Labour Government would bring economic disaster. The Manchester-Guardia n described it 
as: - "the shortest, strangest and most fraudulent election campaign of our times". (45) The National 
Government was, for instance, responsible for a number of notorious stunts, which were aimed at 
alarming the electorate. MacDonald displayed worthless German banknotes at meetings, as a warning 
of what might happen under Labour. Even more notorious was Runciman's announcement, backed by 
Snowden, that the Labour Government had borrowed from the P. O. Savings Bank to meet the cost of 
unemployment insurance. Although it was later acknowledged that Churchill had done the same in the 
previous Conservative Government, Labour suffered as their policies were displayed as irresponsible. 
Smart, in a recent study of the National Government, accepts that few historians today would consider 
these stunts as "decisive". (46) Nevertheless the reaction of contemporaries suggests that their impact 
on a population, which was still largely politically ignorant, was quite significant. (47) The growing role 
of the media at this election would have accentuated the situation. 
The Labour Manifesto put much emphasis on the apparent breakdown of the capitalist system. The 
theory of the `banker's ramp', which had brought down the Labour Government was also widely 
proclaimed. There were promises of nationalisation, but not the specific policies needed to implement 
it. Tariffs were denounced, whilst industry and trade would be revived by national planning. Pledges 
were also made to restore the cuts in unemployment benefits and civil service salaries. This was not 
helped though by the exposure that over half the previous Cabinet had been prepared to implement the 
August cuts. Snowden claimed that the programme would "plunge the country into irretrievable ruin", 
despite Labour's promise to keep a balanced budget. (48) Thorpe describes the Manifesto as "a deeply 
self contradictory and rather irrelevant document in the conditions of 1931". He goes on to claim that it 
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was adopted "more as an article of faith for the future and to keep what remained of the party together 
than as a programme for immediate government". (49) 
Although Labour performed badly in the 1931 General Election, the Liberals did even worse, despite 
the fact that 72 of their MPs were elected. In fact only 10 of the 72 faced Conservative opposition. 
Their total vote fell by over 3 million, compared with only I %z million for Labour. Stevenson and Cook 
put the reason for this down to the flight of the middle classes to the Conservatives. This and the united 
front that the National Government presented is seen as the chief reason for Labour's defeat rather than 
the desertion of the working class. This explains why the Labour vote held up to its 1929 level in South 
Wales and in mining seats in the North East. In fact Labour won three quarters of all mining seats, 
where less than 10 per cent of the electorate was middle class. They also point to a strong Labour vote 
in the railway towns of Swindon, Carlisle, Crewe and York. Elsewhere too they did best in working- 
class cities, like Stoke, Sheffield and Hull. (50) On the other hand Labour performed badly in middle- 
class seats as well as in working-class areas like Birmingham and the textile towns of South 
Lancashire, where tariff reform was the big issue. (51) 
The 1931 municipal elections, which immediately followed the General Election, proved another 
setback for Labour. The party had a net loss of 201 seats, winning only 149 out of 709. Labour lost 92 
seats in London, 12 in Birkenhead, 11 in Stoke and Bradford, 10 in Derby, 9 in Liverpool and 
Manchester, 8 in Sheffield and 6 in Nottingham. There were no Labour victories in Birmingham, 
Bradford, Birkenhead, Stockport or Middlesborough. The party's only successes were in Leeds, 
Sheffield and Manchester, which each elected 7 councillors. (52) 
B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
The decline in Labour's popularity after 1929 seemed to come earlier in Birmingham than 
elsewhere. Labour was confidently expecting to win three seats in the November municipal elections, 
but it was the Conservatives, who gained two seats, one from Labour and one from the Liberals. This 
left the Conservatives with a 72 to 36 lead over Labour on the Council. Yet in the same year Labour 
made five gains from the Conservatives in nearby Coventry. (53) 
In 1930 Labour did even worse, suffering "a sharp setback", losing 5 of the 10 seats that they 
contested in the city. (54) The Town Crier defended the position by pointing out that the total vote for 
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Labour in the city had remained stable, whilst they had also lost 6 seats in Sheffield, Liverpool and 
Plymouth, 5 in Salford and 4 in Cardiff and Blackburn. On the other hand the Labour Party was starting 
from a much lower base in Birmingham. The Town Crier believed that dissatisfaction with the 
Government's handling of the unemployment situation was not the main issue, as Labour had won 
seats in areas of high unemployment. Voters were reckoned to be upset by Labour's plans to raise the 
school leaving age to 15, whilst owner occupiers were influenced by the slogan ̀Vote Tory and keep 
down the rates". (55) 
Divisions within the Borough Labour Party continued. At the Birmingham I. L. P. Conference in 
April 1930 the local branch led a move for disaffiliation from the Labour Party. Meanwhile the Town 
rig, under its editor W. J. Chamberlain, attacked the activities of Maxton and his followers, as 
"providing anti-Labour press with a great deal of ammunition for use against the Labour 
Government". (56) In February 1931 at the Annual Conference of the Midland ILP a motion, moved by 
Joseph Southall of the Birmingham Federation, to cease affiliation to the Labour Party, was defeated. 
Two Birmingham MPs, Jim Simmons and Wilfred Whiteley, who had been nominated by ILP 
branches, were outlawed. In their place W. J. Brown and John Strachey were welcomed as new 
members, despite the fact that they had both signed the Mosley Manifesto, denounced by the National 
Council of the ILP. (57) 
The activities of Oswald Mosley proved a more serious threat to the local party. In a speech to the 
Birmingham Business Club on ̀ The Problems of British Trade' in November 1930, Mosley gave notice 
of his intentions by stating that he did not believe that the emergency could be faced "with the present 
parliamentary system". (58) When Mosley issued his Manifesto in December 1930, the Town Cri r was 
quite critical especially for its relegation of socialism and promotion of tariffs. (59) The Birmingham 
Labour Party then twice deferred from asking Mosley to address them, before eventually deciding not 
to invite him. Fearing his impact on the local party, it was felt that the invitation would serve "no good 
purpose"(60) 
When Mosley made his move to form the New Party, the Birmingham Labour Party responded 
quickly. The president, J. Johnson, wrote in the T wn Crier of "the tremendous blow ... 
being aimed at 
the Labour movement". Mosley and his supporters were described as "conspicuous more by self- 
advertisement han by faith" and of not having "the grounding in the work and the struggles of the 
movement". In another article `The Watchman' wrote that "we of the Birmingham Labour movement 
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feel that you have let us down badly and justified all that your critics said about you when you came 
over to us". (61) Mosley's move was to be rejected by all the local parties in the city, whilst the Aston 
party cast out Strachey. Nevertheless it does appear that Mosley used Birmingham personnel for his 
London organisation, with Young becoming secretary of the New Party. In July 1931, however, as 
Mosley began to transfer the New Party into a Fascist movement, both Strachey and Young 
resigned. (62) 
The impact of Mosley's departure on the Birmingham Labour Party is not clear-cut. Riddell, for 
instance, clams that he "heavily subsidised the local party and the Town Crier". (63) His departure 
meant that "organisation and morale were dealt a serious blow". (64) Hastings, however, has found it 
difficult to assess the extent of Mosley's involvement in the Birmingham Labour Party. "His sincerity 
was always doubted by certain sections... because of his ambition, vanity and large personal fortune". 
Certainly from the financial point of view Mosley appears to have done nothing to relieve it of its 
perennial debt. (65) His departure seemed to vindicate the left in the party, which had always distrusted 
his membership. Nevertheless Hastings still concludes that Mosley's desertion left the party machine in 
Birmingham "shattered for the second occasion in three years". (66) 
Two months later, however, the Town Crier, under the heading ̀Birmingham's Record Labour Day 
Rally', reported 20,000 people at Aston Park for the May-Day celebrations. (67) In September when 
Mosley returned to the city for a speech at the Town Hall, he encountered a hostile reception. When he 
addressed an overflow meeting of 5-6,000 outside his speech down was shouted down and he had to be 
escorted away by a bodyguard of police. (68) Mosley's reception here probably convinced him that it 
would be futile for him to stand in the city for parliament in the 1931 General Election. 
The defection of MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas seem to have had a bigger impact on the 
Birmingham Labour Party. MacDonald had enjoyed considerable local popularity with the rank and 
file. It was his visit and speeches, which had done much to revive the party after Mosley's defection. 
Hastings claims that "the older members in Birmingham revered him" and after his departure the local 
party was "discredited in the public's eye". (69) 
Party membership certainly took a dip in Birmingham during 1931. In 1929 total membership in 
Birmingham was 3,889, with Kings Norton and Yardley each having over 600 members. (70) By 1930 
there had been a dramatic increase to 6,825, despite the rise in membership fees from 2d to 3d a year. 
This was also at a time when the party was showing a dip in support at municipal elections. Kings 
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Norton now had over 1,000 members, followed by 782 for Erdington, 755 for Moseley and 710 for 
Edgbaston. (71) In 1931, however, total membership had dropped to 5,603. The biggest declines were 
in Edgbaston, down to 490, and Erdington, down to 507. Yardley too dropped to 440, having 
maintained a total of 600 since 1926. Only West Birmingham showed an increase, rising from 600 to 
624. (72) The figures tend to confirm Riddell's theory of a general decline in membership in 1931. 
Nevertheless it should be noted that the 1931 total was still well above that for 1929. The impression 
here is that Labour support held up well until the 1931 General Election and it was the actions of 
MacDonald rather than Mosley that brought the decline. 
Birmingham was to be less seriously affected by the 1930's Depression than other industrial regions. 
Nevertheless unemployment here was signif icant, peaking at 76,000 in August 1931, which at 17.7 per 
cent was below the national rate of 20.7 per cent. Moreover the Birmingham total was only just above 
the post war figure of 73,681 for July 1922. (73) The reason for this was that the motor industry along 
with its component sections was much less affected by the Depression than other industries. Annual 
production was down by only 5 per cent between 1929-31. Indeed it began a revival in the autumn of 
1931, which continued throughout the decade and helped the West Midlands as a whole avoid the 
worst of the Depression. (74) 
The 1931 General Election in Birmingham proved to be a disaster for Labour with the Conservatives 
winning all twelve seats with five figure majorities. The total Labour vote also dropped by over a 
third. (75) Whereas in 1929 Birmingham had voted Labour above the national average, in 1931 the 
Labour vote was only 26.7 per cent compared with a national average of 30.6 per cent. Hastings 
describes the local Labour Party as being "back in its pre-war place". (76) Even the Conservatives were 
surprised by the size of their victory with the chief Unionist agent in Birmingham describing the result 
as "beyond our most optimistic expectations". (77) 
It has been pointed out that since Labour's local success was "recently won and weakly rooted", the 
failure of the Labour Government in office in 1931 proved a serious blow. (78) At the start of the 
campaign The Times reckoned that the local Labour Party was in "particularly difficult circumstances". 
They pointed out that it had "plenty of candidates, a fairly large body of workers, but (was) suffering 
from a lack of funds and secondly from the lack of an outstanding figure". ! be Time believed that the 
departure of Mosley would be decisive since, despite Birmingham's reputation for enterprise and its 
thousand trades, "the Midlander ... loves to be led and has an unusual respect for authority". 
(79) 
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Mosley in fact made one infamous sortie into Birmingham, when he spoke at the Rag Market on the 
18th October. After attempting to make himself heard for 20 minutes, uproar broke out amongst the 
15,000 crowd, when Mosley's stewards moved towards a heckler. A large section of the crowd then 
charged the platform, "brandishing chairs and chair legs, hurling bottles and swept all before them". 
When Mosley showed a reluctance to leave, the police threatened to lock him up for his own safety. 
The Birmingham Gazette described the meeting as "one of the most extraordinary scenes that has 
marked Birmingham's parliamentary history". (80) 
It is probable, therefore, that The Times reporter overestimated the significance of Mosley, 
especially given the later disastrous performance of the New Party in the Election itself. The two New 
Party candidates, which stood in Birmingham, for instance, secured only about 1 per cent of the 
vote. (81) The article, however, went on to touch upon a more significant factor, when it pointed to the 
National candidates support for Protection. It described a display van, which was being used to 
illustrate the effects of dumping on local industries. This was an issue, it claimed, which the Labour 
Party "having weakened on the question of Protection, finds it awkward to meet". (82) 
Hastings also points out that manufacturers opened their factories to Unionist candidates often in 
works time and used their walls for displays. (83) At the end of the campaign the Liberal Birmingham 
Gazette agreed that "up to a point ... Birmingham 
has gone tariff. The Conservatives all stressed the 
need for tariffs in their election addresses and speeches". (84) 
An equal disaster followed almost immediately for Labour with the 1931 municipal elections. In 
Birmingham the Unionists made "another clean sweep" with no Labour candidates being elected. They 
made 9 gains, giving them 70 seats on the Council compared with Labour's 15. This was a much worse 
performance than elsewhere in the Midlands. (85) The results reflected the shallowness of Labour's 
support in the city, where their organisation and finances remained much inferior to the Unionists. 
2. THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. THE STATE OF LOCAL PARTIES 1929-31 
By 1931 the Black Country was much more seriously affected by the Depression than Birmingham. 
Only Smethwick, with a figure of 18.9 per cent, had an unemployment rate as low as Birmingham's 
17.9%. All other boroughs had rates above 20 per cent with Dudley having 38.8 per cent. (86) On the 
one hand there were industries in absolute decline like coal mining, domestic chainmaking and the iron 
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industry, whilst others like steel and glass making were badly affected by cheap imports. Those making 
components for the motor industry, however, were less affected, which explains the relatively low rate 
in Smethwick. 
Support for Labour held up much better in the Black Country. The Party was still making gains, for 
instance, in the 1929 municipal elections. Two seats were captured in Stourbridge and one in 
Wednesbury, Wolverhampton and Smethwick. In West Bromwich Labour gained one seat, but lost one 
to the Liberals, who were in an electoral pact with the Conservatives (87) The Wednesbury result gave 
Labour control of the town for the first time. (88) Yet this and Smethwick were the only municipal 
boroughs that Labour were to control during the inter-war years, at a time when they had captured all 
but one of the parliamentary seats. The reasons for this disparity lie partly in the more restricted 
municipal franchise and partly in the numerous anti-socialist pacts. These existed in most boroughs and 
concentrated on appealing to ratepayers to keep down local authority spending and the rates. 
Immediately after these elections further divisions were exposed in the Wolverhampton Labour 
Party. Under the heading ̀Wolverhampton Labour Party Sensation' the Express and Star announced the 
expulsion from the Party of Councillor Miss Perry and G. T. Williams, who had stood in opposition to 
the official candidate at the local elections. Williams, who was a former Councillor and Chairman of 
the Wolverhampton Board of Guardians, had unsuccessfully sought the Labour nomination in two 
wards, before standing as an Independent. Miss Perry, who claimed that she had resigned from the 
Party the previous December over a disagreement over an educational grant, had nominated Councillor 
Haddock the opponent of the official Labour candidate. The publicity, which followed this rift, further 
exposed the local party as factious and disunited. In the newspaper article Williams accused the West 
Wolverhampton Labour Party of seeking "to commit political suicide by expelling all its intelligence 
and retaining only the brute force and ignorance". (89) 
Labour lost seats in the Black Country in the 1930 municipal elections. In Smethwick the local party 
lost control of the Council to the Conservatives, who gained two seats. A number of local factors were 
thought to have influenced voting. In the first place the Labour Party's decision to oppose the 
Conservative mayor in the election, after he had agreed to accept a second term in office, was 
considered unpopular locally. Not only was the mayor re-elected, but the turnout in his ward was by far 
the highest in the borough. (90) 
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Another factor was thought to be the proposal to introduce a £3 a week minimum wage for council 
workers. The Conservatives argued that this would lead to an increase in rates, causing businesses to 
close down or move elsewhere. A Manufacturers' Manifesto was drawn up by major employers and 
distributed widely around the borough. They claimed that the scheme would cost them around 
£100,000 a year as the local wage for labourers, fixed by the Joint Industrial Council, was only £2 9s 
2'/%d a week. Labour councillors sought to defend their stand by pointing to the benefits that the De- 
Rating Act had brought. Their position was undermined, however, by the steady rise in unemployment 
from 2,612 in mid January to 5,073 at the beginning of November. (91) 
Elsewhere Labour lost seats in Dudley, Walsall, Wednesbury and West Bromwich. The result in 
Wednesbury meant that Labour lost control of the Council. In Wolverhampton Labour's two rebels had 
mixed fortunes. Councillor Perry held on to her seat as an Independent, but G. T. Williams failed to win 
in St. George's ward. (92) In July the Wolverhampton Labour Party had reported that "no ward (was) 
reaching their quota of contributory members". Graisley had 153, Dunstall 134, but the other five were 
only around 50. (93) Soon after the elections a special ward meeting was called to report on the state of 
the local party. The picture was similar with only Graisley and Dunstall in a healthy position. 
Elsewhere reports spoke of poor attendances at ward meetings (St George's and Park), "nothing being 
done" (St Mark's and St Matthew's) and "ward in a backward state ... requires reorganising" 
(Blakenhall and St John's). The Chairman Jacob concluded that the present situation was disappointing 
and appealed for "service to the party with the idea of stabilising the position". (94) 
As Oswald Mosley and other Black Country MPs became more openly critical of the Government, 
there was a danger of further splits in local parties. When Mosley resigned from the Cabinet opinions 
locally were rather ambivalent with the Town Crier saying that their sympathy was "fairly equally 
divided" between him and the Cabinet. (95) John Strachey, writing in the same paper, claimed that if he 
thought that Mosley's action would lead to a split "(he) would never have given it (his) support for one 
moment". (96) When Mosley came to Smethwick in June he addressed the Trades and Labour Council, 
as well as an open air meeting of several thousand in Victoria Park. He claimed that his proposals 
would create work for 800,000 at a cost of £200 million. (97) Meanwhile, the local Trades and Labour 
Council recorded "its unabated confidence in Sir Oswald and assured him of its belief in his integrity 
and loyalty to the Labour Movement". (98) 
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There was more open criticism of Mosley, however, after the issue of his Manifesto. Writing in the 
T wn Crier W. A. Exon pointed out that, although he agreed that new methods were needed to deal with -Cg 
unemployment, "I am not yet convinced that the Manifesto meets the case in every way". He did not 
"doubt Mosley's sincerity", but questioned the argument for tariffs, claiming that countries with 
Protection were suffering as badly as those without. (99) 
Mosley's final contact with the Smethwick Labour Party came at a meeting in London with the 
president of the Trades and Labour Council, W. E. Lawrence, and its secretary and agent, J. Stonier. Here 
he explained his intention to form a new political party, expecting other groups, including the ILP, to 
join. The Smethwick pair apparently "begged him to reconsider, promising Smethwick's support if he 
stayed within the Labour Party". (100) 
At a stormy meeting of the Smethwick Trades and Labour Council on the 25th February the rank and 
file made their views felt The mood of the meeting was described as "ugly and antagonistic". There 
was criticism of Mosley's non-attendance and of his excuse of ill health. (101) Lawrence then gave an 
account of the meeting with Mosley, at which he had made it clear to the MP that, if he took up a 
position outside the party, the Council would not support him. Lawrence stressed that for him "loyalty 
to the Party comes before ... 
loyalty to any individual". He concluded by expressing his regrets "that 
the man to whom we looked up with such hope.... should have left us so high and dry". (102) 
After further heated discussion, during which several delegates were accused of "having first hero- 
worshipped Sir Oswald and then fallen upon him tooth and nail", a resolution was passed inviting 
Mosley to address a private meeting of the Council. (103) The editor of the Birmingham Gazette wrote 
that " "the Council came very near to making Sir Oswald a martyr by sacking him out of hand while he 
is ill. Fortunately a sense of fairness prevailed". (104) W. A. Exon summed up the situation accurately in 
the Town Crier, writing that "Mosley has made a big mistake. Always at the back of his mind he 
thought he could carry Smethwick with him. He knows different now". (105) 
Mosley never attended the private meeting of the Trades and Labour Council, claiming that he was 
too unwell. In fact he made no commitment to meet representatives of the party in the future. There 
were further heated arguments locally before the Executive Committee decided that, if Mosley were to 
withdraw from the Party, he would no longer be supported as the borough member. (106) Within a 
week, however, the NEC had expelled Mosley from the party and he never returned to Smethwick. 
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According to his biographer Mosley himself reckoned that, had he not been unwell and been able to 
visit the constituency, he could have carried much of the local Labour Party. (107) This seems unlikely, 
although it is apparent that before his expulsion he still had some local support. In a letter to the 
Smethwick Telephone, Clem Jones, the first Labour agent in the borough, summed up what appears to 
be the majority local feeling: - "We did not spend years of effort in the Labour movement of Smethwick 
in order to make it the catspaw of a rich and ambitious man". (108) 
Meanwhile on the 20" February Oliver Baldwin sent a letter to the press, announcing his decision to 
resign from the Labour Party and stand as an Independent. He then confirmed his intention that evening 
at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Dudley Labour Party. It appears from his letter that 
Baldwin hoped to carry the majority of his former supporters with him In this he was to show his lack 
of understanding of Labour politics at this time. (1 09) 
In an interview with the Birmingham Gazette he criticised the Government for its "inaction" in the 
face of the developing economic crisis. He stressed his loyalty to the programme, on which he had 
fought the last election, but which "has been largely sacrificed, including national work schemes for the 
unemployed". He predicted that Snowden's financial policies would cut purchasing power, add to 
unemployment and bring "an inevitable reduction in the standard of living of the working classes". He 
concluded by stating his intention of standing at the next election as an Independent. (110) 
It seems that relations between Baldwin and some sections of the Dudley Labour Party had become 
strained even before the eventual breakdown. The Express and Star reported that the circumstances of 
his resignation "have created a crisis for the local Labour Party". Not only was there no vote of 
confidence in Baldwin but "not a single member supported his attitude". The issue was not so much his 
disagreement with the Government, with which attitude several left wingers were in agreement, but the 
method he had used "to engineer the position". There was particular criticism of his letter to the press, 
giving the reasons for his resignation before he had even met the Committee. As the Labour agent, 
Harold Chambers, said: - "He need not have come to Dudley. The thing was cut and dried by him 
before we started. He has treated us shabbily". A party member and town councillor was even more 
critical when interviewed by the paper: - "I should be really glad if I never saw Baldwin again. He has 
no sense of friendship and has either not the ability or the desire to get down to the real work of 
bringing in Socialism". (111) 
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Baldwin was billed to speak on the New Party platform in Birmingham on the 8th March but failed 
to put in an appearance. Instead he stated his determination to fight the next election as an Independent. 
He did, however, speak at a meeting of the Conservative candidate in the St George's by-election, 
although this was mainly to condemn his Beaverbrook backed Empire Free Trade opponent. Later he 
appeared on a platform with Lady Cynthia Mosley at a meeting held under the auspices of the New 
Party. The local Labour Party wanted him to resign his seat. At a meeting of the Executive Committee 
on the 19'h March to consider possible replacement candidates, some disapproval of their stand was 
expressed. Two members withdrew from the meeting and one of them resigned from the Party. (1 12) 
Baldwin's response to calls for his resignation was to declare that he would contemplate it "if you 
can show me any vote I have given in the House of Commons, which is contrary to my election 
pledge" or name any previous Dudley MP, who has voted as regularly as himself. He then accused the 
local Labour Party of being "more concerned with a party machine than they are with the principles of 
Socialism". (l 13) 
Harold Chambers replied by pointing to Baldwin's apparent link with Mosley's New Party, which 
had abandoned Socialism and had been denounced by James Maxton, who had previously spoken in 
Dudley on behalf of Baldwin. In the end there was to be no split in the local party. Members even 
passed a unanimous resolution thanking Baldwin for his services. (114) In fact Baldwin never joined the 
New Party and rejoined the Labour Party after the events of August 1931, standing unsuccessfully as 
their candidate for Chatham in the General Election. (115) 
Whilst the activities of Mosley and Baldwin failed to arouse sufficient support to allow the 
emergence of local factions, the situation was much different in the case of W. J. Brown in 
Wolverhampton. This might well have been because, whilst Mosley and Baldwin were upper class 
outsiders with few links with the working class, Brown was a trade union official with roots in the 
Labour movement. In fact it was in his role as secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association, that 
he made his bitterest attacks on the Labour Government, which was seeking to cut public service pay 
early in 1931. 
Brown had been a critic of the Government's economic policy from as early as January 1930, when 
he informed his local Executive Committee of his intention of following an independent line on 
government policy. He did give a pledge not to vote against the government on anything that was in the 
Party's 1929 election programme or to endanger the life of the government. (116) In March 1930 
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Brown urged the government to disarm unilaterally, voting with a group of 22 for an amendment to 
reduce naval armaments and in another to cut the army estimates. (117) He joined the breakaway ILP 
faction, becoming its secretary for a time and providing a link with the Mosleyites. (1 18) There was, 
however, much political jealousy between the ILP and Mosley. The Left considered Mosley's schemes 
as ̀ reformism', whilst Mosley regarded the Left as ̀ impossiblist'. (119) Riddell claims that Brown took 
more of a Maxtonite than a Mosleyite stand during the debate on the King's speech in October 1930 by 
calling for immediate socialisation. (120) 
Having signed the Mosley Manifesto in December, Brown's activities provoked a special Executive 
Committee meeting of his local Labour Party on the 13th January 1931. It was decided to put a number 
of points to Brown and to ascertain his attitude to the government at a future General Election. (121) 
Brown met the Committee on the 18t', where he must have been encouraged by the knowledge, 
reported by the secretary, that the local party was "divided in its opinions" over the attitude he had 
adopted towards the government. Brown made no apologies, claiming that he intended going on in the 
same way, "believing that his personal standing was now much stronger". (122) The Wolverhampton 
West Labour Party was anxious to avoid a confrontation with him. (123) Not only would this bring a 
likely division in their local party, it also threatened its finances as Brown's Civil Service Association 
provided an annual parliamentary fund of £250. This was a significant sum for a local party, which had 
a £50 deficit and was expressing concern over its inability to collect individual membership 
subscriptions. (124) 
On the 1e February Brown was expelled from the Trade Union Parliamentary group, following an 
attack on Snowden's decision to cut the bonus paid to Civil Service clerks. (125) In an interview with 
the Express and Star he criticised the Government for abandoning the interests of the working class and 
becoming "the custodian of the very interest it was decided to oppose". He claimed that sacrifices 
should only be called from all classes, "if we fail to do our duty in respect of the bond holders and the 
rentiers, who prey upon manufacturers and workmen alike". Asked whether he would stay within the 
Labour Party, he replied that if there were a separation, it would be "because the party is leaving its 
declared principles not because I am". On the question of tariffs he replied that "the common sense of 
the situation points to the scientific control of imports with proper safeguards for consumer and 
workman". (126) 
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At this point it seems certain that Brown was planning to leave the Labour Party and join the New 
Party. Writing later in his autobiography Brown showed his admiration for Mosley, claiming that he 
thought that "he really did want to get something done". He blamed the Labour establishment, who saw 
him as an outsider and "a young man in a hurry", for keeping him out of the Cabinet. There was also a 
certain amount of class prejudice involved. Brown concluded bitterly by writing: - "Let those who 
attack and deride him for `going Fascist', ask themselves how much they contributed to the 
disillusionment and bitterness, which led him along that path". (127) 
It was intended that Brown should speak on the New Party platform on the 22`' February and to take 
the lead in announcing his resignation from the Labour Party on the 23`x. Instead Brown withdrew from 
the meeting, pleading ill health and never joined the New Party. In his autobiography he claimed that 
he held back after reading Mosley's interview in the Observer, in which he likened his movement to 
Hitler's in Germany. (128) A different reason appeared in the press. It was claimed that the executive of 
the Civil Service Clerical Association objected to Brown's move and threatened to withdraw their 
sponsorship of him, if he joined the New Party. (129) Mosley, himself, agreed with this interpretation of 
events in his autobiography, claiming that Brown told him "he would lose his job and his family would 
be ruined". Yet Mosley, himself, admitted that he had a guarantee from Lord Nuffield to cover 
Brown's salary. (130) 
Another ILP member, who had also signed the Mosley Manifesto, was J. MacShane, the Walsall 
MP. He too was due to speak on the same platform as Lady Cynthia Mosley on the 22nd February. He 
also withdrew his support at the last moment, claiming that he was prepared to support action within 
the Party, but not to leave it. In an interview with the Wolverhampton Express and Star on the 23`d 
February he said: - "Possibly something of Hitler's National Socialism may be on their minds, with 
more emphasis on nationalism than socialism. If this be so I am not prepared to support Hitlerism either 
in Germany or in Britain". (131) 
On the same date the Executive Committee of the Wolverhampton Labour Party received a telegram 
from Brown, asking for a meeting to be arranged at the Theatre Royal. (132) On the 260' a letter was 
received stating that he would arrange for publicity and advertisements, whilst his agent, Mr Jacob, 
should arrange for a Chairman and stewards. He pointed out that Lady Cynthia Mosley would be 
present. The Executive resolved to do nothing in connection with the meeting, unless it went through 
the agent and was called "under the auspices of the West Wolverhampton Labour Party". The 
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Committee also heard that, although they had received £20 from Brown's parliamentary fund, the grant 
was to be withdrawn. Three months notice was then given to the agent and to the landlord to terminate 
their tenancy of the Labour rooms. (133) 
Meanwhile Brown himself was suspended by the House of Commons for persisting in asking 
questions on the Civil Service bonus payments after the Speaker had asked him to resume his seat. His 
suspension, moved by Snowden himself, was carried by 296 votes to 17. (134) Brown later described 
Snowden "as the rock on which the British Labour movement broke". (135) On the 5t' March Brown 
announced that he was leaving the Parliamentary Labour Party. In his resignation letter to MacDonald 
he explained that the character of the party had been "gradually and skilfully changed from that of a 
Socialist party to that of a Social Reform party". (136) In an interview with the Express and Star Brown 
stressed his desire to stay loyal to his election pledges. He went on to say that if he had believed it were 
possible to reform the government from within the party, he would have "refrained, in spite of my 
profound differences with the government's line, from taking this step". Eighteen months experience, 
however, had convinced him "that this was not possible". (137) 
The local Labour Party voted only narrowly to stay impartial over Brown's meeting and then carried 
a motion to take no further action against him "until the national party has given its decision". (138) 
Brown postponed his Theatre Royal meeting due to illness. In a letter to the Express and Star he made 
it clear that he did not intend joining any other party. "I shall support the government's foreign policy, 
oppose Mr Snowden's financial policy, resist any attempt to worsen the position of the unemployed 
and do my best to stimulate the government to more effective action on unemployment". (139) 
On the 25th March the Executive Committee held a special meeting with Mr Shepherd, the Labour 
Party National Agent, to deal with Brown's resignation from the Parliamentary Labour Party. Shepherd 
pointed out that resignation from the PLP meant resignation from the party. He stated that the next step 
was to select a new candidate and outlined the various procedures. A move to ask Brown to resign his 
seat was defeated by 7 votes to 2. (140) On the following day a full party meeting was held, which 
confirmed the recommendations of the Executive Committee An amendment, challenging Brown's 
exclusion from the Labour Party, was defeated by 25 votes to 12. (141) 
The vote reflected the split, which Brown's move had made in the local Labour Party. Resignations 
were already taking place with one of the earliest being that of the former agent, Don Davies, who 
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joined Mosley's New Party. (142) No councillors were involved, but on the 7t' May it was reported that 
there were ten vacancies on the Executive Committee due to resignations. (143) 
One major problem for the local party was to be finance, as it had lost the Parliamentary Fund from 
Brown's union. On the 2°d April a deficit of over £73 was announced, which had risen to £123 by the 
end of the month. (144) Support from Labour Party HQ was sought, leading to another meeting with the 
national agent, Shepherd, on the 2"d June. He suggested setting up a series of public and private 
meetings using local Labour MPs, the selection of a new parliamentary candidate and the taking out of 
a loan. (145) 
Meanwhile Brown's union executive voted 17 to 2 in favour of terminating his political candidature. 
When the matter was debated, however, at the Annual Conference of the Civil Service Clerical 
Association, Brown swung the delegates round overwhelmingly to his side with a dramatic 
speech. (146) Thus financed by his union, Brown and his supporters formed the Independent Labour 
Association. One organisation that decided to back him was the local branch of the ILP. (147) Indeed in 
his autobiography Brown claimed support from "the bulk of the individual membership of the local 
Labour Party". (148) The evidence from the Labour Party Annual Report does not totally support this. It 
does show membership rising from a lowly 300 in 1928 and 1929 to 650 in 1930, with a fall back to 
400 in 1931. (149) Moreover on the 4t` June 1931 Labour won a by-election victory in the St Matthews 
ward, where even in 1929 they had failed. (150) 
The only other elections held at this time were those for urban and rural district councils held on the 
30th March. Nothing in these results would suggest that Labour was on the edge of an electoral disaster. 
In Oldbury, for instance, Labour won four of the seats that were being contested, making three 
gains. (151) In Rowley Regis Labour lost three seats in the chain making ward of Cradley Heath, but 
gained three in Rowley and one in Old Hill. Labour also made a net gain of one seat in Brierley Hill. 
The only disaster was in Tipton, where Labour lost control of the Council, losing eight seats to 
Conservatives or Independents. (152) 
At the end of April the Stourbridge Divisional Labour Party held its annual meeting. It reported an 
increase in individual membership of the party and of the number of bodies affiliated to it. The party's 
representation in local government was up by 7, with 19 Labour councillors and I alderman plus 2 
Labour County councillors. There were no hints here of a future electoral disaster as the MP, Wellock, 
outlined strategies for the party. (153) Indeed the Annual Report confirms the progress made in 
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Stourbridge at this time. Membership had risen from 600 in 1928 to 930 in 1929,1,010 in 1930 and 
1,079 in 1931. This was by far the largest membership of any of the Black Country constituencies, 
overtaking Bilston in 1930. Interestingly the corresponding figures for Smethwick, which had Mosley 
as its MP, show a much lower and static membership of 240. (154) 
It would appear that, apart from the three constituencies that were affected by the defections, the 
Labour Party in the Black Country was not greatly influenced by these events. The New Party, in fact, 
put up no candidates in the region in the 1931 General Election, with Mosley, himself, preferring to 
stand in Stoke. This was in spite of claims in the local Smethwick press, that he was receiving 
"hundreds of letters" urging him to fight the seat again. (155) 
The collapse of the Labour Government in August 1931, however, appears to have had a bigger 
impact. MacDonald had always been a popular speaker in the region, especially after Mosley's 
defection. The Town Crier, for instance, reported a speech he made in West Bromwich on the 17'h 
April 1931. "It was a wonderful meeting. Every foot of space was filled with people, who had come to 
give MacDonald practical expression of their loyalty to him and the great Labour movement he and 
they had built up". As to the speech itself W. A. Exon wrote of MacDonald "pleading, ironic, sarcastic; 
hitting hard and often; he moved that mighty audience as easily as the organist did the organ". (156) 
When the Town Crier reported the defection of MacDonald and Snowden there was much 
moderation in its tone. Its main headline stated that they had chosen the "Wrong Road" out of a 
"Mistaken Sense of Duty". The paper concluded its article by calling for "no bitterness in our strenuous 
opposition to their policy". (157) Even so none of the local Black Country parties backed MacDonald, 
with the Walsall party passing a resolution backing Labour policy. (158) 
B. THE 1931 GENERAL ELECTION 
1. SMETHWICK 
In Smethwick the nominations to replace Mosley as Labour candidate all came from local 
politicians. Eventually W. E. Lawrence, President of the Trades and Labour Council, was selected ahead 
of G. F. Betts and A. M. Willetts. (159) The Birmingham Post described him as having "none of the airs 
and graces of his predecessor, nor is he a very effective speaker". (160) Even W. A. Exon gave him less 
than fulsome praise: - "Whatever Ernie's faults and failings may be, nobody can question his honest, 
unswerving faith and belief in the Labour movement and that will always blot out smaller things, as far 
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as I am concerned". (161) The Conservative candidate, supporting the National Government, was again 
A. RWise, who was a firm believer in the two key policies of tariff reform and economy in public 
spending. 
Unemployment in Smethwick, which had stood at 5,117 at the end of November 1930, climbed to 
7,522 at the time of the fall of the Labour Government in August 1931. It then continued to rise, 
peaking at 8,821 on the 3'' October, which was reported as the highest since 1921. In the weeks leading 
to the General Election, however, the figure dropped to 7,301, which provided good news for 
Wise. (162) He reinforced his tariff policy by using a `dumping' van to tour the constituency, exhibiting 
a selection of dumped articles, which, he claimed, could have been made in Smethwick. (163) 
The problem for Labour was that it lacked a viable policy to fight unemployment. Lawrence opposed 
any tariffs, claiming that they would "hinder the recovery of the export trade and result in increases in 
the cost of living". (164) He did not help himself by informing his audiences that "unemployment was a 
necessity of capitalism". (165) Labour was also affected by the absence this time of a Liberal candidate, 
whose supporters were more likely to support the National ticket and vote Conservative. Also worrying 
for Labour was the report in the Birmingham Gazette of "apathy" amongst the electorate, which 
implied that the party's internal troubles were having an impact on their voters. (166) Significantly the 
turnout of 74.7 per cent was down from the 78.9 per cent of 1929. 
The result was to be a heavy defeat for Labour with Wise winning by over 7,000 votes, which 
proved to be the second largest Conservative majority in the Black Country. Given the strong roots of 
the party in Smethwick going back to before the First World War, the result reflected the disarray of 
the local Labour Party. Indeed Lawrence admitted that when parliament was dissolved, the local Party 
"did not think they would be able to fight an election at all". (167) W. A. Exon, in the Town Crier 
blamed the impact of Conservative scare stories. Claims such as "They want your savings" and "There 
will be no money to pay unemployment benefit by the middle of November" were thought to have had 
a big impact on the working class. (168) 
2. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
The Labour Party was in an even worse state in Wolverhampton West, where an official candidate 
was not even selected to fight the seat. Attempts to find one foundered on the financial position, which 
the local party was left in, following the defection of W. J. Brown. (169) The MP, himself, financed by 
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the Civil Service Clerical Association and backed by the locally formed Independent Labour 
Association, sought some sort of arrangement with the Labour Party. In a meeting with the local party 
secretary, Brown endeavoured to secure their backing on the condition that they stood by their 
Scarborough Conference policy. He promised that he would only vote against the party, if they 
departed from that policy. If an agreement were reached, Brown's ILA would be disbanded and a 
united front presented at the General Election. (170) The Executive Committee of the Labour Party 
could not accept the terms, although they resolved not to fight the seat themselves. They also made a 
pledge "to refrain from speaking or working for an unofficial candidate"(171) 
Wolverhampton West was one seat which Ramsay MacDonald hoped would be contested by a 
National Labour candidate. In fact, Ernest Stanford appeared in the constituency, backed by 
MacDonald's private Parliamentary secretary, Markham, with the instructions: "It is essential that you 
should contest Wolverhampton West". (172) A letter followed from MacDonald, offering "my heartfelt 
good wishes for your triumph and success". (173) The West Wolverhampton Conservative Association, 
however, confirmed their support for Sir Robert Bird as the National candidate. Stanford eventually 
agreed to withdraw saying that "it is impossible to expect the Conservative candidate to stand down, 
having regard to his traditions in the constituency". (174) 
The contest thus became a straight fight between Brown and Bird. Bird claimed that the priority was 
not tariffs but the need for government by "strong, prudent and resourceful men" from all parties. (175) 
At the same time he sought to reassure Liberal voters by stressing that the policy of the National 
Government was not "a tariff policy", but they would provide "a thorough and impartial consideration 
of tariffs among a number of other proposals". (176) 
In his election address Brown made clear his opposition to tariffs. He also called for the restoration of 
the cuts in the pay of public workers and unemployment benefit, a reduction in spending on armaments, 
a living wage and a cut in working hours to absorb the unemployed. (177) Brown later complained that 
a number of local firms, such as the Wolverhampton Steam Laundry, were circulating or putting up 
posters in their works against him. (178) The Wolverhampton Conservatives were quick to misrepresent 
Brown's position. He was forced to deny first that he was a member of the Communist Party and then 
that he was an atheist. He was also accused of being "the holder of rather extreme Socialist views", 
whose local party "did not go far enough for him" and have consequently "left him severely alone in 
this fight". (179) 
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The outcome was a sweeping victory for Bird with a majority of over 9,000. In his autobiography 
Brown called it "a remarkable result", since, "without the aid of the local machine, I polled over 17,000 
votes, only 4,000 less than the number with which I had won the seat". (1 80) For the Wolverhampton 
Labour Party the events of 1931 were to prove a disaster, with Brown and his ILA supporters 
remaining and contesting seats on the borough council. 
3. DUDLE 
The third Black Country Labour MP to defect from the Labour Party had been Oliver Baldwin. A 
new candidate, William Hadgkiss, a former Smethwick councillor, was selected to replace him in 
Dudley. Hadgkiss had entered Smethwick Council in 1926 as a Conservative, before switching to 
Labour. He became an alderman, but was voted off the Council when the Conservatives regained 
control in 1930. On his adoption the local press described him as "an able speaker, who has done a 
great amount of spadework for the Labour Party and has been much sought after as a parliamentary 
candidate". (181) 
At first the Liberals selected Alderman F. J. Ballard as their candidate to stand on the National ticket 
with a free hand on the question of tariffs. (182) Within a few days, however, Ballard had agreed to 
withdraw and throw his support behind the Conservative candidate, Dudley Joel. (183) This was later 
approved in a vote by the local Liberals with only one opposing voice. (184) Nevertheless Joel started 
his campaign as a firm tariff reformer, claiming that it was "not Free Trade but free imports". (185) He 
also spoke in favour of Imperial Preference. (186) Later, anxious to secure Liberal votes, he toned this 
down, emphasising instead that the election was a question of "national solvency or national 
bankruptcy". (187) 
Hadgkiss in fact fought a strong Free Trade campaign, raising the issue of the standard of living of 
the working class. This obviously worried Joel, who claimed that his opponent was not "a doctrinaire 
Free Trader" and his Party was only "half hearted" in their advocacy of it. (188) Joel secured a 
statement from the Chairman of the Dudley Liberal Association, in which he warned that "if tempted to 
vote for a Socialist, who happens to be a Free Trader, it must be remembered that his vote in parliament 
will be cast in general against the National Government and in favour of proposals, which when carried 
would aggravate our financial difficulties". (189) Later when Joel sought to use Ballard at his meetings, 
the Liberal was shouted down with cries of `Traitor'. (190) 
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Hadgkiss suffered badly at the hands of the local press, which described him as "one of the more 
extreme members of the Socialist Party". (191) His policies were criticised as a call for more socialism 
to cure the nation's economic problems. (192) The Dudley Herald printed an article under the heading 
`New Hope for the Black Country', in which they put the blame for unemployment on Free Trade, as it 
had brought the dumping of foreign goods and the closure of local industries. They saw new hope in 
the setting up of a National Government under MacDonald, warning that the return of Labour would 
lead to a collapse similar to that in Germany in 1923. (193) The same tone was adopted in an open letter 
sent to Joel by Stanley Baldwin, which warned of a "catastrophe" for the nation if Labour were 
returned. (l94) 
A more immediate scare came from one of the directors of the Round Oak Steel Works, who stated 
that the return of the National Government was imperative, warning that another Labour Government 
would lead to the closure of the plant within three months. (195) Meanwhile an editorial in the Dudley 
Herald claimed that the Labour Government had brought on the crisis "by their own squandermania" 
and had then "run away rather than take the measures, which were necessary to balance the nation's 
budget". Rather misleadingly it praised Joel for seeking "to abolish those cuts in the pay of the services 
and the unemployment benefit, which the late Socialist Government rendered necessary". (196) 
Hadgkiss's response to all this was to point out that it was the working classes who were making all 
the sacrifices. (197) In fact support for him held up well, with the Labour vote falling by only 1,500 
from 47.6 per cent to 43.1 per cent. Joel's victory margin of 3,904 was less than the size of the Liberal 
vote in 1929. Much of the credit for this rests with the campaign fought by Hadgkiss, who remained a 
popular candidate throughout. Afterwards he admitted that "the forces arranged against us have been 
tremendous and, having regard to the happenings in other constituencies all over England, I think that 
we in Dudley have posted a magnificent result". (198) Evidence from the Labour Party's Annual Report 
supports this view, showing a big increase in party membership in Dudley during this troubled period. 
The 1931 Report gives a figure of just 240 for 1930, but this rose dramatically to 880 for 1931 and 
1,561 for 1932, which was the largest in the region. (199) The figures suggest that with the departure of 
Oliver Baldwin, the local party was forced to expand its membership in order to meet its financial 




Another Labour MP who had been critical of the Labour Government, was J. J. McShane of Walsall. 
He had backed the breakaway ILP group, which in October 1930 had decided to work independently of 
the Labour Party. In December he signed the Mosley Manifesto. In January 1931 Mosley visited 
Walsall to support McShane, who called for vigorous and decisive action against unemployment. (200) 
When Mosley broke away to form the New Party, however, McShane refused to join, arguing that "the 
man who seeks to break up and start a new party knows nothing of the working-class movement". (201) 
McShane had worked hard to ensure that the Walsall Labour Party remained well organised after his 
1929 victory. Reports in October 1929, for instance, pointed to 31 women attending a lecture given by 
the Women's section, whilst the Men's section pledged to develop an organisation in any ward, where 
it was lacking. (202) As early as January 1930 McShane had warned delegates of "the necessity of 
keeping the work going as it was anticipated that there would be an early appeal to the country". (203) 
The same message was stressed at the AGM, where the party declared itself free of debt. Wards were 
urged to be active, arranging "to have boards for publicity purposes" and to hold Sunday night 
meetings. (204) In June McShane backed a decision to appoint an organiser for the party on £4 a 
week. (205) A month later he was again stressing the importance of organisation, warning of the 
proximity of a General Election, "at which we should be fighting a defensive action". (206) 
Ward reports in February 1931 showed the Labour Party to be far more active in Walsall than in 
Wolverhampton. The Bloxwich Ward, for instance, stressed the financial support that the people were 
giving the party. (207) When McShane addressed a meeting in April, he praised "the propaganda effect" 
of the Sunday evening meetings. He also advised members to visit trade union branches, promising to 
go himself "if need be". (208) McShane was also careful to keep his local party informed of his voting 
record in the Commons. In defending his line on opposing any introduction of a Means Test, he 
informed the delegates that "many members of our party were middle class and did not understand the 
position of the workers as fully as should be desired". (209) Despite voting against the Government's 
Education Bill, he received a vote of confidence at his party's AGM in January 1931. (210) 
Walsall was one of the Black Country towns to be most affected by unemployment with numbers 
rising from about 4,000 in 1929 to 12,000 in 1931. (211) Dean has claimed that its Poor Rate, set at 
£1.5s per head, was the third highest in the country. (212) When the General Election was called, 
McShane warned of "the need to fight hard because a stormy time was ahead and every ounce of 
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energy would need to be expended in order to win". The party organiser, Councillor Whiston, selected 
various headings, with which he addressed delegates, warning also of the need for "discipline and real 
obedience". (213) 
A newspaper, McShane's Special, was produced in an attempt to put Labour's case. In it McShane 
stressed his belief that capitalism had broken down and the future lay with Socialism. He expressed his 
firm opposition to tariffs, claiming that they would not solve unemployment, but would threaten 
exports. (214) McShane also promised work through opening trade with Russia, where he claimed 
"millions of horses" wanted saddles. (215) 
McShane's opponent was J. A. Leckie, who was a local leather manufacturer and Chairman of the 
Walsall Liberal Association. Since the Walsall seat had been a three cornered contest during the 1920s, 
the Conservatives agreed to drop their candidate and back Leckie as a National Liberal so long as he 
agreed to "vote for any policy brought in by the National Government". (216) In the past Leckie had 
been a supporter of Free Trade, but Labour sought to exploit this agreement by claiming that it meant 
he would now back tariffs. (217) At the same time, however, Leckie attacked McShane, as a signer of 
the Mosley Manifesto, for appearing to show support for Protection. Furthermore in an answer to a 
question on dumping McShane was refuted to have said: - "I believe in Protection. I am not fighting the 
election on Free Trade". (218) In reality, however, both candidates were anxious to stress their Free 
Trade credentials, in order to secure the large Liberal vote. 
McShane, like other Black Country Labour MPs, was threatened by leafleting from local employers. 
On this occasion employees of George Wheway and Son received instructions in their pay packets 
telling them to vote for the National candidate "if they valued their jobs". (219) Thorpe dismisses this 
sort of intimidation, claiming that it was no worse than accusations from Labour politicians in the Daily 
Herald that workers, who voted for the National Government, were blacklegs. (220) Leckie's campaign, 
however, descended in the last week to further scaremongering, when he warned of the collapse of the 
country's finances and the loss of working-class savings in the Post Office if Labour were returned. 
McShane was not helped either by an outbreak of rowdyism at Leckie's meetings, which encouraged 
the opposition to brand the Labour Party as wreckers of the country. (221) 
The result was a victory for Leckie with a majority of 6,555. McShane, however, performed 
creditably, increasing the Labour vote by around 3,000 and his share of it from 39.6 per cent to 44 per 
cent. (222) He put his defeat down to the various scare stories, the attitude of the press and intimidation 
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by employers. (223) The absence of a Liberal candidate was an even more significant factor. Indeed the 
relatively low swing against Labour owed much to McShane's work. He had campaigned tirelessly in 
Parliament for working-class causes, whilst in his constituency he had substantially improved party 
organisation. Perhaps of even greater significance was the fact that he appeared to have healed the long 
standing divisions within the local Labour Party. 
5. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
In the Wolverhampton East constituency Labour once again found itself the third party in the 
contest. The reason for this was the refusal of the Conservatives to back Geoffrey Mander as the 
National Liberal candidate. This was despite the fact that Mander was a member of the Samuel 
Liberals, who were supporting the National Government. The Wolverhampton Conservatives, seeing 
the election as an opportunity to break the Liberals hold on the constituency, refused to drop their 
candidate, Major Taylor, despite national agreements. Their argument was that the Liberals had backed 
the minority Labour Government, whilst Mander was inconsistent in his support of the National 
Government. (224) Indeed Mander had shown his radicalism by voting against the government's cuts in 
unemployment benefits. (225) 
In these circumstances it was inevitable that the Labour candidate, John Smith, would find his 
support squeezed. This was even more the case, as the main issue in the election was tariffs. Taylor 
went further even than most Conservatives by proposing tariffs on foreign food to protect British 
farming. (226) Leo Amery was again drafted into the constituency, proclaiming that three months more 
of Free Trade would bring food to "famine prices". (227) At Willenhall in the heart of the constituency, 
the Birmingham Post reported one lock manufacturer as stating that £10-12,000 worth of foreign locks 
were being imported into the country every month, which might have been made locally. Nevertheless 
the paper thought that the lockworkers would not break with their past tradition of voting for the 
Liberals. (228) 
Mander remained an opponent of tariffs, although he was "prepared to consider them with an open 
mind, as a means of restricting certain luxury imports". (229) He was accused in the press of seeking to 
have it both ways. On the one hand he attracted the votes of opponents of the government, having voted 
against their cuts in unemployment benefit. On the other he sought to exploit the Liberals association 
with the National Government with posters proclaiming: - "Trust Mander who trusts the National 
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Government" and "The National Government should include all parties; send Mander back to give the 
Liberal flavour". (230) 
With his reputation for being something of a radical, Labour could make little impression on 
Mander's support. In fact the Liberal tactics in Wolverhampton East were a lesson to the Labour Party 
as the result was another victory for them. Although Mander's majority was cut to 2,317, this was the 
only seat, which the Conservatives failed to capture in the region. Indeed the Labour vote was further 
squeezed, falling by 2,500 to 6,340. Mander acknowledged that his victory was due to the "devotion 
and faithfulness of the people of East Wolverhampton to the cause of Liberalism and Free Trade". (231) 
6. STOURBRIDGE 
Another constituency which had a three cornered contest was Stourbridge. Here the Conservatives, 
having won three elections in the 1920s, claimed that their candidate, R. H. Morgan, was entitled to 
stand as the sole National representative. The Liberals, however, had appointed Donald Finnemore, the 
president of the Birmingham Liberal Association, as their candidate. Finnemore, who had fought the 
1929 Election, stated: - "I have been here since 1928. Why should I stand down for a man, who has 
been a candidate for twelve months". Morgan, on the other hand, had received a personal letter from 
Baldwin, officially acknowledging his stand as the Conservative candidate. (232) 
Since no agreement was reached, the split gave Wellock, the Labour MP, a chance to retain his seat. 
Wellock was a member of the ILP and Chairman of the Parliamentary Peace Group. He had avoided 
any of the controversy associated with the ILP, being appointed Chairman of a Select Committee for 
the promotion of development schemes by local authorities. He had also avoided any association with 
the Mosley group. 
In his Election Address he declared that "capitalism throughout the world is collapsing", which was 
something he had long predicted. He rejected tariffs claiming that they would only lead to higher tariffs 
in return, as well as higher prices. Instead he called for state control of the economic resources of the 
country with the setting up of Import Boards for bulk exchange with other countries. (233) In one of his 
Free Trade posters he warned that workers in tariff countries had "longer hours, lower wages, black 
bread and margarine, horse flesh and mangel wurzel soup". (234) Wellock also campaigned against the 
cut in unemployment benefit and the Means Test, which was due to be implemented after the election. 
He described these as "a betrayal of the unemployed" and "a crowning infamy". (235) 
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Morgan, who was the headmaster of a Dudley school, put most emphasis in his campaign on tariff 
reform, whilst Finnemore was a strong Free Trader. The Conservatives were able to point to the revival 
locally of the enamelled hollow ware industry, which was safeguarded, comparing it favourably with 
depressed industries such as iron, steel, coal, glass and chain making, which were not. (236) 
The fact that Stourbridge was a three-cornered contest did not save Wellock. In fact Finnemore, the 
Liberal candidate, campaigned on the same issues as Labour, attacking the Government's cuts in 
unemployment benefit and the introduction of a Means Test. (237) Morgan won by 3,742 votes, 
increasing the Conservatives vote by nearly 5,000 to 22,652, whilst Wellock dropped 2,433 votes to 
18,910. Finnemore's vote remained static at just over 16,000. The Labour vote held up well in this 
constituency with a below average swing to the Conservatives. One reason for this could have been the 
strength of the local party, whose membership, numbering 1,079 in 1931, was easily the highest in the 
region. (238) 
N BILSTO 
Labour had held this seat since 1924, with their MP, John Baker, having a majority of over 5,000 in 
the 1929 election in a three cornered contest. This time, however, he had just one opponent, the 
Conservative, G. K. Peto, who was a former MP and experienced parliamentarian. (239) Baker fought 
the election with a left wing programme, calling for the need "to take over the land and many if not all 
our industries". (240) In his Election Manifesto he stressed his fight "to raise the standard of living of 
the people". He advocated "higher wages, shorter hours and better conditions of work; higher 
education, better sanitation and greater leisure so that the workers might have a higher standard of 
living, better health and greater hygiene". (241) The local party still retained their active agent, Sam 
Hague, who had helped to boost individual membership to 750 in 1931 after it had slipped back to 240 
in 1930. (242) 
Peto had the personal endorsement of the ex-Liberal candidate. (243) Moreover, like most Black 
Country Conservative candidates, he took a strong stand on tariff reform. (244) Gardner in his survey of 
the Conservative Party in Wolverhampton at this time, suggests that despite the backing of the 
Hickman family, the Party was short of funds and without a full time agent. (245) One concern for Peto 
was a rumour that he was a foreigner, which led him to send an open letter of denial to the local 
press. (246) 
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. Peto won with a majority of 3,773. The Conservative vote increased by about a half, giving them 55 
per cent of the total. The Labour vote, however, held up well here, with Baker's support falling by less 
than 2,000. Nevertheless the result must have been disappointing for Labour, given the progress the 
Party had made locally. The outcome was partly influenced by the absence of a Liberal candidate, 
although Labour had won here in 1924 in similar circumstances. More significant was the tariff 
argument in a constituency, which was dominated by the steel works. 
8. WEST BROMWICH 
Labour had held the remaining Black Country seats of West Bromwich, Wednesbury and 
Kingswinford since 1918 with the same MPs. An eve of poll article on the region in The Times 
reckoned that these seats were vulnerable. Labour was said to be losing the support of many of the 
unemployed, "enough to give the government victory". Meetings were being held "successfully in 
districts where they used to be broken up". Nevertheless the article pointed to the firmness of much of 
the Labour vote, "which is holding tenaciously to a party rather than to a creed and is angry that it 
should be found at a disadvantage". (247) 
In West Bromwich there was still much local support for Frank Roberts, who had the stature of being 
Minister of Pensions in the previous Labour Government and a member of the NEC. He also had the 
advantage of the intervention of a Liberal candidate, W. Ramage. The Birmingham Post, however, 
reckoned that Roberts's local esteem was "personal rather than political", whilst his party had not "a 
single constructive proposal to meet the immediate exigencies of the country's crisis". (248) 
Nevertheless the West Bromwich Labour Party remained a formidable force. Party membership, for 
instance, having remained static at the minimum number of 180 throughout the 1920s, began rising to 
240 in 1930 and 358 in 1931. (249) Also the local party was one of the few in the region to still retain a 
full time agent at the time of the Election. (250). 
The West Bromwich Liberal Party had secured some successes in local government in recent years, 
but nothing in national elections. Ramage, their candidate, had been in the constituency for three years 
and sought unsuccessfully to claim the National ticket. (251) Although a committed Free Trader, he 
claimed a willingness to examine the tariff question "in the light of today's problems", but considered 
Free Trade "the best system for this country". (252) 
300 
Ramsey, the Conservative, who was a self made engineering manufacturer, warned the Labour Party 
that they would regret not being associated with the National Government. (253) Having published a 
study on Safeguarding, he proved a persuasive advocate of Tariff Reform. There were claims that he 
was being invited to speak in factories not by the employers but by the foremen and workers. (254) He 
also asserted that his nomination papers were signed by Liberals and that one prominent Liberal 
candidate had volunteered to speak for him. (255) The local press gave its support openly to Ramsey 
with the Midland Chronicle publishing a poster claiming that the Socialists threatened to take away 
savings, private houses and businesses. It also warned that Labour was "pledged to allow the foreigner 
to dump his cheap labour goods in this country and stop you from making them". Finally there were 
warnings of what had happened in Russia, when the banks were taken over. The editorial in the same 
paper spoke of a choice between "financial security on the one side and bankruptcy and beggary on the 
other". (256) 
In these circumstances Roberts did well to hold on to his support, losing by only 525 votes. There 
was much jeering, shouting and singing of the Red Flag, when Ramsay tried to speak after the result. 
Roberts put his defeat down to the appeal of tariff reform, along with efforts by employers to put 
pressure on their workforces. He also blamed the apathy of some of his usual supporters. Finally he 
pointed to the "complicated" national situation, where many people were misled into believing that the 
members of the late Labour Government "had run away from MacDonald" and due to the "esteem" 
which the former Labour leader was still held in, voters preferred to vote for the candidate who 
supported him. (257) 
9. WEDNESBURY 
In Wednesbury the Labour MP, Short, was opposed by Lord Ednam, the son of the Earl of Dudley 
and chairman of the Round Oak Steel Works. Short concentrated his campaign on Free Trade and the 
cuts in benefits and wages. The Times commented on his popularity and progress through the 
constituency, borne "shoulder high' from meeting to meeting by his supporters "in a sort of wooden 
palanquin". (258) The local Labour party had been even more successful than in West Bromwich in 
increasing individual membership. This had risen from the basic 180 in 1929 to 508 in 1930 and 461 in 
1931. (259) 
301 
For this election, however, the Conservatives were very confident of success. Ednam was said to 
have "got into very close touch with the workers and has found them willing to listen everywhere, 
which is a triumph because it includes Tipton, reported to be the most extreme place in the Black 
Country". (260) Ednam was even able to promise jobs, since foreign manufacturers were said to be 
making inquiries for sites in Wednesbury "in anticipation of increased safeguarding measures". (261) 
Not all Conservative meetings were peaceful, however. The Birmingham Gazett e reported disruption 
at Tipton, where Labour supporters, crying `traitor' and breaking into party song, disrupted Lord 
Londonderry's speech after he referred to Ramsay MacDonald. (262) There was further uproar at 
another meeting, addressed by an ex-Labour councillor and the former Wednesbury Conservative 
candidate, H. G. Williams, which ended when the latter "jumped off the platform and elbowed his way 
among the crowd". (263) Ednam showed that he had a populist touch, when at one meting he scattered a 
bundle of worthless German banknotes, warning that the same would happen to the pound if the 
Labour Party were returned. One of his supporters, Duff Cooper, went further than most by saying that 
it would have been "better for Britain to have been beaten in the Great War, than for a Socialist 
majority to be returned at this election". (264) 
Short was defeated by over 4,000 votes, although his total vote was down by only 1,578. The 
absence of the 5,000 Liberal votes from 1929 was significant. Short put his defeat down to "the 
combination of unique circumstances associated with this so called national appeal, which... time will 
show it as false as it was dishonourable". (265) 
10. KINGSWINFORD 
Kingswinford was another constituency with a high level of unemployment. At the time of the 
General Election those out of work totalled 10,000 in Cradley Heath and over 8,000 in Brierley Hill. 
Workers in these towns were affected by the slump in chainmaking, glassmaking and iron and 
steel. (266) There appears initially to have been an unsuccessful move by the Conservatives to invite the 
Labour MP, Charlie Sitch, to stand unopposed as a National candidate. This was a reflection of the 
support that Sitch, as MP and union official, had built up in the constituency. (267) It is not apparent 
what persuaded Sitch to stay on in the Labour Party. 
This was to be another contest, which became centred on the question of tariffs. Sitch remained a 
firm supporter of Free Trade, claiming that the imposition of tariffs would not solve the unemployment 
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problem and would "inevitably result in lowering the all too low standard of living of the people". (268) 
He pointed out that tariffs would make the importation of the raw materials for the glass industry 
difficult, as they made up 90 per cent of the total. (269) Moreover, he claimed that despite a 
safeguarding duty on enamelled hollowware the wages in that industry in his constituency had recently 
been cut by 10 per cent. (270) Sitch also strongly attacked the cuts in unemployment benefit, claiming 
that the unemployed were "the very last people who should have been asked to make a greater 
sacrifice". (271) 
The Conservative candidate, A. L. Stuart Todd, wanted "an immediate imposition of tariff duties on 
all imported goods". In particular he pointed to the glass industry of Wordsley, which was once "a 
thriving community", but now hit by cheap imports from Czechoslovakia. (272) The Birmingham Post 
too blamed "the unrestricted competition of the products of foreign furnaces, manned by cheap labour 
working long hours". (273) Local employers were used to support this stand. The glassmaker 
S. M. Stuart, for instance, denied Sitch's claim that the industry was vulnerable to retaliation over tariffs 
by pointing out that the most important ingredient in glass making was oxide of lead, which was made 
in this country. Also the senior director of the Round Oak steel works repeated his warning that the 
plant would close within three months of the return of a Labour Government. (274) 
The Conservatives were helped by the withdrawal of the Liberal candidate and the support given 
them by that Party. (275) Sitch went down to defeat by 2,439 votes, which was Labour's second closest 
result in the region. He put his defeat down to "the doctrines of fear", preached by his opponents, 
especially over the value of the pound. He also pointed to the bitter attacks on the Labour Party by 
MacDonald, Thomas and especially Snowden. (276) 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall in the Black Country the Labour Party, including the ILA, secured 166,712 votes or 40.1 per 
cent of the total. The Conservatives, along with the National Liberals, secured 214,205 or 51.5 per cent 
and the Liberals 34,917 or 8.4 per cent. This compares with the 1929 figures for the three parties of 46, 
33.5 and 20.5 per cent. Yet whereas in Birmingham Labour's share of the vote was below the national 
average, in the Black Country Labour's 40.1 per cent was well above the national 30.8 per cent. Indeed 
Labour's total vote of 166,712 was only down by 11.5 per cent on its 1929 figure, compared with a 
national drop of 21 per cent. (277) This was a creditable performance, although not as good as in the 
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mining districts of South Wales. It was actually better than in Durham, which was a county singled out 
by Stevenson and Cook for the solidarity of the Labour vote in 1931. (278) Similarly in West Yorkshire 
the Labour vote dropped from 46 per cent of the total in 1929 to 32.5 per cent in 1931, which was not 
only a considerably bigger fall than in the Black Country but also more than the national drop from 
37.1 per cent to 30.8 per cent. (279) 
The Labour Party was affected in the Black Country as elsewhere by the National pact between the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, which meant that they fought only one opponent in seven of the ten 
seats. In those seats, where a third candidate in 1929 had now withdrawn, the Conservative / National 
vote rose by 63.3 per cent whilst the Labour vote fell by 10.2 per cent. Yet this compares favourably 
with a fall in similar such seats of 15.8 per cent in the West Riding of Yorkshire, 23.2 per cent in 
London and 27.2 per cent in West Lancashire. In the West Midlands as a whole the figure was 18.9 per 
cent. (280) The Times in its post-election summary of the results in the West Midlands as a whole, 
pointed out that there was "no mass drift from Labour" and that the Party "still remains strong and has 
been overborne either by the united anti-Socialist vote or by the emergence of a vote that is not usually 
cast at all. "(281) 
One factor which probably contributed to the Labour vote holding up so well was that most of the 
Black Country seats were industrial rather than urban ones with close knit working-class 
communities. (282) Significantly the biggest swings against the party were in the two seats of 
Wolverhampton West and Smethwick, which were least typical of the area. Wolverhampton West was 
the one Black Country seat, which had an urban as well as an industrial element. Smethwick, on the 
other hand, was closest to Birmingham and more likely to be influenced by the case for tariff reform. 
Interestingly both of these seats were also severely affected by the disarray caused by the defection of 
Oswald Mosley. Elsewhere both the Mosley factor and tariff reform appear to have had less impact. 
One factor, which does seem important in this General Election, is the importance, which candidates 
made of national issues to explain their result. The radio and sound newsreels were significant for the 
first time in this election, whilst the national press was rivalling the local one in importance. It can be 
argued that working-class communities, living in industrial areas, were likely to be less affected by the 
national media than those in urban areas, if only because their communities were more closely knit. 
jhtjj= article, for instance, points out that "signs of a change of heart in the Labour electorate are 
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to be found chiefly in the big towns, where it has been comparatively easy to reach the voters and to set 
before them the facts of the fight. Birmingham is a noteworthy example of this change". (283) 
A study of the municipal election results, which were held a few days after the General Election, 
gives a similar picture for Labour. Nationally the Party had 201 net losses with the Conservatives 
making a clean sweep in a number of boroughs, including Birmingham, but there were few changes in 
the Black Country. (284) The one borough, where the Conservatives did well with two gains, was again 
Smethwick, with Labour winning only one seat. In West Bromwich, where the Conservatives and the 
Liberals had an electoral pact, there were contests in six wards, with Labour retaining three seats and 
the Conservatives losing one to an Independent. The local press expressed its surprise, as they expected 
the Liberals to make at least one gain. (285) Labour did even better in Walsall, adding to their strength 
by winning four seats in new wards. One seat was lost in Wednesbury, whilst there were no elections in 
Wolverhampton or Dudley. 
It seems, therefore, that although the Labour Party lost all of its parliamentary seats in the Black 
Country, there was no major loss of support during 1931. Indeed the party performed better here than 
in similar regions. MacDonald's decision to form a National Government and the nature of the 
campaign that followed did have an adverse effect on Labour's support. Nevertheless it seems that the 
national anti-Labour propaganda had less of an impact here. The party's losses were down more to the 
united front that Labour faced in the General Election than the desertion of working-class voters. A 
study of party membership figures for this period shows that, with the notable and understandable 
exception of Wolverhampton West, there was a considerable increase in members in 1931. Indeed the 
Annual Report shows numbers even higher in the 1933 Report, which covers membership for the year 
following the election. (286) Nevertheless the Labour Party did experience a serious reverse, leaving it 
without any MPs in the region for the first time since the 1918 General Election, but the test of the 
party's strength would be in the speed, with which it recovered from this position during the 1930s. 
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CHAPTER 6 1932-1939 
A. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
During the 1930s a deep division emerged across Britain between the Midlands and South on the one 
hand, where full employment had returned to many parts by 1935, and parts of the North, Wales and 
Scotland, which had not experienced the same economic recovery. Historians of the period have 
reflected this dichotomy. On the one side are the `pessimists', who see the decade as one of wasted 
years, in which a self satisfied government failed to deal effectively with unemployment and its social 
consequences. (1) On the other side are those such as Stevenson and Cook, who have taken a more 
optimistic view, stressing the economic revival that came about with the expansion of new industries 
such as the motor car, artificial fibres and electric appliances. (2) Certainly historians are agreed that 
there was steady economic expansion between 1933 and 1937, partly stimulated by low interest rates 
and rising real wages following the big slump in prices in the early 1930s. This encouraged increased 
spending leading to the growth of the new industries as well as a recovery in house building. When the 
economic cycle ended it seemed that the economy would slip back into depression again in 1938. 
However the immediate pre-war years saw a revival in the staple industries, especially steel, due to the 
Government's rearmament programme. It meant that the majority of the population saw a growth in 
real wages during the 1930s leading to an improvement in the quality of life, including advances in 
health and welfare. 
The level of unemployment was a key factor. After the 1931 General Election the numbers rose so 
that by August 1932 the total was 3'/. million or 23 per cent of the insured workforce. Thereafter there 
was a slow but steady fall to 17.5 per cent at the end of 1933 and 9 per cent by late 1937, when the total 
was 1.4 million. How much this was due to government policy is unclear. There has, for instance, been 
some controversy amongst historians as to whether more could have done by following a Keynesian 
policy of deficit spending. (3) Tariffs along with Imperial Preference were introduced in 1932, but their 
effects have also not been uncontroversial. (4) 
For the Labour Party the 1930s have been described as "a decade of disappointment". (5) After the 
1931 defeat it seemed for a while that the Labour Party would swing to the left, as unemployment 
mounted. (6) In 1932 with the left claiming that capitalism was in its death throes, the ILP voted to 
disaffiliate from the Labour Party. They objected to the Labour Party's insistence that they vote in the 
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same way as the PLP. The move did not have such a dramatic impact, since many of the MPs decided 
to stay within the party, forming the Socialist League under Stafford Cripps. 
During the mid 1930s, as the economy improved, moderates, such as Herbert Morrison and Hugh 
Dalton, rose to prominence in the party seeking to make Labour more electable. Historians have 
described a Bevin, Citrine, Dalton block emerging at this time, which was to steer the party away from 
the left and towards a more realistic foreign policy. (7) The close links with the trade unions meant that 
the Party became more identified with the working class. Indeed Laybourn claims that in the mid 1930s 
"the trade union movement effectively became the dominant force in Labour politics", which meant 
that "the Labour Party was truly, as it had never been before, the party of the working class". (8) At the 
same time under Dalton and Morrison the party set about formulating a more precise electoral 
programme. In 1934 ̀For Socialism and Peace' was published with its stress on the role of the State in 
planning for a Socialist society. (9) Meanwhile efforts by Cripps and the Socialist League to secure a 
more radical document, ̀Forward to Socialism' were successfully resisted. (10). 
Attempts were also being made to improve the party's financial base. In 1932 the `Million New 
Members and Power' campaign was launched, which resulted in an increase of nearly 80,000 members 
from 297,003 in 1931 to 371,607 in 1932. (11) Nevertheless during 1932 the party overspent by around 
£7,000. Its income of £38,000, of which £33,350 came from the trade unions, failed to match its 
expenditure of £45,000. Some constituencies were said to be in "desperate straits" with Transport 
House unable to give help for agents or by-elections. (12) This eventually led to the setting up a central 
By-Election Insurance Fund to help hard pressed constituencies put up candidates. Even this fund, 
however, was soon in debt as many District Labour Parties and smaller unions were unable to 
contribute. (13) Meanwhile Labour's individual membership dipped to 366,023 in 1933, before making 
a modest rise to 381,259 in 1934 and a further rise to 419,311 in 1935. (14) In fact income for 1934 was 
£3,000 below that even of 1933, as union affiliation fees continued to slump with the Depression. (15) 
This affected Henderson's General Election Fund, which was set up in 1934 to help weakly organised 
constituencies. (16) 
Yet in the municipal elections between 1932-34 Labour made significant gains nation-wide, enabling 
the party to recover from the 1931 disaster. In 1932 there were only 15 net gains, but these were based 
on the 1929 results, which was Labour's best year till then. There were bigger successes in 1933 with 
the Party making 176 net gains, winning power in Sheffield, Norwich, Leeds, Bootle, Swansea and 
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Barnsley. The 1934 results seem to have been the high-water mark of Labour's recovery in the 1930s. 
The party, fighting on the 1931 results, made 203 gains with only 8 losses and won control of the 
London County Council for the first time, along with Derby, Stoke, Hull and Burnley. The 1935 
municipal elections, which were held only two weeks before the General Election, were to prove to be 
a foretaste of that result. Labour had a net loss of 24 seats, of which 15 were in the West Midlands. 
Herbert Morrison admitted that the results were "somewhat unexpected". (17) 
There was a similar pattern in parliamentary by-elections with Labour capturing 10 seats between 
1931-35. The average swing against the Government was 15.8 per cent. The Party's first by-election 
success was at Wakefield in April 1932, followed by Wednesbury in July. In 1933 there were further 
gains at Rotherham and East Fulham, where there was a 29.1 per cent swing. There were four successes 
in 1934, which has been described as probably Labour's "best year in the life of the National 
Government". (18) The Party gained two more seats during 1935, but there were disappointments, 
especially in Scotland, where the Labour vote was down on the 1929 level in Edinburgh West and 
Aberdeen South. (19) By this time the National Government was able to take credit for a revival in the 
economy and a housing boom, along with a popular Budget and the King's Jubilee celebrations. 
Labour was not seen at this stage as a viable alternative. (20) 
The 1935 General Election was held at a difficult time for Labour. It coincided with the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia, which had led to the imposition of League of Nation sanctions on Italy. In fact 
the crisis exposed Labour's own divisions. There was a feeling within the Party that in a growing war 
atmosphere Labour's pacifist views were not popular, which would lead to further electoral 
disappointments. (21) Lansbury, the Labour leader, defended the pacifist line at the Brighton Party 
Conference, where he was harshly attacked by Ernest Bevin. (22) The ensuing vote was comfortably 
won by Bevin, which was followed by Lansbury's resignation. His replacement, Clement Attlee, was 
generally considered to be a lightweight, temporary leader. (23) He supported collective security, but 
not the rearmament programme of the National Government. This enabled Baldwin to pose as the 
national leader, supporting the League of Nations and seeking a mandate for rearmament, whilst at the 
same time reassuringly promising "no great armaments". (24) Baldwin was also greatly assisted by the 
considerable amount of patriotism aroused by King George V's Jubilee celebrations, which he was able 
to exploit on behalf of the National Government. (25) 
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It was thought that foreign policy would prove to be the big issue in 1935, but how far it affected the 
result is difficult to assess. Mowat, for instance, believed that Baldwin succeeded because he had 
"stolen the clothes" of the Labour and Liberal Parties by his conversion to supporting the League. (26) 
Dalton, himself, later wrote that Baldwin's enthusiasm for collective security through the League of 
Nations steadied the Liberal vote behind the National Government. (27) A. J. P. Taylor, on the other 
hand, thought that "the electors showed little interest in these questions... Housing, unemployment and 
the special areas were still the dominant themes". (28) Stannage, in his study of the General Election, 
also puts the record of the National Government first, coupled with government claims that Labour 
would precipitate another financial collapse as in 1931. (29) 
Although Baldwin started the campaign by stressing the National Government's backing for the 
League of Nations, he soon concentrated on the economic achievements of the Government. 
Unemployment had dropped below 2 million in the autumn of 1935. Real wages had also increased 
during 1934 and 1935, whilst the salary cuts of 1931 were reversed. Moreover one million new homes 
had so far been built under the National Government. Although the Means Test still remained, the 
Government had responded to pressure earlier in the year not to impose national rates. The economic 
recovery was still far from complete, but it was sufficient for the government to appear competent, 
warning of increased taxation and a breakdown in confidence if Labour won. There were plenty of 
reminders of the 1931 collapse. Furthermore during the campaign the government announced money 
for road building and naval contracts to distressed areas. They also announced that the school leaving 
age would be raised to 15 and child allowance increased, which had both been Labour policies for 
some years. 
The Labour Manifesto for the 1935 Election was based on the 1934 policy statement, For Socialism 
and Peace. Capitalism was attacked as the source of unemployment and of "four barren years". 
Nationalisation figured widely, as did the setting up of a National Investment Board, but there was still 
no commitment to deficit financing. Labour promised to sweep away the Means Test and deal with the 
distressed areas with "a vigorous policy of national planning". (30) On foreign policy the Party stressed 
its backing for the League of Nations and collective security, whilst continuing to work for multilateral 
disarmament. 
According to Thorpe, Labour's policies were seen by the voters as "too radical and class oriented at 
a time when the country was moving to prosperity under a competent if uninspiring government". (31) 
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Stevenson and Cook believe that Labour failed to win the middle ground, frightening the electorate 
with "wild" proposals such as nationalising the banks. (32) Indeed the right-wing of the party attacked 
"the silly propaganda" of the Socialist League, which had been founded by Cripps. The party's lack of 
effective leadership, especially when compared with Baldwin's appeal, was also seen as decisive. (33) 
Stevenson and Cook have stressed the plight of Labour constituencies. As there had been only a modest 
increase in membership organisation remained inadequate, with the number of full time agents down 
20 per cent on 1929 and even down on 1924. (34) 
Labour had hoped to win between 200-240 seats in the General Election. (35) In fact they won only 
154, but they could console themselves by claiming 38 per cent of the vote, which was their highest to 
that point, including the 1929 Election. The swing to Labour from 1931 was 9.4 per cent, whilst at 8.3 
million the total vote was similar to that of 1929. The absence of Liberal intervention, however, meant 
that fewer seats were held. Labour did well in London, thanks to the organisational efforts of Herbert 
Morrison, gaining 17 seats to return 22 MPs. Elsewhere their best results included the cities of Stoke 
and Sheffield, where they won over half the vote and in West Yorkshire, where 10 of the 23 seats were 
won. On the other hand the Labour Party's performance in Lancashire was disappointing, winning only 
3 seats in Manchester, one in Liverpool but none in Salford, Bolton, Oldham, Preston or Stockport. 
Labour also did badly in the North East towns, including Newcastle and Sunderland. 
Following the disappointment of the 1935 General Election further efforts were made within Labour 
to make the party more electable. Herbert Morrison claimed that the British people were "not going to 
vote in a hurry for a first class financial crisis". He claimed that the party's base was too narrow to 
appeal to former Liberal voters, who had supported the National Government since 1931. (36) The 
following years saw efforts by Dalton, backed by Ernest Bevin, to formulate a more viable economic 
policy for the party and then to persuade Labour to support rearmament. The Socialist League, on the 
other hand, wanted to involve Labour in anti-Fascist pacts with the ILP and the Communist Party. This 
was successfully resisted by the party leadership, which eventually came out in opposition to the 
government's appeasement policy. When Cripps and Aneurin Bevan called for support for the Spanish 
Republic and the establishment of a Popular Front early in 1939, both were expelled from the 
party. (37) 
Meanwhile Labour's Immediate Programme, published in 1937, gave concrete proposals of what a 
majority Labour Government would do. These included the establishment of a national investment 
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board, the nationalisation of the Bank of England, the coal industry, power and transport. Also the 
Means Test would be abolished, the school-leaving age raised and a 40-hour week with paid holidays 
was proposed. A Constituency Parties movement developed in 1937 as a counter to the power of the 
trade unions. Their main achievement was to increase their representation on the NEC from 5 to 7, 
whilst excluding unions from the election of their representatives. 
The general impression of Stevenson and Cook during these years was that there was no major swing 
to Labour with the two main Parties remaining on "a fairly even keel". (38) In by-elections between 
1935-39 Labour made 13 gains but most were seats won by the party in 1929. The swing to Labour in 
these seats was 7 per cent, but the overall swing in by-elections between 1935-9 was only 3.9 per cent. 
Moreover Labour failed to win 5 seats, which they had held in 1929. (39) In municipal elections Labour 
did less well, suffering net losses in each of the years. In 1936 as many as 81 seats were lost, based on 
the 1933 results. In 1937 there were 5 net losses, although Labour did make sweeping gains in London 
and also took control of Coventry for the first time. In the 1938 elections the Conservatives made a net 
gain of 30 seats, whilst Labour lost control of Burnley, Bristol, Hull and Sunderland. One factor, which 
partly explains this poor performance, was the relentless decline of the Liberal Party, which won 1 in 7 
seats in 1931,1 in 10 in 1935 but only I in 13 in 1938. (40) 
At a meeting of the Campaign Committee of the NEC on 18 November 1938, the results were 
described in some quarters "as deplorable and would have been worse but for the special national 
effort". It was felt that the election results reflected concern over the international crisis, as they were 
held soon after the Munich Conference. Nevertheless it was pointed out that since 1934 Labour had 
been "at a standstill outside London" and held only a third of the seats in County Boroughs and a sixth 
of those in non County Boroughs. The Committee comforted itself by claiming that municipal elections 
did not provide "an accurate guide to the strength of political parties or to the state of political opinion 
in relation to national politics. Since municipal elections are not fought on ̀ strict party lines' over wide 
areas of the country, it is only possible to gather a general trend of opinion". (41) One important 
consideration in the immediate pre-war years was the growing importance of the situation in Europe. 
The threat of an oncoming war made the appeal of the National Government more powerful, even 
though by this time it was essentially a Conservative Government. 
Yet there were exceptions to these disappointments. Reynolds and Laybourn, for instance, have 
noted rising membership in the Halifax and Leeds Constituency Parties at this time. There were also 
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two by-election successes here in 1939. (42) Labour representation on Town Councils peaked in West 
Yorkshire in 1936 at 20 per cent above the 1930 figure. (43) Reynolds and Laybourn conclude that by 
the end of this period despite the strength of the National Government and anti-Socialist alliances in 
local government, Labour was "the most important single parliamentary party in West Yorkshire". (44) 
Thorpe has also detected a similar revival of Labour's fortunes in Derby during the decade. (45) 
Labour had lost both of their parliamentary seats here in 1931, along with control of the borough 
council. This was regained, however, in 1934, whilst one of the parliamentary seats was recaptured in 
1935. Thorpe gives three major reasons for Labour's strength here. Firstly Derby had three main 
sources of employment, the railways, Rolls Royce and British Celanese, which were all strongly 
unionised. This gave the local Labour Party strong financial support and responsible leadership. (46) 
Secondly Derby had a large Co-operative Movement, which was Labour's largest of iliate. (47) Thirdly 
Derby had a powerful Nonconformist tradition, which had shifted its support from the Liberals to 
Labour. Thorpe also stresses Labour's municipal record when in power after 1928: - "moderate 
responsible leadership working, unlike the party's national leaders, to well defined strategies in 
improving housing, educational facilities and the condition of the town generally". According to 
Thorpe it had been "only Labour's perceived incompetence at national level that brought the 
Conservatives back". (48) 
The state of the Labour Party in 1939 is, therefore, open to some controversy. Laybourn, for 
instance, gives some support for the views of Henry Pelling in believing that Labour might have won 
an election, called before the outbreak of war, "especially given the performance of the National 
Government in foreign affairs". (49) The conclusion of most historians, however, is that had there been 
a General Election in 1939, Labour would not have won it. (50) Stevenson and Cook believe that after 
three by-election victories in the spring of 1938, "the tide of Labour's popularity seems definitely to 
have waned". (51) Thorpe claims that on the evidence of Labour's poor electoral record, the party 
would have faced a defeat as bad as in 1935. (52) He concludes, in his study of the 1930s, that the 
Labour Party was still seen by many as "the party of depression and governmental incompetence", 
which had proved itself "unfit to govern". His most optimistic view of the decade has been to see it as a 
time of "limited revival and consolidation" with the organisation holding good, and with membership 
and trade union affiliation rising. Even so the party was still seen by many as representing primarily the 
trade unions and the unemployed. (53) The National Government and Conservative Party, on the other 
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hand, were able to retain widespread support "even among sections of the unemployed and more 
generally within the working class". This, he claims, was because they provided "a degree of stability 
and prosperity which benefited all classes, though not all to the same degree". (54) 
B. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1. THE LABOUR PARTY IN BIRMINGHAM 
The 1930s have been described as a "dismal decade" for the Birmingham Labour Party. (55) Even in 
municipal elections between 1932-35, when nationally Labour was making a recovery, the Party was 
not performing well in the city. Then in the 1935 General Election Birmingham recorded one of the 
lowest swings in the country and again failed to elect a single Labour MP. (56) In the succeeding years 
Labour failed to win three by-elections, whilst continuing to lose seats on the Town Council. 
Yet the period seemed to start well for Labour in the 1932 municipal elections. By concentrating 
their attack on the Means Test, three seats were gained, based on those held in 1929. Labour was 
reported to be "disappointed" with the result, as it meant that the Party held only 18 seats on the 
Council compared with 67 for the Conservatives. (57) In 1933 Labour won two seats in the new ward of 
Perry Barr, but made only one other gain. (58) Labour was further disappointed by its results in 1934. 
Nine seats had been lost in the 1931 municipal elections, although one was recaptured in a by-election. 
Labour won seven of the other eight seats but optimists were said to be hoping for ten or twelve gains. 
The Birmingham Post claimed that the result was "a vote of confidence" in the existing Council, which 
had built 40,000 new houses and provided public services of "high efficiency". (59) 
The 1935 municipal results added to the disappointment of the local Labour Party, which lost seven 
seats to the Conservatives in an election held only two weeks before the General Election. (60) Labour 
concentrated their attack on the inadequate health, housing and education conditions in the city. The 
Birmingham Post, however, described the Labour candidates as "not impressive" and their programme 
as having "little to say for itself'. The party also had to contend with the opposition's political machine 
operating in a high gear ready for the General Election. (61) 
A similar disappointing pattern can be seen in the numbers of individual members in the 
constituency Labour Parties of Birmingham at this time. From its 1931 total of 5,603 the number rose 
at first to 7,930 in 1932, partly due to the national membership drive. The total then dropped to 7,277 in 
1933 and 6,464 in 1934, before making a modest rise to 6,849 in 1935. Nationally too there had been a 
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dip in membership in 1933, but thereafter the total rose each year. The Birmingham figures do contain 
considerable disparities amongst the constituencies. The most successful one remained Kings Norton, 
situated in the outer suburbs of the city, where numbers rose from 936 in 1931 to 1,284 in 1932 and 
reached 1,587 in 1935. On the other hand constituencies in the inner ring of Birmingham generally 
showed a decline in numbers. Deritend, for instance, did increase its membership from 280 in 1931 to 
470 in 1932, but the total dropped back to 276 by 1935. Both Ladywood and West Birmingham also 
had big rises for 1932, reaching 850 and 1,054 respectively, before dropping to 456 and 793 in 1935. 
On the other hand the Duddeston total remained around 240 throughout these years. Of the middle- 
class suburbs Edgbaston declined from 490 in 1931 to 240 in 1935, whilst Moseley rose from 667 in 
1931 to 1,052 in 1932 before dropping back to 784 in 1935. (62) The conclusion from these figures is 
that Labour lost its support in the inner wards, which it had captured in 1929, but retained it in the outer 
suburbs with their new council estates. 
Labour's performance in Birmingham in the 1935 General Election was predictably disappointing. 
The swing to the party was a modest 7 per cent, compared with 10.5 per cent in Manchester, 11.4 per 
cent in Liverpool and 12.9 per cent in London. (63) Moreover Labour was starting from a much lower 
base in Birmingham. The Party, which had secured only 126,702 votes or 26.8 per cent of the total in 
1931, could raise this to just 140,293 or 33.8 per cent in 1935. This compares unfavourably with the 
195,500 or 41.8 per cent, which was achieved in 1929. Indeed in six constituencies the total Labour 
vote was below that of 1931, although, due to a lower poll, their percentage of the total vote was 
higher. (64) Moreover, unlike the position noted by Laybourn in West Yorkshire, there was no 
significant Liberal vote here to move to the Conservatives during the 1930s. (65) Indeed in the 
Midlands as a whole Labour did badly, winning only 11 seats in 1935 compared with 35 in 1929. 
A major problem for Labour in Birmingham was that with the middle ground held traditionally by 
the Conservatives, Labour tended to move to the left. Hastings claims that foreign affairs dominated the 
1935 General Election to Labour's disadvantage. Not only was the local party divided on rearmament 
but also 9 of their 12 candidates for the election came from its pacifist wing. The National Government 
meanwhile pointed out the benefits to the city's economy of their tariff policies along with rearmament, 
claiming that they would bring greater prosperity and jobs. Meanwhile Labour's posters showing 
children in gas masks were seen as election scares. (66) 
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Stevenson and Cook have also pointed to the lack of organisation in the Birmingham constituencies, 
which they describe as "hopelessly ill-equipped financially to fight the election". (67) Another factor 
was the turn-out, which fell by 10.5 per cent in Birmingham to 62.8 per cent, compared with a national 
drop of 5 per cent to 71 per cent. This was a significant fall, reflecting the heavy rain that fell during 
the afternoon and evening as well as working-class apathy. (68). 
The reasons for this apathy could be connected to Birmingham's relative prosperity during the 
1930s, which brought a certain contentment with the National Government amongst the working class. 
Asa Briggs dates the improvement in Birmingham's economy from September 1931. By the spring of 
1933 the city had the lowest unemployment figures since July 1930. Indeed there were reports of 
labour shortages in certain skilled trades, so that between 1934-37 there was a marked movement of 
labour into the city. (69) Unemployment in September 1935 was 21,645, which was just 5.9 per cent, 
compared with a national rate of 15.3 per cent. (70) The Birmingham Post claimed that the General 
Election result reflected the National Government's record of economic recovery over the previous 
four years and the unrealistic programme that Labour fought under. (71) 
The position did not improve for Labour between 1936-39, when the party failed to win three by- 
elections at Erdington in October 1936, Birmingham West in April 1937 and Aston in May 1939. 
Indeed there were only slight reductions in the Conservative majorities. (72) The main question at 
Erdington appeared to be the "peace issue" with the Labour candidate, Jim Simmons, losing on account 
of his pacifist stand. (73) He was accused of being prepared to leave the British people "in the same 
position as the Abyssinians and exposed to the same terrible fate that they suffered". (74) The 
Conservatives used the slogan 'Peace and Prosperity', exploiting the fact that the Government's 
rearmament programme was helping to keep down unemployment in the city. (75) 
Richard Crossman, the loser at Birmingham West, claimed that he had the support of the artisans and 
their wives in the west end of the constituency, but "in the courts and back to back houses I had two 
enemies to fight - grinding poverty, which has caused many to accept the crumbs from the rich man's 
table and fear of the possible consequences of `breaking faith' with the traditional masters". (76) The 
Town Crier put the blame for Labour's defeat on the inequalities in the voting system, which allowed 
"5,000 Tory outvoters ... possessing property qualifications from as far away as Bournemouth and the 
Isle of Wight". (77) 
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The final by-election to be held in the city before the war proved to be something of an anti-climax. 
Despite the country heading for war and the presence of some 1,000 canvassers, voter apathy reigned in 
Aston, where the standard comment was that "people just don't seem interested". (78) The Labour 
Party, helped by the Town Crier, tried to make the government's conscription policy an issue. Dr 
S. Segal, the Labour candidate, announced that "unless there is conscription of wealth, I cannot give 
support to the Government's proposals concerning the conscription of life". (79) The Birmingham 
Gazett e, on the other hand, declared that conscription aroused "few queries" and most of those were 
concerned with personal rather than general problems. (80) 
In the end, on a poll of only 44.2 per cent there was a swing to Labour of 2.5 per cent, but Major 
Kellett had a comfortable majority of over 5,000. He praised women voters in particular for backing the 
National Government on the issue of "peace and conscription". (81) Dr Segal declared that the 
Chamberlain tradition was "being smashed". "Many Aston electors", he claimed "clinging to the 
Chamberlain tradition for years, started realising the danger of Tory government for the first time. But 
the Tories poured all their resources into the fight. What they lacked in policy, they made up in money 
and organisation". (82) The Birmingham Gazette praised the way that Labour had built up their election 
machine, crediting the agent, W. F. Shepherd, with refurbishing and extending their organisation. (83) 
e There were similar disappointments in the municipal elections. In 1936 the Birmingham Gazett 
warned that with many factories working overtime, "large numbers of people will find it very 
inconvenient if not impossible to vote before 8 PM". The Labour message was reported to be that since 
the city was a wealthy one it could afford to provide more in the way of social services. Yet Arthur 
Greenwood was said to have commended local government in Birmingham. (84) Indeed after the 
results, which saw a further net loss of two seats by Labour, the Birmingham Gazette admitted that "the 
Conservatives on the City Council are on the whole a progressive rather than a reactionary body". (85) 
The Town Crier, on the other hand, warned that "we are allowing the Tories to live on that long since 
dead tradition of radicalism". The Labour defeat was put down to "lack of drive and militancy of policy 
and because our organisation is bad". (86) 
In 1937 there were 3 more losses for Labour, leaving them with only 27 seats on the Council, which 
represented a loss of twelve seats in three years. Yet in nearby Coventry, which was experiencing 
similar economic growth to Birmingham, Labour gained three seats to take control of the Council. The 
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Birmingham Post put the Unionist success in the city down to "a record of progressive administration 
altogether too conspicuous to be forgotten or seriously disputed", (87) 
Soon after these elections the Town Crier singled out five reasons for Labour's poor showing during 
the 1930s. The first was thought to be organisation, as there was said to be a lack of workers and 
support. The quality of candidates was also questioned, with a call for the payment of members to 
attract the right calibre. There was a call for more women candidates. Party propaganda was also 
criticised, with one member claiming that the writers knew more about Spain than Birmingham. Finally 
there was an admission that the local party needed "a clear cut municipal policy, which will deal with 
`brass tacks' rather than vague generalities". (88) 
The 1938 municipal results were to prove another disaster for Labour with the Conservatives taking 
a further five seats from them, winning 23 of the 27 wards. This was the fourth successive year that 
they had added to their strength on the City Council, whilst Labour retained only 4 of their 9 seats. The 
Town Crier thought that the Conservative victory was partly due to their greater financial resources, 
whilst also admitting that their organisation "had proved superior to our own". (89) The Birmingham 
Post, on the other hand, claimed that the results reflected "satisfaction with the policy of the City 
Council" and "the continued failure of Socialist propaganda". (90) 
Party membership in Birmingham shows a similar trend during this period. After a slight increase to 
7,002 on 1936, numbers dropped again to 6,342 in 1937,6,298 in 1938 and 6,665 in 1939. Nationally 
party membership stood at 408,804 on the eve of the war, which was only slightly down on the 1935 
figure of 419,311. Once again Kings Norton was the notable exception to this pattern. Numbers here 
rose to 1,699 in 1936,1,808 in 1937,1,709 in 1938 and 1,734 in 1939. Another outer suburb 
constituency, Yardley, having dropped their numbers in the early 1930s, showed a big revival by rising 
from 579 in 1936 to 1,174 in 1939. Yardley was also the only Birmingham constituency to maintain a 
full-time agent on the eve of the war. At the other extreme Aston, Deritend and Duddeston consistently 
returned the minimum membership of 240 during these years. (91) 
In contrast to the situation in the constituencies Hastings has noted increased union militancy during 
the late 1930s. (92) Trade union membership rose as the rearmament boom got under way. The AEU, 
for instance, more than doubled its Birmingham membership between 1935 and 1939. Union links with 
the Labour Party were said to be closer, whilst there were even successful strikes during 1938, with 
workers securing wage increases and paid holidays. (93) This was part of a national trend, which saw 
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the number of affiliated trade unionists reached 2.21 million in 1939, which was the highest total since 
the 3.24 million of 1927. (94) None of this, however, appears to have brought any electoral success to 
the local Labour Party. 
Hastings has noted that the decade ended with the Birmingham Labour Party returning to a more 
radical stand. There was, for instance, a good deal of support for the Spanish Republic on the outbreak 
of civil war there. This was reflected in calls for support for a Popular Front here and the setting up of 
all-party Spanish democratic aid committees. In 1937 Chamberlain's policy of appeasement came 
under attack with the Birmingham Council of Labour organising a `Chamberlain must Go' 
campaign. (95) 
Then in May 1938 the Birmingham Borough Labour Party took a controversial stand with its 
decision, motivated by its support for the Spanish Republic, to support the formation of a Council of 
Action. It called for support from "every Peace and Democratic organisation in the city", which 
included amongst others the Liberal Party, the Birmingham Council of Labour and the Communist 
Party. (96) Since this went against Labour Party policy, the Birmingham Trades Council complained to 
the NEC. (97) The result was a letter from the National Agent, Shepherd, threatening disaffiliation if 
connections were made with other political bodies. This in turn provoked much opposition to the 
NEC. (98) 
Such opposition was further aroused in February 1939 when delegates voted 44-26 in opposition to 
the expulsion of Stafford Cripps over his support for a Popular Front. Delegates wanted local 
constituency parties to decide whether at the next General Election to run a Labour candidate, who 
might split the anti-Government vote. They urged the calling of a special conference to discuss the 
matter. (99) 
Although the Birmingham Labour Party was far from unanimous in its stand on these matters, the 
position taken by the majority shows that the left still predominated. Such activity, however, appears to 
have gained the Party little local support. There is little evidence to suggest that Birmingham at this 
time was anything other than a stronghold of Unionism. There is a suggestion of a change, however, 
with Labour's support for the Rent Strike of 1939. This was a campaign involving 10,000 tenants, who 
were opposed to differential rents on municipal housing estates. According to Hastings it led to many 
of them identifying for the first time with Labour, making these estates Labour strongholds in the post- 
war period. (100) 
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2. THE LABOUR PARTY IN THE BLACK COUNTRY 
A. THE STATE OF LOCAL PARTIES 1932-35 
The first important test for Labour in the Black Country during this period was to be the Wednesbury 
by-election in July 1932, which followed the elevation of Lord Ednam to the Earldom of Dudley on the 
death of his father. A report in The Time predicted a Labour victory, especially given the character of 
the constituency. A picture was painted of "little houses and little shops, encircled by gaunt factory 
chimneys... a haze of smoke over the surrounding country. Many could wish that the smoke were 
denser and more general, for that might mean returning prosperity". (101) 
The Labour candidate was John Bandfield, who was the secretary of the National Union of Operative 
Bakers and Confectioners. With 12,000 unemployed in the constituency, he concentrated on the Means 
Test as the main issue. (102) He also campaigned as a Free Trader, hoping to pick up Liberal votes and 
exploit the apparent failure of Protection in the constituency, where the iron and steel industry was 
showing no sign of an upturn. (103) He was well supported by Labour MPs, including the new leader, 
George Lansbury, and Arthur Greenwood, who accused the National Government of deliberately 
seeking to reduce the standard of living of the working class. (104) Labour was also helped by the 
admission in the press that the Party had "overhauled and tightened up" the local organisation. (105) 
Initially it appears that there was an attempt to impose a National Labour candidate on the 
constituency, but this was successfully resisted by the local Conservative organisation. (106) Instead 
they selected Captain Rex Davies, whose slogan was "British trade for British hands". He put most 
emphasis on "economy, employment and Empire", whilst trying to put responsibility for the Means 
Test on the former Labour Government. (107) Davies was well supported by Liberals, including the 
1929 candidate, John Stockdale, but his meetings were met with rowdy receptions and several were 
broken up. (108) 
The result was a Labour victory by 3,799, which was a swing of 9.2 per cent, representing around 
8,000 votes, on the 1931 General Election. Bandfield put his success down to resentment over the 
Means Test and the apparent failure of tariffs to lift local industries. Davies blamed apathy for his 
defeat along with what he called "the fraudulent prospectus regarding the Means Test". (109) Nationally 
the result was to be Labour's second by-election success of the Parliament out of nine attempts. 
Labour also did well in the municipal elections held in November 1932, where the candidates who 
had won in the successful year of 1929 were up for re-election. In Smethwick, for instance, the local 
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party won six of the eight wards, making one gain. Elsewhere Labour won seven of the ten contested 
seats in Dudley, making two gains, whilst in Walsall they won four out of five, making one gain. (110) 
The elections were held at a time of high unemployment with Labour stressing the iniquities of the 
Means Test. Feelings on this issue were certainly high, as was the case in Oldbury where six 
councillors had walked out in protest, moving that the local council should abolish the Means Test and 
pay unemployment benefit for "as long as a worker could not find employment". (111) 
Meanwhile in Wolverhampton the Labour Party remained in such financial difficulty that each ward 
was instructed not to exceed £1S in election expenses. (112) Further disarray was caused by the 
emergence of the Independent Labour Association, which made its first appearance in local elections 
and gained two seats. William Lawley, who was Brown's election agent, was the major force behind 
the setting up of the ILA. He captured the St Matthew's Ward from Labour, whilst their other success 
was at the expense of the Liberals in St James's Ward. Furthermore their presence in the Blakenhall 
and St John's Ward was enough to push Labour into third place. (113) 
In the municipal elections of 1933 the Labour Party was more successful in the Black Country than 
in Birmingham. Two seats were gained in Smethwick and one in each of Dudley, Wednesbury, West 
Bromwich and Walsall. Yet there were disappointments as in Bilston, which was holding its first 
elections as a municipal borough. Here Labour, despite having a thriving local party organisation, 
secured only two of the fifteen seats. (114) 
In Wolverhampton the Labour Party remained openly divided. In the 1933 elections there were 
contests in only five wards, none of which were held by Labour. The Party decided to contest three of 
the wards, whilst ILA candidates stood in the other two. Labour was so short of funds that they pledged 
to limit spending to only £12 per candidate. (115) However, neither the Labour Party nor the ILA 
gained any seats. The Conservatives did lose the Blakenhall and St John's seat, but this was to a 
candidate backed by local trade unions. The Labour Party had decided not to contest this seat and had 
pledged not to give recognition to any candidate not in association with the official party. (116) Another 
successful candidate was Miss M. L. Perry, the former Labour councillor, who comfortably retained her 
seat as an Independent in the St Matthews ward. 
In the 1934 municipal elections, which nationally were Labour's best results for the decade, the 
party's performance in the Black Country was disappointing. This was partly because there had been 
less of a swing against Labour in the 1931 municipal elections, on which they were based. In Dudley, 
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for instance, Labour lost two seats, winning only two out of the ten overall. In Smethwick too the party 
won only one seat, which was the same position as in 1931. The Party did make two gains in 
Wednesbury and one in Stourbridge, but none in either West Bromwich or Wolverhampton, where the 
ILA made one further gain. (1 17) 
Labour's performance in the Black Country in the 1935 municipal elections was rather similar to that 
in Birmingham. In Smethwick, for instance, which was the Black Country town closest to Birmingham, 
Labour lost two seats, including that of C. H. Marriott, who was chairman of the Trades and Labour 
Council. Both Labour and the ILA each lost a seat in Wolverhampton, whilst the Conservatives gained 
three in Dudley. Labour's only gains were in West Bromwich and the recently chartered borough of 
Rowley Regis, which was part of the Kingswinford constituency. In the newly chartered borough of 
Oldbury, however, Labour lost three seats, which they had held on the District Council, to 
Independents. (118) 
The problems for the Labour Party in Wolverhampton were made worse by the slump in both 
individual subscriptions and union affiliation fees. According to the Annual Report individual 
membership of the Wolverhampton West Party dropped from 650 in 1930, which was the second 
highest in the region, to 400 in 1931,381 in 1932 and 267 in 1934, which was the second lowest. For 
Wolverhampton East a minimum figure of 240 was returned for each of these years. (119) These were 
the lowest numbers in the whole region. This was at a time when the Labour Party was making big 
strides nationally to increase membership. 
There were reports of officials and delegates not being appointed in some wards, whilst a loan of 
£150 was needed from Labour Headquarters. (120) In these circumstances the National Organiser for 
the Midland Regional area, H. Drinkwater, was called in to give advice. He suggested bringing in 
outside speakers to address ward meetings and calling a special conference of trade unionists. He also 
thought that the local party should select a new parliamentary candidate and try to bring about a 
reunion of party members. (121) 
During 1934 the West Wolverhampton Labour Party was twice called upon to support joint action. 
The first was a move to call a conference to set up a United Front Against Unemployment, but the 
Executive Committee agreed to take action only "in conjunction with the TUC and the Labour 
Party. (122) Four delegates had given their names to the Front's Manifesto and one was to be suspended 
for a year for not rescinding his support for the organisation. (123) Later the Executive Committee 
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agreed not to take part in a May Day demonstration organised by the Wolverhampton Workers Joint 
Council and requested their councillors not to attend, "so long as opposition councillors are 
invited". (124) These actions suggest that the members, who had stayed loyal to the Labour Party, were 
determined to avoid contacts with the ILA and to toe the official line. This was particularly necessary 
for financial reasons as the local party was indebted to the national one. Hence on the eve of the 1935 
General Election the treasurer was again reporting on the seriousness of the financial position and the 
need for action. (125) 
Meanwhile the Walsall Labour Party was also showing a certain amount of public disunity within its 
ranks. The main area of concern was amongst the Labour group on the Town Council, where 
disagreements were being aired in public. The secretary, Councillor Whiston believed that these 
differences were "chiefly personal antagonisms and largely unnecessary". Group members were 
requested to attend a meeting on the 17 March 1932. (126) There was much talk here of the group 
breaking up due to disagreements and non-attendance. There were instances of members voting in 
opposition to one another and of two members being nominated for one position on a Committee. The 
secretary repeated his claim that "personalities were at the bottom of the trouble" and that it should be 
possible for all councillors "to thrash out their differences in private". Eccleston, the chairman, 
however, pointed out that "the parties most concerned were conspicuous by their absence". McShane, 
the former MP, then moved a resolution revising the Standing Orders, so that any disagreements were 
put in writing first. (127) 
Soon afterwards a letter was written to the Walsall Observer by an unemployed delegate, Harry 
Anslow, which criticised the late Labour Government for its failure to deal with unemployment. This 
aroused some outrage within the party, causing Anslow's temporary resignation from it. (128) A more 
serious division occurred within the ranks of the Labour group, when Councillor Cartwright, who was 
on the Public Assistance Committee, voted to support cuts in expenditure despite a group decision to 
oppose them. Cartwright defended his stand by claiming that his concern was over the level of rate 
increase needed and that his intention was not to cut relief, but the salaries of officers and 
administrators. Cartwright's explanation was not accepted, although he did agree to support the Labour 
whips in future. (129) 
More embarrassing for the local Labour Party was Councillor Cresswell's refusal to abide by their 
decision not to attend the Mayor's luncheon in protest over the Means Test. When instructed to explain 
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her position at a party meeting, she merely sent a letter, which was followed later by her 
resignation. (13 0) This dispute seemed to reflect a move to the left by the Walsall Labour Party at this 
time, which was reflected in a resolution, which was passed and put to the Party Conference that year. 
It proposed that "amongst the first duties of a future Labour Government (was) the immediate 
socialisation and control of the entire system of finance and credit, including joint stock banks, and 
close control of all industries". (131) When the resolution was carried at the Leicester Conference, it 
was reported back that "the Party was recovering its Socialist soul". (132) 
During 1933 the Walsall Labour Party received a memo from the Dudley Labour Group, expressing 
its serious concern "at the lack of drive by the Executive Committee regarding definite proposals" and 
doubts whether "Socialist measures vigorously advocated and laid down would be followed if we 
gained power". Members of the Walsall Labour Party, prompted by their former MP, McShane, 
expressed active support for this, with talk of inaction by party leaders and the need to show more fight. 
It was suggested that a Midland Conference be called to formulate a programme to put to the next 
Labour Party Conference. (133) Indeed the Dudley memo provided the basis for the local party's 
resolution to the Conference that year. (134) 
This activity in Walsall came despite more serious divisions within the local party, which were 
exposed again when a new parliamentary candidate was selected. Following the resignation as 
candidate of J. McShane, the former MP, in July 1932, six names were put forward to replace him. (135) 
One of these was Councillor Cartwright, but he was forced to withdraw. This was because he was not a 
member of the Miners' Federation but of a breakaway union, which was not affiliated to the Labour 
Party or the TUC. (136) 
Following further withdrawals, the local party then voted by 28 votes to 26 to select J. Eccleston, 
who was the President of the Pelsall Miners Association. (137) His union branch promised to put up 
£50 with possibly a further £100. The vote, however, aroused "intense disagreement in the party", 
which was "definitely divided into two camps". (138) It was felt by the supporters of the defeated 
candidate, Councillor Poole, that Eccleston's success was due partly to an eloquent speech of support 
from McShane and partly to the appearance on the night of two additional delegates from Eccleston's 
union. McShane had also openly stated that he thought Poole was too young to stand. Criticism of him 
by Poole's supporters led McShane to ask for a vote of confidence, which he easily secured. (139) After 
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a further meeting, at which there were "heated passages" and "heated interchanges", the selection was 
finally confirmed by a vote of 26 to 15 with 10 abstentions. (140) 
Meanwhile the Walsall Labour Party was experiencing a decline in membership during these years. 
The 1933 Annual Report gave a figure of 760 for 1932, which was nearly double the 1931 total of 360. 
Members were not retained, however, with numbers dropping to 660 in 1933 and 459 in 1934 before 
rising again to 641 in 1935. (141) Ward reports described the situation as "very disappointing", whilst 
finances were described as being in "a very poor state". (142) At the AGM in January 1935 the local 
party reported a deficit of £80. (143) Meanwhile Councillor Whiston, who was now the agent, called for 
"a concerted effort by all to cut out all personal differences and heal all internal breeches in view of the 
imminence of the General Election". (144) 
The problems which the Wolverhampton and Walsall Labour Parties experienced on the eve of the 
1935 General Election were not unique to the Black Country. Local parties had always been dependent 
on the trade unions for financial support. They were now being hit by falling membership and the 
`contracting in' law. The national drive in 1932 to increase individual membership seemed to be very 
effective at first within the region. Thus the Annual Report gives a total of 8,766 for the 10 Black 
Country constituencies in 1932, which was a dramatic increase on the 1931 figure of 5,473. The 
highest memberships were 1,454 for Kingswinford, 1,519 for Stourbridge and 1,561 for Dudley, whilst 
even Smethwick, following Mosley's departure, rose from 240 to 590. Total numbers stayed high for 
1933 at 8,013 with both West Bromwich at 1,147 and Wednesbury at 1,150 showing dramatic 
increases. The major exception to this trend was Wolverhampton, where the Labour Party's internal 
problems meant that membership in the East stayed on the 240 minimum, whilst the West had only 381 
members. In the following years, however, there was a sudden drop in numbers, so that by 1935 the 
total had fallen to 6,290. The figures for Kingswinford, Stourbridge and Dudley had dropped to 738, 
975 and 514 respectively, whilst the West Bromwich total had fallen by nearly a half to 617. (145) 
It seems that Labour's membership and support held up well in the years immediately following the 
fall of the Labour Government in 1931, only to drop off in 1934 and 1935. This fall coincided with the 
revival of the local economy. In their constituency reports on the region for the 1935 General Election 
the Birmingham Post gave figures for the fall in unemployment between 1931 and 1935. In West 
Bromwich the drop was 4,000, in Smethwick 6,000 and in Kingswinford 7,000. The total fell from 
16,076 to 7,675 in Wolverhampton, 7,341 to 2,889 in Dudley and 11,133 to 5,222 in Walsall. (146) 
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By 1935 much of the Black Country was experiencing a similar economic recovery to that in 
Birmingham. A major factor behind this revival was the role played by the region in supplying 
components for the expanding motor vehicle industry. The National Government's policy of tariff 
protection also seemed to be vindicated, as the Birmingham Post pointed to new industries being 
attracted into the region as a result of this policy. (147) 
Economic revival in the 1930s did not benefit the Labour Party as the wartime boom had done. One 
reason for this was that the trade union movement remained subdued. Local workers were conscious 
that their standard of living was higher than for those in the depressed regions. The result was a decline 
in active support for Labour, which reflected itself in the form of falling membership, increased apathy 
at the polls and a grudging acceptance of what the National Government had achieved. Turnouts in the 
1935 General Election, for instance, were the lowest since the exceptional circumstances of 1918, with 
a drop of over 10 per cent in most constituencies. The National Government sought to capture the 
mood of the electorate with a poster, which was widely distributed across the region at this time. One 
half showed their 1931 poster with an unemployed man explaining: - `Mates, help me get a job. Vote 
for the National Government'. Next to it under the date 1935, the same man is seen saying: - `I got the 
job - help me to keep it. Vote for the National Government'. (148) 
Although it has been claimed that the Conservatives were not well prepared for this election, having 
reduced their organisation since 1931, they were certainly in a better position than Labour. (149) 
Gardner, in his study of the Conservatives in Wolverhampton, shows how a mass membership was 
built up in the town at this time. Much of it in the West division was middle class and female, being 
absorbed from the old Primrose League. (150) By 1939 he reckoned that there were 150 business or 
potential business subscribers. (151) Before the 1935 Election the local party organised a monthly 
supply of literature, a number of open air meetings and a visit by an Open Air Talking Cinema 
Van. (152) The local Labour Parties, on the other hand, could not match the resources or organisation of 
their opponents. 
B. THE 1935 GENERAL ELECTION 
1. KINGSWINFORD 
Labour's three successes in 1935 were all quite narrow victories. The Kingswinford seat, which had 
been held by Charlie Sitch from 1918 to 1931, was regained by a mere 16 votes. Not long after his 
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defeat in 1931 Sitch had been sent to prison for 9 months, after being found guilty of embezzling the 
funds of his trade union, the Chainmakers' and Strikers' Association. As Labour's successes here in the 
1920s had been strongly dependent on a personal vote for Sitch, this incident might have affected their 
chances. On the other hand there had been a significant increase in party membership in the 
constituency since the 1931 Election. Sitch's replacement, Arthur Henderson, who was no relation to 
the former leader, concentrated his campaign on attacks on the Means Test and stressed the full 
nationalisation programme of the Labour Manifesto. (153) 
The Conservative MP, Alan Todd, was aware of the force of Labour's argument on the Means Test, 
as the constituency had suffered badly from the decline of the hand chain making industry in the early 
1930s. He announced that "he had never agreed to the present family application of the Means Test", 
which he accepted was "operating harshly" and "would continue to work to get it altered". (154) He 
warned that a Labour victory would lead to increased unemployment and a return to the conditions of 
1931. He was supported here by the Earl of Dudley, who asserted that if a Labour Government were 
returned, "the Round Oak steel works and other industrial undertakings in the country would have to 
close down". This was described by the Express and Star as "political intimidation". (155) Henderson's 
own response to talk of a financial crisis if Labour were returned, was to warn that the Emergency 
Powers Act would be used in order to prevent people "sabotaging the general will" of the public. (156) 
There was talk of a last minute Liberal intervention, but this did not materialise. In the event the 
Chairman of the recently formed Divisional Liberal Five Hundred and a number of other local party 
members took part in Todd's adoption. (157) Their support may have accounted for Todd losing only 
about 1,000 of his 1931 vote. Labour, however, was able to increase its vote by nearly 1,500, which 
gave them their narrow victory. 
2. WEST BROMWICH 
In West Bromwich, where Frank Roberts was fighting the seat he had held from 1918 to 1931, the 
Labour majority was to be larger although still below 1,000. Roberts was a highly respected figure, 
having been on the NEC throughout the 1920s and the Minister of Pensions in both Labour 
Governments. His opponent was not the MP, Alexander Ramsey, as he had stood down when 
appointed director of an employer's federation, but another company director, Robert Ashton from 
Sevenoaks. 
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The Liberal vote was considered a key factor in the constituency, since this time, unlike 1931, there 
was no Liberal standing. The Conservatives had the support of Dr A. E. W. Hazel, a former Liberal MP 
who had backed Labour in previous elections, and Alderman W. Poultney, who signed Ashton's 
nomination papers. Roberts, however, had a letter of support from another prominent Liberal, 
Alderman John Bill-(158) Ashton hoped to exploit the improved employment situation in the borough, 
along with the Corporation's house building programme. Indeed he pointed out that, thanks to low 
interest rates, the local Council had increased the number of new houses from 1,500 to 2,800. (159) 
Roberts, however, relied heavily on the personal vote, which he had secured over the years. In a later 
article, written when Roberts retired from parliament, the Birmingham Mail pointed out that "the secret 
of his hold on West Bromwich has been that he identified himself so completely with the interests and 
everyday life of its people, that they regarded him as one of their own". (160) At the same time, 
however, there had been a big increase in individual membership in the constituency from the 240 
minimum in 1930 to 973 in 1935. (161) West Bromwich was also one of only three Black Country 
constituencies to retain an agent during these years. (162) It was these distinctive factors, which helped 
Roberts to gain his narrow victory. 
3. WEDNESBURY 
Labour's third and biggest victory was at Wednesbury, where John Banfield retained the seat, which 
he had won in the by-election, with a reduced majority. His opponent was Reverend H. Dunston, who 
stood as a National Labour candidate, backed by the local Conservative organisation. Banfield, 
however, proved a strong candidate, putting most emphasis on the constituency's social problems. He 
campaigned on the abolition of the Means Test and on local housing conditions, citing the case of a 
man, wife and seven children living and sleeping in one bedroom. (163) He called for a subsidy to the 
local authority to assist in the provision of new houses, claiming that conditions were worse than those 
in Glasgow. He highlighted one backyard in Tipton, where 23 people were living and sharing one 
lavatory. (164) 
The Labour Party here was greatly helped by increased individual membership with numbers rising 
from 461 in 1931 to 1,147 in 1933 and 973 in 1935. (165) This was a constituency, whose individual 
memberships had rarely risen above the 180 minimum during the 1920s. To combat the Labour appeal 
Dunston's main strategy was to stress the economic record of the National Government, especially the 
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impact that Protection had made on employment prospects in the constituency. (166) Banfield's victory 
margin of nearly 3,000 was a reminder of what Labour had achieved in the 1920s. The turnout, 
however, was only 78.1 per cent compared with 88-89 per cent during the 1920s. 
4. SMETHWICK 
Smethwick was the other seat, which Labour had held throughout the 1920s. Given the party's 
performance in recent local elections, it was probably not surprising that they failed to win it back in 
1935. It appears that there was still something of a backlash following the departure of Oswald Mosley, 
although this probably took the form of apathy at the polls rather than outright opposition. The turnout 
of 70.7 per cent was the lowest in the Black Country and down from 74.7 per cent in 1931 and 78.9 per 
cent in 1929. (167) 
Another problem for Labour was that Roy Wise, who had captured the seat for the Conservatives in 
1931, proved a popular MP, especially it seems with the young. Wise was a maverick member, who 
refused to be bound by the rigid party system, and spoke freely on his main concern, which was 
imperial development. (168) He also condemned the Peace Ballot as "a grotesque sham", believing that 
the government should not fully support the existing covenant of the League of Nations. (169) 
The Labour candidate, Dr Brock, appeared to take some time to settle to the campaign with his 
meetings reported as failing to arouse enthusiasm. He was attacked as an "out and out Socialist, who is 
preaching an idealism that has no relation to circumstances". (170) He spent much time attacking 
unemployment but locally Smethwick was now experiencing increased employment. Similarly his 
concern over poor housing conditions in the constituency was challenged by the slum clearance 
programme launched by the National Government. Even the cry of `dear food' from a protectionist 
Government seemed to have little appeal. (171) 
The problem for Labour was that enthusiasm for the party was not growing as local membership 
figures show. Having leaped from 240 members in 1931 to 590 in 1932 and 617 in 1933, party 
membership then dropped to 545 in 1934 and 535 in 1935. (172) Faced with a populist candidate and an 
improving employment situation, the Labour Party was unable to convince the local electorate that it 
was a viable alternative. One local observer noted that Brock improved as the election progressed, 
revealing "fighting qualities that surprised me". (173) Even this statement, however, suggests that the 
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local party was not totally behind their candidate. Wise won with a fairly convincing majority of over 
1,500. 
5. BIL T 
Labour's best hope of success in Wolverhampton was probably at Bilston, which had been held from 
1924 to 1931. The Conservative MP, G. K. Peto, had retired to be replaced by Ian Hannah, who claimed 
to be on the left of the party. His support for the Peace Ballot, along with "reasonable rearmament" 
probably ensured him the backing of many local Liberals, including their 1929 candidate, Major 
S. T. Thompson, who spoke on the same platform. (174) The normally Liberal Wolverhampton Express 
and Star also called for the return of a National Government "by a substantial majority". The paper 
warned that if Labour were returned, "the result can only be chaos" with "violent changes in the 
economic order" at a time unsuited for "hazardous experiments". Baldwin was praised as "the most 
Liberal minded leader the Conservatives ever had" and whose governments "have continually in mind 
the lot of the workers and the troubles of the depressed areas". (175) 
The Labour candidate, D. L. Mort, had been nursing the seat since the retirement of John Baker after 
the previous election. The local party had a strong tradition within the region for its membership and 
organisation. Unfortunately it no longer had Sam Hague as its agent. Nevertheless in 1934 party 
membership was the highest in the region at 995. This proved to be the peak for the decade, as the total 
for 1935 was only 763. (176) The Birmingham Post accused the Labour Party of putting too much 
emphasis on the decay of capitalism in a constituency where employment was rising and the 
Government's industrial policy seemed to be working. (177) 
Hannah retained the seat for the National Government with a majority of 869 votes. A significant 
factor here was also the low turnout, which was down from over 80 per cent at the previous three 
General Elections to only 70.9 per cent. (178) Hannah stressed his moderation as a factor in his success, 
claiming that he was "not a die-hard" and would be "on the left side of the Conservative Party". Mort 
stressed the bad weather on polling day and the lack of motor cars at his disposal as factors behind his 
defeat. (179) It seems more likely that working-class apathy was encouraged by the economic climate, 
which persuaded many workers that they risked losing their jobs by voting Labour. 
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6. WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
Elsewhere in Wolverhampton Labour's prospects were much weaker. In the West Division the party 
was not only split, but also short of members and up against the populist appeal of Sir Robert Bird. The 
decision to fight the seat had been made by Labour soon after the 1931 General Election. It was felt by 
the Midland Region National Organiser, H. Drinkwater, that party organisation would be improved "if a 
good fighting candidate were in the field". (180) An attempt was made to secure Charles Ede, a 
prominent Labour politician and former MP for South Shields., but it appears that he was unwilling to 
stand. (181) It was then resolved to nominate Jessie Stephens, but this was blocked by Head 
Ofice. (182) Eventually the Reverend R. Lee from Coventry, who was suggested by Drinkwater, was 
nominated in May 1933. (183) 
In September of the same year W. J. Brown announced his decision to fight the seat again for the ILA, 
with the backing of £1100 from the Civil Service Association. Brown denounced Lee, claiming that he 
was in the field "because the Labour Party could get no one better". He went on to say that Labour had 
been trying for months to get a trade union candidate or a wealthy man, "but there was not a trade 
union leader in the country, who would fight that seat while he was in the field and no wealthy man 
would throw his money away". (184) 
Lee's response to this was to accuse Brown of dividing the working class at a time when Fascism 
threatened. (185) This brought a reply from W. G. Clemson, Chairman of the ILA, who in a letter to the 
Express and Star, claimed that Lee was misled about the local situation, when he was persuaded to 
stand, due to "blind hatred for a genuine Labour man on behalf of the local officials of the Labour 
Party". He went on to claim that "these local caucuses never believed in, preached or practised the 
barest elements of Socialism". (186) 
This clash set the pattern for the election campaign, with the two Labour men appearing more 
concerned with fighting each other than Bird. In this matter Brown emerged the undoubted winner as 
Lee proved a lacklustre candidate. Moreover despite setting up a special election fund on the 25th April 
1935 the West Wolverhampton Labour Party was desperately short of money. (187) On the 22"d 
October they agreed to accept a loan of £200 from a Mr Grainger to help contest the seat. At the same 
time it was agreed by the Executive Committee to limit expenditure to £210. (188) 
Brown's finances were on a much sounder footing. He also had important backers, including Lloyd 
George, who telegramed his support. (189) Brown promised action on unemployment, including raising 
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the school leaving age and granting pensions at 60. (190) Meanwhile Bird concentrated on the 
economic successes of the National Government, boasting that "short time has practically gone; full 
time and even overtime are becoming the rule in Wolverhampton". (191) He also backed the 
Government's modest rearmament programme, quoting Baldwin's declaration that "there has not been, 
there is not and will not be any question of huge armaments or materially increased forces". (192) 
Bird won a comfortable victory, polling more than the combined vote of the two Labour candidates. 
Lee came a poor third, losing his deposit. Even in defeat Brown seemed more concerned over his 
rivalry with the official Labour Party, claiming that "it was incumbent upon me to fight the vicious and 
corrupt caucus, which now dominates the Labour movement in Britain". He blamed his defeat on the 
bringing in of Lee, as he had "split the progressive vote". (193) 
7. WOLVERHAMPTON EAST 
In Wolverhampton East the position of the Labour Party was little better. This was a constituency, 
which had been held continuously by the Liberals throughout the inter-war years, and where Labour 
had come third in every General Election they had contested. Only in 1929 had they exceeded 25% of 
the poll. Furthermore party membership had stood at a not very impressive 240 since 1931 in this 
predominantly working-class constituency. (194) Their candidate, H. E. Lane, was a local man, who was 
expected by the Birmingham Post to take votes from the Liberals. Indeed the paper thought that 
Geoffrey Mander, the Liberal MP, would lose his seat to John Brockhouse, the Conservative. (195) 
Mander had stood as a National Liberal in 1931, although opposed by both Conservatives and 
Labour candidates. As a Samuelite Liberal he had withdrawn his support for the government, following 
the introduction of tariffs. Brockhouse, who was a West Bromwich manufacturer, reckoned he could 
win the seat by stressing the economic advantages that Protection had brought to the constituency. (196) 
Instead it was Mander, who squeezed the Labour vote, by stressing his opposition to the Means Test 
and supporting the peace efforts of the League of Nations. (197) His strongest support remained 
amongst the Nonconformist community of locksmiths in Willenhall. (198) He was therefore able to 
increase his majority over the Conservatives by 1,700 to 4,000. The Labour vote fell by roughly the 
same amount to just below 5,000, giving them only 15% of the total, which was their lowest since 
1922. The only sign of a Labour advance here, which eventually gave them victory in 1945, was the 
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success of the ILA in local elections, where they challenged the Liberal hold in the two eastern wards 
of St. James and St Matthews. (199) 
8. WALSALL 
In Walsall, where the local Labour Party had selected J. Eccleston as their candidate in November 
1933, open conflict erupted early in 1935. According to the Walsall Observer "various sections have 
not been harmonising as they might... Some take the view that Labour cannot hope to win Walsall 
unless they have a candidate with a national reputation". Others defended the choice, pointing to the 
former popularity of local leaders, such as Alderman Thicket and J. McShane, the former W. Eccleston 
was not considered "a brilliant platform man" but had the advantage of "a sound and sober knowledge 
of working-class aspirations and an obvious sincerity, which many people admire". According to the 
local press much of the opposition to the candidate came from the left in the form of members of the 
ILP and those, "who are alleged to have Communist views". Asked at a meeting in February 1934 
about uniting with the ILP, the Communist Party and the Unemployed Workers Union, Eccleston had 
refused to give a guarantee that the Walsall Labour Party would affiliate with the ILP. (200) 
In March 1935 delegates had been read a letter from Harden Ward, which was Councillor Poole's 
base, complaining of "the inactivity of the candidate, the necessity to poll more votes at the next 
election and the lack of effort to influence the electorate". Poole himself spoke, declaiming any part in 
the letter, but pointing out that "the bare majority vote of the Selection Conference was proving a 
difficulty". He spoke of a "lack of propaganda" and thought "the town should have been stumped from 
end to end". The secretary and agent, Councillor Whiston, added that the candidate had attended only 
two of the Sunday evening meetings, which had been held regularly for six months in the wards. He 
pointed out though that they should not expect "the strenuous efforts, which had been shown by Mr 
McShane". Eccleston was defended by McShane who spoke of "the disgusting manner in which the 
letter had been used in the press" When a vote was taken, delegates backed Eccleston by 33 votes to 
7. (201) 
Meanwhile membership of the Walsall Labour Party was falling. Having risen from 360 in 1931 to 
760 in the following year, it then dropped to 660 in the 1933 and 459 in 1934. There was then a small 
revival to 641 in 1935. (202) The fall was reflected in the financial situation within the party, which was 
so bad that on the 23'' May the Financial Committee resigned en bloc. Councillor Whiston warned that 
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"sections of the party would not work together or were willing to let things drift... there was greater 
enthusiasm outside the party delegates than was evidenced inside". (203) He later decided to tender his 
resignation as the Labour Party Agent. (204) 
A Special Delegates' Meeting of the party was held in July 1935, attended by the Assistant National 
Organiser, R. T. Wimble. He spoke of concern within the NEC over the fall in membership and the 
apathy in the constituency towards the Victory to Socialism campaign. Concern was also shown over 
the termination of the agent's appointment on the eve of a General Election. Delegates then spoke of 
personal differences within the local party and the lack of interest in ward meetings. Whiston spoke of 
the failure of the candidate to justify his selection, as he had not been able to inspire enthusiasm within 
the party. Eccleston defended himself by saying that he had received little co-operation from 
councillors but had been welcomed in the wards and by trade union branches. Windle then warned that 
"the Party could not enter a fight in this frame of mind, the outlook would be disastrous". He concluded 
by saying that "he had never before met such a defeatist spirit" and on the question of the candidate "he 
felt it was the wish of the party to reconsider the matter". (205) 
Windle attended a further delegates' meeting on the 29th August, claiming that Headquarters wanted 
the constituency's problems sorted out, since "it is industrial, it has been represented in Parliament by a 
Labour member and it is marginal". He warned that the local party was in a terrible position with "no 
literature distributions, no unity, very little propaganda". Delegates then voted by 26 to 21 to reopen the 
question of the parliamentary candidate. (206) A week later Eccleston agreed to resign complaining "of 
lack of support generally from members of the party". (207) His letter of resignation was leaked to the 
press. In it he wrote that he had "never received from certain prominent people in the party that support 
and loyalty to which I was morally entitled". (208) 
Such were the divisions within the party, that no other local candidate was considered. Instead a list 
of outsiders was drawn up, but the best choices declined to stand. (209) A move was made to select Sir 
William Jowett, who had been the Attorney General in the last Labour Government, but had then been 
expelled from the Party for joining the National Government. The NEC, however, rejected such a 
move. (210) Eventually on the 1e October W. Graham, a London merchant, was appointed. He had 
been a conscientious objector in World War 1 and was recommended as the best informed on 
international relations. (211) 
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As the General Election followed soon afterwards, the Labour Party had little time to reorganise and 
rally behind their candidate. Leckie, the National Liberal MP, had the advantage not only of being the 
local man, but also of presiding over a big improvement in the town's economic position, with 
unemployment falling by over a half since the previous General Election. (212) One local issue that 
aroused feeling was the National Government's decision to tax the reserves of the Co-operative 
Societies. (213) Graham made a big appeal for Liberal support on the grounds that Leckie was no 
longer true to his principles but dependent upon the Conservatives. (214) He also attacked housing 
conditions in the town, claiming that "the poorest Chinese labourers are not living under such 
abominable conditions as exist in the Birchfield Ward". (215) The problems associated with 
unemployment and the Means Test were also emphasised, but it was felt that, since they were no longer 
urgent issues in Walsall, they tended to identify the party with the depressed years. (216) 
The result was an increase in Leckie's majority by nearly 2,500 to 6,555, with the Labour vote 
falling by nearly 4,500. In accounting for Graham's poor performance the local paper thought that he 
was "not completely at home in the ranks of Labour" and there was "something of a gulf between him 
and his supporters", which was not bridged. It was also thought that the trouble over Eccieston's 
candidature had compromised Labour's position amongst the miners. (217) Leckie, meanwhile, had the 
advantage of being associated with an improving economy as well as being the local man, whilst 
Graham was "a complete stranger". (218) Nevertheless Graham's vote and his proportion of the total 
were almost identical to that of McShane in 1929. What had made the seat harder for Labour to win in 
1935 was that, whilst in 1929 Labour was opposed by both a Conservative and a Liberal, it was now 
faced by a single National Liberal candidate. 
Following the election there were disagreements between the Walsall Labour Party and their former 
candidate over expenses. There were a number of items, which Graham refused to pay and when the 
Executive Committee requested a meeting, they received "an insulting reply". (219) Eventually the 
secretary and agent met him in London in the presence of Windle, the Assistant National Organiser. 
Graham agreed to make some payment but the secretary complained "very bitterly of the attitude 
adopted by the candidate and also his gross insults when asked to deal personally with the matter. (220) 
The incident illustrates the financial plight of local Labour Parties in the region at this time, making 
them dependent upon outsiders with money to fight elections. 
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9. DUDLEY 
In Dudley Labour had a strong candidate in Wedgwood Benn, who was the former Secretary for 
India in the 1929 Labour Government. Until 1927, however, Benn had been a Liberal, accusing Labour 
in 1924 of having produced "a cascade of counterfeit promissory notes". He also described calls to 
class war as "a mocking of the needs of the people" and as "unsound economically and wrong 
morally". (221) Benn was now hoping to gain Liberal votes in a two horse race, but his earlier career 
and statements left much ammunition to his Conservative opponent. 
In 1931 the Liberals had backed Joel, the Conservative candidate, who expected this support to be 
continued in 1935. (222) The president of their Association expressed the view that "Liberals here if 
they vote at all in this election, must either vote for Mr Joel, who satisfactorily answered the Dudley 
Association's questions and has the approval of the Council of Action or they must vote for one who 
left us, when the political skies were dark, one who is now not a Liberal but a Socialist, a renegade who 
seeks to destroy the Liberal Party as a political force and Liberalism along with it". (223) 
There had been a dramatic increase in party membership in Dudley since 1930, when the number of 
individual members totalled only 240. This figure rose to 880 in 1931 and 1,561 in 1932, before 
dropping back to 977 in 1933,752 in 1934 and 514 in 1935. (224) This increase had probably been 
made necessary by the defection of Oliver Baldwin, whose finances had previously underwritten the 
local party. Dudley was also one of only three Black Country constituencies to retain an agent in 
1933. (225) Labour had not performed well in recent local elections in Dudley, losing three seats to the 
Conservatives in those held two weeks before the General Election. Here again the Conservatives could 
put much emphasis on increased prosperity with unemployment falling from 7,341 in 1931 to 2,885 in 
October 1935. The Birmingham Post painted a picture of new industries moving in and of existing ones 
extending their premises. The choice was summed up as "more prosperity versus Labour". (226) 
Joel's vote was down by over 2,000, but the Labour vote also fell, leaving the Conservative majority 
down 1,500 at 2,445. Benn claimed that he had seen documents "sent by employers to their workpeople 
telling them if they voted Socialist and the Socialist Government was elected, they would lose their 
jobs". Benn described this as a "scandal" with workers already in "economic servitude" now being put 
in "political servitude". (227) This type of pressure, which was not unusual in the Black Country at this 




The Stourbridge constituency had increased the number of its electors since 1931 by 10,000 to 
80,000, which reflected its changing character as parts of the seat became a middle class commuter 
region for Birmingham. Unemployment had fallen dramatically in the main industrial regions, such as 
Halesowen from 2,100 to 500 and Oldbury from 3,000 to 800. (229) Local Labour Party membership 
having peaked at 1,519 in the Depression year of 1932 fell away slightly to 1,300 in 1933,1,000 in 
1934 and 975 in 1935. (230) These high numbers, however, reflected the fact that Stourbridge was one 
of the few Black Country constituencies to still support a full time agent. (23 1) 
The 1935 contest was a three cornered fight with the same candidates as in 1931. Wellock, who had 
held the seat for Labour between 1927 and 1931, was a well-known pacifist, who concentrated much of 
his campaign on the threat of war. He denounced the National Government not just for trying to hide 
"one of the most barren four years in modern parliamentary history", but also for carrying through an 
anti-League of Nations policy. (232) His supporters placarded the constituency with posters, illustrating 
war crosses and calling for "election crosses not wooden crosses". (233) 
Morgan, the Conservative MP, described himself as "pro-sanctionist", standing for "national 
defence, peace and prosperity" under a National Government. (234) He dismissed Wellock as "an 
extreme pacifist" and his Liberal opponent as a Free Trader. (235) His cause was considerably helped 
by the increase in local trade. Indeed his supporters put up posters depicting people happy as a direct 
result of National Government activity, whilst Labour posters were denounced as "an insult to our 
honoured dead". (236) The result was an increase in Morgan's majority by around 1,500 to 5,301. Much 
of this was due to the decline in the Liberal vote, which fell by around 3,500. Wellock, himself, 
increased his vote by 687 on a much lower turn out. (237) 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the 1935 General Election in the Black Country seem to confirm Stannage's verdict 
that economic factors were the main reason for the National Party's victory. (238) There had been a big 
fall in unemployment in the Black Country since 1931, which made it easy to portray Labour as the 
Party linked with the 1931 collapse and likely to damage confidence if re-elected. Pressure at the 
workplace from employers helped further this view. Moreover the Labour Party manifesto, which 
stressed nationalisation, allowed them to be portrayed as extremist. Even on the question of social 
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reform, which was badly needed in the Black Country, the National Government could counter by 
pointing to its house building programme, as well as its rushed increase in the child allowance and its 
promise to raise the school leaving age. Foreign policy appears to have been less of an issue here, 
except in Stourbridge, where Wellock, the Labour candidate, was a well-known pacifist. 
The total Labour vote for the 1935 General Election, including the ILA vote in Wolverhampton 
West, was up by less than a thousand at 167,441 on the 1931 figure. This gave Labour 42.8 per cent of 
the poll, compared with 40.1 per cent in 1931 and 44.8 per cent in 1929. The swing to Labour was well 
below that even of Birmingham, but the total percentage remained considerably higher. The results do 
show, however, a consistency in the Labour vote at these elections. The main change from 1929 was 
the collapse of the Liberal vote, which went predominantly to the Conservatives under the National 
banner. Thus where the Liberals won 20.5 per cent of the vote in 1929, they secured only 8.4 per cent 
in 1931 and 7.7 per cent in 1935. 
The statistics for the Black Country are very similar to those for West Yorkshire, where the Labour 
Party gained 43 per cent of the vote, securing 10 MPs out of 23, whilst the National Parties won 45.9 
per cent and the Liberals 9 per cent. (239) This was enough for Reynolds and Laybourn to consider the 
region to have secured its position as a ̀ Labour Heartland'. (240) The authors claim that there had been 
a successful drive to increase individual membership, whilst the Labour organisation had been re- 
invigorated. Finances remained precarious, "but that had always been the case". (241) Laybourn claims 
that by 1935 Labour was considered "respectable" and "responsible". They had won over the working 
class, but had failed to capture the middle-class Liberal vote, which had swung to the National 
Party. (242) He appears not to recognise a working-class Conservative vote in that region. 
In the Black Country, on the other hand, the National Party was slightly stronger, so that Labour was 
able to win only 3 of the 11 seats. The National Party's strength was largely due to the survival of a 
working-class Conservative vote and the absence of Liberal candidates in most constituencies. They 
also had the advantage of being backed by the organisation and financial resources of the Conservative 
Party. Local Labour parties, on the other hand, remained handicapped by their low membership 
numbers and poor finances. Many were also suffering from the long-term effects of the divisions 
brought about by the events of 1931. 
The local press too was firmly anti-Labour with even Liberal papers, such as the Wolverhampton 
Express and Star and the Walsall Observer, put off by the Party's apparently extremist policies. Labour 
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was also affected by the low turnout in this election. A number of reasons have been suggested to 
explain this, including the wet weather and the shortage of cars on Labour's side. (243) It seems more 
probable though that a number of working-class voters, sensing the economic improvement over the 
previous four years, preferred to stay at home. 
D. THE STATE OF LOCAL PARTIES 1936-39 
Following the 1935 General Election left-wing elements appeared to have a greater say in both the 
Wolverhampton and Walsall Labour Parties. On the 30th June 1936, for instance, a resolution from an 
AEU Branch was proposed to the Wolverhampton Labour Party Executive, calling for the Communist 
Party to be affiliated to the Labour Party, "so as to combat the menace of Fascism and War". (244) On 
the 2°d July a motion was carried by the party asking the NEC to place a motion on the agenda at the 
Party Conference calling for the affiliation of the Communist Party. (245) 
In July 1937 W. J. Brown, who had been readopted as the future ILA candidate, agreed to contest 
Stroud as a Popular Front candidate. Within six months the ILA was to dissolve itself and affiliate to 
the Co-operative Party, enabling them to maintain some independence, whilst opening the way to links 
with Labour. Soon after this the local Labour Party, under the influence of Drinkwater, the Regional 
Organiser, took steps to find a prospective candidate for West Wolverhampton. Drinkwater suggested 
that Jim Simmons, the former MP for Erdington, be proposed and this was agreed unanimously. (246) 
On the 14th August Jim Simmons, who had recently lost the Erdington by-election as a pacifist 
candidate, was unanimously adopted at a Special Party Conference. (247) Two weeks later a 
programme of activities was drawn up by Drinkwater to further the new candidate's campaign. (248) 
The selection of Simmons, although suggested by the regional party officials, shows the left leaning 
nature of the West Wolverhampton Party. This was further illustrated in November/December 1937 
when the Communist Party held a series of lectures in the Labour Rooms. When challenged both the 
treasurer and the secretary disclaimed any knowledge of the bookings. (249) On the 2' October 1938 
the local Labour Party joined with the Communist Party and the Left Book Club in a united 
demonstration, which both the Co-operative Party and the Liberals had withdrawn from. It seems that it 
was the Communist Party, which was the driving force behind the action. (250) This was all part of the 
move to involve Constituency Labour Parties in Popular Front activities, which the Birmingham Party 
had become involved in. 
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Despite this on the 2"d February 1939 the local party carried a motion endorsing the action of the 
NEC over the expulsion of Sir Stafford Cripps for his advocacy of a Popular Front. (251) This action 
would suggest that the moderates had prevailed in the local party, which would confirm the views of 
Jones in Borough Politics. He claims that it was the extremists who joined the ILA, leaving "harmony" 
amongst those that remained. For this he credits the leadership of A. Davies, the railwayman, who 
became Chairman of the local party and leader of the Group, and C. W. Hill, who was the secretary of 
both. Jones claims that they were "able, commanded the respect of followers, kept their fingers on the 
pulse of Council activities and exercised moderate, tactful yet firm leadership". (252) There was even a 
slight improvement in membership during these years from a low 240 in the 1936 to 310 in 1939. (253) 
A more pronounced left-wing element also appeared in the Walsall Labour Party at this time. During 
the abdication crisis delegates unanimously protested to the Daily Herald over the attention it was 
giving to the monarchy. A majority also criticised party leaders over their attitude to the crisis and for 
not exploiting the matter in the interests of the working class. (254) Then in May 1937 a motion was 
carried protesting to the NEC over its threat to expel members of the Socialist League for its support 
for the Unity Campaign. (255) Later the Walsall delegates, unlike those in Wolverhampton, 
unanimously backed Cripps after his expulsion from the Party. (256) 
Attempts were made to improve local party unity. In particular the Labour Group on Walsall Council 
had to sign a declaration that they would accept the whip. Delegates were to be informed if councillors 
missed three consecutive meetings without an explanatory letter. (257) None of this, however, seemed 
to improve party membership, which dropped from 482 in the 1936 to 256 in 1938 before rising to 407 
in 1939. (258) Indeed the local party seemed to hit a crisis early in 1939, when the secretary announced 
his resignation at the AGM over "the lack of organisation in most of our wards". (259) 
Other local constituency parties seemed to be in an equally poor state during these years. 
Smethwick's membership, which stood at 535 in 1935, dropped to 404 in 1937, revived slightly in 
1938, before slumping to 249 in 1939. (260) In January 1938 the Smethwick Trades and Labour 
Council was said to be "in a state of chaos" and there was a move to appoint a subcommittee "to 
examine the whole question of organisation in the borough". (261) In February it was reported that the 
Trades and Labour Council would no longer meet as a joint body. (262) Other constituency parties also 
experienced drops in membership at this time. Stourbridge, for instance, which had 1,000 members in 
1936, dropped to 700 in 1937 and 620 in 1939. Indeed total party membership in the ten Black Country 
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constituency parties fell by a third from 6290 in 1935 to 4275 in 1938, before making a modest revival 
to 4457 in 1939. (263) 
Another important indicator of the strength of the Labour Party in the region in 1939 was the fact 
that there were only two full time agents in Black Country constituencies. In 1930 there had been six. 
The situation was even worse in Birmingham, where there was only one agent in 1939. (264) 
These dismal figures are reflected in the municipal election results between 1936-1938, when there 
was to be no swing back to Labour. In 1936, for instance, Labour lost three seats in both Dudley and 
Wednesbury, one in West Bromwich and a net loss of one in Smethwick. Only in the recently 
incorporated borough of Rowley Regis did Labour achieve any success, capturing three seats from 
Independents and a majority on the Council. (265) 
In 1937, however, Labour lost three seats in Rowley Regis along with two in Wednesbury and one 
in Stourbridge, Dudley and Smethwick. In Rowley Regis Labour had an ambitious programme for new 
housing schemes, municipal offices, welfare measures and an improved deal for council workmen, but 
the opposition, fighting as Independents successfully accused them of extravagance, wastefulness and 
officialdom (266) 
In 1938 Labour lost a further seat in each of Smethwick, Wednesbury and Dudley, whilst gaining 
one in Stourbridge, Walsall and West Bromwich. (267) The result left Labour with 16 out of 40 seats in 
Walsall, 6 out of 16 in Wednesbury, 11 out of 33 in West Bromwich, 18 out of 59 in Wolverhampton 
and 9 out of 32 in Smethwick. (268) One explanation for this poor performance in municipal elections, 
was the existence of anti-Socialist alliances, which Reynolds and Laybourn have also noted in West 
Yorkshire. (269) Thus from 1936 onwards the main opposition to Labour in Wolverhampton, Walsall, 
Stourbridge, West Bromwich, Rowley Regis and Oldbury came from so called Independents. Only in 
Smethwick and Dudley, where the Liberals were no longer strong, did the Conservatives fight under 
their own party label. 
Two weeks after the 1938 municipal elections on the 16'h November a by-election was fought at 
Walsall, following the death of Leckie, the National Liberal W. Since the by-election was held only a 
few weeks after Chamberlain had signed the Munich Agreement, it was seen by many commentators as 
a test of approval for the Prime Minister. At the recently held Oxford by-election, for instance, the 
Government had triumphed, but at Bridgwater a startling victory was secured by Vernon Bartlett, who 
stood as an Independent Progressive with unofficial Labour backing. (270) 
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Another National Liberal, Sir George Schuster, stood for the Government. Unlike his predecessor he 
was not a local man, but a director of a number of banks as well as being chairman of Allied Suppliers 
Ltd, which controlled a group of multiple shopping companies. (271) Schuster appealed for a vote of 
confidence in Chamberlain's policy, claiming that he could no longer support the Treaty of Versailles 
or justify a war to return '/2 million Germans in Czechoslovakia. His watchwords, he claimed, were: - 
"Peace in the world based on strength, generous social services at home, based on prosperity in 
industry and good employment". (272) In his election address he stated that the British needed a leader, 
who "must be known in other countries and believed in as a man of peace". Labour's policy, he 
claimed, "would have landed us in war". (273) 
The Labour Party laid much importance on this by-election. As evidence of this it can be pointed out 
that, whilst the local party could only raise £90 for expenses, £300 was supplied nationally from the 
By-Election Insurance Fund. This enabled an agent, Pat Connolly, a joint organiser of the Party, to be 
appointed. (274) The Labour candidate, G. Jeger, had been adopted unanimously as candidate for the 
General Election earlier in the year. He was a London journalist and mayor of Shoreditch, who agreed 
to assist the party financially, promising about £190 for election expenses. (275) 
Jeger denounced the Government over Munich for having "betrayed its pledges, encouraged 
aggression and sabotaged the League". He attacked them for failing to follow a policy of collective 
resistance to aggression through the League of Nations. (276) He warned that the Munich Agreement 
had not brought peace: - "Everybody is asking where will Hitler strike next". (277) Jeger outlined 
Labour's peace policy, which called for "a collective stand.... against lawlessness and aggression" and 
the calling of a world conference to "deal with legitimate grievances and to evolve a system of security 
and economic opportunity, which will remove the causes of war". (278) Jeger also tried to stress 
domestic as well as foreign affairs, raising the matter of old age pensions and the Means Test. (279) 
There were also visits from prominent figures in the party, including Clement Attlee. In an open letter 
he highlighted incompetence in the production of anti aircraft defences, whilst also pointing out that 
unemployment nationally had risen by 400,000 during the year. (280) 
Schuster, however, won with a substantial majority of over 7,000. Labour's one satisfaction was to 
increase its vote by nearly 2,000 and reduce the 1935 majority by a similar amount. Schuster put his 
victory down to "the fact that Mr Chamberlain has saved this country from the risk of war and that the 
best hope for better employment and greater expenditure on social services lies in supporting a 
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Government that works for peace and creates that confidence on which prosperity depends". (281) It 
was also felt that women voters, who made up the majority of electors in the constituency, favoured 
Chamberlain's policy, being "very grateful to the Prime Minister for the bold initiative he took in 
dispersing the clouds of war". (282) 
Jeger reckoned that he had lost because "the people of Walsall are so bewildered by recent events 
that they have not yet come to an understanding of the effects of Munich on the nation's future". (283) 
He also claimed that "on account of his Jewish origins" he had been subjected to "a certain amount of 
vile abuse" by local speakers supporting his opponent. (284) The former Walsall MP, J. McShane, 
argued that since the local party lacked unity "it had not for years had an adequate machine in the 
town". He also claimed that memories of the horrors of war were still intense, so that people in Walsall 
thought that Chamberlain "had saved them from dreadful perils". The local party president, Hamson, 
admitted that "there were working-class wards, where Labour has nothing like a proper 
organisation". (285) Pat Connolly, the election agent, blamed the Chamberlain influence, stating that 
"taking all into account it must be realised that we are still under the Birmingham influence". (286) It 
seems that in this by-election, in which foreign policy was the major issue, the government candidate 
had the advantage. 
In these circumstances pressure was put on the local party to impose some discipline and unity. At 
the next delegates meeting Connolly, the joint organiser of the Labour Party, praised the local party's 
campaign but warned that "local people were not turning out in the desired strength for winning such a 
fight". He claimed that meetings had been well attended and all points of policy covered. Defeat, he 
reckoned, had come in the last three days of the campaign, due to the tactics of the opposition in their 
poster campaign. At the same time he praised the Labour candidate for "his willingness to work and 
fight". Connolly went on to suggest the need for a membership campaign to enrol 10 per cent of the 
22,000 Labour poll. (287) Judging from the Annual Report there appears to have been some 
improvement in membership with numbers, which had sunk from 304 in 1937 to 256 in 1938, rising to 
369 in 1939. (288) 
It is hard not to conclude that the 1930s were a disappointing decade for the Labour Party in the 
Black Country. Whereas in the 1920s the region had been ahead of similar working-class regions in its 
support, during the 1930s it seemed to be trailing. Thorpe, in his study of the Labour Party in Derby, 
points to a strong revival in the mid 1930s with the party regaining control of the borough council in 
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1934 and returning one Labour MP in 1935. (289) Similarly in West Yorkshire Reynolds and Laybourn 
have Labour winning 43 per cent of the vote and returning 10 of 23 MPs in the 1935 General Election. 
A major reason for this, they claim, was the Labour organisation. Thanks to a successful campaign to 
increase individual membership there was "a re-invigoration of the whole movement". (290) On the 
other hand Savage in his study of the Labour Party in Preston detects a malaise in the local party here 
similar to that in the Black Country. Despite the high unemployment the party lost parliamentary and 
municipal elections. Savage claims that unemployment divided the working class, whilst women were 
alienated by the policies towards them of the 1929 Labour Government. (291) 
Labour's decline in the Black Country did not begin with the 1931 General Election, as Labour had 
performed better than average in the region, despite the upsets caused by Mosley and Brown. Indeed 
ward organisation as judged by party membership peaked in 1932 and 1933. In the following years, 
however, with employment and economic activity improving more quickly here than in Labour's 
northern heartlands, it was the National Government that got the credit. Local Labour parties began to 
suffer from a shortage of funds and poor organisation. A mass membership had not been built up in the 
constituencies, leaving the local parties dependent on the work of a few active members and the 
finances of a trade union movement, which had become weakened and shackled during the inter-war 
years. 
Behind this situation lay a decline in working-class confidence in their own institutions. This was not 
helped by the divisions and disunity, which affected many local parties during the 1930s. It would be 
wrong, therefore, to see the Labour Party at this time moving inexorably towards its great success of 
1945. In fact had a General Election been called in 1940 the party was unlikely to have improved on its 
1935 performance in the region. 
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CONCLUSI 
The initial aim of this thesis was to produce for the first time a breakdown of the strength of the 
Labour Party in the Black Country between 1918 and 1939. The evidence from the available primary 
and secondary sources hows that from 1918 to the early 1930s the Labour Party established itself in 
the region with sufficient strength for the Black Country to have claims to be considered a 'Labour 
heartland'. Having secured a breakthrough in the 1918 General Election with four NVs and 42.8 per 
cent of the poll in contested seats, the party's support remained fairly solid throughout he period. It 
grew steadily to reach a peak of 45.9 per cent in 1929, before dipping to 40.1 per cent in 1931. There 
was then a modest recovery to 42.8 per cent in 1935, which was exactly the same proportion as in 
1918. The figures show that the biggest swing of voters to Labour took place during the First World 
War, with support remaining fairly solid during the inter-war years, neither expanding nor dropping 
significantly. This accounts for the consistently small size of the electoral majorities of Labour's NVs 
as well as the low swing against the party in the 1931 General Election, when Labour lost all its seats in 
the region. Similarly a Labour recovery during the 1930s was less apparent here than in similar 
industrial areas. This meant, however, that by the end of the period the region could no longer be 
considered 'a Labour heartland'. 
It has been less easy to meet the second aim of this thesis, which was to supply a full explanation for 
Labour's varied electoral fortunes. This has been largely owing to the nature of the source material. 
The thesis has had to rely heavily upon the press and Labour Party records, both of which have 
significant gaps and limitations. Party records, for instance, have only been available in two instances 
for the Black Country, whilst much of the local press tended to have an anti-Labour bias. This me-ant, 
of course, that that there was a lack of balance in covering Labour's electoral fortunes. Even newspaper 
treatment of constituencies at election times was not always even, as much depended on the 
parliamentary division's significance as a major population centre or on the personality of the 
politicians involved. These are major problems but not unique to a study of the Labour Party in the 
Black Country. 
The issue, which transcends the whole of this thesis, however, was Labour's inability to make this 
region one of its heartlands, despite the party's dramatic breakthrough in 1918 and its success in 
securing at least two-fifths of the vote in each of the inter-war General Elections apart from 1923. 
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Explanations for Labour's varied electoral achievements in the Black Country have been discussed in 
the relevant chapters. Nevertheless certain final conclusions can be made. 
The thesis has shown that Labour's initial breakthrough in the Black Country rested almost entirely 
on its links with the trade union movement, since it provided the bulk of the funds, organisation and 
NVs at least down to 1926. Non-union parliamentary candidates were invariably unsuccessful at this 
time. This close link between the unions and the Labour Party parallels the findings of other Labour 
historians, such as those presented nationally by McKibbin and locally by Reynolds and Laybourn in 
their study of the West Riding, In particular, the sudden emergence of the Labour Party in the Black 
Country seems to reinforce McKibbin's claim that it was a combination of the new extended franchise 
and the growing class consciousness of the industrial working class that enabled Labour to win support 
in the immediate post-war years. The link between the unions and local constituency parties had 
developed in the years just before and during the First World War. This was a time of full employment, 
which brought the unions rising membership and influence. Indeed most of the local parties in the 
region appear to have emerged from their local trades councils and in some cases seemed almost 
inseparable. In this respect this thesis reinforces McKibbin's claim that it was the efforts of these union 
dominated local parties that brought Labour success in the post-war years. 
McKibbin, however, was also aware of the limitations on Labour's expansion at this time, 
comparing the party's achievements in Britain unfavourably with those of the Social Democrats 
amongst the German working class. Howard went further by pointing out that the trade union link had 
its drawbacks, as it deterred Labour from broadening its support amongst the non-unionised working 
class and other sections of society. Savage, in his study of Labour in Preston, describes how the local 
party's initial success was tempered because of its inability to break away from its trade union roots. 
The evidence from the Black Country constituencies gives some backing for this position as the region 
experienced only a slow expansion in Labour's support during the early 1920s. The loss of Dudley in 
1922 following its capture in a by-election in the previous year was a blow to Labour and illustrates the 
weakness of some local parties at this time. As Ia major characteristic of the region's constituency 
parties in the post-war years was their low individual membership this was not surprising. It left them 
very much under the influence of the trade unions at a time when union membership and funds were 
being hit by the post-war slump and a series of defeated strikes. Nevertheless, although expansion was 
slow through the first half of the 1920s, there is no evidence here of any major reversal in the fortunes 
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of the Labour Party in the Black Country during this period. This thesis does not support the 
pessimistic views of the unions of Howard and Savage, but recognises the importance of the trade 
union link in giving local parties a solid base in the early 1920s, although restricting them from 
expanding more widely. 
During the late 1920s ward organisation, particularly party membership, came to play a part in the 
electoral fortunes of the Labour Party. This was particularly important at this time as constituency 
parties were being hit not just by failing trade union membership, but also by the new law forcing their 
members to contract into the Labour Party, following the defeat of the General Strike. This thesis has 
shown that where local parties were able to improve their ward organisation some success followed. 
Bilston, for instance, expanded its individual memberships and broadened its appeal by incorporating a 
successful Women's Section. It is possible that defeats for trade unions in industrial disputes and the 
loss of some of their powers encouraged more individual members to join their local constituency 
party. The by-election victory in Stourbridge, for instance, seems largely to have been a consequence of
improved organisation, especially the big growth in individual membership. The successful candidate, 
Wellock, was an active pacifist and socialist rather than a trade union official. Parallels here can be 
made with the changes made to the ward organisation of the local party in Preston in the middle to late 
1920s, as described by Savage. 
Improvements in ward organisation and membership were evident in most Black Country 
constituencies during the time of the 1929 Labour Government. Even the fall of this government and 
the electoral defeat of 1931 did not immediately change matters, as the peak years for individual 
membership were 1932 and 1933. During the mid to late 1930s, however, many of the Black Country 
Labour constituencies eemed to retreat to their trade union roots. This was at a time when 
unemployment in the region was declining, although union membership remained low and fairly static. 
Indeed Labour's three successes in the 1935 General Election came in constituencies where the union 
link was always more important than individual membership. 
During the mid to late 1930s the decline in the individual membership of many local parties in the 
Black Country and their indifferent electoral fortunes was a contrast to the national picture. Labour's 
inability to fully re-establish its position here during these years means that the region can no longer be 
described as one of its heartlands. This contrasts sharply with the situation described by Reynolds and 
Laybourn in the West Riding and Thorpe in Derby, where Labour experienced a major recovery in the 
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late 1930s. Labour's position in the Black Country, however, was matched by that in Birmingham, 
whilst Savage has noted a similar malaise in the local party in Preston. 
It seems, therefore, that most but not all the constituency parties in the Black Country remained 
predominantly under trade union influence during the inter-war period. This was sufficient to provide 
Labour with its initial success in the region, but it failed to make it the majority party during this period 
when trade union membership, finances and influence were all in decline. Improvements in ward 
organisation in some constituencies during the late 1920s and early 1930s seemed to be giving local 
parties a new direction. Although this helped to bring Labour further successes for a time, the change 
was not widespread nor was it deep rooted in many constituencies, The result was that most seemed to 
revert to being under union influence by the end of the period. 
Personality also played a significant role at various times during this period. Labour benefited in the 
early 1920s from having moderate, hard working Ws. They were active in Parliament on behalf of 
their constituents, whilst their trade union roots contributed to their popularity. With their relatively 
small majorities these factors were quite important to their electoral success. During the late 1920s, 
however, the crisis in trade union membership encouraged local parties such as those in Smethwick and 
Dudley to entrust heir fortunes to a rich patron, who could provide the wealth and publicity to fight 
electoral campaigns. There was a similar situation in Wolverhampton West although in this case the 
personality concerned was a well financed trade union official. In all these cases, however, the result 
for the local party proved to be disastrous in the 1930s, as the personalities involved were responsible 
for splits and divisions in the critical year of 193 1. 
The fortunes of the Labour Party in the region were also affected by the nature of the opposition. 
Liberalism was less a threat to Labour because its organisation, which was weak even before 1914, had 
virtually collapsed in many constituencies during the inter-war period. Yet in the three divisions of 
Wolverhampton East, Walsall and Stourbridge, where the Liberal Party survived as a force, it could 
still damage Labour's prospects. This was because the Liberal vote was predominantly aworking-class 
one and traditionally opposed to the Conservatives. Wolverhampton East was certainly a seat, which 
Labour should have won had Liberalism not secured such a hold there. In both Walsall and Stourbridge 
the Liberal vote was significant enough to delay Labour's efforts to develop a separate identity. 
It was the Conservative Party, however, which remained the major threat to Labour's expansion, 
especially since it secured significant support amongst the working class in the region. Its strength lay 
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amongst non-unionised workers, particularly those who felt economically insecure. It was these 
workers who were most likely to be attracted by the idea of protective tariffs. At the same time, 
however, the Black Country Conservatives lacked the reforming traditions of the Unionists in 
Birmingham. Most of their candidates tended to be hard-headed local businessmen, whose main 
election strategy seemed to be either to ffighten the electorate over the disasters a Labour Government 
would bring or to wam of the loss of jobs that would come without the adoption of tariff reform. These 
policies had some success amongst the economically insecure, especially in the 1930s, when the 
working class was generally on the defensive. At other times, however, Conservative policies must 
have seemed rather negative compared to the reforms that Labour was proposing, 
One strategy, which helped the Conservatives at important times throughout the inter-war years, was 
to agree with the Liberals over forming anti-Socialist pacts. The aim was to confront Labour with one 
candidate at elections. Stressing the word Socialist rather than Labour was partly propaganda s this 
term was more likely to frighten those who felt threatened by a Labour administration, The pacts were 
used in this form mainly in local elections, as in Wolverhampton in 1927, where appeals to ratepayers 
over potentially high council spending under Labour could also be made. For parliamentary elections 
the one party approach of the National Party in the 1930s can be seen to have had a similar impact. 
Given Labour's high percentage of the vote but rather low success rate in the form of MIs in several 
inter-war parliamentary elections, the presence of only one opposing candidate was a major factor in 
restraining Labour in the region during the inter-war years. It helped the Conservatives to retain a large 
proportion of the working-class vote so that by the end of this period it was they rather than Labour, 
who were in the predominant electoral position. 
It is difficult to estimate the effect that unemployment had on voting habits. Labour seemed to 
perform best when the economy was strong as in 1918 and to a certain extent in 1929. At other times 
fear of unemployment seems to have led many workers to took to the apparent economic security 
offered by Conservative tariff policies. This seems to have been a major factor for the support given to 
them in the 1930s in the form of the National Government. One problem for Labour was that nationally 
the party took time to develop an effective policy for dealing with unemployment, 
The third aim of this thesis was to compare the strength of the Labour Party in the Black Country 
with that in Birmingham and in the nation as a whole. The impact on Birmingham politics of the 
strength of Unionism during the inter-war years has already been considered. There was a significant 
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economic factor behind this. The persistence of small-scale workplaces in workshops and factories 
encouraged a common interest between employer and employed. This was less evident in the Black 
Country although here too there were small-scale workplaces. The difference was that much of the 
work here tended to be semi or unskilled with lower pay rates than in Birmingham. There was less 
workplace collaboration and more scope for confrontation as can be seen in the rash of strikes, which 
affected the region in the period around the First World War. The uniqueness of the Black Country lay 
in the distinctive nature of much of its employment, which encouraged a parochial attitude as well as a 
sense of community. The survival, for instance, of Liberalism in industrial Wolverhampton East 
exemplifies this situation. It meant that parts of the region were relatively isolated from many of the 
trends and attitudes affecting both the national situation and nearby Birmingham. The distinctiveness of 
the Labour Party in the Black Country can be seen in its performance in all the inter-war General 
Elections with the exception of that of 1929. 
This thesis has been able to advance the historiography of the Labour Party on a number of issues 
which historians have disputed. Where this has happened reference has been made here and in the 
conclusions to each chapter. On one overriding issue, however, this thesis has shown that contrary to 
many assumptions Labour was a major force throughout he Black Country during the inter-war years. 
It has challenged the idea that the region was simply an extension of Chamberlain's Birmingham. 
Whilst it is true that the party's performance here during the 1930s prevented it from becoming a 
'Labour heartland', the figures show that Labour was winning solid support from at least two-fifths of 
the electorate throughout he period. By illustrating the distinctive nature of Black Country politics, it 




TABLE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS IN THE BLACK COUNTRY BETWEEN THE 
WARS 
1.1918 GENERAL ELECTION 
DUDLEY 
Electors 26,103 
Sir A. S. T. Griffith-Boscawen (Coalition Con) 9,126 60.2% 
W. B. Steer (Lab) 6,046 398. °lß 
3,080 20.4% 
Turnout 60.4% 
KINGSW_JNFORD (STAFFS. ) 
Electors 37,924 
C. H. Sitch (Lab) 10,397 47.6% 
A. E. Beck (Con) 7,509 34.4% 





J. E. Davison (Lab) 9,389 52.2% 
Miss C. Pankhurst (Coalition Women's Party) 8.614 4Z 80/ 
775 4.4% 
Turnout 54.7% 
STOURBRIDGE (WORCS. ) 
Electors 42,205 
J. W. Wilson (Lib) 8,920 38.5% 
Miss M. MacArthur (Lab) 7,587 32.7% 





Sir R. A. Cooper (Coalition National Party) 14,491 52.3% 
J. Thickett (Lab) 8,336 30.0% 
W. H. Brown (Lib) 4,914 I!, 




A. Short (Lab) 11,341 49.8% 
A. W. Maconochie (Coalition Con) 10,464 45.9% 





F. O. Roberts (Lab) 11,572 54.0% 






T. E. Hickman (Coalition Con) 10,343 60.5% 





G. R. Thorne (Lib) 7,660 51.8% 





A. F. Bird (Coalition Con) 13,329 56.8% 
A. G. Walkden (Lab) 10.158 43.2% 
3,171 13.6% 
Turnout 63.3% 
2. BY-ELECTIONS 1918-22 
DUDLEY 3 March 1921 
Electors 25,305 
J. Wilson (Lab) 10,244 50.7% 





Sir R. B. Bird (Coalition Con) 
A. G. Walkden (Lab) 
7 March 1922 
16,790 54.9% 
13.799 j LM 
2,991 9.8% 
Turnout 80.0% 
3.1922 GENERAL ELECTION 
DUDLEY 
Electors 25,923 
C. E. Lloyd (Con) 12,876 60.2% 
J. Wilson (Lab) 8522 39 8 
4,354 20.4% 
Turnout 82.5% 
KINGSWINFORD (STAFFS. ) 
Electors 39,306 
C. H. Sitch (Lab) 15,232 51.6% 






J. E. Davison (Lab) 13,141 50.7% 







D. P. Pielou (Con) 18,200 51.8% 





P. Collins (Lib) 14,674 38.6% 
Lady Cooper (Con) 14,349 37.8% 





A. Short (Lab) 16,087 50.2% 




F. O. Roberts (Lab) 14,210 50.6% 
H. E. Parkes (Con) 11,263 40.1% 




C. K. Howard-Bury (Con) 12,297 54.2% 





G. R. Thorne (Lib) 11,577 45.9% 
C. H. Pinson (Con) 9,410 37.3% 
W. T. A. Foot (Lab) 3,076 12.2% 





R. B. Bird (Con) 17,738 53.9% 







C. E. Lloyd (Con) 10,227 60.2% 
F. J. Ballard (Lib) 8,510 41.1% 
R. F. Smith (Lab) 1.958 S° 
1,718 8.3% 
Turnout 78.8% 
KINGSWINFORD ( STAFFS .) Electors 40,045 
C. H. Sitch (Lab) 15,174 49.5% 
W. H. Webb (Con) 10,862 35.4% 





J. E. Davison (Lab) 13,550 54.7% 
C. E. R. Brocklebank (Con) 11.217 453% 
2,333 9.4% 
Turnout 71.7% 
STOURBRIDGE ( WORCS. )
Electors 47,241 
D. P. Pielou (Con) 14,764 39.8% 
H. E. Palfrey (Lib) 13,269 35.8% 





P. Collins (Lib) 
S. K. Lewis (Con) 








A. Short (Lab) 17,810 51.5% 





F. O. Roberts (Lab) 12,910 44.8% 
H. E. Parkes (Con) 11,146 38.7% 




WOLVERHAMTON BIL STON 
Electors 32,670 
C. K. Howard-Bury (Con) 10,186 41.6% 
J. Baker (Lab) 9,085 37.1% 




G. R. Thorne (Lib) was returned unopposed. 
WOLVERHAMPTON WEST 
Electors 39,941 
Sir R. B. Bird (Con) 15,990 50.4% 






C. E. Lloyd (Con) 11,199 52.1% 
O. R. Baldwin (Lab) 10.314 
885 4.2% 
Turnout 80.2% 
KINGSWINFORD (STAFFS. ) 
Electors 40,470 
C. H. Sitch (Lab) 17,235 51.5% 




J. E. Davison (Lab) 14,491 52.3% 
M. J. Pike (Con) 13.238 4 
1,253 4.6% 
Turnout 78.2% 
STOURBRIDGE (WOR CS. ) 
Electors 48,466 
D. P. Pielou (Con) 16,023 39.5% 
W. Wellock (Lab) 14,113 34.8% 





W. Preston (Con) 15,168 37.9% 
P. Collins (Lib) 12,734 31.8% 
G. L. R. Small (Lab) 11,474 28.7% 






A. Short (Lab) 18,170 50.5% 





F. O. Roberts (Lab) 15,384 51.6% 





J. Baker (Lab) 14,583 53.2% 





G. R. Thorne (Lib) 11,066 42.1% 
Sir T. G. Strangman (Con) 10,013 38.1% 





Su R. B. Bird (Con) 17,886 51.2% 
W. J. Brown (Lab) 17.046 48.8% 
840 2.4% 
Turnout 85.9% 
6. BY-ELECTIONS 1924-1929 
WALSALL 27 February 1925 
Electors 46,407 
W. Preston (Con) 14,793 38.2% 
T. J. MacNamara (Lib) 12,300 31.8% 
G. L. R. Small (Lab) 11.610 0 0° 
2,493 6.4% 
Turnout 83.4% 
SMETHWICK 21 December 1926 
Electors 35,862 
O. E. Mosley (Lab) 16,077 57.1% 
M. J. Pike (Con) 9,495 33.7% 




STOURBRIDGE (WO RCS. ) 
Electors 49,587 
W. Wellock (Lab) 16,561 41.9% 
H. C. Hogbin (Con) 13,462 34.0% 
A. J. G. Edwards (Lib) 9.535 41° 
3,099 7.9% 
Turnout 79.8% 
7.1929 GENERAL ELECTION 
DUDLE 
Electors 34,883 
O. R. Baldwin (Lab) 13,551 47.6% 
C. E. Lloyd (Con) 10,508 36.9% 
T. I. Clough (Lib) 4.399 1 
3,043 10.7% 
Turnout 81.6% 
KINGSWINFORD (STAFFS. ) 
Electors 53,530 
C. H. Sitch (Lab) 22,479 53.2% 
S. E. Garcke (Con) 12,151 28.7% 





Sir O. E. Mosley (Lab) 19,550 54.8% 
A. R. Wise (Con) 12,210 34.2% 
Miss M. E. Marshall (Lib) 3.909 11,0% 
7,340 20.6% 
Turnout 78.9% 
STOURBRIDGE (WORCS. ) 
Electors 66,145 
W. Wellock (Lab) 21,343 38.4% 
Sir H. S. Reed (Con) 17,675 31.8% 





J. J. McShane (Lab) 20,524 39.6% 
W. Preston (Con) 15,818 30.6% 






A. Short (Lab) 22,420 50.1% 
H. Rubin (Con) 17,089 38.1% 
J. H. Stockdale (Lib) 5,249 11.7% 





F. O Roberts (Lab) 19,621 52.1% 
J. I. Chesshire (Con) 10,943 29.0% 
W. Ramage (Lib) 7.119 18.9% 
8,678 23.1% 
Turnout 83.1% 
WOLVERHAMPTON BILST ON 
Electors 43,093 
J. Baker (Lab) 18,679 50.7% 
S. J. Thompson (Con) 13,635 37.1% 





G. M. Mander (Lib) 15,391 44.8% 
P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn (Con) 10,163 29.5% 





W. J. Brown (Lab) 21,103 49.1% 
Sir R. B. Brown (Con) 17,237 40.2% 
G. H. Roberts (Lib) 4.580 1 
3,866 8.9% 
Turnout 84.1% 
8 1931 GENERAL ELECTION 
DUDLEY 
Electors 34,818 
D. J. B. Joel (Con) 16,009 56.9% 
W. Hadgkiss (Lab) 1 05 ALM 
3,904 13.6% 
Turnout 80.7% 
KINGSWINFORD (STAFFS. ) 
Electors 55,138 
A. L. S. Todd (Con) 21,934 52.9% 






A. R. Wise (Con) 20,945 60.1% 
W. E. Lawrence (Lab) 13.927 22_9% s 
7,018 20.2% 
Turnout 74.7% 
STOURBRIDGE M RCS. ) 
Electors 70,324 
R. H. Morgan (Con) 22,652 39.3% 
W. Wellock (Lab) 18,910 32.8% 





J. A. Leckie (National Lib) 30,507 56.0% 





Viscount Ednam (Con) 25,000 54.5% 





A. Ramsay (Con) 17,729 45.7% 
F. O. Roberts (Lab) 17,204 44.4% 
W. Ramage (Lib) 3.851 92° 
525 1.3% 
Turnout 81.7% 
WOLVERHAMPTO N BILSTON 
Electors 46,045 
G. K. Peto (Con) 20,620 55.0% 





G. M. Mander (Lib) 14,945 44.1% 
A. T. Waters-Taylor (Con) 12,628 37.2% 







Sir R. B. Bird (Con) 26,181 60.5% 




9. BY-ELECTIONS 1931-35 
WEDNESBURY 26 July 1932 
Electors 51,498 
J. W. Banfield (Lab) 21,977 54.7% 
R. G. Davis (Con) 18.198 AM 
3,779 9.4% 
Turnout 78.0% 
10,193 5 GENERAL ELECTION 
DUDLEY 
Electors 33,823 
D. J. B. Joel (Con) 13,958 54.8% 
W. W. Benn (Lab) 11-509 
2,449 9.6% 
Turnout 75.3% 
KINGSWINFORD ( STAFFS. )
Electors 58,490 
A. Henderson (Lab) 20,925 50.0% 





A. R. Wise (Con) 16,575 52.5% 
Dr. C. W. Brock (Lab) 15.023 4 
1,552 5.0% 
Turnout 70.7% 
STOURBRIDGE (WORCS. ) 
Electors 80,598 
R. H. Morgan (Con) 24,898 39.3% 
W. Wellock (Lab) 19,597 32.8% 





J. A. Leckie (National Lib) 28,563 57.5% 
W. Graham (Lab) 19,594 39.5% 





J. W. Banfield (Lab) 22,683 53.3% 






F. O. Roberts (Lab) 19,113 51.3% 





I. C. Hannah (Con) 18,689 51.2% 





G. M. Mander (Lib) 15,935 48.5% 
J. L. Brockhouse (Con) 11,935 36.3% 
HE. Lane (Lab) 4.985 15 2° 
4,000 12.2% 
Turnout 73.3% 
WOLVERHAMPTON W EST 
Electors 49,537 
Sir R. B. Bird (Con) 19,697 54.9% 
W. J. Brown (ILA) 14,867 41.4% 
Rev. R. Lee (Lab) 325 3 
4,830 13.5% 
Turnout 72.4% 
11. BY-ELECTIONS 1935-39 
WALSALL 16 November 1938 
Electors 66,226 
Sir G. E. Schuster (National Lib) 30,507 56.0% 
G. Jeger (Lab) 21 .. 5 2 42.9% 7,158 14.2% 
Turnout 75.9% 
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TABLE B. TOTAL LABOUR VOTE AND ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE WHOLE VOTE IN 








LABOUR % OF THE 
TOTAL VOTE IN 
CONTESTED SEATS 
1918 9 81,570 42.8% 
1922 9 104,79A 41.0% 
1923 9 102,293 37.8% 
1924 10 137.998 43.3% 
1929 10 188 110 45.8% 
1931 10* 166,712 40.1% 
1935 11* 167,441 42.8% 
* Includes ILA candidate in Wolverhampton West 
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TABLE C. GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS IN BIRMINGHAM BETWEEN THE WARS 
1.1918 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 35,443 
E. Cecil (Coalition Con) 9,997 62.4% 
J. W. Banfield (Lab) 4,451 27.8% 





J. W. Dennis (Coalition Con) 9,495 82.7% 





E. Hallas (Coalition NDP) 8,796 79.4% 





Sir F. W. Lowe (Coalition Con) 13,565 76.4% 





Sir A. H. D. R. Steel-Maitland (Coalition Con) 12,678 66.0% 
A. E. Eyton (Ind Lab) 5,211 27.1% 
R. H. E. H. Somerset (Lib) 1.329 6 °/Q 
7,467 38.9% 
Turnout 56.1% 
HAND S WORTH 
Electors 37,254 
E. C Meysey-Thompson (Coalition Con) 12,019 56.4% 
N. Tiptaft (IndO 4,697 22.1% 
H. J. Odell (Ind Lab) 4.576 2L 5% 
7,322 34.3% 
Turnout 57.2% 
KING. S NORTON 
Electors 27,117 
Sir H. Austin (Coalition Con) 8,809 54.5% 
T. Hackett (Co-op) 4,917 30.4% 






A. N. Chamberlain (Coalition Con) 9,405 69.5% 
J. W. Kneeshaw (Lab) 2,572 19.0% 





Sir H. Rogers (Coalition Con) 16,161 69.2% 
Dr. R. Dunstan (Lab) 3,789 16.2% 





L. C. M. S. Amery (Coalition Con) 15,225 78.1% 
F. Spires (Co-op) 3,014 15.5% 




J. A. Chamberlain (Coalition Con) unopposed 
YARDLEY 
Electors 36,575 
A. R. Jephcott (Coalition Con) 10,960 56.3% 
G. Shann (Lab) 7,466 38.3% 
G. Jackson (Lib) 1.049 5.40 
3,494 18.0% 
Turnout 53.2% 
2.1922 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 36,113 
Sir E. Cecil (Con) 15,913 60.8% 





J. S. Crooke (Con) 11,700 48.9% 
F. Longden (Lab) 6,892 28.8% 





Sir E. V. Hiley (Con) 13,091 61.1% 





Sir F. W. Lowe (Con) unopposed 
Sir A. H. D. R. Steel-Maitland (Con) unopposed 
HANDS WORTH 
Electors 38,164 
O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) 18,859 59.6% 





Sir H. Austin (Con) 8,870 41.6% 
Mrs E. Barton (Lab/Co-op) 7,017 32.8% 





A. N. Chamberlain (Con) 13,032 55.2% 




P. J. H. Hannon (Con) unopposed 
Hanson returned unopposed in a by-election 4/3/1921 
SPARKBROOK 
Electors 37,918 
L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 13,326 49.5% 
T. F. Duggan (Lib) 7,283 27.1% 





J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 15,405 61.6% 





A. R. Jephcott (Con) 15,586 58.1% 




3.1923 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 36,416 
Sir E. Cecil (Con) 13,291 56.2% 
P. Bower (Lab) 7,541 31.8% 





J. S. Crooke (Con) 12,015 56.1% 





J. B. Burman (Con) 11,712 59.6% 
G. F. Sawyer (Lab) 7,309 37.2% 
A. Ford (Ind) 634 




Sir F. W. Lowe (Con) 15,459 72.2% 





Sir A. H. D. R. Maitland (Con) 14,683 66.0% 




O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) unopposed 
KING'S NORTON 
Electors 29,652 
Sir H. Austin (Con) 9,545 43.4% 
Mrs E. Barton (Lab/Co-op) 6,743 30.7% 





A. N. Chamberlain (Con) 12,884 53.2% 




M SQ ELEY 
Electors 43,642 
P. J. H. Hannon (Con) 19,628 71.3% 





L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 13,523 56.0% 
E. W. Hampton (Lab) 5,948 24.6% 





J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 16,862 58.3% 





A. R. Jephcott (Con) 13,300 53.5% 
A. G. Gossling (Lab) 11,562 46 5° o 
1,738 7.0% 
Turnout 64.4% 
4.1924 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 36,391 
Sir E. Cecil (Con) 14,244 54.6% 





J. S. Crooke (Con) 13,552 51.5% 





J. B. Burman (Con) 11,407 51.2% 





Sir F. W. Lowe (Con) 18,822 76.6% 






Sir A. H. D. R. Steel-Maitland (Con) 16,754 59.5% 





O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) 20,056 65.6% 





R. Dennison (Lab) 10,497 43.3% 
Sir H. Austin (Con) 10,364 42.8% 





A. N. Chamberlain (Con) 13,374 49.1% 
O. E. Mosley (Lab) 13,297 48.9% 





P. J. H. Hannon (Con) 24,333 77.2% 





L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 15,718 58.1% 
S. B. M. Potter (Lab) 9,759 36.1% 





J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 14,801 67.4% 





A. R. Jephcott (Con) 16,149 53.2% 




5.1929 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 45,687 
E. J. St. L. Strachey (Lab) 18,672 52.2% 





F. Longden (Lab/Co-op) 16,932 50.7% 
J. S. Crooke (Con) 14,165 42.5% 





G. F. Sawyer (Lab) 18,204 61.0% 





AN Chamberlain (Con) 23,350 63.7% 
W. H. D. Caple (Lab) 8,590 23.4% 





C. J. Simmons (Lab) 20,665 43.5% 
Sir A. H. D. R. Steel-Maitland (Con) 20,532 43.1% 





O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) 22,035 53.9% 
L. A. Fenn (Lab) 11,959 29.3% 





L. Beaumont-Thomas (Con) 14,465 42.0% 
R. Dennison (Lab) 13,937 40.6% 






W. Whiteley (Lab) 16,447 50.0% 





P. J. H. Hannon (Con) 33,820 56.8% 
Dr F. G. Bushnell (Lab) 15,733 26.4% 
A. M. Meek (Lib) 9,398 15.7% 
G. Brigden (Ind Lab) 675 
-m 18,087 30.4% 
SPARKBROOK 
Electors 47,041 
L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 15,867 46.2% 
A. Young (Lab) 12,875 37.4% 





Sir J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 16,862 50.1% 





A. G. Gossling (Lab) 
E. W. Salt (Con) 






6.1931 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 44,123 
A. O. J. Hope (Con) 22,959 70.8% 
T. J. May (Lab) 6,212 19.2% 





J. S. Crooke (Con) 21,684 66.0% 






O. E. Simmonds (Con) 16,332 61.1% 
G. F. Sawyer (Lab) 9,789 36.6% 
B. Moore (Com) 327 1.2% 





A. N. Chamberlain (Con) 33,085 86.5% 





J. F. Eales (Con) 35,672 68.1% 





O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) 30,989 78.4% 
L. A. Fenn (Lab) 8-548 21,60 
_g 22,441 56.8% 
Turnout 75.1 % 
KINGS NORT 
Electors 47,399 
L. Beaumont-Thomas (Con) 22,063 57.5% 
G. R. Mitchison (Lab) 11,016 28.7% 




G. W. Lloyd (Con) 23,057 71.8% 





P. J. H. Hannon (Con) 53,041 79.8% 
F. G. Lloyd (Lab) 13.39 20.20/ ý
---A 36,642 59.6% 
Turnout 72.1 % 
SPARKBROOK 
Electors 46,073 
L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 23,517 73.4% 






Sir J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 22,448 68.1% 





E. W. Salt (Con) 32,061 65.2% 
A. G. Gossling (Lab) 16,640 33.8% 
E. J. Bartleet (NP) 479 
15,421 31.4% 
Turnout 76.7% 
7.193 5 GENERAL ELECTION 
ASTON 
Electors 42,527 
A. O. J. Hope (Con) 
R. P. Messel (Lab) 
18,933 68.8% 





J. S. Crooke (Con) 14,925 59.5% 
F. Longden (Lab/Co-op) 10.14 




O. E. Simmonds (Con) 12,146 57.8% 





AN Chamberlain (Con) 28,243 81.6% 





J. F. E ales (Con) 27,716 58.3% 
C. J. Simmons (Lab) 17,757 37.4% 
H. C. Bell (Ind) 2.050 





O. S. Locker-Lampson (Con) 24,135 73.0% 





J. R. H. Cartland (Con) 24,559 56.8% 





G. W. Lloyd (Con) 18,565 71.7% 





P. J. H. Hannon (Con) 43,885 71.4% 





L. C. M. S. Amery (Con) 17,509 68.5% 





Sir J. A. Chamberlain (Con) 16,530 64.3% 





E. W. Salt (Con) 25,717 57.7% 
C. Jarman (Lab) 18.87 9 42.3° 
6,838 15.4% 
Turnout 65.2% 
S. BY-ELECTIONS 1935-9 
ERDINGT 20 October 1936 
Electors 74,038 
J. A. C. Wright (Con) 27,068 56.5% 




WEST B 29 April 1937 
Electors 39,600 
W. F. Higgs (Con) 12,552 56.6% 
R. H. S. Crossman (Lab) 9.632 41ý4Oý. 
2,920 13.2% 
Turnout 56.0% 
ASTON 17 May 1939 
Electors 40,308 
E. O. Kellett (Con) 12,023 66.3% 
Dr S. Segal (Lab) 6.12 2 ý33 7 OY, 5,901 32.6% 
Turnout 450% 
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TABLE D. TOTAL LABOUR VOTE AND ITS PERCENTAGE OF THE WHOLE VOTE IN 








LABOUR % OF THE 
TOTAL VOTE IN 
CONTESTED SEATS 
1918 9* 35,996 24.5% 
1922 8 70,251 36.0% 
1923 9 77,386 37.0% 
1924 1 118,103 39.6% 





126,702 26.9% 1 1935 72 140,293 -1 33.8% 
* Includes Independent Labour and Co-op candidates. 
# Includes Independent Labour candidate at Moseley. 
Communist candidates not included with Labour vote. 
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TABLE E. MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS 1919-38 
121 
DUDLEY 
3 Seats contested 
Labour won 2, gaining 2. fromProgressives / Coalition 
SMETHWICK 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Independents 
Independents gained 1. 
WALSALL 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Conservatives. 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2 gaining 1. 
WEST BROMWICH 
7 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I 
independents gained 1. 
WOLVERHANVT 
8 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Liberals I from Conservatives and I from Independents, 
Progressives gained 2 from Conservatives. 
Birmingham Gazette 3 November1919. 
1920 
DUDLEY 
6 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour gained 2 from Liberals 
Liberals gained I from Labour. 
SMETHWICK 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour gained I from Coalition Unionists 
Coalition Unionists gained I from Labour. 
STOURBRIDGE 
6 Seats contested 
No Change - Independents retain all seats from Labour. 
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WALSALL 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour gained 2 seats from Conservatives. 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Conservatives gained 2 from Labour. 
WESTBROMWIC 
2 Seats contested 
Labour gained 2 seats from Independents. 
WOLVERHAMPTO 
8 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour gained 2 from Liberal and Conservative 
Liberals gained I from Labour 
Independents gained I from Labour. 
Birmingham Gazette 2 November 1920. 
1921 
DUDLEY 
8 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining 2 from Independents 
Independents gained 2 
Conservatives gained I 
SMETIMCK 
6 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining 3 from Coalition 
Coalition gained I from Labour 
STOURBRID 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 0 
Independents gained 2 
WALS 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2 
Unemployed Association gained I 
Anti-Waste gained I 
WEDNESB 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won I 
Conservatives gained I from Labour 
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WESTBROMWIC 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 2 
Independents gained I 
Liberals gained I 
WOLVERHANVTO 
5 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining 3 
Independents gained I from the Conservatives 
Bimingham- Gazett 2 November 1921 
1922 
D 
6 Seats contested 
Labour won 1 
4 No Change 
Independents gained I from Labour 
Conservatives gained I from Labour 
SMETHWIC 
6 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 3 
STOURBRIDGE 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won I 
Independents gained 2 from Labour 
WALS 
5 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
Ratepayer Coalition gained 2 from Labour 
Independents gained I from Labour 
WEDNESBURY 
3 Seats contested 
Labour won 0 
Conservatives gained 3 from Labour 
VVEST BROMWIC 
I Seat contested 
I No Change 
Labour won I 
WOLVERHAAVT 
8 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 2 
Conservatives gained 2 from Labour and Independents 




5 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won I 
Conservatives gained 2 from Labour 
SNJETHWIC 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3 
Conservatives gained I from Labour 
STOURBRIDGE 
6 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won I 
WALSALL- 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won I 
Ratepayers gained I from Labour 
WEDNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 1 
WESTBROMWICH 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Independents gained I from Labour 
WOLVERHAWT 
7 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 2 seats, gaining I 
Birmingham Gazette 2 November 1923. 
1924 
PJJDLEY 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
Liberals gained I from Conservatives 
SMETRWICK 
5 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Conservatives 
Conservatives gained 2 from Labour 
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WALSALL 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
Conservatives gained I from Labour 
WEDNESB 
2 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
WEST BROMWIC 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Independents 
WOLVERHAMPT 
4 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining 1 from Conservatives 
Conservatives gained I from Labour 
irmingham Gazette 3 November 1924. 
1925 
DUDLEY 
8 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Conservatives 
Ratepayers gained I from Conservatives 
SMETHWICK 
5 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining I from Conservatives 
STOURBRIDGE 
2 Seats contested 
No Change 
Labour won I 
WALML 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Ratepayers 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won I, gaining I from Conservatives 
WEST BROMWICH 
3 Seats contested 
No Change 
Labour won 1 
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WOLVERHAWT 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Independents 
irmingham Gazette 3 November 1925. 
1926 
DUD-L-EY 
9 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining 4 from Conservatives 
SMETHWICK 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining 2 from Liberals and Conservatives 
STOURBRIDGE 
6 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 0 
WALS 
5 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 2 
WE NESBURY a] 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Conservatives 
WEST BROM-MC 
0 Seats contested 
WOLVERHAWTON 
0 Seats contested due to a borough extension 
13irmingham Gazette 2 November 1926. 
1927 
WOLVERHAMPTON 
All 13 seats contested with 3 candidates 
Labour won 12, Anti-Socialists won 27. 
Express and St 23 March 1927. 
DIMLEY 
9 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 5, gaining 3 from Conservatives and I from Independents 
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SNIETHWICK 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I 
STOURBRID 
6 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 0 
WALSALL 
2 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Conservatives 
WEMMSB 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2 
WEST BROMWIC 
5 Seats contested 
4 No change 
Labour won 3, losing I to Liberals 
Birmingham Gazett 2 November 1927. 
1928 
DUDLEY 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Conservatives 
SMETHWIC 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 3 
STOURBRIDGE 
4 Seats contested 
No Change 
Labour won I 
WALSALL 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0, losing I to Independents 
WE DNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Independents 
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WOL-V-ERHAWTO 
8 Seats contested 
7 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Independents 
Bimingham Gazette 2 November 1928. 
1929 
DUDLEY 
7 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 3 
SMETHWI 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining I from Independents 
STOURBRID9E- 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining 2 from Independents 
WaSALL 
2 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Conservatives 
WESTBROMWIC 
3 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Liberals and losing I to Liberals 
WOLVERHAWTO 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Anti-Socialists 
Birmingham Gazette 2 November 1929. 
1930 
DUDLEY 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Liberals 
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SMETHWICK 
7 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing 2 to Conservatives 
STOURBRID 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 0 
WALSALL 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0, losing I to Independents 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Conservatives 
WESTBROMWIC 
2 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 0, losing I to Independents 
WOLVERHAVEPT 
3 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I and losing 1 to Conservatives 
Birmingham Gazette 3 November 1930 
1931 
SMETHWIC 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing 2 to Conservatives 
STOURBRIDGE 
2 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
WALSALL 
5 Seats contested 
Labour won 4 
WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Conservatives 
WEST BROMWIC 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 




10 Seats contested 
9 No Change 
Labour won 7, gaining 2 from Conservatives 
SMETHWICK 
8 Seats contested 
7 No Change 
Labour won 6, gaining I from Conservatives 
WALS 
5 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining I from Independents 
WE DNESB 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 3 
WESTBROMWICH 
3 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2 
WOLVERHANUT 
7 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3, losing 2 to ELA 
ELA won 2, gaining 2 
Birmingham Gazett 2 November 1932 
1933 
BILSTONN 
First election for municipal borough 
15 Seats available 
Labour won 2 unopposed 
DUD 
9 Seats contested 
8 No Change 
Labour won 5, gaining I from Conservatives 
SMETHWICK 
6 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining 2 from Conservatives 
WALS 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Independents 
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WEDNESB 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I from Conservatives 
WESTBROMWIC 
5 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Independents 
WOLVERHAMPT 
5 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 0 
Trade Unions gained I from Conservatives 




2 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
DIM-LEY 
10 Seats contested 
8 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing 2 to Conservatives 
ROWLEY REGIS 
8 Seats contested 
7 No Change 
Labour won 4, gaining I from Independents 
SMETHWICK 
6 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won I 
STOURBRID 
2 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I 
WALSALL 
5 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3 
WEDNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining 2 from Ratepayers 
WESTBROMWI 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3 
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WOLVERHAMPT 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
ILA gained I from an Independent 




I Seat contested 
I No Change 
Labour won I 
DUDLEY 
8 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3, losing 3 to Conservatives 
OLDB 
First election as municipal borough 
21 Seats available 
Labour won 5 Independents won 16 
ROWLEY REGIS 
8 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining 2 from Independents and losing 2 to Independents 
SMETHWICK 
8 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 4, losing I to Conservatives and I to Independents 
STOURBRIDGE 
5 Seats contested 
5 No Change 




5 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Independents 
WEDNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 3 
WEST BROMWIC 
2 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 2, gaining I 
424 
WOLVERHAMPT 
8 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Conservatives 
ILA won 1, losing I to Independents 





8 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3, losing 3 to Conservatives 
OLDB 
3 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won I 
ROWLEY REGIS 
8 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 6, gaining 3 
SMETHWICK 
6 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Conservatives and losing 2 to Independents and Conservatives 
STOURBRIDGE 
5 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Independents and losing I to Independents 
WALSALL 
4 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2 
NESBL WE, D TRY 
4 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 0, losing I to Conservatives and 2 to Independents 
WEST BROMWIC 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Independents 
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WOLVERHAMPT 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2 
ILA won 1, gaining I from Independents 
Birmingham Gazette 3 November 1936. 
1937 
BILSION 
3 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I 
DUDLE 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 0, losing I 
OLDB 
2 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 0 
ROWLEY REGIS 
8 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 0, losing 2 to Independents 
SMETHWICK 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Independents 
STOU-RBRIDGE 
5 Seats contested 
4 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Independents 
WALS 
3 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 3, including I unofficial Labour 
WEDNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 1, losing I to Conservatives and I to Independent Ratepayers 
WESTBROMWIC 
4 Seats contested 
2 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining from Independents and losing I to Independents 
426 
WQLVERHAI-APT 
5 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 3 
HA won I 
Birmingham Gazett 2 November 1937 
1938 
BILSION 
I Seat contested 
I No change 
Labour won I 
DUDLEY 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Conservatives 
OLDB 
2 Labour and 5 Independents unopposed 
ROWLEY REGIS 
7 Seats contested 
6 No Change 
Labour won 3, gaining I from Independents 
SMETLMCK 
6 Seats contested 
5 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Conservatives 
STOURBRIDG 
5 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Independents and losing I to Independents 
TIPT 
First election for municipal borough 
9 Seats contested 
Labour won 3, Independents won 6 
WALSALL 
2 Seats contested 
I No Change 
Labour won 1, gaining I 
WEDNESBURY 
4 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won 2, losing I to Independents 
WESTBROMWIC 
2 Seats contested 
I No change 
Labour won 1, gaining I from Independents 
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WOLVERHANDTO 
3 Seats contested 
3 No Change 
Labour won I 
Birmingham Ga ette 2 November 193 8. 
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TABLEF INDIVIDUAL LABOUR PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE BLACKCOUNTRY--1918-- 
1927 
Figures are the total subscriptions for individual members. The minimum was L1110. Those who could 
not meet this total were not given a figure. Members were expected to pay an annual fee of 2d. 
piay 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 
Dudley 11/10 f6/10/8 LIM 11/10 11/10 
Kingswinford -- fl/lo Lillo Lillo 
. 
Smethwick Plio --- ... ... LIM 
Stourbridge Lillo Lillo LIM L1110 
Walsall V110 L2/15 D/6/8 L31619 L2110 
Wednesbury Lillo V110 Lillo ... 
W. Bromwich LIM LIM .. ... 
Wolv. Bilston I L1110 I L1110 L1110 
Wolv. East I Lillo 1111E= 11/10 
Wolv. West L7/10* D 1. D Lillo I L111314 
Party 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 
Dudley Lillo 13/6/8 -- - 
Kingswinford 11/10 
Smethwick MAO 11/10 Lillo L2/15/10 L2/1 0 
Stourbridge LIM 12 12/10 L41314 1413/4 
Walsall LIM LIM Lillo D Lillo 
Wednesbury L1110 Lillo B/12 Lillo 
W. Bromwich 11/10 Lillo Lillo L2/1 Lillo 
Wolv. Bilston D/10 fl/lo 11/10 1 L12 
. 
15/10 
I. Wolv. East I L1110 Lillo Lillo 1 11/10 
I Wolv. West 111/10 Lillo L2110 L211 0 1 L211 0 
The Wolverhampton East Constituency Party was not set op at this time. Hence figure is a 
combined total for East and West. 
Labour Party Annual Report 1919-1928. 
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TABLE G INDIVIDUAL LABOUR PARTY MENIEBERSHIP IN THE BLACK COUMY 1928. 
39 
Party 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
Dudley -- - 240 880 1561 
Kingswinford 180 378 340 713 1454 
Smethwick 240 240 240 240 590 
Stourbridge 600 930 1010 1079 1519 
Walsall 300 180 340 360 760 
Wednesbury -- ISO 508 461 777 
W. Bromwich 42 180 240 358 710 
Woly. Bilston 700 660 240 750 774 
Wolv. East 180 180 240 240 240 
Woly. West 300 300 650 400 381 
Party 1933 1934 1935 
M- W Total M w Total m W Total 
Dudley_ 489 488 977 346 406 752 239 275 514 
Kingswinford 277 546 
_823 
259- 360 619 263 475 738 
Smethwick 291 326 617 260 285 545 231 304 535 
Stourbridge 578 722 1300 406 594 1000 439 536 975 
Walsall 353 307 660 248 211 1 459 365 276 641 
Wednesbury 349 798 1147 363 494 857 381 592 973 
West Bromwich 550 1 600 1150 430 420 850 271 346 617 
Wolv. Bilston 276 1 401 677 445 550 995 325 438 763 
Wolv. East 220 64 284 190 50 -240 120 . 120 240 
Wolv, West 1., 8 104 1 163 1 267 
t 
132 1 Al 294 
Party 1936 1937 1938 
mI W Total M w Total m W Total 
Dudley 250 250 500 140 100 240 120 120 240 
Kingswinford 365_ 550 915 356 377 733 356 377 733 
Smethwick 227 247 474 196 208 404 175 291 466 
Stourbridge 475 525 1000 325 375 1 _ 700 410 1 430 840 
Walsall 238 244 482 161 143 303 129 127 256 
Wednesbury 307 355 662 140 221 361 200 212 412 
West Bromwich 118 185 303 360 460 820 224 323 547 
Wolv. Bilston 232 415 647 513 195 708 220 321 1 541 








West Bromwich 444 
Wolv. Bilston 750 
Wolv. East 240 
Wolv. West 310 
Labour Party Annual Report 1929-1940. 
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TABLE IL INDIVIDUAL LABOUR PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN BMMINGHAM 1928-39 
Party 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
Aston - 396 400 371 317 
Deritend 117 ISO 360 280 470 
Duddeston 152 168 240 240 282 
Edgbaston 180_ 710 490 460 
Erdington 180 180 782 507 939 
Handsworth 336 322 491 475 435 
King's Norton 630 630 1002 936 1284 
Ladywood 330 350 493 322 850 
Moseley 180 180 755 667 1052 
Sparkbrook 180 283 382 251 339 
West Birm. 360 420 600 624 1054 
Yardley 600 600 1 610 440 448 
Party 1933 1934 1935 
m W Total m W Total m W Total 
Aston 177 143 320 186 118 304 200 120 320 
Deritend 228 167 395 136 137 273 138 138 276 
Duddeston 151 95 246 140 100 240 140 100 240 
Edgbaston 186 66 252 200 95 295 140 100 240 
Erdington 696 381 1077 653 324 977 590 275 865 
Handsworth 259 230 489 222 218 440 199 210 409 
King's Norton 724 558 1282 733 526 1259 961 626 1587 
Ladywood 295_ 333 628 189 249 438 193 263 456 
Moseley 597 229 826 444 203 647 470 314 784 
Sparkbrook 188 82 270 167 115 414 127 126 253 
West Birmingham 450 600 1050 390 460 850 351 442 793 
Yardley- 267 175 442 1 267 195 714 365 261 629'- 
Party 1936 1937 1938 
m W Total m W Total M W Total 
Aston 134 106 240 120 120 240 120 120 240 
Deritend 120 120 240 120 120 240 120 120 240 
Duddeston 140 100 240 140 100 240 144 144 288 
Edgbaston 120 120 240 195 195 390 136 141 1 277 
Erdington 737_ 359 
- 
1096 531 255 786 241 228 469 
Handsworth 179 1 9 -2 -3 71 177 174 351 172 166 338 
King's Norton 993 706 1699 1030 778 1808 1031 678 1709 
Ladywood 189 214 403 150 171 321 174 210 384 
Moseley 539 342 881 276 134 410 242 98 340 
Sparkbrook 157ý 
-1 
77 140 100 240 190 150 340 
West Birmingham 313 403 1 716 _ 235 300 535 245 330 575 
Yardley 358 221 ý7ý; 59 501 280 781 673 1 405 
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